People v. Hill

2026 IL App (3d) 250131

Opinion filed June 24, 2026

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2026

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court

ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit,

) Will County, Illinois,

Plaintiff-Appellee, )

) Appeal No. 3-25-0131

v. ) Circuit No. 23-CM-1315

)

RENITTA D. HILL, ) Honorable

) Sherri Hale,

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.

JUSTICE BERTANI delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Brennan and Anderson concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Defendant, Renitta D. Hill, appeals her conviction for resisting a peace officer, arguing that

the evidence was insufficient to find her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 The State charged defendant by criminal complaint with obstructing a peace officer (720

ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2022)) and two counts of resisting a peace officer (id.). The obstruction

charge alleged defendant obstructed a peace officer by refusing the officer’s order to stop and

move away from a residence. The two resisting counts alleged defendant (1) pulled her arms

away from the officer effectuating her arrest and (2) locked her legs and refused orders to enter

the squad car during her arrest.

¶4 At a bench trial, officer testimony and body camera video footage established that on

November 14, 2023, Village of University Park Police Chief Dale Mitchell and Sergeant Jason

Kinnan were assisting defendant with the enforcement of a court order to retrieve personal

property, which included a PlayStation 5 gaming system. A dispute arose when the occupant of

the residence, Terrance Summers, refused to relinquish the gaming system to defendant. As a

result of this dispute, defendant and Summers intermittently engaged in heated verbal exchanges

during the transfer of other property listed in the order. After loading the items into her vehicle,

defendant drove away from the residence.

¶5 Defendant returned moments later and stopped her vehicle in front of the residence as the

officers spoke with Summers in the driveway. Summers claimed he felt threatened, and Kinnan

asked if he would be willing to sign a complaint for disorderly conduct. Summers responded

affirmatively. Both officers testified that, after an individual has expressed his or her desire to

sign a criminal complaint, the subject of the complaint is usually arrested. Defendant informed

the officers that she intended to speak with the neighbors across the street and proceeded to pull

her vehicle into their driveway after Mitchell repeatedly warned her that she would be arrested if

she did not leave. Defendant then entered the neighbors’ residence. The officers were

subsequently allowed inside the residence, and defendant was arrested. Defendant pulled her

arms away as Kinnan attempted to place defendant in handcuffs.

¶6 During closing arguments, defense counsel discussed section 31-1(d) of the Criminal

Code of 2012 (Code), which states that “[a] person shall not be subject to arrest for resisting

arrest under this Section unless there is an underlying offense for which the person was initially

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subject to arrest.” Id. § 31-1(d). Counsel appears to have argued that section 31-1(d) required the

State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed a predicate offense for which

she was initially subject to arrest. Counsel asserted that the State had failed to meet this burden

because the evidence did not establish that defendant committed disorderly conduct or

obstruction of a peace officer.

¶7 Defendant was found guilty of resisting a peace officer for pulling her arms away from

Kinnan during her arrest and acquitted of the remaining charges. In rendering its decision, the

court found there was probable cause to arrest defendant, explaining that the officers credibly

testified that their decision to arrest her was based on her failure to comply with repeated orders

to leave. The court sentenced defendant to 12 months’ conditional discharge.

¶8 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the finding of guilt and sentence in which she

alleged, in relevant part, “that the court erred in finding that the State presented evidence

sufficient to support a finding of guilt as to the charge of Resisting a Peace Officer.” Defense

counsel argued, without reference to any statute, that the evidence was insufficient to establish

that she was subject to arrest for the underlying or predicate offense of disorderly conduct.

Counsel clarified on rebuttal that “it’s not my assertion that the State needed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that [defendant] committed a disorderly conduct.” Rather, she argued the

evidence did not support a finding that defendant was subject to arrest for that offense. The court

denied the motion, noting that whether disorderly conduct would have been proven beyond a

reasonable doubt “was not before the Court, only that the officers were acting in their official

capacity.” The court stated that the officers had acted in their official capacity based on

defendant’s conduct and because they had a complaint against her.

¶9 II. ANALYSIS

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¶ 10 On appeal, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction

for resisting a peace officer. Defendant does not challenge the elements of the offense as charged

under section 31-1(a) of the Code. See id. § 31-1(a). Rather, defendant asserts that section 31-1(d) incorporates an additional element of, or alternatively creates an exception to, the offense of

resisting a peace officer. Defendant argues that, pursuant to section 31-1(d), the State failed to

prove that she was subject to arrest for a predicate offense. See id. § 31-1(d). In support of her

assertion, defendant points to the legislative history of section 31-1 of the Code, citing statements

made regarding the 2021 amendment that added section 31-1(d): “[i]n regards to resisting arrest,

the Bill requires a predicate offense to charge someone with resisting arrest. Please stop charging

black folks for resisting arrest when there has not been a predicate offense.” 101st Ill. Gen.

Assem., House Proceedings, Jan. 13, 2021, at 7 (statements of Representative Slaughter); Pub.

Act 101-652, § 10-215 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (amending 720 ILCS 5/31-1).

