FILED
Jun 24, 2026
10:04 AM(CT)
TENNESSEE COURT OF
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
CLAIMS
TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS
AT NASHVILLE
Chad Primm, Docket No. 2025-60-3209
Employee,
v.
Central Sales & Service, Inc.,
Employer, State File No. 3061-2025
Auto-Owners Ins. Co.,
Carrier,
And
Troy Haley, Administrator, Judge Kenneth M. Switzer
Subsequent Injury and Vocational
Recovery Fund.
COMPENSATION ORDER GRANTING BENEFITS
In this accepted claim, the principal issue is the extent of Chad Primm’s
permanent impairment from a low-back injury he suffered while lifting a heavy
object for Central Sales & Service on January 6, 2025.
The parties clash on the correct impairment rating. Mr. Primm contended he
is entitled to permanent total disability or at least 12% with a future claim for
extraordinary benefits. Central Sales argued that Mr. Primm is only entitled to an
original award of 7% permanent partial disability. The Subsequent Injury and
Vocational Recovery Fund denied any liability.
Mr. Primm and Central Sales also disputed whether Mr. Primm is entitled to
past temporary disability and the circumstances of him leaving his employment.
After a compensation hearing on June 3, 2026, the Court finds that Mr. Primm
is not permanently and totally disabled, retained a 7% permanent partial impairment,
and is entitled to past temporary disability benefits from Central Sales. The Fund
has no liability.
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Claim History
Mr. Primm’s testimony
Mr. Primm, age 51, recalled that on the date of the work incident, he picked
up a steel slab. As he turned, “It felt like somebody stabbed me in my lower back[.]” A year and a half later, he said his condition is worsening not improving.
Mr. Primm has not worked since the injury due to severe daily back pain and
numbness in both legs. The pain interferes with his sleep and prevents him from
doing chores around the house or pursuing his former hobbies. Prescribed
medications, physical therapy, and injections have brought little or no relief.
In addition to pain, Mr. Primm described other physical limitations that
prevent him from working. Sitting for longer than half an hour at a time is difficult. Bending over to retrieve an object is also challenging. He cannot stand for long
periods of time, lift, or twist. He can drive but must take frequent breaks.
As for his education and work history, Mr. Primm has a high school diploma
and attended college for “half a semester.” His first jobs were mostly as a laborer
until he started working in industrial maintenance, which he has done for well over
a decade and was his field at Central Sales. At the time of his injury, he was a
production supervisor in the cleat department. Mr. Primm directed the work of three
other “operators” but also performed the same work alongside them.
Their workdays consisted of using water jets to cut rubber cleats and then
boxing and loading them on pallets. They also cut and lifted extrusion dies, which
are half-inch steel plates weighing anywhere from 80 to 100 pounds. The job was
fast-paced and involved constant lifting, and he was on his feet for most of his
workdays. His position also occasionally required reading and revising blueprints,
but Mr. Primm said he could not create them himself. He has a welding certificate.
Mr. Primm said he had no previous back injuries or workers’ compensation
claims. This statement was contradicted somewhat by medical records from before
the injury. In 2020, he had a cyst at the bottom of his spine that was lanced, and on cross-examination by Central Sales, he agreed that in 2017 he was treated for a boil
on his back. He further acknowledged that a medical record from that same year
stated that he was seen for “workers’ comp and knee pain.” But on questioning by
the Fund, Mr. Primm could not recall filing a claim, receiving significant treatment
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or an impairment rating, or settling. He maintained he had no previous disabilities
or restrictions before January 6, 2025.
Central Sales vigorously cross-examined Mr. Primm, questioning his
credibility on numerous other matters. For example, he acknowledged using a
product known as kratom frequently while working for “energy.”
In addition, Mr. Primm said on cross that he started a business called Primm
Powder Coating in October 2024. This short-term business consisted of powder
coating auto parts to make the parts more durable. Mr. Primm learned the process
by watching online videos. He stopped after the injury because he could no longer
do the work.
