NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: September 17, 2024
S24A0670. PYNE v. THE STATE
LAGRUA, Justice.
Appellant Jacob Pyne appeals his convictions for malice
murder and other crimes related to the July 6, 2016 shooting death
of Gerard Foster.1 On appeal, Pyne contends that his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance at trial and that the trial court erred
1 On October 6, 2016, a DeKalb County grand jury indicted Pyne for
malice murder (Count 1), two counts of felony murder (Counts 2 and 3),
aggravated assault (Count 4), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon
(Count 5), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count
6). A jury trial was held on May 30, 2017, through June 2, 2017, and the jury
found Pyne guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced Pyne to life in prison
without the possibility of parole on the malice murder count (Count 1), five
years to serve to run concurrent with Count 1 on the possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon count (Count 5), and five years to serve to run consecutive to
Count 1 on the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony count
(Count 6). All other counts were merged or vacated by operation of law. Pyne
filed a timely motion for new trial, which was amended through new counsel.
After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion for new
trial on January 3, 2024. Pyne filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court, and
the case was docketed to the April 2024 term and submitted for a decision on
the briefs.
by overruling Pyne’s objection to certain statements the prosecutor
made during his closing argument and by failing to give a curative
instruction in response to those statements. Seeing no merit to
these claims, we affirm Pyne’s convictions.
The evidence presented at trial established that, around 6:00
a.m. on July 6, 2016, Pyne, Christoyna Section, 2 and K.C.—two
women who worked as prostitutes for Pyne—were riding around the
Decatur area in K.C.’s black Chevrolet Impala. K.C. was driving the
car, and at Pyne’s direction, she drove the group to an apartment
complex. K.C. and Section testified that they had never been to this
apartment complex before and did not know why they were there
that morning. K.C. parked the car on a nearby street, and Pyne
ordered Section to get out of the car because he had been arguing
with her. Section exited the car, and after about 20 minutes, Pyne
exited the vehicle as well, telling K.C. to “wait on him.”
Pyne and Section walked over to the apartment complex and
2 Section was indicted as a co-defendant in this case, and she later
entered a guilty plea, which is not a part of the record on appeal.
2
sat down on the stairs leading up to the apartments. Section
testified that she and Pyne started arguing again, and after about
45 minutes, Pyne began “clutching at his waistline where he ke[pt]
his gun”—a gun she saw him carrying that morning. Section
testified that she “was trying to calm [Pyne] down,” and as she was
doing so, she “s[aw] a figure of a man coming down the steps.”
Section heard the man—later identified as Foster—say to Pyne,
“Excuse me, Young Brother.” According to Section, Pyne told her
that “[she] better not move,” and he turned towards Foster and
began insulting and yelling at him. While Pyne was shouting at
Foster, Section “took that chance to run,” testifying that “[Pyne] had
scared [her] when he was clinching at his waist . . . [and] was talking
crazy, looking deranged.” Section testified that, as she was running
away, she “heard shots,” and she “ran to [K.C.’s] car” because she
“wasn’t sure if [Pyne] was shooting at her.”
K.C., who had been waiting in the car, saw Section running
towards the car, with Pyne right behind. Section and Pyne entered
the car, and K.C. drove the group back to the hotel where they were
3
staying. K.C. testified that, when Pyne entered the car, he was
holding a gun, but K.C. never saw Section with a gun. Section
testified that, when they returned to the hotel, Pyne told her and
K.C. that he “watch[ed] a motherf**ker take their last breath.” A
short time later, Pyne “grabbed [K.C.’s] keys” and “took [her] car.”
Section later turned herself in to law enforcement when she learned
that she was wanted in connection with a murder.
Around 8:00 a.m., law enforcement officers with the City of
Decatur Police Department were dispatched to the apartment
complex. One of the responding officers testified that, when he
arrived at the apartment complex, he saw Foster “lying on the
stairwell” leading to the apartments and observed that Foster
“wasn’t responding” and “was bleeding heavily.” Several .40 caliber
shell casings—later determined to have been “fired from the same
firearm”—were located around Foster’s body, but the murder
weapon was never recovered by law enforcement officers. At trial,
the medical examiner testified that Foster was shot four times and
that the cause of death was “gunshots of the head, neck, and torso.”
