NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: May 28, 2025
S25Y0715. IN THE MATTER OF JOHNBULL OKECHUKWU
NWOSU.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and
recommendation of the State Disciplinary Review Board (“Review
Board”), which reviewed the report and recommendation of Special
Master Paul Wain Painter, III at the request of Johnbull
Okechukwu Nwosu (State Bar No. 184284), pursuant to Bar Rules
4-214, 4-215, and 4-216. The formal complaint upon which this
disciplinary proceeding was based alleged that Nwosu, who has been
a member of the State Bar since 2014, violated Rules 3.3 (a) (1), 3.3
(a) (4), 3.4 (a), 4.1 (a), 4.1 (b), 8.4 (a) (1), and 8.4 (a) (4) of the Georgia
Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC” or “Rules”) found in Bar Rule
4-102 (d). The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (1) is
the maximum penalty for the specific Rule violated, and the
maximum penalty for all the remaining Rules listed is disbarment.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the Special Master determined
that Nwosu violated the Rules with which he was charged and, after
thoroughly analyzing Nwosu’s conduct under the framework found
in the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions (1992) (“ABA Standards”), recommended that he be
disbarred. Upon its review, however, the Review Board concluded
that the Special Master’s analysis of the ABA Standards was
incomplete — particularly as it pertained to the applicable
aggravating and mitigating factors — and recommended that the
case be remanded back to the Special Master for a more complete
analysis. After consideration of the entire record in this matter, we
conclude that the Special Master’s analysis of the ABA Standards is
not incomplete, and we agree with the Special Master that Nwosu’s
conduct violated the above-mentioned Rules and that disbarment is
the appropriate sanction for these violations.
1. Procedural History
2
In August 2023, the State Bar filed a formal complaint
charging Nwosu with violations of Rules 3.3 (a) (1) (a lawyer shall
not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a
tribunal); 3.3 (a) (4) (a lawyer shall not knowingly offer evidence that
the lawyer knows to be false); 3.4 (a) (a lawyer shall not unlawfully
obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter,
destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential
evidentiary value); 4.1 (a) (a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false
statement of material fact or law to a third person in the course of
representing a client); 4.1 (b) (a lawyer shall not knowingly fail to
disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the
client); 8.4 (a) (1) (a lawyer shall not violate or knowingly attempt to
violate a Rule, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so
through the acts of another); and 8.4 (a) (4) (a lawyer shall not
engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation). Nwosu acknowledged service of the
complaint and filed his answer, in which he admitted some of the
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State Bar’s factual allegations but denied all Rule violations. After
an evidentiary hearing, the Special Master filed his report and
recommendation.
2. Special Master’s Report and Recommendation
(a) Factual Findings
In his report and recommendation, the Special Master
recounted that in September 2021, Nwosu filed a complaint on
behalf of his clients, asserting a claim for breach of contract related
to a business dispute. Nwosu attached the alleged contract to the
complaint as Exhibit A. No date was included on the original
contract, but Nwosu hand-labeled the document attached to the
complaint as “Plaintiff Exhibit A. Agreement between [the parties]
on March 26, 2016.” Nwosu also handwrote the date “March 26,
2016” in an additional place toward the top of the document.
The defendants in the suit filed a motion to dismiss on various
grounds, including the statute of limitations. In response, Nwosu
filed a “Motion Opposing Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,” and
subsequently filed an amended motion with an attached copy of the
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alleged contract. This copy of the contract contained different
handwritten alterations, including a different date than that which
had been written on the copy submitted with the complaint. On this
copy of the contract, Nwosu wrote, “Plaintiff Exhibit ‘E’” and,
separately, “5/12/2019.”
On August 1, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the
defendant’s motion to dismiss. During the hearing, Nwosu told the
trial court that the contract dated May 12, 2019, “was completed by
the [opposing party] in his own handwriting, his name.” More than
halfway through the hearing, the trial court judge’s staff attorney
alerted the judge to the date discrepancy between the two versions
of the contract that had been submitted to the court. The judge
questioned Nwosu about the matter. Nwosu initially did not answer
the judge’s questions, but eventually admitted that he had initially
written the date “March 26, 2016” on the exhibit and then altered
the date to “May 12, 2019.” On August 8, 2022, the trial court
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and subsequently,
Nwosu filed a “Motion [for] New Trial and/or in the Alternative
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Judgment Notwithstanding the Judgment.” The defendant
responded in opposition and filed a motion seeking attorney fees.
