NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: May 28, 2025
S25Y0649. IN THE MATTER OF STEPHANIE DIANNE
WOODARD.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition for
voluntary discipline filed by Stephanie Dianne Woodard (State Bar
No. 233695) prior to the filing of a Formal Complaint. See Bar Rule
4-227 (b). Woodard has been a member of the State Bar since 1996
and served as the Solicitor General of the Hall County State Court
for 15 years. In her petition, Woodard admits that, between July
2018 and September 2022, she received 11 improper
reimbursements from the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council of Georgia
and Hall County and that she entered a guilty plea to one
misdemeanor count of a violation of OCGA § 45-11-4 (b) (1) (a public
officer may be criminally charged for malpractice, misfeasance, or
malfeasance in office) and (5) (a public officer may be criminally
charged for willfully and knowingly demanding more cost than she
is entitled to by law), which constitutes a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (3)
and (4) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”),
found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum sanction for a violation
of these Rules is disbarment. While acknowledging that her conduct
was a breach of her duty as a public official, Woodard asserts that
several mitigating factors are applicable and requests that the Court
impose a public reprimand for her Rule violations. In response, the
Bar states that Woodard’s request for a public reprimand is
appropriate but notes that the presumptive penalty for her
violations is a short suspension. Upon careful review, we decline to
accept Woodard’s petition for the reasons explained below.
In her petition, Woodard states that, on June 18, 2024, she was
indicted by a Hall County Grand Jury on 24 felony counts of criminal
misconduct, which was comprised of 13 counts involving alleged
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violations of OCGA § 16-10-201 and 11 counts involving alleged
violations of OCGA § 16-8-2.2 The 24 counts alleged that, on 11
occasions, Woodard—while serving as the Solicitor General of the
Hall County State Court—made requests and received
reimbursement for expenses which were not official expenses for
which she was entitled to reimbursement. Specifically, Counts 1-11
related to reimbursements from the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council,
the circumstances of which Woodard contends she has “scant
1 OCGA § 16-10-20 provides that:
A person who knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals, or covers
up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; makes a false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or makes or
uses any false writing or document, knowing the same to contain
any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry, in any
matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of state
government or of the government of any county, city, or other
political subdivision of this state shall, upon conviction thereof, be
punished by a fine of not more than $1,000.00 or by imprisonment
for not less than one nor more than five years, or both.
2 OCGA § 16-8-2 provides that:
A person commits the offense of theft by taking when he
unlawfully takes or, being in lawful possession thereof, unlawfully
appropriates any property of another with the intention of
depriving him of the property, regardless of the manner in which
the property is taken or appropriated.
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information,” but believes may have resulted because she
improperly sought reimbursement from both the Prosecuting
Attorneys’ Council and Hall County. Counts 12 and 13 related to an
improper charge for the cremation of a dog, which Woodard contends
was an inadvertent and improper charge. Counts 14 and 15 related
to cleaning supplies provided to someone Woodard was rehoming,
which she contends was a legitimate reimbursement request
pursuant to the Legal Victim Assistance Program and which
resulted in an indictment because of the State’s misunderstanding
of the Program. Counts 16 and 17 related to a meal at a restaurant,
which Woodard also contends was a legitimate reimbursement
request. Counts 18-223 related to an improper charge for an LSAT
prep course for Woodard’s daughter, which she contends happened
because someone on her staff saw the receipt and mistakenly
3 Woodard mistakenly states in her petition that only Counts 18-21 in
the indictment were related to the LSAT prep course, but Count 22 was also
related to the same reimbursement.
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pursued reimbursement. Counts 23 and 244 related to a pillow
purchased for Woodard’s son, which she contends happened because
she mistakenly used the wrong credit card. In total, the amount of
misappropriated funds was $2,219.28 (with $1,190.48 from the
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council and $1,028.80 from Hall County).
Following the indictment, Woodard and the State began
negotiations and agreed that the matter would be best settled by a
nolle prosequi of the felony charges and Woodard entering a guilty
plea to one misdemeanor count of a violation of OCGA § 45-11-4 (b)
(1) and (5). According to Woodard, the State was concerned as to
whether there was sufficient evidence to prove scienter or intent, as
required for the indicted felony charges. Nevertheless, as Woodard
admitted that her conduct constituted a breach of her duty as a
public official, such that there was enough showing of criminal
culpability to sustain a misdemeanor conviction under OCGA § 45-11-4, she entered her guilty plea under the First Offender Act and
4 Similar to the previous mistake, Woodard inadvertently omits Count
24 in her description of the counts in her petition, but Counts 23 and 24 are
the correct counts related to the reimbursement for the pillow.
5
received 12 months on probation, which was to be terminated upon
full and timely payment of restitution.5
Based on her conduct, Woodard admits to violating Rule 8.4 (a)
(3) (it shall be a violation of the GRPC for a lawyer to “be convicted
of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying
conduct relates to the lawyer’s fitness to practice law”) and (4) (it
shall be a violation of the GRPC for a lawyer to “engage in
professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation”). Further, relying on the ABA Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992), Woodard offers in mitigation
that she has no disciplinary history; that she lacked a dishonest or
selfish motive; that she was experiencing personal or emotional
problems due to suffering from a physical ailment and the death of
a family member; that she made a timely good faith effort to make
restitution and rectify the consequences of her misconduct; that she
5 Because Woodard provided full restitution at the time of the plea, no
probation sentence was ever initiated. Further, because Woodard fully
complied with the Georgia First Offender Act, she is now exonerated and has
no criminal record.
