NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: September 17, 2024
S24A0669. BROCK v. THE STATE.
COLVIN, Justice.
Appellant Wesley Brock appeals his convictions for malice
murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Ronald
Williams. 1 On appeal, Appellant contends that the evidence
1 Williams died on November 26, 2021. On February 9, 2022, a Paulding
County grand jury charged Appellant with malice murder (Count 1), felony
murder (Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), possession of a firearm during
the commission of a felony (Count 4), and concealing the death of another
(Count 5).
At a jury trial held from August 8, 2022, through August 12, 2022, the
jury found Appellant guilty on all charges. On August 12, 2022, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder (Count 1). The felony-murder count (Count 2) was vacated by operation
of law. Though the trial court purported to merge the aggravated assault count
(Count 3) into the felony murder count (Count 2), Count 3 actually merged into
Count 1, because Count 2 had been vacated. See Thompson v. State, 318 Ga.
760, 761 n.1 (900 SE2d 607) (2024). The trial court also sentenced Appellant to
five years in prison for the possession-of-a-firearm-during-the-commission-ofa-felony count (Count 4), to run consecutively to the malice-murder count, and
ten years in prison for the concealing-the-death-of-another count (Count 5), to
run consecutively to his other counts.
Appellant timely filed a motion for new trial, which he amended through
presented at trial was insufficient as a matter of constitutional due
process to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred by
declining to grant a new trial based on the general grounds, as
provided in OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21. Appellant also argues that
the State violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section
I, Paragraph I of the Georgia Constitution by misstating the law on
self-defense in its closing argument. And lastly, Appellant argues
that the Paulding County Superior Court Clerk’s Office used an outof-date list to summon jurors for his trial, and that the use of this
list violated the Paulding County Standing Order on Jury
Management, Jury Composition Rule 6 (“JCR 6”), OCGA
§ 15-12-40.1,2 and his right to an impartial jury and due process
new counsel on August 23, 2023, and supplemented on August 24, 2023.
Following a hearing on November 7, 2023, the trial court denied Appellant’s
amended motion for new trial, as supplemented, on November 10, 2023.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court on November 21,
2023. This appeal was docketed to this Court’s April 2024 term and submitted
for a decision on the briefs.
2 While Appellant inconsistently cites both OCGA § 15-12-40 and OCGA
§ 15-12-40.1 in his brief, it is clear in context that Appellant is only arguing
that OCGA § 15-12-40.1 was violated and not OCGA § 15-12-40. See OCGA
2
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
1. The trial evidence showed the following. Williams lived in
Gwinnett County with his cousin, Jackie Johnson. On November 26,
2021, he asked Johnson if she could drive him “way up [the
interstate].” She declined but offered to let him borrow her car
instead. He accepted and left home around 5:00 p.m. that evening.
When Williams did not return home, Johnson filed a missingpersons report, and a BOLO (“be on the lookout”) was issued.
On December 3, 2021, the Cobb County Police Department
contacted Johnson to inform her that her car was found at an
apartment complex located in Cobb County. After retrieving her car,
she noticed a foul odor in the vehicle and possible blood stains in her
trunk. She called the Gwinnett County Police Department (the
“GCPD”), and an officer was sent to inspect the car. The officer
impounded the vehicle so that it could be processed for evidence. The
§ 15-12-40 (providing that convicted felons and mentally incompetent persons
are ineligible to serve as jurors).
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crime scene technician who processed the vehicle also noted a
“decomposition smell,” a “slight chemical smell,” and possible blood
stains in the trunk. The stains tested positive for the presence of
human blood and matched Williams’s DNA profile.
Williams’s phone records showed that on November 26 — the
day after Thanksgiving — Williams’s phone called Appellant’s
phone at 2:20 p.m., and Appellant’s phone called Williams’s phone
twice at 5:30 p.m., with Williams’s phone pinging off the cell tower
near Williams’s home in Gwinnett County during each of these calls.
Then, around 7:00 p.m., the records showed that Williams’s phone
began pinging off a tower in Hiram, which is in Paulding County,
and which was “consistent with . . . [what] [the GCPD] w[as] seeing
from the license plate readers at the time” for Johnson’s car. The
last active communication Williams’s phone had was with
Appellant’s phone at 7:31 p.m.