The trial court held another hearing on these motions, during
which Nwosu again admitted that he made the alterations. The trial
court summarily denied Nwosu’s motion and granted the
defendant’s motion for attorney fees on the basis that “Plaintiffs
filed the case outside of the statute of limitations and when Defense
Counsel brought up the statute of limitations issue . . . , Plaintiffs
tried to mislead the [c]ourt and filed [a brief] with the same exhibit
but with a different ‘contract date.’”
The Special Master further recounted that, at the evidentiary
hearing in the disciplinary matter, Nwosu admitted to twice altering
the document by adding different dates on the undated contract and
filing these altered documents with the trial court but asserted that
he did so to aid the court by showing the date that his client told him
the contract was executed. Nwosu further asserted that he did not
know that he could not alter the document and that his actions were
due to ignorance and negligence because this was his first
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commercial dispute and he was unfamiliar with the practice of
submitting exhibits.
However, in his factual findings, the Special Master rejected
Nwosu’s claims that he was unaware he could not alter the
documents and that his actions were due to ignorance and
negligence, concluding that Nwosu intended to mislead the court to
help his client’s case. Specifically, the Special Master explained that
when asked during the evidentiary hearing whether he believed that
Nwosu’s actions were negligent, the trial court judge testified, “No.
In fact, it was the exact opposite,” and that Nwosu’s actions were
“intentional, not negligent.”1 Further, the Special Master noted that
the record was replete with evidence that Nwosu altered the
documents to intentionally deceive the trial court, as Nwosu
testified at the evidentiary hearing that he “d[id]n’t know why [he]
wrote [the date] twice” on the version of the contract submitted with
1 The Special Master noted that, on cross-examination, the trial court
judge clarified that he was saying that Nwosu had acted intentionally, not that
Nwosu had intended to mislead the trial court, something the judge said was
up to the Special Master to determine.
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the complaint, if the purpose of writing the date was merely to label
the exhibit. The Special Master also noted that Nwosu initially had
told the trial court that the contract dated May 12, 2019, was
completed by the opposing party in his own handwriting. Moreover,
Nwosu had multiple opportunities to inform the trial court and
opposing counsel that he added the date to the undated contract, but
failed to do so. Additionally, the Special Master found that Nwosu is
a competent courtroom lawyer who has worked with exhibits for
over 30 years2 and would have known that altering evidence before
filing it with the court is improper. Thus, based on the record, the
Special Master found that Nwosu “knowingly, willingly, and
intentionally filed the twice-altered [c]ontract to deceive the court
and gain favor for his client’s case.”
(b) Rule Violations
Based on these factual findings, the Special Master concluded
that Nwosu violated the provisions of the GRPC with which he was
2 The Special Master noted that before becoming a lawyer, Nwosu
worked as an investigator for the Division of Family and Children Services for
several years, involving frequent Juvenile Court appearances.
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charged. Specifically, the Special Master determined that Nwosu
violated Rules 3.3 and 4.1 by altering the undated contracts and
filing the contracts as exhibits with the court. In concluding that
Nwosu violated Rules 3.3 and 4.1, the Special Master rejected
Nwosu’s argument that the term “knowingly” as used in these Rules
required the Special Master to find that Nwosu’s actions were done
with the intention to mislead the trial court. The Special Master
explained that “‘knowingly’ should be interpreted to require only
actual knowledge of the fact in question” and, in this instance,
required only that the State Bar prove that Nwosu “had actual
knowledge that he filed altered evidence.” Among other things, the
Special Master concluded that Nwosu violated Rule 3.4 by
unlawfully altering a document having potential evidentiary value
in violation of OCGA § 16-10-20 (making it unlawful for a person to
knowingly and willfully make or use a false writing or document in
any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of
state or local government). Further, the Special Master impliedly
found that Nwosu violated Rule 8.4 (a) (1) by finding that he violated
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several other Rules, and Rule 8.4 (a) (4) by finding that he engaged
in deceit and misrepresentation.
(c) ABA Standards
After concluding that Nwosu violated the provisions of the
GRPC with which he was charged, the Special Master applied the
framework set out in the ABA Standards, which provide that, when
imposing a sanction, “a court should consider the following factors:
(a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer’s mental state; (c) the potential
or actual injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and (d) the
existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.” ABA Standard 3.0.
