FILED
SEPTEMBER 28, 2023
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
R.T.L.,† ) No. 39276-7-III
) (consolidated with
Appellant, ) No. 39277-5-III)
)
v. )
) PUBLISHED OPINION
K.M., )
)
Respondent. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. — R.T.L. appeals the dependency court’s order denying
intervention for her to pursue a petition for de facto parentage of her granddaughter, D.M.
The Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) commenced this
dependency action soon after D.M. was born. Months later, the dependency court placed
D.M. with her maternal grandmother. One year later, when it became apparent D.M.’s
mother would not remedy her parental deficiencies but her father might, the grandmother
moved to intervene in the dependency to pursue a petition for de facto parentage. The
dependency court concluded she lacked standing to seek such relief and denied her
motion to intervene.
† To protect the privacy interests of the minor child, we use the parties’ initials throughout this opinion. Gen. Order for Court of Appeals, In re Changes to Case Title (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2018) (effective September 1, 2018),
http://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts.
No. 39276-7-III; No. 39277-5-III
R.T.L. v. K.M.
We conclude the trial court properly denied the grandmother’s motion to
intervene. In a dependency, a relative who obtains placement of a child does not satisfy
RCW 26.26A.440(4)(c)’s requirement of undertaking full and permanent responsibilities
of a parent.
FACTS
D.M. was born July 7, 2020, to K.M., her mother, and D.B., her father. She was
placed in foster care on July 10, after a shelter care hearing at which neither parent
appeared. The father was incarcerated at the time. Both parents later entered agreed
orders of dependency placing D.M. in foster care.
R.T.L. is D.M.’s maternal grandmother. She began visitation with D.M. when
D.M. was one month old. When D.M. was approximately eight months old, DCYF
moved to change D.M.’s placement from foster care to relative placement with the
grandmother. At one point in the dependency, D.M.’s primary permanency plan goal was
a guardianship with her grandmother, not adoption, because her grandmother wanted to
give K.M. additional time to remedy her parental deficiencies.
The father was released from prison in February 2021, shortly before D.M. was
placed with her maternal grandmother. He reengaged with DCYF in November 2021 and
began visitation with D.M. in December of that year. After the father began engaging in
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No. 39276-7-III; No. 39277-5-III
R.T.L. v. K.M.
services, D.M.’s secondary permanency plan goal became reunification with him. The
mother never participated in the dependency nor did she ever engage in services.
While the dependency was active, the grandmother filed a petition in family court
for de facto parentage of D.M. D.M.’s mother joined in that petition. The grandmother
then filed a motion in dependency court for leave to proceed in family court with the de
facto parentage petition. She later moved to intervene in the dependency so as to properly
move for the relief she sought.
A dependency court commissioner denied the grandmother’s motion to intervene.
The grandmother then moved to revise the commissioner’s decision, and a dependency
court judge denied her motion. The court found that the grandmother had not set forth a
prima facie case of de facto parentage under RCW 26.26A.440, and thus she did not have
standing to intervene. The grandmother appealed to this court.
While the appeal was pending, D.M. and her father were reunified and the
dependency court dismissed this action. DCYF, joined by D.M.’s father, moved to
dismiss this appeal as moot. Our commissioner referred the decision on the motion to this
panel.
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No. 39276-7-III; No. 39277-5-III
R.T.L. v. K.M.
ANALYSIS
Because we need not address any substantive issues if a case is moot, we address
mootness first.
MOOTNESS
An appeal is moot when the reviewing court “‘can no longer provide effective
relief.’” In re Marriage of Horner, 151 Wn.2d 884, 891, 93 P.3d 124 (2004) (quoting
Orwick v. City of Seattle, 103 Wn.2d 249, 253, 692 P.2d 793 (1984)). We generally will
not review a moot appeal. Id.
DCYF and the father argue this appeal is moot because the dependency has been
dismissed and accordingly there is no case into which the grandmother may intervene.
The grandmother counters that her petition filed in family court for de facto parentage is a
separate matter not mooted by the dismissal of the dependency.
We agree that the issues relating to the grandmother’s intervention in the
dependency court are moot. But now that the dependency is dismissed, that action no
longer bars the grandmother from pursuing her de facto parentage petition in family court.
Because the dependency court’s order likely has preclusive effect in family court, a
decision from this court in the grandmother’s favor could provide her effective relief. For
this reason, her appeal is not moot.
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No. 39276-7-III; No. 39277-5-III
R.T.L. v. K.M.
PRIMA FACIE CASE OF DE FACTO PARENTAGE
The grandmother contends the dependency court erred by concluding she did not
set forth a prima facie case of de facto parentage and by denying intervention on that
basis. We disagree.
A petitioner seeking de facto parentage must first establish standing.
