[Cite as State v. Quarels, 2026-Ohio-2394.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NOS. C-250470
C-250471
Plaintiff-Appellee, : TRIAL NOS. C/23/CRB/18200
24/CRB/3435
vs. :
DARRELL QUARLES, :
Defendant-Appellant. : JUDGMENT ENTRY
This cause was heard upon the appeals, the record, and the briefs.
For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for these appeals, allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24.
The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk:
Enter upon the journal of the court on 6/24/2026 per order of the court.
By:_______________________
Administrative Judge
[Cite as State v. Quarels, 2026-Ohio-2394.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NOS. C-250470
C-250471
Plaintiff-Appellee, : TRIAL NOS. C/23/CRB/18200
24/CRB/3435
vs. :
DARRELL QUARLES, :
Defendant-Appellant. : OPINION
Criminal Appeals From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 24, 2026
Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, and Susan M. Zurface, Chief Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Roger W. Kirk, for Defendant-Appellant.
[Cite as State v. Quarels, 2026-Ohio-2394.]
KINSLEY, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Darrell Quarles was convicted by the Hamilton
County Municipal Court of two counts of engaging in the business of security services
without a license. He challenges his convictions on appeal, arguing that the trial
court’s judgments were against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the State
failed to present sufficient evidence of the offenses at trial. Quarles also argues that
R.C. 4749.13—the statute which requires individuals who engage in the business of
security services to be specially licensed—unconstitutionally infringes on his due
process and equal protection rights. We disagree on all fronts. As explained in this
opinion, we reject Quarles’s constitutional and evidentiary arguments and affirm the
judgments of the trial court.
Background
{¶2} Following an investigation by the Ohio Department of Homeland
Security (“Homeland Security department”) and the Cincinnati Police Department
(“CPD”), Quarles was charged in two separate cases with engaging in the business of
security services without a license, first-degree misdemeanors. See R.C. 4749.13(A)
and 4749.99(A). The charge in the case numbered C/23/CRB/18200 was alleged to
have occurred at Clutch OTR bar on October 19, 2023.1 The charge in the case
numbered 24/CRB/3435 was alleged to have occurred at the Aura Room bar on
February 29, 2024.2
{¶3} Quarles filed motions to dismiss the charges in both cases, asserting that
R.C. 4749.13 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him. In particular,
1 Quarles appealed his conviction in the case numbered C/23/CRB/18200 in the appeal numbered
C-250470.
2 Quarles appealed his conviction in the case numbered 24/CRB/3435 in the appeal numbered C250471.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Quarles alleged that the statute classified employees and business owners who provide
security services into different categories and then treated them differently without a
rational basis for doing so. In his written motions, Quarles also alleged that R.C.
4749.13 is unconstitutionally arbitrary, capricious, and overbroad, although he offered
little explanation for what he meant by these terms.
{¶4} The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Quarles’s motions
to dismiss, at which Quarles called four witnesses to testify. The first witness was
Investigator Nick Gescheider, an enforcement investigator with Ohio’s Homeland
Security department. Gescheider began his testimony by addressing the purpose and
mechanics of the security services licensing requirement. To that end, Gescheider
testified that individuals who provide security services are required by law to have a
“guard card,” which he described as a special license issued by the Homeland Security
department. Gescheider indicated that “bouncers” and other staff who verify the
identification of guests outside of bars and nightclubs provide security services and
therefore fall within the “guard card” requirement. However, according to Gescheider,
the “guard card” law contains an exception. Where a business employs a person to
provide security services for the company, and the employee receives a W2 tax form
from the employer, the employee is not required to obtain a “guard card.” In other
words, as Gescheider explained, individuals working as corporate security are exempt
from the licensing requirement, but those who perform contract security services are
not.
{¶5} Gescheider further testified that the purpose of the security services
licensing requirement is to protect public safety. In particular, requiring licenses of
security personnel ensures that security guards are distinguishable from police officers
and are adept at managing public danger. He also explained that those interests may
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
not apply with the same force against private employers, who have incentives to set
their own standards for their employees who provide security.