Cell-site location data showing Williams’s phone leaving
Gwinnett County and entering Paulding County was corroborated
by security camera footage from a gas station near Appellant’s home,
4
where Williams stopped for a few minutes. The footage, which was
played for the jury, showed that Williams arrived at the gas station
at about 7:30 p.m. in Johnson’s Chevrolet Cruze. The footage also
showed that a Toyota 4Runner arrived shortly thereafter and
parked beside Johnson’s car. The recording revealed that after a few
minutes, the two vehicles left together by turning right out of the
gas station.
On December 8, 2021, officers arrived at Appellant’s house
with a search warrant and interviewed him. An audio recording of
the interview was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. In
the interview, Appellant told officers five versions of his last
encounter with Williams.
First, Appellant said that he last saw Williams before
Thanksgiving, when he met Williams at the gas station to purchase
cocaine. Appellant stated that he drove his Honda Civic, that he
went home after the transaction, that Williams left traveling in the
opposite direction, and that he did not know where Williams went
thereafter.
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After additional questioning during the same interview,
Appellant offered a second version of events. He conceded that he
drove his wife’s Toyota 4Runner to meet Williams at the gas station,
rather than his Honda Civic, and that he met Williams on November
26, 2021, rather than the week before Thanksgiving. Appellant
stated that he and Williams then each drove from the gas station to
a neighborhood under construction (the “neighborhood”), where,
according to Appellant, they completed the deal and parted ways
without issue.
Continued questioning yielded a third version of events.
Appellant told officers that soon after he and Williams arrived in the
neighborhood, Williams pulled a Glock on him and tried to rob him,
that he was able to get the gun from Williams, that he told Williams
never to contact him again, that Appellant then left, and that
Appellant did not have any further knowledge about where Williams
went thereafter or any knowledge about Williams’s location.
Further conversation with law enforcement officers yielded yet
a fourth variation of Appellant’s recounting, during which Appellant
6
stated Williams tried to rob him as previously relayed, but that after
Williams “fumbled” the gun, Appellant “grabbed it” from him and
“immediately shot him” in self-defense. Appellant stated that he put
Williams’s body in the trunk of Johnson’s car but he “d[idn’t] know”
if Williams was still alive when he did so. Appellant further
admitted that he returned to the neighborhood several days later;
that he drove Johnson’s Chevrolet Cruze from the neighborhood to
the apartment complex in Cobb County where it was later found;
and that he left the car there with the keys inside and with
Williams’s body still in the trunk. Despite law enforcement officers
telling Appellant that no body had been found in the trunk,
Appellant repeated several times that Williams’s body was in the
trunk of the car when he abandoned it, and that if Williams was not
in the car when it was found, then he did not know where Williams’s
body was. Appellant also told officers that the gun was inside his
Honda Civic, which officers then retrieved, and that Williams had
tried to rob him on two or three prior occasions.
Even after admitting that he shot Williams, Appellant’s story
7
changed for a fifth time. Under continued questioning, Appellant
conceded that he had given them only “90 percent” of the story, and
he agreed to show them the location of Williams’s body. Williams’s
body was soon located with Appellant’s assistance in a wooded area
behind a home in Dallas, Georgia. It had been covered with leaves
and other natural debris.
Appellant’s account of his disposal of Johnson’s car was
partially corroborated by security camera footage and witness
testimony presented by the State at trial. Footage from the
apartment complex where Appellant abandoned Johnson’s car was
admitted into evidence and played for the jury. It showed a black
Chevrolet Cruze entering the apartment complex at 7:50 a.m. on the
morning of December 1, 2021, and then the driver exiting the vehicle
and leaving the apartment complex on foot. A law enforcement
officer who reviewed the footage testified that “[he] immediately
recognized [the driver] as [Appellant].”
Additionally, a coworker of Appellant’s testified that on
December 1, 2021, he and Appellant worked at a jobsite together in
8
Cobb County. The coworker said that Appellant was forty-five
minutes late to work because his car allegedly broke down and that
Appellant asked him to give him a ride to his car in Paulding County
later that day. The coworker agreed and drove Appellant to the
neighborhood, where Appellant’s car was parked. The coworker
testified that Appellant’s car started without issue, even though
Appellant claimed that his car could not start earlier in the day.