In assessing the duty violated, the Special Master found that Nwosu
violated “one of the most sacrosanct duties beholden to an attorney,”
explaining that “[a]ttorneys who knowingly offer false evidence in a
court of law have engaged not only in the worst kind of professional
misconduct but also in conduct that severely undermines the
public’s confidence in our profession.” In the Matter of ManningWallace, 287 Ga. 223, 229 (695 SE2d 237) (2010) (Nahmias, J,
concurring). In assessing Nwosu’s mental state, the Special Master
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found that Nwosu acted with the intent to deceive the court, while
noting that Nwosu faced pressure from his client during the course
of the representation that amounted to “an unusual amount of
stress.” In assessing the harm caused, the Special Master found that
Nwosu’s actions undermined the integrity of the profession and
judicial system and, if left undetected, threatened a judgment based
in deception and fraud against an unwitting citizen.
Turning to the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors,
the Special Master found in aggravation that Nwosu acted with a
dishonest motive to obtain a positive result for his client. See ABA
Standard 9.22 (b). The Special Master found in mitigation that
Nwosu acted without a selfish motive, see ABA Standard 9.32 (b),
explaining that because Nwosu “was working on a flat fee, . . . the
result [of his client’s case] would not have benefited [Nwosu]
directly.” The Special Master also found that Nwosu provided strong
evidence of his good character and reputation, see ABA Standard
9.32 (g), as the testimony at the evidentiary hearing from the thenChief Judge of the Cobb Judicial Circuit “paint[ed] [Nwosu] as an
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attorney trusted and respected by both the bench and the bar, and
valued by his clients,” and an attorney character witness described
Nwosu as “a leader who gives his time and money to issues
important to the community.”
(d) Recommended Discipline
In assessing the appropriate discipline, the Special Master
noted that this Court has been clear and consistent in its sanctions
for this type of conduct, explaining that “disbarment is the
appropriate sanction where a lawyer, with the intent to deceive and
to harm another party, falsifies documents and relies upon those
documents in a court proceeding.” In the Matter of Dogan, 282 Ga.
783, 783-284 (653 SE2d 690) (2007). See also In the Matter of
Koehler, 297 Ga. 794 (778 SE2d 218) (2015) (disbarment appropriate
where lawyer made materially deceitful and misleading statements
in court filings); In the Matter of Jones-Lewis, 295 Ga. 861 (764 SE2d
549) (2014) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer made false
statements to court); In the Matter of Minsk, 296 Ga. 152 (765 SE2d
361) (2014) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer had pattern of
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making knowingly false statements to his client, the court, and third
parties); In the Matter of Manning-Wallace, 291 Ga. 96 (727 SE2d
502) (2012) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer offered into
evidence forged documents that she created or caused to be created
and made material false statements regarding the same to the
court). Therefore, the Special Master recommended that Nwosu be
disbarred.
3. Review Board’s Report and Recommendation
At Nwosu’s request, the Review Board reviewed the Special
Master’s report and recommendation and suggested that the Special
Master’s analysis of the ABA Standards was incomplete, specifically
as it pertained to the aggravating and mitigating factors, because it
was unclear from the report whether the Special Master considered
all of the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in ABA
Standards 9.22 and 9.32. The Review Board recommended that the
case be remanded back to the Special Master for a more complete
analysis and explicitly stated that it was not providing any analysis
13
as to the Special Master’s findings of fact, conclusions of law
regarding the Rules violated, or disbarment recommendation.
4. The Parties’ Arguments
Both the State Bar and Nwosu filed exceptions in this Court to
the Review Board’s report and recommendation. The State Bar
argues that the Special Master followed the correct framework for
determining the appropriate sanction and that disbarment is
appropriate. In response, Nwosu argues that the Special Master’s
analysis under the ABA Standards is incomplete, as the record
showed that at least four other mitigating factors should apply: the
absence of a prior disciplinary record; full and free disclosure to the
disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude toward the
proceedings; inexperience in the practice of law; and remorse. See
ABA Standard 9.32 (a), (e), (f), and (l). In his exceptions to the
Review Board’s report and recommendation, Nwosu argues that the
Review Board failed to correct several aspects of the Special
Master’s report and recommendation, contending that the Special
Master erred in his interpretation of the mental state required for
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each of the Rule violations alleged, in finding that he acted with an
intent to deceive, and in recommending disbarment as the
appropriate sanction. Nwosu asks this Court to dismiss the Bar’s
complaint, enter an appropriate sanction, or remand to the Special
Master “after reversing his conclusions regarding [Nwosu]’s mental
state and [the] appropriate sanction.” Nwosu argues that his
conduct “more appropriately calls for a reprimand[.]” In response,
the State Bar argues that “[t]he relevant issue regarding intent is
whether [Nwosu] intended for the [c]ourt to accept the altered
contracts as original, unaltered contracts that negated the statute
of limitations defense with their altered dates” and that the Special
Master properly found that Nwosu acted with intent to deceive and
mislead the court.
5. Analysis
We agree with the State Bar that the Special Master applied
the correct framework for determining the appropriate sanction by
analyzing Nwosu’s conduct under the ABA Standards. Further,
upon review of the record, we agree with the Special Master that
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Nwosu’s conduct violated the provisions of the GRPC with which he
was charged and that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. We
have explained that although the framework in the ABA standards
“are generally instructive as to the question of punishment, they are
not controlling.” In the Matter of Cook, 311 Ga. 206, 213 (3) (a) (857
SE2d 212) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). We have
remanded a disciplinary matter in the past because the special
master failed to make particular findings under the ABA Standards
such that we were unable to determine the proper sanction to
impose. See In the Matter of Breault, 318 Ga. 127, 141 (5) (897 SE2d
385) (2024). But a special master’s failure to address expressly each
individual aggravating and mitigating factor listed in ABA
Standards 9.22 and 9.32 does not require a remand, particularly
where the special master’s factual findings are sufficient for us to
make conclusions of law regarding the applicable aggravating and
mitigating factors and the record is sufficient for us to determine the
appropriate sanction. See In the Matter of Melnick, 319 Ga. 730, 738
(5) (905 SE2d 645) (2024) (“[W]hether the facts constitute an
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aggravating or mitigating factor is a matter we consider de novo.”);
In the Matter of Braziel, 318 Ga. 389, 391-392 (898 SE2d 458) (2024)
(determining that special master’s finding that attorney “has been
cooperative” could be considered in mitigation and agreeing with the
Special Master that prior disciplinary history “is an aggravating
factor”).
Here, the Special Master adequately analyzed Nwosu’s conduct
under the framework found in the ABA Standards and made factual
findings regarding the duty Nwosu violated, his mental state, the
injury caused by his conduct, and the existence of aggravating and
mitigating factors, as instructed by ABA Standard 3.0. Specifically,
as for applicable mitigating factors, the Special Master found that
Nwosu acted without a selfish motive and had a good character and
a good reputation. The Special Master appears to have considered
Nwosu’s lack of disciplinary history in recommending disbarment,
saying he was “not aware of a matter where the Court lessened a
sanction for action[s] like the ones committed by [Nwosu] based on
only reputation, character, and lack of prior disciplinary history[.]”
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And, based on the Special Master’s factual findings, we reject
Nwosu’s assertion that his inexperience in the practice of law should
be considered in mitigation, as the Special Master explicitly found
that Nwosu was a competent courtroom attorney and that he had
over 30 years of experience in working with exhibits (albeit much of
that time as a non-lawyer). We also view as unpersuasive Nwosu’s
assertions that this Court should consider in mitigation his full and
free disclosure to the disciplinary board and his remorse, as the
Special Master explicitly found that Nwosu was unable to explain at
the evidentiary hearing why he altered the contract attached to the
complaint in two different places and found his claims that he was
unfamiliar with submitting exhibits and unaware that a document
could not be altered before submitting it to the court were
untruthful. See Manning-Wallace, 287 Ga. at 226-227 (Nahmias, J,
concurring) (noting that it was “odd” for State Bar to credit
“cooperation” of attorney who made additional false statements to
the Bar rather than “coming clean” at the outset of disciplinary
proceedings).
