FILE
THIS OPINION WAS FILED
FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON
JULY 29, 2021
IN CLERK’S OFFICE
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON
JULY 29, 2021
ERIN L. LENNON
SUPREME COURT CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
)
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
)
Respondent, ) No. 99101-4
)
v. )
)
JUAN ENRIQUEZ-MARTINEZ, )
)
Petitioner. ) Filed: July 29, 2021
_______________________________)
GONZÁLEZ, C.J.— With some exceptions not relevant here, when a person is
sentenced to jail or prison they are entitled to credit for all the time they have
already been held by the State on those charges. State v. Lewis, 184 Wn.2d 201,
205, 355 P.3d 1148 (2015) (citing Reanier v. Smith, 83 Wn.2d 342, 517 P.2d 949
(1974)). Juan Enriquez-Martinez was in custody in Oregon, held on both
Washington and Oregon pending charges. For his Washington conviction, he was
denied credit for the time he spent in jail in Oregon on a variety of grounds.
Finding none of those grounds availing, we reverse the Court of Appeals and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
State v. Enriquez-Martinez, No. 99101-4
FACTS
Enriquez-Martinez abused his wife’s young cousin for many years. The
abuse occurred at family events in both Washington and Oregon. In April 2014,
Enriquez-Martinez was arrested in Oregon on charges related to that abuse. While
Enriquez-Martinez was in custody in Oregon, Klickitat County also filed charges
based on that abuse, and a judge issued a warrant for his arrest. That arrest warrant
directed that Enriquez-Martinez be held without bail until he was presented before
the Klickitat County court.
Enriquez-Martinez continued to be held on both charges in the Oregon jail
for months until an Oregon prosecutor proposed a global plea offer to resolve all
charges. Under that proposal, Enriquez-Martinez would plead guilty to first degree
sexual abuse in Oregon and first degree child molestation in Washington and
would receive concurrent 75 month sentences on each, with credit for time served.
A few months later, Enriquez-Martinez agreed to the deal.
For reasons not in the record, Enriquez-Martinez remained in jail in Oregon
nearly 7 more months. In January 2016, 20 months after he was first arrested, he
was transferred to Washington, pleaded guilty to first degree child molestation, and
was sentenced to the top of the statutory range. As part of the boilerplate language
of the judgment and sentence, he received “credit for time served prior to
sentencing if that confinement was solely under this cause number.” Clerk’s
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State v. Enriquez-Martinez, No. 99101-4
Papers at 20. Later in 2016, he was returned to Oregon where he pleaded guilty to
first degree child abuse.
After Enriquez-Martinez was returned to Washington State to serve his
sentence, the Washington Department of Corrections declined to give him credit
for the time he had served in Oregon. Enriquez-Martinez filed a CrR 7.8 motion
asking the trial judge to correct his sentence to make clear he was entitled to credit
for the time he had served after the Washington warrant was served. By the time
his challenge was heard, his original trial judge had retired from the bench, and a
new judge denied his motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and we granted
review. 196 Wn.2d 1042 (2021).
ANALYSIS
Generally, we review trial court decisions on CrR 7.8 motions for abuse of
discretion. See State v. Buckman, 190 Wn.2d 51, 57, 409 P.3d 193 (2018) (citing
State v. Hardesty, 129 Wn.2d 303, 915 P.2d 1080 (1996)). Discretion may be
abused if it is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons, such as a
misunderstanding of the law. State v. Quismundo, 164 Wn.2d 499, 504, 192 P.3d
342 (2008) (citing State v. Rohrich, 149 Wn.2d 647, 654, 71 P.3d 638 (2003)).
As a matter of constitutional law, defendants are entitled to credit for all
time served in confinement on a criminal charge, whether that time is served
before or after sentencing. Lewis, 184 Wn.2d at 205 (citing Reanier, 83 Wn.2d
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State v. Enriquez-Martinez, No. 99101-4
342); State v. Phelan, 100 Wn.2d 508, 514, 671 P.2d 1212 (1983). The legislature
has attempted to capture that principle in RCW 9.94A.505(6), which says, “The
sentencing court shall give the offender credit for all confinement time served
before the sentencing if that confinement was solely in regard to the offense for
which the offender is being sentenced.” But our constitution does not allow us to
treat offenders who cannot obtain bail differently from those who can. See Lewis,
184 Wn.2d at 205 (citing Reanier, 83 Wn.2d 342); Phelan, 100 Wn.2d at 514.
“Even without statutory authority for the allowance of such credit, it is
constitutionally mandated.” State v. Speaks, 119 Wn.2d 204, 206, 829 P.2d 1096
(1992) (citing Reanier, 83 Wn.2d at 347). In a pre-SRA (Sentencing Reform Act
of 1981), ch. 9.94A RCW, case where defendants had been denied such credit, we
elaborated:
Physical liberty, while not recognized as “fundamental”, is a basic human
right and the poor, while not a suspect class, cannot be said to be fully
accountable for their status. Since a denial of credit for presentence jail time
involves both a deprivation of liberty in addition to that which would
otherwise exist, and a classification based solely on wealth, we will apply an
intermediate level of scrutiny in the present case.