The State also presented evidence at trial regarding the gun
used in Williams’s killing. At trial, witness Andrew Wilson testified
that in October 2021, he traded his Glock pistol for one of Appellant’s
firearms through a gun-trade website. Wilson identified Appellant
at trial as the person with whom he traded. A law enforcement
officer who testified at trial confirmed that the Glock handgun found
in Appellant’s Honda Civic was originally registered to Wilson.
Appellant testified at trial in his own defense. He stated that
he bought drugs from Williams with some regularity. Appellant
testified that Williams knew Appellant regularly bought, sold, and
traded firearms, and in early October 2021, Williams contacted
9
Appellant, seeking to acquire a particular type of handgun.
Appellant testified that he acquired the sought-after pistol by
trading one of his own firearms with Wilson for a Glock. According
to Appellant, Appellant then sold the Glock he acquired through this
trade to Williams for $600. Separately, Appellant also testified that
Williams had attempted to rob him on a prior occasion using a knife.
Appellant testified that on November 26, 2021, he arranged to
meet with Williams to buy cocaine at a gas station in Paulding
County, near Appellant’s home. Upon seeing two police cars,
Williams and Appellant decided to complete the deal elsewhere, and
Appellant suggested they meet at the neighborhood. Appellant
stated that the neighborhood was under construction at the time and
that no one was living there.
Appellant testified that after entering the neighborhood, they
parked and exited their vehicles and that Williams looked at him
with “an angry face.” Appellant said that Williams repeatedly asked
him, “[w]here’s the money,” and then pulled a gun from the back of
his pants and pointed it at Appellant. Appellant testified that this
10
was the gun he sold to Williams in October 2021. Appellant stated
that “[Williams] took a couple steps towards [Appellant], turned his
head, and that’s when [Appellant] reached out and grabbed the gun,
twisted it, pulled back[,] and took a couple steps back[.]”According
to Appellant, Williams demanded Appellant give him the gun back
and “lunge[d]” towards him. And as Williams lunged, Appellant shot
him. According to Appellant, Williams fell back into one of the car
doors, and when Appellant went to him, he was not breathing.
Appellant testified that he thought Williams was going to kill him if
he did not defend himself. Appellant said that he then opened the
trunk of Williams’s car, placed Williams’s body in the trunk, and
drove the car to the back of the neighborhood and parked it there.
Appellant left the neighborhood in the 4Runner.
Appellant testified that a few days later he returned to the
neighborhood to move Williams’s body. Appellant drove Williams’s
car, with Williams’s body still in the trunk, to another location,
where he dumped Williams’s body. Appellant said he then washed
Williams’s car at a car wash and drove it back to the neighborhood,
11
where he left it, and drove away in his Honda Civic. Appellant said
that he drove in his Honda Civic the following day back to the
neighborhood, got in Williams’s car, drove it to an apartment
complex in Cobb County, left it there, and then walked from the
apartment complex to a nearby job site.
Appellant admitted at trial that he did not initially tell officers
the entire truth during his interview. He testified that he admitted
to shooting Williams only after officers pressed him on his story and
accused him of lying. He stated that after being interviewed, he
ultimately agreed to show officers the location of Williams’s body.
On cross-examination, Appellant admitted that he agreed with
the accuracy of the evidence presented against him except for the
facts surrounding whether Appellant shot Williams in self-defense.
2. On appeal, Appellant contends that the evidence was
insufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to support his
convictions, and the trial court erred by denying Appellant’s motion
for new trial under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21. While Appellant
conflates his sufficiency and general-grounds claims in his brief, the
12
claims are “two distinct legal arguments with distinct legal
standards.” Thompson v. State, 318 Ga. at 764 (2) (citation and
punctuation omitted). Accordingly, we address each claim
separately and hold that both claims fail.
(a) When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter
of federal constitutional due process, we view the evidence presented
at trial in the light most favorable to the verdicts and consider
whether any rational juror could have found the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted.