RCW 26.26A.440(3); Walker v. Riley, 19 Wn. App. 2d 592, 598, 498 P.3d 33 (2021).
The following procedures and rules govern a petitioner’s standing: the petitioner “must
file an initial verified pleading alleging specific facts that support the claim to parentage
of the child.” RCW 26.26A.440(3)(a). Then, an adverse party may file a responsive
verified pleading. RCW 26.26A.440(3)(b). Then, unless the court determines a hearing
is necessary to resolve factual issues material to standing, the court, based on the
pleadings, determines “whether the individual has alleged facts sufficient to satisfy by a
preponderance of the evidence the requirements of subsection (4)(a) through (g).”
RCW 26.26A.440(3)(c).
The requirements are:
(a) The individual resided with the child as a regular member of the
child’s household for a significant period;
(b) The individual engaged in consistent caretaking of the child;
(c) The individual undertook full and permanent responsibilities of a
parent of the child without expectation of financial compensation;
(d) The individual held out the child as the individual’s child;
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No. 39276-7-III; No. 39277-5-III
R.T.L. v. K.M.
(e) The individual established a bonded and dependent relationship
with the child which is parental in nature;
(f) Another parent of the child fostered or supported the bonded and
dependent relationship required under (e) of this subsection; and
(g) Continuing the relationship between the individual and the child
is in the best interest of the child.
RCW 26.26A.440(4). Because each requirement must be satisfied to maintain a de facto
parentage action, a petitioner’s failure to satisfy even one is a sufficient basis to dismiss a
petition for lack of standing.
The parties address several of the standing requirements. Because one is
dispositive, we limit our analysis to that requirement.
RCW 26.26A.440(4)(c) requires the petitioner to establish she “undertook full and
permanent responsibilities of a parent of the child without expectation of financial
compensation.” The trial court found that the grandmother could not meet the “full and
permanent responsibilities of a parent” requirement because she lacked authority to make
various important decisions for D.M.
The grandmother does not dispute that she could not make certain parental
decisions but contends the trial court’s reading of the “full” parental responsibility
requirement is hypertechnical. We disagree.
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No. 39276-7-III; No. 39277-5-III
R.T.L. v. K.M.
To determine whether the trial court correctly construed the term “full,” we must
interpret the meaning of the subsection. Our primary objective when interpreting a statute
is to discern legislative intent. Cornu-Labat v. Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 177 Wn.2d 221, 231,
298 P.3d 741 (2013). “In order to determine legislative intent, we begin with the statute’s
plain language and ordinary meaning.” Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n v. Riveland, 138
Wn.2d 9, 19, 978 P.2d 481 (1999).
Here, the legislature did not define the term “full” nor did it define the phrase “full
and permanent responsibilities of a parent.” “Where the legislature has not defined a
term, ‘this court will give the term its plain and ordinary meaning ascertained from a
standard dictionary.’” Cornu-Labat, 177 Wn.2d at 231 (quoting State v. Watson, 146
Wn.2d 947, 954, 51 P.3d 66 (2002)).
The dictionary defines “full” as “enjoying or possessed of all recognized or
authorized prerogatives, rights, and privileges.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 919 (1993). “Permanent” is defined as “continuing or enduring . . . without
fundamental or marked change[,] not subject to fluctuation or alteration.” Id. at 1683.
Accordingly, to undertake full and permanent parental responsibilities, a de facto parent
must have all the rights a typical parent would have and those rights must not be subject
to alteration.
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No. 39276-7-III; No. 39277-5-III
R.T.L. v. K.M.
A relative caregiver does not have all the rights a typical parent would have. A
caregiver’s rights are court-given, court-restricted, and court-withdrawn. A relative
caregiver receives placement in exchange for agreeing to comply with court orders,
and the child is subject to removal if the relative fails to comply with the orders.
RCW 13.34.130(10). Moreover, once a child is placed in DCYF custody, the court enters
an order granting DCFY certain authority over the child. See RCW 13.34.069. For
example, DCYF, not the relative with placement, authorizes school enrollment,
medications, and grants permission for extracurricular activities. RCW 13.34.069(4).
Also, DCYF may authorize emergency and routine medical services for a child in its
custody. WAC 110-148-1560.
Additionally, a relative caregiver’s rights are subject to alteration in a way a typical
parent’s rights are not. In a successful dependency, the relative caregiver loses placement
when the trial court orders reunification of the child with one or both parents.
For both of these reasons, a relative receiving placement of a child in the course of
a dependency cannot establish a prima facie case for de facto parentage.
8
No. 39276-7-111; No. 39277-5-111
R.T.L. V. K.M
Affirmed.
Lawrence-Berrey, J.
WE CONCUR:
Fearing, C.J. Birk, J.*
* The Honorable Ian S. Birk is a Court of Appeals, Division One, judge sitting in Division Three pursuant to CAR 2l(a).
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