4
During their investigation that morning, law enforcement
officers obtained surveillance video recordings from cameras
installed around the exterior of the apartment complex, and the
recordings were played for the jury at trial. The surveillance video
recordings showed a black Chevrolet Impala driving around the
parking lot of the apartment complex prior to the shooting, and
shortly thereafter, the same car drove over and parked on an
adjacent side street, with a woman exiting the car at 6:20 a.m. and
a man exiting the car at 6:40 a.m. The Impala remained parked on
the nearby street until 7:57 a.m., at which point the surveillance
video recordings captured the same two individuals who previously
exited the Impala running back towards and entering the car, which
then sped away. From these surveillance video recordings, officers
obtained the Impala’s tag number and learned that the car was
registered to K.C.
Later on July 6, law enforcement officers located K.C.’s Impala
at a residence connected to Demarcus White, a friend of Pyne’s, and
they towed the vehicle to department headquarters. After obtaining
5
a search warrant and conducting a search of the vehicle, law
enforcement officers located Pyne’s cell phone and a credit card in
his name inside the vehicle. Law enforcement officers obtained a
search warrant for Pyne’s cell phone, and a data extraction of the
cell phone revealed that, on July 1, 2016—five days before the
shooting—the cell phone had been used to take a photograph of the
outside of Foster’s apartment at the apartment complex, and the
photograph also captured what was later determined to be Foster’s
car. Additionally, the data extraction revealed that Pyne’s cell phone
had been in the general proximity of the apartment complex at the
time of the shooting, and the apartment complex’s address had been
entered into the phone’s GPS system on the morning of July 6.
On July 7, 2016, the day after the shooting, law enforcement
officers interviewed White over the telephone, and the interview was
recorded and played for the jury at trial. White also testified at trial.
During that phone interview, White stated that, on July 6, Pyne
drove K.C.’s vehicle to the home of one of White’s friends, and Pyne
told White that he “f**ked up” and “f**ked around and shot a deacon
6
at a church.”3 Pyne was in possession of a gun at that time, and he
tried to give the gun to White, who refused to take it. While Pyne
was inside the house, law enforcement officers arrived and towed
K.C.’s car, and Pyne expressed concern that his cell phone was inside
the car. White told law enforcement officers during the interview on
July 7 that, based on his conversation with Pyne, Pyne was “about
to leave to go to Tennessee” and that Pyne’s “girlfriend [was] on the
way to come get him.” On July 9, 2016, Pyne was arrested in
Knoxville, Tennessee at the home of his girlfriend.
1. Pyne first contends that his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to object when the State allegedly
pursued inconsistent theories of prosecution at trial. For the
reasons that follow, Pyne’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
fails.
“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant generally must show that counsel’s performance was
3 At trial, Foster’s wife testified that Foster was ordained as a deacon in
their church.
7
deficient, and that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice to
the defendant.” Moss v. State, 311 Ga. 123, 126 (2) (856 SE2d 280)
(2021) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-695 (104
SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)). “To prove deficient performance,”
a defendant “must show that his counsel performed in an objectively
unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in light of
prevailing professional norms.” Ward v. State, 313 Ga. 265, 273 (4)
(869 SE2d 470) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).
The reasonableness of counsel’s conduct is examined from
counsel’s perspective at the time of trial and under the
particular circumstances of the case, and decisions
regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for
an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently
unreasonable that no competent attorney would have
followed such a course.
Taylor v. State, 312 Ga. 1, 15-16 (6) (860 SE2d 470) (2021) (citations
and punctuation omitted). See also Robinson v. State, 278 Ga. 31,
36 (2) (d) (597 SE2d 386) (2004) (“As a general rule, matters of
reasonable trial tactics and strategy, whether wise or unwise, do not
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel,” and “[a] reviewing court
evaluates trial counsel’s performance from counsel’s perspective at
8
the time of trial.”). Our assessment is an objective one, not based on
the subjective views of trial counsel. See Lane v. State, 312 Ga. 619,
623 (2) (a) (864 SE2d 34) (2021) (noting that “we are not limited in
our assessment of the objective reasonableness of lawyer
performance to the subjective reasons offered by trial counsel for his
conduct”) (citation omitted).
