[Cite as Berea v. Blackshear, 2025-Ohio-4757.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
CITY OF BEREA, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 114819
v. :
REGINALD N. BLACKSHEAR, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 16, 2025
Criminal Appeal from the Berea Municipal Court
Case No. 24CRB01037-1
Appearances:
Barbara L. Jones, City of Berea Law Director and Megan
M. Matthews, City of Berea Assistant Law Director, for
appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
Jennifer J. Pritchard, Assistant Public Defender, for
appellant.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J.:
Reginald N. Blackshear (“Blackshear”) appeals his conviction for
domestic violence. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. I. Facts and Procedural History
On August 26, 2024, a complaint was filed in the Berea Municipal
Court alleging that Blackshear, who was living with I.G. at the time, kicked I.G. in
the face in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A). The court held a hearing that same day
during which Blackshear entered a not guilty plea and the court issued a domesticviolence temporary protection order against Blackshear pursuant to R.C. 2919.26.
On November 21, 2024, the court conducted a bench trial and, on November 26,
2024, the court issued a journal entry finding Blackshear guilty of domestic violence.
On December 5, 2024, a magistrate sentenced Blackshear to pay a
$1,000 fine which was suspended; a 180-day jail sentence, with 179 days suspended
and credit for one day served; “Basic 2 Yr Probation,” which we take to mean two
years of community-control sanctions pursuant to R.C. 2929.25 and no contact with
I.G. On December 9, 2024, the court issued a journal entry adopting the
magistrate’s decision and imposing the aforementioned sentence.
II. Trial Testimony and Evidence
The following evidence was presented at trial.
I.G. testified that she was living with Blackshear in Berea on
August 26, 2024. According to I.G., she and Blackshear “had an on and off
relationship . . . since 2011.” I.G. testified that, in the late-night hours of August 25,
2024 and the early morning hours of August 26, 2024, she and Blackshear had a
disagreement about an air mattress. I.G. poked a hole in the air mattress with a
knife she had retrieved from the kitchen and then she lay down on blankets on the floor. According to I.G., when she was lying on the ground, Blackshear kicked her
in the nose “with his yellow and black LeBron James shoes.”
Asked how Blackshear caused her physical harm, I.G. testified as
follows: “I mean, he kicked me across my face this way. I was sort of insulated by
the blankets and everything. He made an attempt to kick at my body more after he
kicked me in the face, but I was on my way down the steps as quickly as I possibly
could.”
Under cross-examination about her physical injuries, I.G. testified
that her face was “sore.” When asked to identify the injury to her face from a still
photograph, as well as the video taken from a police officer’s body camera
immediately after the incident, I.G. testified as follows: “I’m not sure if I would be
able to see an injury or not, sir, because I was terrified for my life, so I ran down the
steps as quickly as I could to initiate a call to the police.” Blackshear’s attorney
cautioned I.G. that she was not answering the questions he was asking and he asked
her again if there was “an actual physical injury” to her face. I.G. answered, “Yes.
There was a physical injury to my face. I was kicked in my face right here.”
Ultimately, I.G. testified that her nose looked “a little swollen” in the photograph.
Berea Police Department Patrolman Xavier Payton (“Ptl. Payton”)
testified that he responded to a call concerning a domestic dispute “around 12:30,
12:40 in the morning” on August 26, 2024. When he arrived at the apartment
building, I.G. was sitting outside. I.G. told Ptl. Payton that she and her boyfriend,
Blackshear, lived at the address. According to Ptl. Payton, I.G. told him the following about what occurred: “She said that she and [Blackshear] had gotten into an
argument. She had been laying on an air mattress. At some point, she was dragged
off of the air mattress. And she did state to me that at some point, she popped it.
After popping the air mattress, he pulled her and kicked her in the face.”
Asked if he “examined [I.G.] physically for injuries,” Ptl. Payton
answered, “Yes . . . . I saw some redness around her nose.” Ptl. Payton further
testified that it was “not atypical” that I.G. did not “have marks or bruises where she
was injured.”
According to Ptl. Payton, he spoke with Blackshear at the scene, and
Blackshear stated that he and I.G. “were having an argument over other women that
he was seeing — or another woman he was seeing, and that made [I.G.] upset. And
I believe he stated that she’s called the police on him in the past to get him in trouble
to prevent him from leaving her.” Ptl. Payton also testified that, during Blackshear’s
transport to the police station, Blackshear alleged that I.G. “came after him with a
knife.”
The prosecutor asked Ptl. Payton the following question: “Based
upon your training and knowledge, along with the evidence that was before you on
August 26th, 2024, do you believe that Mr. Blackshear knowingly caused or
attempted to cause physical harm to his live-in girlfriend, [I.G.], by kicking her in
the face?” Ptl. Payton replied, “Yes.”
On cross-examination, Blackshear’s attorney played the video from
Ptl. Payton’s body camera as he arrived at the scene. Ptl. Payton agreed that there is a “pretty clear image” of I.G. on the video as she is speaking to him. Ptl. Payton
also agreed that there is no “redness” visible on or around I.G.’s nose in the bodycamera video.
III. Law and Argument
Blackshear raises two assignments of error on appeal.
I. The trial court erred by entering a judgment of conviction that was
against the manifest weight of the evidence, in derogation of Reginald
Blackshear’s right to due process of law, as protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as Article I,
Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution.
II. Reginald Blackshear was denied his right to effective assistance of
counsel as provided by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution as well as Section 10, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution.
