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25-P-102 Appeals Court
ADOPTION OF ZULA1 (and a consolidated case2).
No. 25-P-102.
Suffolk. April 15, 2026. – June 24, 2026.
Present: Massing, Ditkoff, & Hand, JJ.
Adoption, Care and protection, Parent's consent. Minor,
Adoption, Care and protection. Parent and Child, Adoption,
Care and protection of minor. Consent. Jurisdiction,
Juvenile Court. Practice, Civil, Standing, Care and
protection proceeding. Statute, Construction.
Petitions filed in the Suffolk County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on May 17 and June 7, 2022.
A motion to revoke consent to adoption was heard by Fabiola P. White, J., and a motion to approve an open adoption agreement was also heard by her.
Jeanne M. Kaiser for the mother.
Claire Gilchrist for Department of Children and Families.
J. Sandra Ferrigno for the child.
1 A pseudonym.
2 The consolidated case involves the same parties.
2
MASSING, J. Shortly after giving birth to Zula, the mother
agreed to the child's adoption, executing a written consent form
as required by G. L. c. 210, § 2. When the planned adoption
fell through and Zula became the subject of a care and
protection petition in the Juvenile Court, the mother filed a
motion in that matter to revoke her consent on the ground that
she had not understood the paperwork she had signed. A Juvenile
Court judge (motion judge) denied the motion on August 2, 2024.
The motion judge determined that the Juvenile Court lacked
jurisdiction because the mother consented to adoption before the
care and protection proceeding had commenced. By order dated
May 19, 2025, the motion judge likewise declined, on
jurisdictional grounds, to entertain the mother's motion to
approve an open adoption agreement. The mother appeals,
contending that the Juvenile Court possessed jurisdiction to
hear and decide both matters. The Department of Children and
Families (DCF) and the child filed briefs in support of the
mother's argument. We agree with the parties and vacate the
orders dated August 2, 2024, and May 19, 2025. The case is
remanded to the Juvenile Court for further proceedings.
Background. By the time Zula was born in 2022, the mother,
working through a private adoption agency, had chosen a family
to adopt her. In the days following Zula's birth, however, DCF
took custody of Zula's two older siblings after supporting
3
reports of neglect and abuse of all three children. See G. L.
c. 119, §§ 51A, 51B. Rather than see Zula taken into DCF
custody with her siblings, the mother -- who herself had spent
time in the foster care system -- placed the child in the care
and custody of the adoption agency. To facilitate the adoption,
the mother signed several documents, including a consent form,
described in detail below, and a form affidavit stating that she
had "no information pertaining to either the name or address of
the [b]irth [f]ather." The same day, DCF filed a petition in
the Juvenile Court under G. L. c. 119, § 24, alleging that the
mother's two older children were in need of care and protection.
Zula was not named in the petition.
At the temporary custody hearing regarding the two older
children, the father of one of them asserted that he might be
Zula's genetic father as well. When genetic marker testing
confirmed his parentage, the adoption agency determined it could
not provide long-term foster care for Zula during protracted
custody litigation and transferred custody of Zula to DCF. Zula
was then added to the pending care and protection petition
involving her two older siblings. Given the mother's previous
consent to Zula's adoption, the first judge to preside over the
care and protection proceedings declined to add the mother as a
party to Zula's case, on the ground that the mother lacked
standing.
4
The mother subsequently filed a motion in the care and
protection proceeding to revoke her consent to Zula's adoption
or, alternatively, for the judge to reconsider the decision to
deny the mother party standing. The judge made a preliminary
determination that the Juvenile Court had authority to hear the
mother's motion under its equity jurisdiction, see G. L. c. 218,
§ 59, and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the motion.
Following several continuances, the evidentiary hearing was
held by the motion judge. The mother testified that she had
agreed to allow Zula to be adopted by a particular family with
an open adoption agreement, that she felt rushed when she signed
the paperwork, and that she did not understand she had consented
to the child being adopted by any other family. The motion
judge denied the mother's motion exclusively on the ground that
the Juvenile Court lacked jurisdiction to determine the validity
of her consent because she had given it before Zula was the
subject of the care and protection case. As a result, the
motion judge reasoned, only the Probate and Family Court had
jurisdiction to decide whether the mother's consent could be
revoked. The mother timely filed a notice of appeal.