Mr. Primm acknowledged a few incomplete or inaccurate responses to
discovery relating to his business. When confronted with bank statements showing
minimal deposits related to Primm Powder Coating, he clarified that all work was
done before the work injury. He similarly did not produce the requested copies of
photos or videos of work performed for the business, and he answered “none” to a
request asking for copies of correspondence with customers. Mr. Primm said any
photos, videos, or emails were deleted. He further said that a post-injury social
media ad for the business was intended for his son to do the work. But, his son
eventually took another job, and the post should have been taken down.
Treatment
Mr. Primm went to the emergency room two days after the accident.
Afterward, Central Sales gave a panel, and he chose an orthopedic specialty clinic.
He saw a physician assistant two weeks later. She ordered an MRI and physical
therapy and placed work restrictions. A month later, the physician assistant ordered
additional physical therapy and an injection, and she kept restrictions in place. Then, in March, another physician assistant referred Mr. Primm to a spine specialist and
took him off work for eight days.
Mr. Primm saw authorized physician Dr. Scott Standard in late July, who
recorded the failure of conservative treatment and diagnosed a herniated disc at L5-S1. He recommended another injection but wrote that if it failed to bring relief,
surgery would be necessary.
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At the next visit on September 3, Dr. Standard noted improvement in Mr.
Primm’s pain level and he was “not needing surgical management at this time.” Mr.
Primm said that the doctor examined him for about five minutes. Dr. Standard
assigned maximum medical improvement, a 12% impairment, and a permanent
restriction of no lifting more than 35 pounds. He released Mr. Primm from
treatment.
Approximately two months later, Mr. Primm attended an employer’s
examination with Dr. John Brophy. In the review of symptoms, Mr. Primm
confirmed back pain radiating down both legs but denied “muscle weakness” and
“neurologic weakness.” Dr. Brophy assigned a 7% impairment but placed no
restrictions. Notes from the exam stated that they discussed “the possibility of
improvement in the disc herniation over time and the option of returning to an
alternative career requiring less heavy lifting.”
Expert proof
Dr. Standard testified that, at the first office visit, Mr. Primm was “obviously
in a significant amount of pain.” He performed a physical exam lasting
approximately five minutes. He reviewed the MRI film and diagnosed degenerative
disc disease in the lumbar spine and a disc herniation on the left at L5-S1. Mr.
Primm had radiculopathy at that visit, as well as pain when sitting, standing, “or
lifting anything significant.”
After another injection and more physical therapy, Mr. Primm reported a pain
level of 2/10 at the second and final visit. Dr. Standard performed a “superficial
exam” on that date but did not record that in the records. He placed a permanent 35-pound lifting restriction because it is “standard” and within the “medium demand
category.” As for limits on sitting or standing, Dr. Standard placed no restriction
but said Mr. Primm should “self-manage.” He believed Mr. Primm’s standing
ability should improve over time.
Dr. Standard explained how he arrived at his rating. He used the AMA
Guides, table 17-4 on page 570. He placed Mr. Primm in “Class 2, which is
intervertebral disc herniation at a single level, medically documented findings, with or without surgery, and documented radiculopathy at the clinically appropriate level
at the time of the examination.” He added that Class 1 is inappropriate “[b]ecause
he had radiculopathy and a herniated disc.” On cross, Dr. Standard said that at the
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second visit, he did not record numbness—just at the initial exam—but he said Mr.
Primm had numbness at maximum medical improvement.
Dr. Standard testified that Mr. Primm was unable to return to the same type
of work he did before the injury. On cross, he clarified that he was not saying that
Mr. Primm “couldn’t go back to work.”
For his part, Dr. Brophy testified he is a member of the Bureau’s Certified
Physician Program and the Workers’ Compensation Medical Advisory Committee.
He, too, reviewed the actual imaging and Dr. Standard’s records.