{¶6} After addressing the licensing requirement, Gescheider explained his
investigation of Quarles’s conduct. Gescheider first came into contact with Quarles
when police responded to a shooting at a bar called Brandy’s Lounge. The police
suspected that the bar’s security guards were unlicensed and were not employed by
Brandy’s, so they alerted Gescheider.3 Gescheider then searched Quarles’s name in a
state database and found no record for him. But Gescheider spoke with Quarles, who
admitted that he operated his own private security company. Later, Gescheider was
again alerted by CPD that Quarles was serving as an unlicensed security guard, this
time at an establishment called Aura.
{¶7} Quarles’s next witness was CPD Officer Dennis Barnette. Barnette
testified that he arrived on scene at Brandy’s in response to a shooting, where he
recognized Quarles. At the time, Quarles was dressed in tactical gear and a vest that
said “fugitive response team” on the front. Barnette did not request a “guard card”
from Quarles at the time.
{¶8} Quarles next called CPD Officer Doug Horton. Horton identified
Quarles at the front of the Clutch bar, where he was working security.
{¶9} Quarles’s final witness in support of his motions to dismiss was CPD
Officer Brent Eve. Eve testified that he was aware of Quarles from his time policing
various bars in the central business district, including a time when he responded to a
fire alarm at Aura Room. Eve also testified that he had been instructed by the vice
3 Quarles was charged with a third count of engaging in the business of security services without a
license arising from the incident at Brandy’s Lounge, but the trial court found him not guilty of this offense.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
squad to request “guard cards” from security guards.
{¶10} The trial court denied Quarles’s motions to dismiss and continued the
cases for trial.
{¶11} On October 3, 2024, Quarles tried the two charges against him to the
bench. The State presented four witnesses: (1) Eve, (2) Barnette, (3) CPD Officer
Curtis Latham, and (4) Gescheider.
{¶12} Eve testified to events that occurred when he responded to a fire alarm
at Aura Room. When Eve arrived on the scene, Quarles stood at the door of the bar.
Quarles wore a bullet-proof vest and other attire that resembled a security guard.
Quarles also had a firearm. According to Eve, the bar was in operation, as he could see
people inside the building who were smoking and mingling.
{¶13} Eve was wearing a body-worn camera (“BWC”) at the time, and its
footage was admitted into evidence and played for the trial court. Eve’s BWC footage
depicted Eve asking Quarles for his “guard card.” Quarles responded that he left his
wallet at home.
{¶14} Barnette testified he observed Quarles in the parking lot of Brandy’s
Lounge when he arrived at the bar in response to a reported shooting. Quarles was
dressed in a tactical vest that said “Lieutenant Quarles.” Quarles told Barnette that he
was not working that evening.
{¶15} Latham responded to the Clutch bar on September 30, 2023 in response
to a report from undercover officers who had been conducting an operation at the
establishment related to underage drinking. When Latham arrived, he encountered
Quarles, who was wearing a vest that said “security.” Quarles also carried a firearm.
Quarles declined to provide his social security number or license information to
Latham.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶16} Like Eve, Latham wore a BWC, and his BWC footage was admitted into
evidence. Latham’s BWC footage showed Quarles managing a parking problem in
Clutch’s parking lot.
{¶17} Gescheider testified that he interviewed Quarles at his home following
the incident at Brandy’s Lounge. The interview was recorded, and the recording was
played in court. During the interview, Quarles denied working as a security guard the
night of the shooting at Brandy’s. But he acknowledged that he owns a private security
company called P&Q Security and Fugitive Recovery (“P&Q”), that he is aware of the
“guard card” requirement, and that P&Q is unlicensed. Quarles also told Gescheider
that he does not maintain contracts with the businesses that he works for but normally
gets paid $40 to $50 in cash.
{¶18} After interviewing Quarles, Gescheider searched for Quarles in a state
database for licensed security services. He was unable to find Quarles.
{¶19} The trial court found Quarles guilty of the offenses arising from Clutch
and Aura Room. Quarles moved the trial court to reconsider its verdicts, arguing that
the State had not disproven that Quarles was an employee of either Clutch or Aura
Room and was therefore exempt from the licensing requirement. The trial court
denied the motion. In both cases, it sentenced Quarles to 180 days in jail, 179 of which
were suspended. He was given credit for one day and placed on one year of community
control. The trial court remitted Quarles’s fines and court costs and stayed Quarles’s
sentences pending appeal.
Analysis
{¶20} Quarles raises three assignments of error on appeal. The first relates to
the trial court’s denial of his motions to dismiss. The second and third challenge the
weight and sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. None of Quarles’s
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
assignments of error have merit.
Constitutional Challenges
{¶21} In his first assignment of error, Quarles contends that the trial court
erred as a matter of law by denying his motions to dismiss, because R.C. 4749.13
violates his equal protection and due process rights.
{¶22} As an initial matter, our review of Quarles’s argument is frustrated by
the lack of completeness in his briefing. Quarles’s constitutional challenge comprises
a mere four paragraphs in his appellate brief, in which he fails to cite a single authority.
As Quarles has barely developed a constitutional argument, we could overrule his
assignment of error on this basis alone. See, e.g., Hall v. Waselski, 2025-Ohio-2552,
¶ 19 (9th Dist.) (“where the appellant failed to develop an argument . . . this court may
disregard those assignments of error”). But, for the sake of completeness, we address
Quarles’s claims as best we understand them. In doing so, we apply a de novo standard
of review. See State v. Hammock, 2022-Ohio-3570, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.) (holding that the
constitutionality of a statute is a legal question subject to de novo review on appeal).
{¶23} Quarles’s first allegation is that R.C. 4749.13 deprives him of equal
protection by treating private security guards differently from the employees of
businesses who provide security services for their employers. “Equal protection does
not forbid the legislature from making classifications but simply prohibits ‘treating
differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.’” State v. Duncan, 2025-Ohio-1153, ¶ 30 (1st Dist.), citing State v. Klembus, 2016-Ohio-1092, ¶ 8. Thus, where
a statute classifies individuals on the basis of a nonsuspect classification, the law will
be upheld if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest. Id. at
¶ 34. Under this rational basis standard, the government has no obligation to produce
evidence supporting either its interest or the relationship between its interest and the
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
challenged law. Pickaway Cty. Skilled Gaming, L.L.C. v. Cordray, 2010-Ohio-4908,
¶ 19. Rather, “[t]he party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the
burden to negate every conceivable basis that might support the legislation.” (Cleaned
up.) Id.
{¶24} Ohio’s security services licensing statutes create two groups—those that
require a license and those that do not. The dividing line between the groups is
employment status. Pursuant to R.C. 4749.01(H)(6), an employee of a business who
secures the employer’s property and is subjected to tax withholding by the employer
is exempt from the R.C. 4749.13 licensing requirement Quarles was convicted of
violating. Because this is a nonsuspect classification, the statutory scheme need only
be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.4 And Quarles bears the
burden of showing it is not in order to prevail.
{¶25} Quarles has made no such showing. To the contrary, at the evidentiary
hearing on Quarles’s motions to dismiss, Gescheider testified that the security services
licensing requirement is supported by the state’s interest in promoting public safety.
He explained that licenses are needed to ensure that security guards are not confused
with police officers and to promote security guards’ ability to manage public danger.
These interests are plainly legitimate. See, e.g., State v. Green, 2013-Ohio-1197, ¶ 9.
{¶26} As to whether the licensing scheme is rationally related to public safety,
Gescheider testified that the government’s concern about security guard preparedness
is less strong with respect to private employers, who have reasons to develop their own
safety standards for their employees. This explains why the license requirement
4 A suspect classification involves race, national origin, or a fundamental right, categories that are
plainly not at issue here. See Adamsky v. Buckeye Local School Dist., 73 Ohio St.3d 360, 362 (1995).
