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A.R.R. v. Rubio

2026-06-24No. Civil Action No. 2026-1921

Summary

Holding. The Court granted the plaintiffs' motion to proceed under pseudonym, finding that their legitimate interest in protecting themselves and their minor family members from safety risks in Afghanistan outweighed the presumption in favor of public disclosure of litigant identities.

Afghan asylum holders who successfully obtained asylum status in 2023 and filed family reunification petitions for 24 relatives in Afghanistan found their efforts blocked by presidential proclamations suspending entry from Afghanistan and subsequent State Department directives implementing those suspensions. The plaintiffs sought to proceed anonymously in their lawsuit challenging the legality of these directives, citing safety concerns for themselves and their family members still in Afghanistan who face risks from Taliban policies and potential retribution for attempting to leave the country.

The court applied a five-factor balancing test to evaluate the plaintiffs' anonymity request. The court found that the sensitive nature of asylum claims, combined with documented fears of Taliban retaliation and ethnic cleansing, justified pseudonymous proceedings. The presence of 16 minor plaintiffs in Afghanistan strengthened this conclusion. Although the fourth factor—that the defendant is the government—ordinarily disfavors anonymity, the court determined that the other factors created truly exceptional circumstances warranting an exception, particularly because the defendants already knew the plaintiffs' identities.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Right to proceed anonymously in litigation
  • Balancing disclosure presumption against personal safety concerns
  • Heightened confidentiality interests in asylum cases
  • Protection of minor plaintiffs' identities

Procedural posture

The court ruled on a motion filed by plaintiffs seeking permission to proceed under pseudonyms rather than disclosing their real identities in a case challenging the legality of executive proclamations and State Department directives restricting entry from Afghanistan.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

A.R.R., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No. 26-1921

MARCO RUBIO, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs in this case — six unrelated Afghan asylees residing in Colorado and their

respective wives and children stuck in the country they fled — commence this lawsuit as part of

their efforts to finally reunite. See ECF No. 1 (Compl.), ¶¶ 1–7, 13, 17, 27, 29, 36, 40. Securing

asylum status in 2023, the asylees successfully applied for Form I-730 “Asylee Relative

Petitions” for their (collectively) 24 immediate family members in Afghanistan, who did their

part by verifying their requisite familial relationships in consular interviews in Islamabad,

Pakistan. Id., ¶¶ 2–3, 51–97. Their efforts, however, have been stalled. In the first year of his

current administration, the President issued two proclamations fully suspending entry from

initially twelve and later twenty countries, Afghanistan among them. Id., ¶¶ 110, 116; see also

Proclamation No. 10949, 90 Fed. Reg. 24497 (June 4, 2025); Proclamation No. 10998, 90 Fed.

Reg. 59717 (Dec. 16, 2025). The State Department, in turn, disseminated a series of “cables”

directing consular officers on how to implement the new policy, including processes for granting

narrow “National Interest Exceptions.” Id., ¶¶ 113–15, 117–18. So instead of issuing the I-730-holding relatives documents for travel to the U.S., the American Embassy in Islamabad issued

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letters deeming them ineligible for entry and unqualified for a National Interest Exception. Id.,

¶¶ 57, 65, 72, 79, 86, 93.

Plaintiffs now sue the Secretary of State and the Department he leads under the

Administrative Procedure Act, arguing that the cables amount to a nationality-based entry ban

that is arbitrary and capricious, exceeds statutory authority, violates the Department’s own rules

for adjudicating cases individually, and flouts notice-and-comment requirements. Id., ¶¶ 119–

61. They also contend that State has unreasonably delayed the ultimate adjudication of the I-730

petitions. Id., ¶¶ 162–69. All this Plaintiffs seek to do pseudonymously, citing concerns for the

safety of those among them still in Afghanistan. See ECF Nos. 2 (Mot.) at 1–2; 2-1 (Memo.) at

1–2. The Court will grant their Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym, subject to any further

consideration by the United States District Judge to whom this case is randomly assigned. See

LCvR 40.7(f) (providing that Chief Judge shall “hear and determine . . . motion[s] to seal the

complaint and motion[s] to file a pseudonymous complaint . . . .”).

I. Legal Standard

Complaints must typically identify a plaintiff. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a); LCvR 5.1(c)(1).

This identification requirement reflects the “presumption in favor of disclosure [of litigants’

identities], which stems from the ‘general public interest in the openness of governmental

processes,’ and, more specifically, from the tradition of open judicial proceedings.” In re Sealed

Case, 931 F.3d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Washington Legal Found. v. U.S. Sentencing

Comm’n, 89 F.3d 897, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). A party moving to proceed pseudonymously thus

“bears the weighty burden of both demonstrating a concrete need for such secrecy[] and

identifying the consequences that would likely befall it if forced to proceed in its own name.” In

re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d 324, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2020). As a result, the court must “‘balance the

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litigant’s legitimate interest in anonymity against countervailing interests in full disclosure’” by

applying a “flexible and fact driven” balancing test. Id. (quoting In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at

96). That test assesses “five non-exhaustive factors”:

(1) whether the justification asserted by the requesting party is merely to

avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to

preserve privacy in a matter of a sensitive and highly personal nature;

(2) whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental

harm to the requesting party or, even more critically, to innocent nonparties;

(3) the ages of the persons whose privacy interests are sought to be

protected;

(4) whether the action is against a governmental or private party; and

relatedly,

(5) the risk of unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an action

against it to proceed anonymously.