The motion judge subsequently found the father of Zula
unfit and adjudicated Zula in need of care and protection.
Thereafter, the mother, DCF, and counsel for Zula reached an
open adoption agreement with a new family, and the mother filed
5
a motion for approval of that agreement. On May 19, 2025, the
motion judge denied this motion too, reasoning that the mother
lacked standing as to Zula and the Juvenile Court therefore had
no authority to approve the agreement. DCF and counsel for Zula
then jointly filed a motion for approval of the agreement, or in
the alternative, for an order of visitation between the mother
and Zula. The motion judge also denied this motion on
jurisdictional grounds. The mother moved to file a late notice
of appeal from the order denying her motion to approve the
agreement. A single justice of this court allowed the late
appeal and consolidated it with the mother's appeal from the
August 2, 2024 order.
Discussion. 1. Standard of review. "The Juvenile Court
is a court of limited jurisdiction, which 'has no . . .
authority in the absence of a specific statutory
authorization.'" Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 473 Mass. 164, 167
(2015), quoting Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 406 Mass. 31, 34
(1989). "We review dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction de novo." Matter of an Impounded Case (No. 3), 497
Mass. 530, 533 (2026), quoting Gammella v. P.F. Chang's China
Bistro, Inc., 482 Mass. 1, 16 (2019). "We likewise 'review
questions of statutory interpretation de novo.'" Care &
Protection of Faraj, 496 Mass. 426, 429 (2025), quoting
6
Conservation Comm'n of Norton v. Pesa, 488 Mass. 325, 331
(2021).
2. Motion to revoke consent to adoption. When she first
agreed to Zula's adoption, the mother executed a consent form in
the broad language required by G. L. c. 210, § 2. The form
stated that the mother "voluntarily and unconditionally
surrender[ed]" the child to the care and custody of the adoption
agency "for the purpose of adoption or such other disposition as
may be made by a court of competent jurisdiction." Immediately
above the mother's signature the form recited, in all capital
letters as specified in the statute, "I UNDERSTAND THIS
SURRENDER IS FINAL AND CANNOT BE REVOKED." See G. L. c. 210,
§ 2, third par.
Notwithstanding clear warnings in the statute and the form
that the consent to adoption cannot be revoked, the Supreme
Judicial Court has permitted biological parents to revoke their
consent to adoption on the ground it was not knowing and
voluntary. In Adoption of Thomas, 408 Mass. 446, 450 (1990),
the court held that despite "the express terms of the statute
[that] the parents' consents are final and irrevocable," a judge
may consider evidence that consent was not voluntarily given.
"For an expression of consent [to an adoption] to be effective,
it must have been given voluntarily and on the basis of a full
understanding of the facts necessary to the consent." Id.
7
"Reasonably construed, the provision in G. L. c. 210, § 2, with
respect to the finality and irrevocability of a required consent
means only that a knowing and uncoerced expression of consent in
the statutory form and attended by the statutory procedures
shall be final and irrevocable." Id. at 451. Consenting to a
child's adoption "is in many, if not all, cases a cause of
emotional and mental stress," however, and the grounds for
invalidating consent must go beyond the "emotion, tensions, and
pressures caused by the situation." Surrender of Minor
Children, 344 Mass. 230, 236 (1962). See Adoption of Thomas,
supra at 450-451, and cases cited ("consent given under c. 210
cannot be withdrawn when the consent was submitted voluntarily
and with a full understanding").