“To satisfy the prejudice prong, a defendant must establish a
reasonable probability that, in the absence of counsel’s deficient
performance, the result of the trial would have been different.”
Moss, 311 Ga. at 126 (2). “If an appellant fails to meet his or her
burden of proving either prong of the Strickland test, the reviewing
court does not have to examine the other prong.” Id. (citation and
punctuation omitted).
As mentioned above in footnote 2, Section was indicted as a codefendant in this case, and she entered a guilty plea 4 after Pyne’s
trial. Section was compelled to testify at Pyne’s trial by an order of
testimonial immunity. Section testified about this immunity
4 The record does not reflect the crimes to which Section pleaded guilty.
9
agreement during the State’s direct examination of her at trial, and
she testified that she did not receive a deal in exchange for her
testimony. At Pyne’s request, the trial court also instructed the jury
regarding immunity agreements.
During the State’s direct examination of Section, the
prosecutor asked Section if she “kill[ed] anybody,” and she
responded, “No, sir.” The prosecutor then asked whether Section
“played a role in the murder” of Foster, to which Section responded,
“Not knowingly, sir.” The prosecutor asked Section if she
“voluntarily participate[d] in” Foster’s murder and/or was “trying to
get back at him for something,” and Section replied, “No, sir” and
testified that she did not know Foster. During cross-examination,
defense counsel pointed to Section’s statement on direct that she was
not “involved in the murder” and asked her whether “the State
disagree[d]” with this statement since she was “obviously a
defendant in this case, right?” Section responded, “Yes, sir.”
On appeal, Pyne contends that, because the State indicted
Section as Pyne’s co-defendant and also elicited testimony from
10
Section at trial that “she was in no way involved with any of the
criminal acts appearing in the indictment,” the State “presented and
argued” two “contradictory” and “inconsistent theories of
prosecution in the same trial.” Pyne further contends that his
“[t]rial counsel’s failure to object” to the State’s presentment of
allegedly inconsistent theories and failure to argue that this line of
questioning violated Pyne’s due process rights was “objectively
unreasonable,” and that, “absent trial counsel’s ineffective
assistance,” the outcome of the proceedings would have been
different. We disagree.
As an initial matter, this Court has not affirmatively held that
the State’s use of inconsistent theories against two separately tried
defendants charged with the same crimes violates a defendant’s
state or federal due process rights. Moody v. State, 316 Ga. 490, 539
(9) (888 SE2d 109) (2023) (“In the past, we have assumed that there
could be a due process problem if the State uses inherently factually
contradictory theories, while at the same time we have noted that
there is perhaps some doubt as to whether such a due process right
11
exists.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). See also Battle v. State,
305 Ga. 268, 274 (2) (b) (824 SE2d 335) (2019) (noting that the
Eleventh Circuit has “cast[] doubt on whether such a due process
right exists”) (citing United States v. Hill, 643 F3d 807, 832-834
(11th Cir. 2011)). Pyne concedes as much on appeal, noting that “[i]t
has not been established conclusively that the State pursuing
inconsistent theories of prosecution that were contradictory and
contained inconsistent factual premises in separate trials of codefendants violates a [d]efendant’s due process rights. . . .”
What is more, while Section was indicted with Pyne for crimes
connected to Foster’s murder, she never went to trial on those
charges because she entered a guilty plea. By contrast, in the cases
where we previously addressed the use of inconsistent theories by
the prosecution, the State had allegedly used inconsistent theories
to prosecute multiple defendants for the same crime in separate
trials. See Moody, 316 Ga. at 539-540 (9). See also Battle, 305 Ga.
at 272 (2) (a). Pyne acknowledges that there were no separate trials
here, but he nevertheless argues—without supporting legal
12
authority—that his trial counsel should have objected and argued
that Pyne’s due process rights were violated because “[t]he State
presented two inconsistent theories during the trial of [Pyne’s] case
itself.”
The State’s contention that Pyne was the shooter, while also
questioning Section about what she witnessed and what her
potential involvement in the shooting might have been, did not
amount to the presentment of “inherently factually contradictory
theories” against Pyne at his trial. See Battle, 305 Ga. at 274 (2) (b).