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d
560) (1979); Pritchett v. State, 314 Ga. 767, 771 (1) (879 SE2d 436)
(2022). When doing so, “we leave to the jury the resolution of
conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence, credibility of witnesses,
and reasonable inferences to be derived from the facts, and we do
not reweigh the evidence.” Id. at 770 (1) (citation and punctuation
omitted).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence
showed that Appellant admitted to shooting and killing Williams,
13
placing his body in the trunk of Johnson’s car, hiding his body,
washing Johnson’s car to destroy evidence, and leaving Johnson’s
car at an apartment complex. Appellant did not inform law
enforcement that he shot Williams until after officers discovered
Appellant’s potential involvement and questioned Appellant while
executing a search warrant of his home. When speaking with law
enforcement, he told multiple versions of what happened on
November 26, 2021. And at trial, he stated for the first time that he
sold the Glock handgun that killed Williams to Williams a few weeks
before Williams was shot and killed with that very handgun.
This evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to reject
Appellant’s self-defense theory and find that Appellant was guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted.
See Lopez v. State, 318 Ga. 664, 668-669 (2) (898 SE2d 441) (2024)
(holding that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s
malice-murder and possession-of-a-firearm convictions where
defendant claimed self-defense and gave “shifting accounts” of how
the shooting occurred); Huff v. State, 315 Ga. 558, 563 (1) (883 SE2d
14
773) (2023) (holding that the evidence was constitutionally sufficient
to support defendant’s convictions where defendant claimed selfdefense and “[his] testimony at trial and his statements during his
interview immediately after the shooting were inconsistent” and
thus “a rational jury could have disbelieved [defendant]’s claim of
self-defense based on his own trial testimony”); Pritchett, 314 Ga. at
771 (1) (rejecting defendant’s contention that the State failed to
disprove his self-defense argument where defendant “told conflicting
stories [to the police] about what occurred, and these stories were
also inconsistent with the physical evidence”). See also Mims v.
State, 310 Ga. 853, 855 (854 SE2d 742) (2021) (“[T]he defendant’s
testimony, in which he claimed he was justified or provoked into
acting, may itself be considered substantive evidence of guilt when
disbelieved by the jury, as long as some corroborative evidence exists
for the charged offense.”). Thus, Appellant’s constitutional
sufficiency claim fails.
(b) Even when the evidence is legally sufficient to uphold a
conviction, a trial judge may grant a new trial if the verdict of the
15
jury is “contrary to evidence and the principles of justice and equity,”
OCGA § 5-5-20, or if the verdict is “decidedly and strongly against
the weight of the evidence,” OCGA § 5-5-21. See Wilkerson v. State,
307 Ga. 574, 574-575 (837 SE2d 300) (2019). When a defendant
properly raises these grounds for new trial, commonly known as the
“general grounds,” the trial court exercises broad discretion to sit as
the “thirteenth juror” and consider matters typically reserved to the
jury, including conflicts in the evidence, witness credibility, and the
weight of the evidence. King v. State, 316 Ga. 611, 616 (2) (889 SE2d
851) (2023). The trial court exercised this discretion in its order
denying Appellant’s motion for new trial and Appellant does not
argue otherwise; instead, he merely argues that the trial court
abused this discretion when denying his motion for new trial. But
“[t]he merits of a trial court’s discretion on the general grounds are
not subject to our review—that decision is vested solely in the trial
court.” Lee v. State, 318 Ga. 412, 418 (3) (897 SE2d 856) (2024)
(citation and punctuation omitted). Accordingly, Appellant’s
argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new
16
trial based on the general grounds presents us nothing to review.3
3. Appellant also contends that the State violated Appellant’s
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section I, Paragraph I of the
Georgia Constitution by misstating the law of self-defense during its
closing argument.
In the State’s closing arguments, the prosecutor stated:
[T]he defense made a point about how I didn’t tell you that
you don’t have to retreat. No, you absolutely do not have
to retreat. You do not have to. You do not have to retreat
in a situation where you are justified. But you know what?
You should. [Appellant] had other things he could have
done.
(Emphasis supplied). Defense counsel did not object to the statement
during or after the State’s closing argument.
Because defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s
3 At times in the past, we have performed a Jackson sufficiency analysis
in evaluating the general grounds. See, e.g., Montgomery v. State, 315 Ga. 467,
474 (3) (883 SE2d 351) (2023). While many of us “question whether it is proper
for this Court to import Jackson into an appellate review of the general
grounds,” we need not resolve that question here because Appellant raised both
claims, and because, as held in Division 2 (a), the evidence against Appellant
was constitutionally sufficient to affirm his convictions. King, 317 Ga. at 616
n.8 (2).