In concluding that the Juvenile Court lacked jurisdiction
to consider the validity of the mother's consent to Zula's
adoption, the motion judge correctly noted that, to date, the
published cases involving such motions have arisen in the
Probate and Family Court. Indeed, in Adoption of Thomas, 408
Mass. at 450, the court cited Surrender of Minor Children, 344
Mass. at 234, for the proposition that the "only way to withdraw
consent to an adoption . . . is to secure the permission of a
probate judge."3 See Adoption of Derrick, 415 Mass. 439, 446
3 The full parenthetical following the court's citation to Surrender of Minor Children, 344 Mass. at 234, reads as follows:
8
(1993) (stating, in reference to 1990 versions of G. L. cc. 119,
210, "consent [to surrender] cannot be withdrawn without the
permission of the probate judge").
These cases were handled exclusively by Probate and Family
Court judges because they were decided at a time when the
Juvenile Court did not have jurisdiction over proceedings for
adoptions or to terminate parental rights. Through 1992, while
care and protection proceedings under G. L. c. 119, § 24, were
initiated in the Juvenile Court or the District Court,4 DCF was
required to bring a separate petition in the Probate and Family
Court, under G. L. c. 210, § 3, to terminate parental rights and
dispense with the need for consent to adoption. See Adoption of
Simone, 427 Mass. 34, 41-42 (1998); Custody of a Minor (No. 1),
391 Mass. 572, 575-576 (1984); Adoption of Donald, 44 Mass. App.
"(only way to withdraw consent to an adoption that was given with full understanding of all necessary facts is to secure the permission of a probate judge)" (emphasis added). Adoption of Thomas, 408 Mass. at 450. Older cases recognized the discretion of a probate judge to void even a voluntary placement of a child for adoption. See, e.g., Ellis v. McCoy, 332 Mass. 254, 258-259 (1955); Erickson v. Raspperry, 320 Mass. 333, 335 (1946).
4 Before the Statewide expansion of the Juvenile Court Department of the Trial Court, care and protection proceedings were also brought in the District Court Department. See Adoption of Simone, 427 Mass. 34, 41-42 (1998). The District Court's jurisdiction over care and protection cases was phased out in the 1990s. See St. 1992, c. 379, §§ 121, 203. Today, "[c]are and protection petitions must be initiated in the Juvenile Court." Matter of an Impounded Case (No. 3), 497 Mass. at 533.
9
Ct. 857, 859 (1998), S.C., 49 Mass. App. Ct. 908 (2000) and 52
Mass. App. Ct. 901 (2001).5
Relevant to the disposition of this appeal, critical
amendments to cc. 119 and 210 of the General Laws went into
effect in 1993. Chapter 303 of the Acts and Resolves of 1992
inserted subparagraph (4) into G. L. c. 119, § 26 (b), and
amended paragraph (b) of G. L. c. 210, § 3, to permit entry by
Juvenile Court judges of decrees dispensing with the need for
consent to adoption of children named in care and protection
petitions. See St. 1992, c. 303, §§ 2, 4. Soon thereafter, the
Legislature amended G. L. c. 210, § 1, by adding the following
language, which remains in effect today: "The district or
juvenile court may, if it appears necessary or convenient,
exercise the powers authorized by [c. 210], but only in respect
to a pending proceeding before such district or juvenile court."
See St. 1992, c. 379, § 59.6
5 The chief administrative justice of the Trial Court had the authority to designate a Juvenile Court judge to preside over the two matters simultaneously. See Adoption of Donald, 44 Mass. App. Ct. at 859.
6 Chapter 303 of the Acts and Resolves of 1992 was approved by the Governor on December 30, 1992. Chapter 379 was approved on January 13, 1993. Because they affected the jurisdiction of the courts and lacked emergency preambles, these laws went into effect thirty days later, on January 29, 1993, and February 12, 1993, respectively. See Vittands v. Sudduth, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 515, 518-519 (1996), S.C., 49 Mass. App. Ct. 401 (2000).
10
The sentence of G. L. c. 210, § 1, quoted above gave the
Juvenile Court jurisdiction to inquire whether the mother's
consent to Zula's adoption under G. L. c. 210, § 2, was valid.
The power to inquire into the validity of a birth parent's
consent to adoption is inherent in "the statutory scheme for
adoption, which clearly" -- and particularly by G. L. c. 210,
§§ 3 and 6 -- "contemplates a more active judicial role."
Adoption of Thomas, 408 Mass. at 451. Where Zula was the
subject of a pending care and protection petition in the
Juvenile Court, G. L. c. 210, § 1, gave the Juvenile Court judge
presiding over that petition the jurisdiction to exercise the
same powers with respect to consent to adoption that a Probate
and Family Court judge could exercise under c. 210.
Because the mother's request that the motion judge allow
her to revoke her consent to adoption was made after Zula's name
was added to the care and protection petition, the fact that the
mother executed the consent form before that point was not an
impediment to the Juvenile Court's assumption of jurisdiction.
The language of G. L. c. 210, § 1, plainly grants the Juvenile
Court jurisdiction over adoption matters "in respect to a
pending proceeding," like the one to determine whether Zula and
her siblings were in need of care and protection. Resolution of
the mother's motion to revoke her consent to Zula's adoption was
integrally related to the best interests of Zula at issue in
11
those proceedings. "When statutory language is clear and
unambiguous it must be construed as written." LeClair v.
Norwell, 430 Mass. 328, 335 (1999). As written, the language of
G. L. c. 210, § 1, requires only that a Juvenile Court case
concerning the subject child be pending at the time the Juvenile
Court judge seeks to exercise powers under G. L. c. 210. Cf.
Adoption of Simone, 427 Mass. at 41-43 (care and protection case
"pending" within meaning of G. L. c. 210, § 1, even after judge
adjudicated petition and terminated parents' rights).
The statutory scheme as a whole reinforces our conclusion.
See Plymouth Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal
Bd., 483 Mass. 600, 605 (2019) ("Even clear statutory language
is not read in isolation"). To begin, the relevant section
permits the Juvenile Court to exercise jurisdiction where "it
appears necessary or convenient." G. L. c. 210, § 1. This
flexible, broadly permissive language resists the application of
a strict timeline to the statute. See C.O. v. M.M., 442 Mass.
648, 651 (2004) (declining to "add to [statutory] language by
interpretation" where "Legislature drafted the statute with
purposeful flexibility"). Considering the broader statutory
scheme, if the Legislature had intended for the Juvenile Court's
jurisdiction to depend on the date the consent was executed, it
would have said so. See Dinkins v. Massachusetts Parole Bd.,
486 Mass. 605, 613 (2021), quoting Sisson v. Lhowe, 460 Mass.
12
705, 720 (2011) (Spina, J., dissenting) ("The Legislature knows
how to write exceptions . . ."). For example, G. L. c. 209C,
§ 3 (c), gives the Juvenile Court jurisdiction to adjudicate
parentage in conjunction with a care and protection proceeding,
but only if the care and protection proceeding was "initiated
before the filing of a complaint [to establish parentage] under
this [c. 209C]." General Laws c. 210, § 1, lacks such limiting
language. All this leads us to conclude that the timing of a
parent's execution of the consent form -- whether before or
after the initiation of care and protection proceedings -- has
no bearing on the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction to consider the
validity of the consent, so long as the issue is raised during
and relevant to an active proceeding.
Because the motion judge concluded that the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction, she did not reach the merits of the
mother's motion to revoke her consent. We recognize that a
Juvenile Court judge enjoys a modicum of discretion in
determining whether to exercise powers under c. 210 in
connection with a pending care and protection matter: the
Juvenile Court "may, if it appears necessary or convenient,
exercise the powers authorized by" c. 210 (emphasis added).
G. L. c. 210, § 1. Here, however, if the motion judge had
understood that subject matter jurisdiction existed, the only
reasonable course of action would have been to exercise it and
13
adjudicate the mother's motion. At the time the motion judge
declined to reach the merits of the mother's motion to revoke
her consent, the judge had already conducted an evidentiary
hearing during which the mother testified and was subject to
cross-examination, and all parties were permitted to present
their arguments as to the validity of the consent.7 Failure to
exercise jurisdiction at this juncture "introduce[d] undesirable
and unnecessary delays," Adoption of Simone, 427 Mass. at 43,
while deferring the resolution of this case and the finalization
of Zula's adoption. Moreover, if the mother had commenced an
action in the Probate and Family Court to withdraw her consent
to Zula's adoption, and a judge of that court had determined
that the mother's consent was invalid, that decision would have
had disruptive repercussions on the ongoing care and protection
matter in the Juvenile Court.