And Pyne’s trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to
pursue this argument because there was no clearly-established due
process objection to make. See State v. Spratlin, 305 Ga. 585, 593
(2) (a) (826 SE2d 36) (2019) (concluding that trial counsel’s failure
to object to an unsettled question of law was not deficient
performance). See also Moody, 316 Ga. at 539-540 (9).
Because we conclude there was no deficiency in trial counsel’s
performance here, we need not examine the prejudice prong. See
Thomas v. State, 311 Ga. 706, 712 (1) (b) (859 SE2d 14) (2021) (“If
13
the defendant fails to show either deficiency or prejudice, this Court
need not examine the other prong of the Strickland test.” (citation
and punctuation omitted)). Based on the above, Pyne’s argument
that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance fails.
2. Pyne also contends that the trial court committed reversible
error by overruling Pyne’s objection to certain statements the
prosecutor made during his closing argument and by failing to give
a curative instruction to the jury regarding those statements.
Specifically, Pyne claims that, during the State’s closing, the
prosecutor referred to comments made by defense counsel in Pyne’s
closing about Foster’s visits to pornographic and adult dating
websites the day before he was killed. Pyne asserts that the
prosecutor allegedly argued that, if Pyne had wanted the jury to
consider Foster’s web searches and how they connected Foster to
Section, Pyne should have produced more evidence of that
connection at trial. Pyne contends that these statements by the
prosecutor “amounted to impermissible burden shifting” and a
“comment on [Pyne’s] right to remain silent.” We see no abuse of the
14
trial court’s discretion in this regard. See Moore v. State, 307 Ga.
290, 297 (5) (835 SE2d 610) (2019) (concluding that “a prosecutor is
granted wide latitude in the conduct of closing argument, the bounds
of which are in the trial court’s discretion”) (citation and punctuation
omitted).
To assess Pyne’s claim that the prosecutor’s statements
amounted to impermissible burden-shifting and a comment on his
right to remain silent, we must look at those statements in context.
See Adams v. State, 283 Ga. 298, 302 (3) (e) (658 SE2d 627) (2008)
(“Closing arguments are judged in the context in which they are
made.”). As relevant here, that means we not only look at the closing
argument in which the allegedly offending statements were made,
but also the jury instructions that preceded them. See Johnson v.
State, 312 Ga. 481, 490-491 (3) (863 SE2d 137) (2021) (considering
the trial court’s preliminary instructions, as well as the final charge,
to determine whether the jury was “adequately informed” of the
applicable law).
After the trial court swore the jury in, the trial court gave the
15
jury preliminary instructions, which included the following: (1)
“[t]he defendant is presumed innocent until he is proven guilty”; (2)
“[t]he defendant enters upon the trial of the case with a presumption
of innocence in his favor,” which “remains with the defendant until
it is overcome by the State with evidence that is sufficient to
convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty
of the crime or crimes charged”; (3) “[t]he burden of proof rests upon
the State to prove every material allegation of the indictment and
every essential element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable
doubt”; (4) “[t]here is no burden of proof upon the defendant
whatsoever, and the burden never shifts to the defendant to prove
his innocence”; and (5) “[i]f the State fails to prove the defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it would be your duty to acquit the
defendant.”
During Pyne’s opening statement, defense counsel told the jury
that it would hear “undisputed testimony that Mr. Pyne ha[d]
absolutely no connection with Mr. Foster” and that “Mr. Foster had
a somewhat secretive past.” Defense counsel explained to the jury
16
that Foster, who was “by all accounts, a strong Christian” also had
“another side” that it would “hear about”—“a side his own wife didn’t
know about.” Defense counsel then advised the jury that Foster’s
“cell phone records” would be presented at trial and would reveal
that “[Foster] was looking at a number of websites,” including
“dating websites” and “pornographic websites up until the day
before he was shot.” And defense counsel emphasized that Foster’s
visits to these websites, particularly the dating website, would show
“the connection with Ms. Section” because “[h]ere you have someone
who’s living a secret life, dating websites, and a prostitute,” and this
“connection” gave “Ms. Section the motive” to shoot Foster—the
“motive Mr. Pyne [did]n’t have.”