Dr. Brophy performed a 20-minute examination to include strength-testing in
both extremities, sensory touch, and deep tendon reflexes. Dr. Brophy agreed with
Dr. Standard’s diagnosis that Mr. Primm had an S1 radiculopathy, secondary left
L5-S1 herniated disc.
Dr. Brophy placed a 7% rating using the Guides, table 17.4, Class 1. He chose
Class 1 because “transitioning from class I to class II, it has to be something
objective about the radiculopathy and that means weakness. Nobody ever
documents weakness, so he remains class I, which is 7 percent.”
On cross, Dr. Brophy said that weakness is not the only criterion for a clinical
diagnosis of radiculopathy, but it is necessary for transitioning from Class 1 to Class 2. He reiterated, “[W]eakness is necessary to qualify for class II. Otherwise, it’s
arbitrary.” He added, “You can have a horrible radiculopathy with incapacitating
pain and a huge ruptured disk and not have weakness.”
On redirect, the following exchange occurred while reviewing the applicable
table on page 570:
Q: Can you just expand upon why you did not move it into the class II
seeing this?
A: Well, documented residual radiculopathy to me requires something
objective, meaning weakness, not just having leg pain, so then you go
to 12 percent. That doesn't make sense to me.
Q: So, would you consider leg pain to be a non-verifiable radicular
complaint?
A: Yes.
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Dr. Brophy placed no work restrictions, stating that Mr. Primm “has no
neurologic deficit and he was in no significant pain at this time.” He explained: “I
think generally speaking . . . there has to be some reason other than subjective pain to justify a permanent restriction, and, potentially make someone unemployable.”
Dr. Brophy additionally disagreed that Mr. Primm cannot return to his pre-injury
occupation, saying that Dr. Standard considered Mr. Primm’s “subjective pain.”
The termination
Mr. Primm described his pre-injury job performance as “excellent.” He
recalled the cleat department breaking production records, and at one point, they
were three or four weeks ahead on their orders. After the injury, Central Sales
offered light-duty as ordered by the physician assistant, but he still had difficulty meeting the job demands and had to sit often due to pain.
Mr. Primm said that Daniel Deaver, Central Sales’ (now) president,
terminated him on February 21, 2025, due to poor job performance and attendance.
He said his absences were due to medical appointments and physical therapy for the
injury. Mr. Primm was upset about his termination, but now he understands the
decision. “I just couldn’t do the job,” he said, noting the time-sensitivity of the work. He denied that at a lunch meeting a few months before the injury, two supervisors
discussed with him their concerns about his job performance. No one ever relayed
concerns about production in the cleat department, and in fact, Mr. Deaver praised
his work.
Mr. Deaver testified that the termination was justified. He explained that Mr.
Primm started in a different department, extrusion. Mr. Deaver said that while Mr.
Primm was in that position, he heard “reports that there were some issues with his
job performance and attendance[.]” While Mr. Primm worked night shifts, Mr.
Deaver “heard reports that he was going out to his car a lot at night—things like that. I don’t have any specifics, any proof of that—those were just the things that I heard.” He said the plant manager in extrusion said he “can’t trust him to be over here,” so
they moved Mr. Primm to the cleat department instead of letting him go.
As for his job performance there, Mr. Deaver said that early on, the company
had “issues” with meeting the production schedule. He had concerns about Mr.
Primm’s organizational skills, noting, “We felt like he wasn’t using his time wisely.” He also said the employees Mr. Primm supervised “seemed a little bit disgruntled.
They complained a lot about working for him, that he wasn’t setting them up for
success a lot.” Mr. Deaver said he saw Mr. Primm on his phone or “just hanging out
6
by the water jets.” He said “a couple times” the company talked to Mr. Primm about
their concerns. Further, “I saw multiple instances where it looked like he was just
watching videos on his phone.”
Mr. Deaver agreed that the company provided light duty after the accident but
said Mr. Primm should have been able to do the accommodated work. Devices or
coworkers could have helped him with lifting. As to Mr. Primm’s job performance,
he “couldn’t see an appreciable difference from before the injury to after the injury.” Mr. Deaver said that the company has sitting-only positions in other divisions, such
as the sewing department.
Mr. Deaver did not “take issue with” excused absences for doctor or therapy
visits, but he said that Mr. Primm had “sort of a bad attendance record as well,
coming in late, asking if he could leave a few minutes early for this or that.” Mr.
Deaver stated that some of these instances were recorded, but he offered no
documentation. Discussions took place about terminating Mr. Primm before the
injury, but Mr. Deaver did not say who participated in them, when, or how often
they occurred. He said two other supervisors went to lunch with Mr. Primm before
the injury to discuss their concerns. Mr. Deaver did not attend that lunch.
On cross-examination, Mr. Deaver agreed that Central Sales produced Mr.
Primm’s personnel records, and they contained “no negative reports.” He could not
recall praising Mr. Primm because the cleat department output was increased; he
said the increase overall was due to work in different departments.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Mr. Primm has the burden of proof on all essential elements of his claim and
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to the requested
benefits. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(6) (2025); Willis v. All Staff, 2015 TN
Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 42, at *18 (Nov. 9, 2015).
Permanent total disability
To prevail on this claim, Mr. Primm must show that he is “totally
incapacitated from working at an occupation that brings [him] an income,” meaning
he is unable to work at any job in the open labor market. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(4)(B); Duignan v. Stowers Mach. Corp., No. E2018-01120-SC-R3-WC, 2019
Tenn. LEXIS 224, at *21 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel June 19, 2019).
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The permanent and total disability assessment is based upon numerous
factors, including the employee’s skills and training, education, age, local job
opportunities, and capacity to work at the kinds of employment available in his
disabled condition. Id. at *21-22. Although a rating of anatomical disability by a
medical expert is also one of the relevant factors, “the vocational disability is not restricted to the precise estimate of anatomical disability made by a medical
witness.” Henson v. City of Lawrenceburg, 851 S.W.2d 809, 812 (Tenn. 1993). In
addition, the employee’s own “assessment of his physical condition and resulting
disabilities is competent testimony and cannot be disregarded[.]” Duignan, 2019
Tenn. LEXIS 224 at *22.
Considering the above, Mr. Primm has experience in industrial maintenance,
supervising employees, and reading and changing blueprints occasionally. He also
has a welding certificate. He has shown an entrepreneurial ability, started Primm
Powder Coatings, and provided a service for which he is self-taught. Mr. Primm has
a high school education and “some college.” He was articulate in his testimony. He
is 51 years old. Notably, both doctors believed Mr. Primm is capable of some work.
This all weighs against a finding that he is permanently and totally disabled.
Moreover, Mr. Primm gave no proof on local job opportunities or his capacity to
work at the kinds of employment available.
Mr. Primm credibly testified that he suffers daily, severe, and disabling back
pain and leg numbness. Despite Central Sales’ extensive efforts to attack his
credibility, the Court affords little weight to its cross-examination. To the extent
that Mr. Primm gave incomplete responses to written discovery, the Court frowns
upon that. However, Mr. Primm adequately explained most of the discrepancies
Central Sales identified. In addition, “if minor and insignificant details vary, an
injured worker should not be penalized simply for being a poor historian.” Orman
v. Williams Sonoma, Inc., 803 S.W.2d 672, 677 (Tenn. 1991).
The Court credits Mr. Primm’s description of how the injury affected his
ability to work and daily life. He said that driving, sitting, or standing for long
periods is difficult, and he cannot twist. But Dr. Standard did not place restrictions reflecting these limitations, while Dr. Brophy placed no restrictions at all.
Considering the proof, the Court cannot conclude that Mr. Primm has shown
by a preponderance of the evidence that he is permanently and totally disabled. That
claim is denied.