The denial of credit against discretionary minimum terms for time
actually served in jail prior to sentencing does not satisfy this test.
Phelan, 100 Wn.2d at 514.
Illustrative is the recent case of Adam Lewis, who had been arrested on a
variety of charges in May 2011 and could not make bail. 184 Wn.2d at 202-03.
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State v. Enriquez-Martinez, No. 99101-4
While Lewis was in jail, he was also charged with failing to register as a sex
offender. Lewis pleaded guilty to failing to register in August 2012, began serving
a sentence that same day, and was given credit for the 387 days he had served thus
far in jail. Id. at 203. Later that year, he pleaded to the remaining charges and
received concurrent sentences and credit for the same 387 days. Id. The Court of
Appeals reversed. Id. (citing State v. Lewis, 185 Wn. App. 338, 346, 344 P.3d
1220 (2014)). We accepted the State’s concession that Lewis was entitled to credit
for the 387 days on all of the charges for which he was held. Id. at 205. We
reasoned:
[D]enying Lewis credit for those 387 days would result in him serving a
longer sentence than if he had been able to make bail on the various charges.
If he had been able to make bail, he would have begun serving time only
after he was sentenced. Since he received concurrent sentences, any time
served after sentencing would apply toward all of his sentences. But since
Lewis was unable to make bail, he began serving time prior to trial. If such
pretrial detention applied to only one of his sentences rather than all three,
he would be treated differently based solely on his ability to make bail. The
State concludes that such a result is precluded by our long-standing rule
from [Reanier v. Smith], 83 Wn.2d 342, 517 P.2d 949 (1974). Under
Reanier, a person unable to obtain pretrial release may not be confined for a
longer period of time than a person able to obtain pretrial release without
violating due process and equal protection. Id. at 346. We accept the State's
concession and remand for Lewis to receive credit for those 387 days of time
served on his assault and burglary sentences.
Lewis, 184 Wn.2d at 205. By contrast, once Lewis began serving his sentence for
failing to register as a sex offender, he was no longer statutorily or constitutionally
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State v. Enriquez-Martinez, No. 99101-4
entitled to credit toward the other, unsentenced, charges. Id. at 206; RCW
9.94A.505(6).
The State argues that Lewis does not apply because Enriquez-Martinez was
held on a no-bail warrant. But in a long line of cases we have rejected the
argument that a defendant can be treated differently based on whether or not they
can obtain bail. Lewis, 184 Wn.2d at 205 (citing Reanier, 83 Wn.2d 342); Phelan,
100 Wn.2d at 514. While these cases were based on the constitutional principle
that a defendant cannot be held longer because of poverty, their holdings are
broader. Lewis, 184 Wn.2d at 205 (citing Reanier, 83 Wn.2d 342); Phelan, 100
Wn.2d at 514. Simply put, a defendant is entitled to credit for all the time they
were confined on charges prior to sentencing on those charges, regardless of how
many charges they were held on. 1
We stress, however, that an offender is not entitled to credit for time held on
a pending charge if they simultaneously were serving time on a sentence already
imposed in another case. Lewis, 184 Wn.2d at 206. Nor are they entitled to credit
1
For the first time in its supplemental brief, the State argues we should dismiss this case as moot because Enriquez-Martinez has recently been deported. A case is moot if the appellate court can no longer provide effective relief. State v. Gentry, 125 Wn.2d 570, 616, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995). But we may review a moot case if it presents an issue of continuing and substantial public interest. State v. Beaver, 184 Wn.2d 321, 330, 358 P.3d 385 (2015). Whether a moot case involves a matter of substantial public interest depends on whether the issue is of a public or private nature, whether an authoritative determination is desirable to provide future guidance to public officers, and whether the issue is likely to recur. Phila. II v. Gregoire, 128 Wn.2d 707, 712, 911 P.2d 389 (1996). Given the tension between the Court of Appeals opinion below and Lewis, we decline to dismiss this case as moot.
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State v. Enriquez-Martinez, No. 99101-4
on a charge for time they are also serving on a parole or probation violation. See
State v. Williams, 59 Wn. App. 379, 382-83, 796 P.2d 1301 (1990) (quoting In re
Pers. Restraint of Phelan, 97 Wn.2d 590, 597, 647 P.2d 1026 (1982)).
CONCLUSION
We hold Enriquez-Martinez was entitled to credit for all of the time he was
confined on the Washington charges, including the time spent in custody in
Oregon. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WE CONCUR:
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