17
allegedly improper statement in closing arguments at trial, this
claim is not preserved for ordinary appellate review. See Thompson,
318 Ga. at 766 (3) (holding that the appellant’s claim of error
regarding the prosecutor’s statement in closing was not preserved
for appellate review because defense counsel failed to object). And
plain error review does not apply to statements made in closing
arguments for which no objection was made. See Gates v. State, 298
Ga. 324, 328-329 (4) (781 SE2d 772) (2016) (explaining that “alleged
errors . . . based on improper remarks during closing arguments are
not subject to review on appeal for plain error” where no objection
was made). Appellant’s claim therefore presents nothing for review.4
4 As the cases cited by Appellant indicate, prosecutors “share the duty to
ensure a fair trial,” see e.g., Sammons v. State, 279 Ga. 386, 388 n.12 (2) (612
SE2d 785) (2005) (stating that prosecutors “may alert” the trial court of the
need to pause the proceedings if the defendant is not present), and the trial
court may respond sua sponte to alleged misstatements of law by the
prosecution, see Davis v. State, 234 Ga. 730, 731 (2) (218 SE2d 20) (1975)
(holding that the trial court did not err by denying an untimely motion for
mistrial regarding the trial court’s response to an alleged misstatement of the
law by the prosecution to which no objection had been made). But Appellant
cites no authority requiring reversal where there was no objection to a
prosecutor’s alleged misstatement of the law during closing arguments. That
said, our conclusion that Appellant’s claim presents nothing for our review
should not be misunderstood as approval of the prosecutor’s statement.
18
4. Lastly, Appellant argues that the Paulding County Superior
Court Clerk’s Office (the “Clerk’s Office”) improperly used the 2021
Master Jury List to summon jurors for his trial beginning August 8,
2022, rather than the 2022 Master Jury List. Appellant claims that
this putative error violated the trial court’s Standing Order on Jury
Management, JCR 6, OCGA § 15-12-40.1, and his right to an
impartial jury and due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. For the reasons
explained below, we disagree.
The composition, dissemination, and use of master jury lists is
governed chiefly by OCGA § 15-12-40.1 and the JCR promulgated by
this Court pursuant thereto. See Ricks v. State, 301 Ga. 171, 173-178 (1)-(2) (800 SE2d 307) (2017) (describing the Jury Composition
Reform Act, Ga. L. 2011, p. 59, which includes OCGA § 15-12-40.1,
and explaining the then-current version of the JCR); OCGA
§ 15-12-40.1 (i) (authorizing this Court to “establish, by rules,
reasonable standards for the preparation, dissemination, and
technological improvements of the state-wide master jury list and
19
county master jury lists”). As relevant here, OCGA § 15-12-40.1
requires the Council of Superior Court Clerks to compile a statewide master jury list, and, from this list, to “disseminate . . . a county
master list” to county clerks on July 1 of each year. OCGA
§ 15-12-40.1 (a), (d). The statute further specifies that the clerk in
each county “shall choose a random list of persons from the county
master jury list to comprise the venire.” OCGA § 15-12-40.1 (h).
JCR 6, in turn, governs the time by which annual county master
lists must be used by county clerks. It states that
[t]he Council [of Superior Court Clerks] shall certify new
county master jury lists on July 1 of each year . . . . A new
county master list shall be used by the clerk to summon
jurors by the later of:
i. three months after list certification, or
ii. the first summoning of jurors after list
certification.
In addition to OCGA § 15-12-40.1 and the JCR, the Superior Court
of Paulding County issued a Standing Order on Jury Management,
dated August 11, 2017. The Standing Order provides, among other
things, that the annual county master list issued by the Council of
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Superior Court Clerks “shall constitute the jury list of [Paulding]
County effective as of July 1 of each such year.” The Standing Order
further provides that the Clerk “shall be authorized” to mail juror
summonses “at least 25 days prior” to the date such jurors are
required to appear.