¶ 11 The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent

of the legislature. People v. Harris, 2024 IL App (3d) 230406, ¶ 17. As the plain and ordinary

meaning of the statutory language is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent, we may not

depart from that language by reading in exceptions, limitations, or conditions. Id. Issues of

statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. People v. Clark, 2024 IL 130364, ¶ 15.

¶ 12 Whether a criminal statutory provision is an element of, or exception to, the offense that

must be proved by the State is determined by whether the legislature intended the provision to be

descriptive of the offense. People v. Tolbert, 2016 IL 117846, ¶ 15. Generally, a provision is

considered descriptive of the offense if the elements of the offense cannot be accurately

described without referencing it. People v. Rodgers, 322 Ill. App. 3d 199, 202 (2001).

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¶ 13 In determining whether section 31-1(d) of the Code constitutes an element or exception

that the State is required to prove, we find the recent decision in People v. Carswell, 2026 IL

App (1st) 231884, instructive. The defendant in Carswell raised a virtually identical claim on

appeal regarding the statutory interpretation of section 31-1(d). The First District rejected the

claim and determined that section 31-1(d) does not function as an additional element or an

exception to the offense of resisting arrest 1 because the plain language of the subsection does not

describe the offense or expressly create an exception. Id. ¶ 16. The court held that construing

section 31-1(d) as an element or exception would improperly add an unintended provision or

limitation to the statute, noting that the legislature could have clearly denoted section 31-1(d) an

exception using the same unambiguous language it had employed for other statutory exceptions

throughout the Code. Id. ¶¶ 16-17.

¶ 14 Additionally, the Carswell court noted that section 31-1 must be read in conjunction with

section 7-7 of the Code (720 ILCS 5/7-7 (West 2022)) pursuant to our supreme court’s decision

in People v. Locken, 59 Ill. 2d 459, 464 (1974). Carswell, 2026 IL App (1st) 231884, ¶ 18. As

section 7-7 prohibits the use of force to resist an arrest even if the arrest is unlawful, the

“resistance of even an unlawful arrest by a known officer is a violation of section 31-1.” Locken,

59 Ill. 2d at 465. Applying this principle, the Carswell court concluded that “subsection (d)

merely makes an arrest for resisting arrest without a predicate offense unlawful” but “does not

give rise to an exception or defense” because such an interpretation would “effectively permit

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Defendant here and the defendant in Carswell were both charged with the same offense under

section 31-1(a) of the Code. Carswell, 2026 IL App (1st) 231884, ¶ 1. While we refer to this offense as

resisting a peace officer, Carswell alternatively refers to the same offense as resisting arrest. It is apparent

from our review that both terms are used interchangeably in Illinois case law. See, e.g., People v.

Delgado, 2025 IL App (1st) 241518, ¶¶ 31, 33 (construing the charged offense of resisting a peace officer

under section 31-1 as resisting arrest).

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persons to resort to self-help in contravention of section 7-7.” Carswell, 2026 IL App (1st)

231884, ¶ 18.

¶ 15 Here, as in Carswell, defendant argues that section 31-1(d) is descriptive of the offense

because it makes a conviction contingent on a predicate offense as the initial basis for the arrest.

However, the plain language of section 31-1(d) does not mention conviction; it only makes an

arrest for resisting arrest contingent on the existence of an underlying offense. Id. ¶ 16. As the

Carswell court observed, the statute also does not include any language expressly designating it

as an exception despite the legislature’s use of precise exception designations in other statutes

throughout the Code. Id. ¶ 17. In addition to “except” and “does not apply” as examples of

express exception language noted in Carswell, other designations explicitly refer to exceptions

that preclude conviction or criminal liability for the offense. (Internal quotation marks and

emphases omitted.) See id.; 720 ILCS 5/28-1(b) (West 2024) (stating that participants “shall not

be convicted” of gambling for excluded activities); id. § 12-4.4a(c)(2) (specifying that the

criminal abuse or neglect of an elderly person statute does not “impose[ ] criminal liability” on

caregivers acting in good faith). It is apparent from these examples that the legislature could have

used comparable language if it intended for section 31-1(d) of the Code to operate as a

determinative factor for conviction as defendant suggests. See Carswell, 2026 IL App (1st)

231884, ¶ 17 (“When the legislature has clearly expressed a concept elsewhere, it weighs against

construing the same concept where it has not.”). Moreover, section 31-1(d) cannot be construed

as descriptive of the offense because resisting arrest is a criminal act independent of the

lawfulness of the arrest. See id. ¶ 18; People v. Bruemmer, 2021 IL App (4th) 190877, ¶ 36

(statutory provision is not descriptive where the offense can stand alone without it).

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¶ 16 Accordingly, defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her

conviction fails, as there was no additional element or exception that the State was required to

prove pursuant to section 31-1(d) of the Code.

¶ 17 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 18 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.

¶ 19 Affirmed.

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People v. Hill, 2026 IL App (3d) 250131

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 23-CM1315; the Hon. Sherri Hale, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys James E. Chadd, Santiago A. Durango, and Emily A. Brandon, for of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant. Appellant:

Attorneys James W. Glasgow, State’s Attorney, of Joliet (Patrick Delfino, for Thomas D. Arado, and Max Watson, of State’s Attorneys Appellee: Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

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