At trial, the State called Lisa Arnold, a GBI digital forensic
investigator, to testify regarding her examination and data
extraction of Pyne’s cell phone. During Pyne’s cross-examination of
this witness, defense counsel questioned Investigator Arnold about
whether she had also performed a data extraction of Foster’s cell
phone, which was collected during the investigation, and she
17
indicated that she had done so. Investigator Arnold testified that the
data extraction from Foster’s cell phone demonstrated that a user of
the cell phone visited multiple pornographic websites and a dating
website in the weeks and days before the shooting. 5 This evidence
was the only evidence presented at trial concerning Foster’s alleged
visits to pornographic and dating websites or establishing that
Foster’s cell phone had been utilized to visit such websites.
Additionally, Section testified at trial that, although she worked as
a prostitute, she never had “any dates” with Foster, she did not know
Foster, and she had never seen Foster or been to the apartment
complex where Foster lived before the morning of the shooting.
Nevertheless, during Pyne’s closing argument, defense counsel
argued that, because Section was a “known prostitute” and because
Foster had a secret side” in which he “visited pornographic sites”
and “adult dating sites,” Section and Foster likely had a
“connection.” Highlighting that the “undisputed evidence” showed
5 Excerpts from the data extraction of Foster’s cell phone summarizing
this web history were admitted into evidence at trial.
18
that “Section was there” when the shooting occurred, defense
counsel argued that it made “all the sense in the world” for Section
to have been the shooter. Defense counsel emphasized that Section
was not “trustworthy” or “credible” and the jury could not “expect
her to come in here and tell the truth when she’s got another
person’s life in her hand.” Defense counsel argued that, “if anyone
ha[d] a motivation to maybe not be forthright with the truth,” it
would be Section, who was “facing down the barrel of a murder
conviction” and would want to “distance” herself or “minimize [her]
role” in the shooting of Foster. Defense counsel conceded that the
State did “not have to prove motive” in this case, but argued that
“[t]here ha[d]n’t been any evidence introduced” at trial to give the
jury “the why[,] . . . at least not with respect to Mr. Pyne,” and no
apparent connection between Pyne and Foster had been made.
Defense counsel then reminded the jury that, according to one of the
investigators who testified at trial, “random killings are very rare,”
arguing that, “typically, people have to have some connection, some
relationship, something of that nature” for a murder to occur, and
19
“Ms. Section ha[d] that.”
The prosecutor made the following statements in his closing
argument:
[T]he only evidence presented—it’s not really evidence—
[was] that there [were] some dating sites on a phone and
some pornographic websites on a phone. We don’t know
where they came from. There’s no connection to
Christonya Section. She was very candid and frank about
what her profession was. When she testified, she didn’t
hold anything back. She told you the website that she
uses is BackPage.com. There was no information about
BackPage.com presented to you on Mr. Foster’s phone at
all. So, that is to be completely stricken from your
consideration because you’ve not seen anything, any
connection to a prostitute being responsible. . . . And then
there [were] some page[s] of web history [that] [were]
submitted in evidence. We don’t know who generated it.
We don’t know. There was no profile, a dating profile that
was presented. There was no number. There was nothing.
And, if there had been you would have seen it. . . . You
didn’t see it because it doesn’t exist.
Defense counsel objected on the grounds that the prosecutor’s
comment amounted to “burden shifting.” The trial court overruled
the objection.
On appeal, Pyne argues that the prosecutor’s comments on the
defense’s failure to introduce evidence of a connection between
20
Foster and Section amounted to “impermissible burden shifting”
because “the clear conclusion the jury was left to draw was that
[Pyne] bore the responsibility of producing evidence of the existence
of a dating profile or some other information” in order for the jury to
consider Pyne’s theory that Section was the shooter. Pyne further
argues that the prosecutor’s remarks were improper because the
jury would naturally interpret such remarks as a comment on Pyne’s
right to remain silent and not to testify, and the trial court should
have given a curative instruction to the jury regarding these
statements by the prosecutor. We disagree because, in context, the
State’s comments would not have reasonably been understood as
impermissible burden-shifting or a comment on Pyne’s right to
remain silent in this case.