8
Therefore, the Fund has no liability. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a)(1)
(Fund’s liability requires findings of permanent total disability and that the employee “previously sustained a permanent physical disability.”).
Original award
Given the above ruling, the Court must determine Mr. Primm’s original award
under section 50-6-207(3)(A). Dr. Standard’s 12% rating is presumed accurate but
may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 50-6-204(k)(7). Central
Sales contended that Dr. Brophy’s 7% rating rebuts the presumption.
When presented with competing expert opinions, the Court can consider their
qualifications, the circumstances of their examinations, the information available to them, and the importance attached to the information by other experts. Orman, 803
S.W.2d at 676.
Here, both physicians are well-qualified neurosurgeons. Dr. Brophy has
undergone additional training with the Bureau. This factor favors him slightly. Both
physicians viewed the actual films from the imaging. Dr. Standard’s notes suggest
he read records of previous authorized treatment at the first visit, and Dr. Brophy
reviewed them before the employer’s exam and his deposition. This factor favors
neither physician. Dr. Standard treated Mr. Primm twice, while Dr. Brophy saw him
once for an opinion for litigation. This factor favors Dr. Standard only slightly.
The importance attached to the information they considered is what
differentiates their opinions.
Dr. Standard placed Mr. Primm in Class 2. The Guides on page 570 state in
part that Class 2 requires “documented residual radiculopathy at the clinically
appropriate level present at the time of examination.” Looking at Dr. Standard’s
September 3 notes, as Central Sales stated, no physical exam is documented. Mr.
Primm recalled a brief, five-minute exam, and when pressed on this point at his
deposition, Dr. Standard called it a “superficial exam.” Importantly, Dr. Standard’s
notes do not mention “documented” residual radiculopathy or verified weakness.
Rather, Dr. Standard recalled that Mr. Primm had “numbness” at the first exam.
Overall, the notes from the visit where he assigned the rating are cursory at best.
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In contrast, Dr. Brophy performed a 20-minute examination and concluded
that Mr. Primm should be considered as Class 1. In part, this requires “nonverifiable radicular complaints at clinically appropriate level(s), present at the time of
examination.” In other words, Mr. Primm did not report any muscular or
neurological weakness. Dr. Brophy testified—repeatedly—that Mr. Primm’s pain
is a nonverifiable radicular complaint.
The Court finds Dr. Brophy gave the more plausible and detailed explanation
for his rating, so Central Sales has rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence the
presumption attached to Dr. Standard’s rating. Mr. Primm retains a 7% medical
impairment, entitling him to an original award of $15,303.02.
Temporary partial disability
Temporary partial disability refers to the time during which the injured
employee can resume some gainful employment but has not reached maximum
recovery. Mace v. Express Servs., Inc., 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 49,
at *8 (Dec. 11, 2015).
Central Sales first argued that a physician assistant rather than a physician
placed Mr. Primm’s restrictions, so the restrictions need not be honored. The Court
disagrees.
Tennessee Compilation Rules and Regulations 0800-02-01.06(7) (2018)
permits physician assistants under the supervision of a licensed physician to provide medical treatment, but only a supervising physician may determine medical
causation, a permanent impairment rating, and the date of maximum medical
improvement. Notably absent from this list is placing work restrictions.
Central Sales cited no authority stating that a physician assistant cannot assign
restrictions. Further, by Mr. Primm’s unrefuted testimony, he saw the physician
assistants by choosing them from a panel that Central Sales offered. Mr. Deaver
testified that when the physician assistant placed the restrictions, Central Sales
honored them. This argument is unavailing.
Next, Central Sales argued that Mr. Primm was terminated for cause. Even
though an employee has a work-related injury for which temporary benefits are
payable, an employer may still enforce workplace rules. Mace, 2015 TN Wrk.
Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 49 at *8. Further, “[a]n employer will not be penalized for
10
enforcing a policy if the court determines (1) that the actions allegedly precipitating the employee’s dismissal qualified as misconduct under established or ordinary
workplace rules and/or expectations; and (2) that those actions were, as a factual
matter, the true motivation for the dismissal.” Id. at *9.
Mr. Deaver testified that Central Sales terminated Mr. Primm mostly due to
concerns about how Mr. Primm used his time and the cleat department’s resulting
production levels. Meeting production is an ordinary workplace rule or expectation.
But Mr. Deaver’s vague testimony, rife with hearsay, was unpersuasive.
For example, pre-injury, Mr. Deaver said the extrusion manager told him he
could not trust Mr. Primm. Further, while in extrusion, Mr. Deaver “heard reports”
that Mr. Primm left the workplace excessively to go to his vehicle. He
acknowledged, however, that he had no “specifics” or “proof” about this. Both
instances are hearsay, and the Court gives them little weight.
Once Mr. Primm was moved to the cleat department, Mr. Deaver said the
employees he supervised complained. This is also hearsay. Mr. Deaver saw Mr.
Primm on his phone, watching a video and/or “hanging out” by the water jets. But
again, the details are lacking. Further, Mr. Deaver did not attend the lunch where
supervisors supposedly conveyed their concerns to Mr. Primm, so he has no actual
knowledge of what was discussed.
Mr. Deaver said that sitting-only positions were available at Central Sales.
But when concerns apparently arose, Central Sales did not offer Mr. Primm a
different, sitting-only position. They terminated him.
An employer need not offer written documentation to prove a rule’s existence.
Womble v. Uncle Dave’s Auto Repair, Inc., 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS
61, at *8 (Dec. 10, 2018). Still, Central Sales offered no evidence to corroborate Mr. Deaver’s testimony. It introduced no paperwork about its workplace rules and
expectations, or its efforts to coach, warn, or discipline Mr. Primm when concerns
about his job performance arose before the injury. Mr. Primm’s personnel file exists; it contains nothing negative.
In contrast, Mr. Primm credibly testified to the quality of his work, pre- and
post-injury. He recalled the lunch but said the conversation focused solely on
meeting the demands of upcoming work. Mr. Primm emphatically denied that his
supervisors questioned his production levels. He said the department set production
records and was at times weeks ahead of schedule. Arguably, Mr. Primm offered
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little detail and no documentation to support his testimony, either. But Mr. Primm
also candidly admitted that he just could not do the job after the injury. His
testimony was sincere.
Under these circumstances, the Court cannot find that Mr. Primm engaged in
“misconduct under established or ordinary workplace rules and/or expectations.”
Nor can the Court find that his actions were, as a factual matter, the true motivation for his dismissal.
Rather, Mr. Primm acknowledged that post-injury, he did not meet the
physical demands of his job. The Court finds that he could not do so due to the work
injury. His inability to meet production from the work injury was Central Sales’ true motivation for letting him go.
Therefore, Mr. Primm has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he
is entitled to temporary partial disability benefits from February 22 through
September 3 in the amount of $13,463.87.
Costs
Mr. Primm requested the following discretionary costs: Bertram Reporting,
Dr. Standard’s deposition, $662.80; Lexitas Court Reporting, $525.50; Dr. Brophy’s
Deposition, $750.00; and Veritext Corporate Services, LLC, Mr. Primm’s
deposition, $469.50. Central Sales countered that if the Court awards permanent
partial disability benefits based on Dr. Brophy’s 7% impairment rating, the
discretionary costs should be limited to the $469.50 incurred for the transcript from Mr. Primm’s deposition.
Subsection 50-6-239(c)(8) permits a workers’ compensation judge to “assess
discretionary costs including reasonable fees for depositions of medical experts
against the employer.” Further, as Central Sales argued, the Appeals Board reduced
an award of costs “incurred in the pursuit of permanent total disability benefits,”
which claim was unsuccessful. Oldham v. Freeman Webb Co. Realtors, 2024 TN
Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 37, at *42 n.9 (Nov. 8, 2024).
Mr. Primm’s claims for permanent total disability or 12% permanent partial
disability were unsuccessful. So, costs for Dr. Standard’s deposition are not
available. However, the remainder of the requested costs, $995.00, is reasonable
and awarded to him.
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows:
1. The Subsequent Injury and Vocational Recovery Fund is dismissed from this
case with prejudice.
2. Central Sales shall pay Mr. Primm permanent partial disability benefits of
$15,303.02. Mr. Primm may file another petition seeking increased
permanent partial disability under section 50-6-207(B).
3. Central Sales shall pay Mr. Primm $13,463.87 in a lump-sum as past
temporary disability benefits.
4. Central Sales shall furnish reasonable, necessary, and work-related future
medical benefits with Dr. Standard under section 50-6-204.
5. Mr. Primm’s counsel is entitled to attorney fees of 20% of his past disability
and original awards.
6. Central Sales shall pay Mr. Primm’s discretionary costs of $995.00.
7. The Court taxes the $150.00 filing fee to Central Sales, to be paid to the Court
Clerk under Tennessee Compilation Rules and Regulations 0800-02-21-.06
(2026) within five business days, and for which execution might issue.
8. Central Sales shall file a Statistical Data Form (SD-2) with the Court Clerk
within ten days of the date this order becomes final.
9. Unless appealed, this order becomes final 30 days after entry.
ENTERED June 24, 2026.
JUDGE KENNETH M. SWITZER
Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims
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APPENDIX
Exhibits:
1. Deposition of Dr. Scott Standard with exhibits
2. Deposition of Dr. John Brophy with exhibits, and videotape
3. Joint Medical Records for Compensation Hearing
4. Affidavit for Attorney Fee of Charles L. Hicks
5. Bank statements, December 31, 2024, February 28, 2025
6. Answers to Requests for Admissions, p. 1
7. Answers to Request for Production, p. 4
8. Answers to Interrogatories, p. 3
9. Mr. Primm’s Facebook post, April 8, 2025
10.Google review of Primm Powder Coating by Terry LeFrain
11.Mr. Primm’s Facebook post, March 24, 2026
12. Mr. Primm’s Facebook post (late-filed), April 17, 2026
13.Mileage reimbursement, May 15, 2026
14.Three Rivers Hospital record, October 21, 2017
15. Dickson Medical Associates record, February 23, 2017
16.Cleat Department Supervisor job description
17.Excerpts from the AMA Guides
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of this Order was sent as indicated on June 24, 2026.
Name Email Sent to
Larry Hicks, employee’s attorney X Office@hickslawfirm.com
Ben Norris, employer’s attorney X Bnorris@eraclides.com
Laurenn Disspayne, SIF attorney X Laurenn.Disspayne@tn.gov
Penny Shrum
Clerk, Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims
WC.CourtClerk@tn.gov
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Right to Appeal:
If you disagree with the Court’s Order, you may appeal to the Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Board. To do so, you must:
1. Complete the enclosed form entitled “Notice of Appeal” and file it with the Clerk of the
Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims before the expiration of the deadline.
¾ If the order being appealed is “expedited” (also called “interlocutory”), or if the
order does not dispose of the case in its entirety, the notice of appeal must be filed
within seven (7) business days of the date the order was filed.
¾ If the order being appealed is a “Compensation Order,” or if it resolves all issues
in the case, the notice of appeal must be filed within thirty (30) calendar days of
the date the Compensation Order was filed.
When filing the Notice of Appeal, you must serve a copy on the opposing party (or attorney,
if represented).
2. You must pay, via check, money order, or credit card, a $75.00 filing fee within ten calendar
days after filing the Notice of Appeal. Payments can be made in-person at any Bureau office
or by U.S. mail, hand-delivery, or other delivery service. In the alternative, you may file an
Affidavit of Indigency (form available on the Bureau’s website or any Bureau office)
seeking a waiver of the filing fee. You must file the fully-completed Affidavit of Indigency
within ten calendar days of filing the Notice of Appeal. Failure to timely pay the filing
fee or file the Affidavit of Indigency will result in dismissal of your appeal.