9
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
applies only to those who work for or supply external security services. Quarles
presented no evidence to undercut this assertion. He therefore failed to carry his
burden under the rational basis test, and we reject his equal protection challenge to
R.C. 4749.13.
{¶27} In addition, Quarles contends that he has a due process right to pursue
his chosen profession, which is compromised by the State’s security services licensing
requirement. We disagree. As the Ohio Supreme Court has held, “[T]he state may set
standards and regulate professions with the aim of protecting the public . . . .”
(Cleaned up.) In re Jones, 2018-Ohio-4182, ¶ 40. That is exactly what the State did
here.
{¶28} Finally, in passing, Quarles suggests that R.C. 4749.13 is
unconstitutionally vague. However, Quarles failed to develop this argument below and
has therefore waived it. See State v. Smith, 2019-Ohio-5350, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.).
{¶29} For these reasons, we overrule Quarles’s first assignment of error.
Weight and Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶30} In his second and third assignments of error, Quarles argues that his
convictions are supported by insufficient evidence and are against the manifest weight
of the evidence. We consider these assignments of error together.
{¶31} To determine whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence,
we inquire “whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991),
paragraph two of the syllabus. See State v. Curry, 2020-Ohio-1230, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.).
{¶32} When reviewing whether Quarles’s convictions are against the manifest
weight of the evidence, we sit as the “thirteenth juror.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
St.3d 380, 387 (1997). “A verdict can be against the manifest weight of the evidence
even though legally sufficient evidence supports it.” State v. Myers, 2018-Ohio-1903,
¶ 140. To evaluate a manifest weight challenge, the appellate court reviews the entire
record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, and considers the credibility
of all witnesses. State v. McKelton, 2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 328. The panel questions
whether the trier of fact clearly lost its way in resolving evidentiary conflicts and
rendered a verdict that embodies a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Wilks,
2018-Ohio-1562, ¶ 52.
{¶33} To obtain a conviction for engaging in the business of security services
without a license under R.C. 4749.13(A), the State was required to prove that Quarles
did not have a security services license and that he “[f]urnish[ed], for hire . . . guards .
. . whose primary duties are to protect persons or property.” R.C. 4749.01(D)(1)
(defining the term “business of security services” as used in R.C. 4749.13(A)). Quarles
does not dispute that he was unlicensed. Therefore, the only question is whether
Quarles furnished security services for hire at Clutch and Aura Room on the dates in
question.
{¶34} Ample evidence presented at trial proved that he did. On both
occasions, officers observed Quarles outside the bars dressed in clothing that
identified him as a security guard. At Clutch, Latham observed Quarles wearing a vest
labeled “security.” At Aura Room, Eve saw Quarles dressed in a bullet-proof vest and
other security-type attire. Quarles had a firearm on his person both times as well.
Latham’s BWC captured Quarles performing security guard functions in Clutch’s
parking lot.
{¶35} Quarles also made statements that were consistent with his
performance as a security guard. For example, when Eve asked for his “guard card,”
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
he did not deny serving as a security guard. Instead, he said his wallet was at home.
Quarles also admitted to Gescheider that he owns a security company, P&Q.
{¶36} As for the “for hire” element of R.C. 4749.01(D)(1), the evidence is also
substantial that Quarles performed security services at the bars for a financial benefit.
When interviewed by Gescheider, Quarles indicated that he was typically paid $40 or
$50 in cash for his services. In Latham’s BWC footage, Quarles also admitted that he
was “hired” to secure the parking area.
{¶37} Thus, sufficient evidence provided to the trial court supports the trial
court’s conclusion that Quarles was hired to furnish security services to Clutch and
Aura Room without a license. This is not the exceptional case where the trial court’s
verdicts were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶38} We overrule Quarles’s second and third assignments of error.
Conclusion
{¶39} Having overruled Quarles’s three assignments of error, we affirm the
judgments of the trial court.
Judgments affirmed.
BOCK and NESTOR, JJ., concur.
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