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But even considering in mitigation Nwosu’s lack of prior
disciplinary history, we conclude that disbarment is appropriate
given Nwosu’s dishonesty, fraud, and deceit in twice submitting to
the court altered evidence in the underlying proceeding. See In the
Matter of David-Vega, 318 Ga. 600 (899 SE2d 126) (2024) (disbarring
attorney who provided untruthful discovery responses in
malpractice case brought against her and submitted fabricated
evidence in the disciplinary proceeding, where attorney had no prior
disciplinary history, expressed remorse for her actions, was
suffering from personal and emotional problems, and had a good
reputation and character); In the Matter of Koehler, 297 Ga. at 796
(disbarring attorney who made materially deceitful and misleading
statements in court filings despite the attorney’s lack of a prior
disciplinary record). See also In the Matter of Nicholson, 299 Ga. 737,
741 (791 SE2d 776) (2016) (“Dishonesty in the practice of law and to
the injury of another is a sufficient basis for disbarment.”). Nwosu’s
request for a reprimand is premised on his insistence that he did not
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try to deceive anyone, but the Special Master explicitly found
otherwise, and this factual finding is supported by the record.
Moreover, we reject Nwosu’s arguments that the Special
Master erred in his interpretation of the mental state required for
each of the Rule violations alleged. As for Rules 3.3 and 4.1, Nwosu
continues to argue that the word “knowingly” in these Rules implies
“an intent element” and that the Special Master erroneously
concluded that these Rules do not require the State Bar to show that
Nwosu intended to deceive and mislead the court. However, Bar
Rule 1.0 (m) defines “knowingly” as “denot[ing] actual knowledge of
the fact in question,” such that, to prove the Rule 3.3 violations
charged, the State Bar was required to show merely that Nwosu
knowingly made a false statement of material fact or law to the court
and offered evidence he knew to be false. Further, to prove the Rule
4.1 violations charged, the State Bar was required to show that
Nwosu knowingly made a false statement of material fact or law to
a third person and knowingly failed to disclose a material fact to a
third person when disclosure was necessary to avoid assisting a
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criminal or fraudulent act by his client. Therefore, we agree with the
Special Master’s interpretation that Rules 3.3 and 4.1 did not also
require the State Bar to prove that Nwosu intended to deceive or
mislead the trial court — while recognizing that in many contexts
an attorney’s knowledge that he is making a false statement or
presenting false evidence may itself, without more, give rise to a
reasonable inference that the attorney intended to deceive or
mislead.
As for Rules 3.4 and 8.4 (a) (4), Nwosu appears to argue that
the Special Master erred in concluding that these Rules do not have
“an intent element” and that the State Bar was not required to show
that he acted with an intent to deceive the court to prove violations
of these Rules. However, this argument misrepresents the Special
Master’s conclusions. As an initial matter, the Special Master
concluded that Nwosu violated Rule 3.4 by, among other things,
submitting altered evidence to a Georgia court in violation of OCGA
§ 16-10-20, noted that a violation of this statute can be proven by
showing that the accused acted “knowingly and willfully,” and
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determined that Nwosu’s conduct was “willful and intentional,”
declining to credit Nwosu’s explanations for his actions.
Additionally, the Special Master noted that a violation of Rule 8.4
(a) (4) does require an attorney to have engaged in conduct that
constitutes “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” and
determined that Nwosu intended to deceive the trial court.
We also reject Nwosu’s argument that the Special Master
clearly erred in his factual finding that Nwosu intended to deceive
others. After considering all of the evidence, the Special Master
found that Nwosu acted with an intent to deceive and mislead the
court based on his factual findings that Nwosu wrote a different date
on the contract after opposing counsel raised the statute of
limitations defense, and that Nwosu’s assertions that he hand-wrote
the dates in an attempt to aid the court and because he was not
aware that this was prohibited were not credible. And we see no
reason to disturb these findings. See In the Matter of Eddings, 314
Ga. 409, 417 (877 SE2d 248) (2022) (“[B]ecause this Court recognizes
that the special master is in the best position to determine the
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witnesses’ credibility, it generally defers to the factual findings and
credibility determinations made by the special master unless those
findings or determinations are clearly erroneous.”). Therefore,
Nwosu’s exceptions are without merit.
For these reasons, we conclude that disbarment is the
appropriate sanction for Nwosu’s conduct and is consistent with the
sanction imposed in similar cases. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered
that the name of Johnbull Okechukwu Nwosu be removed from the
rolls of persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia.
Nwosu is reminded of his duties under Bar Rule 4-219 (b).
Disbarred. Peterson, CJ, Warren, PJ, and Bethel, Ellington,
McMillian, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ, concur.
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