“A closing argument is to be judged in the context in which it
was made.” Thompson, 318 Ga. at 767 (4) (b) (citation and
punctuation omitted).
Indeed, a prosecutor may not comment on the failure of a
defendant to testify, but he may argue that evidence
showing guilt has not been rebutted or contradicted[.]
21
Moreover, a prosecutor is entitled to emphasize the
evidence favorable to the State, to discuss and draw
inferences from factual matters in evidence relating to the
credibility of witnesses, and to respond to points made
in—and issues omitted from—the defendant’s closing
argument.
Blaine v. State, 305 Ga. 513, 519 (2) (826 SE2d 82) (2019) (citation
and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied). “A prosecutor has
wide latitude in the conduct of a closing argument, the bounds of
which are in the trial court’s discretion. And where the defense
presents no evidence to rebut the evidence of guilt, it is not improper
for the prosecutor to point out that fact to the jury.” Ridley v. State,
315 Ga. 452, 458 (4) (a) (883 SE2d 357) (2023) (concluding that the
prosecutor’s statement in closing argument that the defendant had
the same power to subpoena witnesses as the State did not
improperly shift the burden of proof to the defendant, but were
“proper comments on the defense’s failure to present evidence”)
(citations and punctuation omitted). See also Thompson, 318 Ga. at
767 (4) (b) (holding that “the prosecutor’s comment that ‘there has
been no evidence exonerating Appellant, and there has been no
22
evidence pointing to somebody else as being the real killer’ did not
improperly shift the burden to Appellant to prove his innocence,”
and “the statement was therefore not improper”) (citation and
punctuation omitted)).
Viewing the State’s closing argument in this context, the
prosecutor’s comments on the lack of evidence showing a connection
between Section and Foster did not shift any part of the State’s
burden to the defense, but merely pointed out that the defense’s
attempt to use Foster’s internet history to connect him and Section
did not show any such connection on closer scrutiny. In other words,
these comments “simply highlight[ed]” that Pyne’s theory of the
case—i.e., that Section was the shooter—was “illogical based on the
evidence,” Thompson, 318 Ga. at 768 (4) (b), and “emphasized to the
jury” that Pyne failed to “successfully rebut[] or explain [] the State’s
evidence” demonstrating that Pyne was the shooter. Kimbro v.
State, 317 Ga. 442, 452 (7) (893 SE2d 678) (2023) (holding that there
was no error arising from the prosecutor’s statement in closing that
“there [was] no defense raised by this evidence” and explaining that
23
such comments did not amount to improper burden-shifting).
As to Pyne’s contention that the prosecutor’s statements were
a comment on his right to remain silent, this Court determines
“whether a prosecutor has improperly commented on an accused’s
right to remain silent” by evaluating “whether the prosecutor’s
manifest intention was to do just that or whether the remarks were
such that a jury would naturally and necessarily take the remarks
to be a comment on the accused’s right to remain silent and not to
testify.” Kilgore v. State, 300 Ga. 429, 432 (2) (796 SE2d 290) (2017).
Here, the State did not “improperly comment[]” on Pyne’s “decision
not to testify.” Blaine, 305 Ga. at 519 (2). The prosecutor’s
statements were not directed at Pyne’s “right to remain silent, i.e.,
his decision not to testify; they were in response to the defense
argument regarding the State’s case and the defense’s failure to
counter the State’s evidence.” Kilgore, 300 Ga.at 432 (2).
Additionally, the trial court’s thorough and accurate instructions to
the jury “on the presumption of evidence, the State’s burden of proof,
and reasonable doubt,” Kimbro, 317 Ga. at 452 (7), at the outset of
24
the trial would reasonably have informed the jury’s understanding
of the prosecutor’s statements.
Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecutor’s “statements
were within the bounds of proper closing argument, and the trial
court did not abuse its discretion” by overruling Pyne’s objections to
them. Ridley, 315 Ga. at 458 (4) (a). “Moreover, because the State’s
closing was proper, a sua sponte curative instruction by the trial
court would not have been warranted.” Blaine, 305 Ga. at 519 (2).
Therefore, this contention also fails.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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