Accordingly, the motion judge erred in denying the mother's
motion to revoke her consent to Zula's adoption solely on the
ground that the Juvenile Court lacked jurisdiction.
7 The hearing satisfied the mother's due process rights. A judge need not apply "the full panoply of constitutional rights afforded criminal defendants" in determining the validity of a parent's consent to adoption; she is required only to "make an appropriate inquiry to establish that the parent's consent was knowing and voluntary." Adoption of John, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 431, 435 (2001).
14
3. Motion to approve open adoption agreement. The motion
judge also erred in concluding that the mother's lack of
standing with respect to Zula's adoption meant the Juvenile
Court had no jurisdiction to act on the mother's motion to
approve the open adoption agreement she had reached with the new
preadoptive parents. Open adoption agreements are governed by
G. L. c. 210, § 6C, which provides, "Prior to the entry of an
adoption decree, prospective adoptive parents and a birth parent
may enter into an agreement for post-adoption contact or
communication between or among a minor to be adopted, the
prospective adoptive parents and the birth parents." G. L.
c. 210, § 6C (a). The statute refers to "birth parents,"
regardless of their legal status with respect to the child. Id.8
Where the preadoptive parents have reached an open adoption
agreement with a birth parent, it is incumbent on the judge
entering the adoption decree to consider whether such an
agreement "(i) is in the best interests of the child;
(ii) contains terms that are fair and reasonable; and (iii) has
been entered knowingly and voluntarily by all parties to the
agreement." G. L. c. 210, § 6C (b). "Even where biological and
8 Indeed, even if a birth parent does not voluntarily consent to adoption and the parent's rights are terminated under G. L. c. 210, § 3, that statute specifically allows the birth parent to enter into an agreement for posttermination contact with the child and, subsequently, an open adoption agreement. See G. L. c. 210, § 3 (d).
15
prospective adoptive parents do agree on postadoption contact,
the Legislature provided for judicial involvement to approve the
agreement." Adoption of Vito, 431 Mass. 550, 559 (2000). And
where, as here, any adoption decree would be entered by the
Juvenile Court judge presiding over the care and protection
case, that same judge would have the authority to approve the
proposed open adoption agreement. See Adoption of Ilona, 459
Mass. 53, 65 n.15 (2011) ("a judge may encourage the prospective
adoptive parents and biological parents to enter into an
agreement for postadoption visitation or communication, which
must be approved by the judge issuing the adoption decree");
G. L. c. 210, § 6C (a) (open adoption agreement "may be approved
by the court issuing the termination decree under [G. L. c. 210,
§ 3]; provided, however, that an agreement under this section
shall be finally approved by the court issuing the adoption
decree").9
Conclusion. The order dated August 2, 2024, is vacated.
In connection with DCF's petition to adjudicate Zula in need of
care and protection, the Juvenile Court has jurisdiction to hear
9 Because we hold that the General Laws explicitly give the Juvenile Court jurisdiction over the matters raised in this appeal, we need not address whether, alternatively, the Juvenile Court had jurisdiction in equity. See G. L. c. 218, § 59 ("The divisions of the juvenile court department shall also have jurisdiction in equity concurrent with the supreme judicial court and with the superior court department in all cases and matters arising under the provisions of chapters 119 and 210").
16
and decide the mother's motion to revoke her consent to Zula's
adoption. The case is remanded for adjudication of that motion,
if the mother chooses to pursue it.
The order dated May 19, 2025, is vacated. The Juvenile
Court also has jurisdiction, in connection with the care and
protection petition, to hear and decide the mother's motion for
approval of the open adoption agreement. The case is remanded
for adjudication of that motion as well, if it is renewed.
So ordered.