On August 8, 2023 — exactly one year after the start of
Appellant’s trial — the Clerk’s Office discovered that it had never
implemented the 2022 Master Jury List and that it had continued
to summon jurors using the 2021 Master Jury List through the date
of this discovery. News of this issue was spread quickly to the Public
Defender’s Office for the Paulding County Judicial Circuit, among
others, and on August 24, 2023, Appellant filed a supplement to his
amended motion for new trial, raising the claims at issue here. The
trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which members of
the Clerk’s Office provided testimony regarding its use of the 2021
Master Jury List and their discovery of its failure to implement the
2022 Master Jury List. Based on the evidence presented, which was
undisputed, the trial court denied Appellant’s claims. In doing so, it
21
found that the Paulding County Clerk’s Office used the 2021 Master
Jury List when it mailed summonses to prospective jurors on or
about July 5, 2022, for Appellant’s August 8, 2022, trial. It further
found that that the Clerk’s Office failure to use the 2022 Master List
for later trials “was unintentional and unknown to the Clerk’s Office
until on or about August 8, 2023,” at which time it immediately
notified the County Attorney and the Chief Judge of the Paulding
County Judicial Circuit. The Chief Judge then notified the District
Attorney’s Office, who in turn informed the Public Defender’s Office
by written memorandum. Pursuant to a joint stipulation of the
parties, the trial court found that each of the 40 prospective jurors
on Appellant’s panel was listed on both the 2021 and the 2022
Master Jury Lists. Based on these findings, the trial court concluded
that the Clerk Office’s use of the 2021 Master Jury List was proper
under JCR 6 and that there was no prejudice to Appellant. It
accordingly denied Appellant’s claims. We review the trial court’s
factual findings for clear error and independently apply the law to
the facts. See Smith v. State, 275 Ga. 715, 720 (4) (571 SE2d 740)
22
(2002) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Appellant argues that the Clerk’s Office’s use of the 2021
Master Jury List to summon jurors for his trial violated OCGA
§ 15-12-40.1 and JCR 6, but this claim fails. A violation of JCR 6
would have occurred only upon the continued use of the 2021 Jury
Master List for summonses sent on or after October 1, 2022. See
JCR 6 (providing, as relevant here, that the Council of Superior
Court Clerks shall certify “new county master jury lists on July 1 of
each year” and that county clerks are required to begin using the
new county master jury lists no later than “three months after list
certification,” i.e., by October 1). But here, summonses were sent on
July 5, 2022 — well before the deadline. While evidence adduced at
the motion for new trial hearing showed that the Clerk’s Office
continued to summon potential jurors using the 2021 Jury Master
List for other trials until August 2023, Appellant’s trial was not
among those that used the 2021 Jury Master List past the deadline
set by the JCR. Further, Appellant’s jurors were chosen from “a
random list of persons from the [2021 Master Jury List]” as required
23
by OCGA § 15-12-40.1 (h). For these reasons, the Clerk’s Office did
not violate JCR 6 or OCGA § 15-12-40.1, and the trial court did not
err by denying these claims.
Notwithstanding the Clerk’s Office’s compliance with JCR 6,
Appellant argues that the Clerk’s Office failed to comply with the
Paulding County’s own Standing Order, which requires the Clerk’s
Office to begin using new county jury lists on July 1 of each year.
Because the Clerk’s Office failed to do so, Appellant claims, he is
entitled to a new trial. But while Appellant cites authority that a
violation of OCGA § 15-12-40.1 or the JCR may require reversal, he
cites no authority that a violation of a local standing order that is
more restrictive than the JCR mandates any particular remedy.
Turning to his constitutional arguments, Appellant fails to
show that the trial court’s use of the 2021 Master Jury list in
accordance with JCR 6 violated his rights to an impartial jury and
due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. While Appellant points to cases showing
that he is entitled to a fair and impartial jury under the Sixth
24
Amendment to the United States Constitution as a general matter,
he does not provide any authority suggesting he was entitled to the
use of a particular jury list other than the one provided for by OCGA
§ 15-12-40.1 and JCR 6. And “[i]t is well settled that a defendant
does not have a right to a particular juror but rather only has a right
to a legal and impartial jury.” Saylor v. State, 316 Ga. 225, 232-233
(3) (887 SE2d 329) (2023). Moreover, Appellant gives us no reason
to believe that his jury was partial: each member of the jury was also
on 2022 Jury Master List, and Appellant does not suggest that he
would have objected to the same panel of jurors if drawn from that
list. Appellant argues only that he could have received a different
jury. While this is true, Appellant fails to provide any authority
suggesting that he was entitled to such a jury, or that the trial
court’s use of the 2021 Master Jury List in accordance with the JCR
violated the federal Constitution. As such, his claim fails.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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