Id. at 326–27 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 97) (cleaned up).

II. Analysis

Plaintiffs have met their burden to overcome the presumption in favor of disclosing their

identities. The Court will address the factors in turn.

A. Factors One and Two

The first two factors, taken together, support pseudonymity. Plaintiffs do not seek to go

unnamed “merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation,” but to

“preserve privacy in a matter of [a] sensitive and highly personal nature.” Id. at 326 (quoting In

re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d at 97) (alteration in original). Such matters can include “maintaining

their and their family members’ safety.” Sponsor v. Mayorkas, 2023 WL 2598685, at *2

(D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2023). Although Plaintiffs’ filings in this case — even the sealed ones — are

short on detail, they express fear of Taliban policies restricting women’s rights and conscripting

young men, see Compl., ¶¶ 58, 66, 73, 80, 87, 94, and “fear [of] any further retribution should

their names be tied to a lawsuit seeking to leave Afghanistan.” Memo. at 5. More specifically,

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one Plaintiff-family belonging to a racial and religious minority group expresses fears over

ongoing ethnic cleansing of that group in Afghanistan. See Compl., ¶ 58. These fears,

furthermore, come in the specific context of asylum, which this Court has indicated warrants

particular sensitivity. See, e.g., J.G.G. v. Trump, 2025 WL 1352316, at *2 (D.D.C. May 8,

2025) (agreeing with plaintiff that federal regulations “provide for the confidentiality of asylum

applicants” in part given risk of retaliation) (quoting plaintiffs’ motion and citing Anim v.

Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243, 253 (4th Cir. 2008)); Doe v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 2024 WL

5483092, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2024) (acknowledging risks if home government learned of

plaintiff’s identity and asylum claim).

Plaintiffs’ filings are generalized almost to a fault, and the Court’s prior

acknowledgements of the particular sensitivities of asylum have generally benefited from

detailed documentation of the abuses that underlay those plaintiffs’ asylum claims. See, e.g.,

J.Z. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 2026 WL 1470530, at * 2 (D.D.C. May 26, 2026); Coal. for

Humane Immigrant Rights v. Mullin, 2026 WL 936034, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2026); Molina

v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 2025 WL 2800807, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2025); J.G.G, 2025

WL 1352316, at *2; Sponsor, 2023 WL 2598685, at *2. The Court finds, however, that the

concerns for family safety and fears of retribution that Plaintiffs do articulate here, particularly in

the sensitive context of asylum, are sufficient to tilt the first two factors in their favor.

B. Factors Three Through Five

The third factor plainly favors pseudonymity because this suit implicates the interests of

minors. Of the 30 Plaintiffs, 16 are minors living in Afghanistan. See Compl., ¶¶ 15–16, 21–26,

31–35, 38–39, 42. Factor three’s support for pseudonymity extends even to the adult Plaintiffs:

as either parents or siblings of minor Plaintiffs, their unmasking would risk revealing the minor

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Plaintiffs’ identities, too. Id.; see Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rights, 2026 WL 936034, at *2

(citing Doe v. Blinken, No. 23-2997, ECF No. 3 (Mem. Op. & Order) at 4 (D.D.C. Oct. 13,

2023) (“To the extent that revealing Plaintiff’s identity would also reveal the identities of his

four minor children, proceeding pseudonymously would be appropriate.”)).

The fourth factor, which concerns the identity of the defendant, is less favorable to

Plaintiffs. When the defendant is the government, this factor turns on whether the plaintiff seeks

programmatic or individual relief. Molina, 2025 WL 2800807, at *2; Doe v. Blinken, No. 23-2997, Mem. Op. & Order at 4–5. Plaintiffs here seek both: they ask this Court to declare a series

of State Department directives generally unlawful and to order full adjudication of Plaintiffs’ I730 petitions in particular. See Compl. at 30. In such hybrid-relief cases, this Court has

considered whether other factors tilt the balance toward pseudonymity assuming the relief sought

is essentially programmatic. Molina, 2025 WL 2800807, at *2 (finding that where both types of

relief sought, “case nonetheless presents the truly exceptional circumstances that overcome the

presumption against pseudonymity even for programmatic relief”) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted); see also Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rights, 2026 WL 936034, at *2

(following Molina).

The fifth and final factor, which considers the risk of unfairness to the defendant, favors

pseudonymity. Plaintiffs confirm that Defendants know their identities, see Memo. at 5, and this

factor does not counsel disclosure when that is the case. In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d at 326 n.1

(explaining that this factor is “not implicated” where defendant knows plaintiff’s identity); Doe

v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 2024 WL 5483092, at *3 (fifth factor supports motion where

defendant already knows plaintiff’s identity).

With most factors weighing toward pseudonymity, the Court will grant the Motion.

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III. Conclusion

The Court accordingly ORDERS that:

1. Plaintiffs’ [2] Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym is GRANTED;

2. All parties shall use the pseudonyms listed in the Complaint and redact

information that would identify Plaintiffs in all documents filed in this action;

3. Defendants shall not disclose Plaintiffs’ identities to any third party unless such

disclosure is necessary to defend against this action; and

4. Within fourteen days of this Order, Plaintiffs shall file:

a. A pseudonymous and redacted version of their [2] Motion and any

attachments as a Notice to the Court on the public docket; and

b. A sealed declaration containing their real names and residential addresses.

/s/ James E. Boasberg

JAMES E. BOASBERG

Chief Judge

Date: June 24, 2026

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