3. You are responsible for ensuring a complete record is presented on appeal. If no court
reporter was present at the hearing, you may request from the Court Clerk the audio
recording of the hearing for a $25.00 fee. If you choose to submit a transcript as part of your
appeal, which the Appeals Board has emphasized is important for a meaningful review of
the case, a licensed court reporter must prepare the transcript, and you must file it with the
Court Clerk. The Court Clerk will prepare the record for submission to the Appeals Board,
and you will receive notice once it has been submitted. For deadlines related to the filing of
transcripts, statements of the evidence, and briefs on appeal, see the applicable rules on the
Bureau’s website at https://www.tn.gov/wcappealsboard. (Click the “Read Rules” button.)
4. After the Workers’ Compensation Judge approves the record and the Court Clerk transmits
it to the Appeals Board, a docketing notice will be sent to the parties.
If neither party timely files an appeal with the Appeals Board, the Court Order
becomes enforceable. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(d)(3) (expedited/interlocutory
orders) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (compensation orders).
For self-represented litigants: Help from an Ombudsman is available at 800-332-2667.
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Tennessee Bureau of Workers’ Compensation
www.tn.gov/workforce/injuries-at-work/
wc.courtclerk@tn.gov -800-332-2667
Docket No.: ________________________
State File No.: ______________________
Date of Injury: _____________________
Employee
v.
Employer
Notice is given that ____________________________________________________________________
[List name(s) of all appealing party(ies). Use separate sheet if necessary.]
appeals the following order(s) of the Tennessee Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board;ĐŚĞĐŬŽŶĞŽƌŵŽƌĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞďŽdžĞƐĂŶĚŝŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĞĚĂƚĞĨŝůĞͲ ƐƚĂŵƉĞĚŽŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƉĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞŽƌĚĞƌ;ƐͿďĞŝŶŐĂƉƉĞĂůĞĚͿ͗
ප Expedited Hearing Order filed on _______________ ප Motion Order filed on ___________________ ප Compensation Order filed on__________________ ප Other Order filed on_____________________ issued by Judge _________________________________________________________________________.
Statement of the Issues on Appeal
Provide a short and plain statement of the issues on appeal or basis for relief on appeal: ________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________
Parties
Appellant(s) (Requesting Party): _________________________________________ ܆Employer ܆Employee Address: ________________________________________________________ Phone: ___________________ Email: __________________________________________________________
Attorney’s Name: ______________________________________________ BPR#: _______________________ Attorney’s Email: ______________________________________________ Phone: _______________________ Attorney’s Address: _________________________________________________________________________
* Attach an additional sheet for each additional Appellant *
LB-1099 rev. 01/20 Page 1 of 2 RDA 11082 Employee Name: _______________________________________ Docket No.: _____________________ Date of Inj.: _______________
Appellee(s) (Opposing Party): ___________________________________________ ܆Employer ܆Employee Appellee’s Address: ______________________________________________ Phone: ____________________ Email: _________________________________________________________
Attorney’s Name: _____________________________________________ BPR#: ________________________ Attorney’s Email: _____________________________________________ Phone: _______________________ Attorney’s Address: _________________________________________________________________________
* Attach an additional sheet for each additional Appellee *
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, _____________________________________________________________, certify that I have forwarded a true and exact copy of this Notice of Appeal by First Class mail, postage prepaid, or in any manner as described in Tennessee Compilation Rules & Regulations, Chapter 0800-02-21, to all parties and/or their attorneys in this case on this the __________ day of ___________________________________, 20 ____.
[Signature of appellant or attorney for appellant]
LB-1099 rev. 01/20 Page 2 of 2 RDA 11082