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cooperated fully with the Georgia Bureau of Investigation and the
State Bar and is petitioning for voluntary discipline; that her
character and reputation are good, as she has volunteered her time
in many laudable activities for her community;6 that she was
suffering a physical disability; that she received additional penalties
and sanctions for her conduct, including negative public attention in
the media and her resignation from her position as Solicitor General;
and that she has expressed remorse for her misconduct. See ABA
Standard 9.32 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (g), (h), (k) & (l). Woodard also
notes in mitigation that the State and trial court recognized that her
conduct was more appropriately characterized as a misdemeanor, as
evident by the State agreeing to nolle prosequi all 24 felony counts
and accept the plea to one count of a misdemeanor, and the court
sentencing Woodard as a first offender for which she received a
sentence of probation. Woodard does not state any factors in
aggravation.
6 Woodard states that she has served as a member or in a leadership role
for several government entities and nonprofit organizations.
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In addressing the sanction to be imposed, Woodard requests a
public reprimand “instead of a harsher punishment” due to the
applicable mitigating factors and contends that this Court has
imposed public reprimands for similar Rule violations. Woodard
relies on In the Matter of Cherry, 305 Ga. 667 (827 SE2d 239)
(2019)—in which we accepted a petition for voluntary discipline
seeking public reprimand where the attorney admitted to violating
Rule 8.4 (a) (4) by sending a letter to an insurance company in which
she falsified a signature—and In the Matter of Davis, 306 Ga. 381
(830 SE2d 734) (2019)—in which we imposed a public reprimand
where the attorney violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4) by improperly notarizing
a signature that he did not witness.
In response, the State Bar recommends that this Court accept
Woodard’s petition for voluntary discipline seeking a public
reprimand, although it states that the presumptive penalty for
Woodard’s violations is a short suspension. Further, the State Bar
notes that it agrees that eight out of the nine mitigating factors
Woodard listed in her petition apply to her case; the State Bar does
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not address whether the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive was
applicable. Additionally, the State Bar found that two of the
aggravating factors listed in ABA Standard 9.22 are applicable—
substantial experience in the practice of law, and illegal conduct. See
ABA Standard 9.22 (i) and (k).
Although the State Bar supports Woodard’s request for a public
reprimand, we do not agree that a public reprimand for Woodard’s
violations of Rules 8.4 (a) (3) and (4) is sufficient as “a penalty to the
offender, a deterrent to others, and an indication to laymen that the
courts will maintain the ethics of the profession.” See In the Matter
of Dowdy, 247 Ga. 488, 493 (277 SE2d 36) (1981) (cleaned up). As an
initial matter, we have explained that “a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (4)
is among the most serious violations with which a lawyer can be
charged.” In the Matter of West, 300 Ga. 777, 778 (798 SE2d 219)
(2017). We have also explained that for a Rule 8.4 (a) (3) violation
“either suspension or disbarment is an appropriate sanction,
depending on the circumstances.” In the Matter of Gardner, 286 Ga.
623, 624 (690 SE2d 611) (2010). Further, as a public official,
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Woodard was in a position of power and responsibility, and when
considering the appropriate sanction to impose “[t]his Court is . . .
concerned . . . about the public’s confidence in the profession.” In the
Matter of Blitch, 288 Ga. 690, 692 (706 SE2d 461) (2011). See also
In the Matter of Skandalakis, 279 Ga. 865, 867 (621 SE2d 750)
(2005) (noting in aggravation that the attorney’s misconduct “arose
out of his actions as an elected public official”).
Additionally, the two cases upon which Woodard relies to
support her request for a public reprimand—Cherry and Davis—are
easily distinguishable from the situation here, as these cases neither
involved a lawyer being convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude nor a lawyer’s repeated misuse of government funds.
Rather, we conclude that this case is most similar to In the Matter
of Williams, 284 Ga. 96 (663 SE2d 181) (2008)—in which we
accepted the petition for voluntary discipline seeking a six-month
suspension for the violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (3) filed by an assistant
district attorney who “participated in a scheme initiated by his boss,
the then-District Attorney, to obtain from [the county] money to
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which the District Attorney was not entitled” and “pled guilty to a
single violation of OCGA § 45-11-5 (misdemeanor for a public officer
to receive money not due [to] him through the use of his office).” 284
Ga. at 96-97. See also In the Matter of Adams, 291 Ga. 768, 768 (732
SE2d 446) (2012) (imposing 18-month suspension where attorney
misrepresented the number of hours worked representing indigent
clients and overbilled the judicial circuit’s Indigent Defense
Program over $10,000). Because Woodard’s case is more akin to
cases which resulted in 6-month and 18-month suspensions than to
cases which resulted in a public reprimand, we are rejecting
Woodard’s petition without prejudice to allow her to file a renewed
petition seeking voluntary discipline more consistent with the cases
we cite as applicable.
We therefore reject the petition for voluntary discipline.
Petition for voluntary discipline rejected. Peterson, CJ, Warren,
PJ, and Bethel, Ellington, McMillian, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson,
JJ, concur.
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