A. Manifest Weight of the Evidence
A manifest-weight-of-the-evidence challenge attacks the credibility of
the evidence presented and questions whether the State met its burden of
persuasion. State v. Whitsett, 2014-Ohio-4933, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.). Weight of the
evidence “addresses the evidence’s effect of inducing belief,” i.e., “whose evidence is
more persuasive — the state’s or the defendant’s?” State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio2202, ¶ 25, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386-387 (1997). When
considering an appellant’s claim that a conviction is against the manifest weight of
the evidence, the appellate court functions as a “thirteenth juror” and may disagree
“with the factfinder’s resolution of . . . conflicting testimony.” Thompkins at 387,
citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). Furthermore, in State v. Jordan,
2023-Ohio-3800, ¶ 17, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[s]itting as the ‘thirteenth juror,’ the court of appeals considers whether the evidence should be believed and
may overturn a verdict if it disagrees with the trier of fact’s conclusion.”
In a manifest-weight challenge, the appellate court examines the
entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn
therefrom, considers the witnesses’ credibility and determines whether, in resolving
conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact ‘“clearly lost its way and created such a
manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial
ordered.”’ Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st
Dist. 1983). Reversal on manifest-weight grounds is reserved only for the
‘“exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.”’ Id.
R.C. 2919.25(A) states that “[n]o person shall knowingly cause or
attempt to cause physical harm to a family or household member.” R.C.
2919.25(F)(1) and (2) define “household member” to include someone who is
“cohabitating with the offender.” Additionally, R.C. 2901.01(A)(3) defines “physical
harm” as “any injury . . . regardless of its gravity or duration.” This court has held
that, because the word “attempt” is in the domestic violence statute, “an offender
does not have to cause a tangible injury to his victim in order to be convicted of
domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A).” State v. Stover, 2017-Ohio-291,
¶ 15 (8th Dist.).
In Blackshear’s first assignment of error, he argues that his conviction
for domestic violence is against the manifest weight of the evidence because I.G.’s
“testimony is questionable and was contradicted by the photographic evidence presented.” Specifically, Blackshear argues that the “implications of being kicked in
the face with a shoed foot while lying on the ground and the only visible evidence
captured being possibly minor swelling or redness seems incredible.”
Upon our review of the trial transcript we find that I.G. testified that
Blackshear kicked her in the face with his shoes on and attempted to kick her in the
body before she ran down the stairs and called the police. Blackshear’s argument
concerning the lack of “visible evidence” of any injury is not well-taken. To be
convicted of domestic violence under R.C. 2919.25(A), visible evidence of an injury
is not required. In other words, attempting to cause physical injury is sufficient to
violate the domestic-violence statute. See, e.g., Parma v. Singh, 2018-Ohio-5235,
¶ 18 (8th Dist.) (“[T]o be convicted of domestic violence, actual physical harm is not
required; the statute criminalizes . . . knowingly attempting to cause someone
physical harm.”).
We do not find this to be the exceptional case that weighs heavily
against the conviction. Accordingly, Blackshear’s first assignment of error is
overruled.
B. Effective Assistance of Counsel
In his second assignment of error, Blackshear argues that he was
denied his right to effective assistance of counsel because of trial counsel’s failure to
object to inadmissible testimony. Specifically, Blackshear argues that “the
prejudicial effect of permitting the introduction of improper character evidence
including years of abuse, the legal conclusion that [Blackshear ] committed the offense of domestic violence, and the arresting officer’s determination that
[Blackshear] was not truthful in the statement he provided law enforcement
demonstrates that there is a reasonable probability that the deficient performance
deprived [Blackshear] of a fair trial rendering the result unreliable.”
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must establish that his or her attorney’s performance was deficient and that the
defendant was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984). However, “a court need not determine whether counsel’s
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant
as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to
grade counsel’s performance.” Id. at 697. See also State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d
136 (1989).
It is well established that “in a bench trial, the court is presumed to
have considered only the relevant, material, and competent evidence.” State v.
Willis, 2008-Ohio-6156, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.). See also State v. White, 15 Ohio St.2d 146,
151 (1968) (“We indulge in the usual presumption that in a bench trial in a criminal
case the court considered only the relevant, material, and competent evidence in
arriving at its judgment unless it affirmatively appears to the contrary.”).
Furthermore, “failure to object to error, alone, is not sufficient to
sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v. Watson, 2020-Ohio3462, ¶ 43 (8th Dist.). The Ohio Supreme Court “has recognized that . . . failing to object to certain evidence [] is not deficient performance, especially in a bench trial.”
Id., citing State v. Keene, 81 Ohio St.3d 646, 668 (1998).
In this case, we need not analyze the allegedly improperly admitted
evidence. This court has held that “because the matter was tried to the court and
not a jury, we may presume that this improper evidence did not infect the judge’s
decision-making.” Willis at ¶ 16. See also Watson at ¶ 46 (“Any prejudicial effects
of [the] testimony were . . . eliminated by the trial court hearing the facts rather than
a jury.”).
Our review of Blackshear’s arguments on appeal shows that he failed
to argue how his counsel’s allegedly deficient performance prejudiced him.
Blackshear did nothing more than summarily conclude that his counsel’s deficient
performance was prejudicial: “[T]he failure of trial counsel to object to each of these
lines of questioning was deficient and such deficient performance prejudiced him so
as to deprive him of a fair trial.” Blackshear’s conclusory statement fails to take into
account the long-established presumption that a judge in a bench trial considers
only properly admitted evidence. Blackshear fails to argue, let alone demonstrate,
anything to the contrary.
Accordingly, Blackshear’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Berea
Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s convictions
having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR