NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA
September 25, 2024
S25A0177. HASAN AL-BARI et al. v. CRAIG PIGG et al.
S25A0178. CORNEL WEST v. ROBERT WITTENSTEIN et al.
S25A0179. RANDOLPH CLAPP et al. v. CRAIG PIGG et al.
S25A0180. BRADFORD J. RAFFENSPERGER v. CRAIG PIGG et
al.
S25A0181. GEORGIA REPUBLICAN PARTY, INC. v. CRAIG
PIGG et al.
S25A0182. BRADFORD J. RAFFENSPERGER v. CRAIG PIGG et
al.
S25A0183. GEORGIA REPUBLICAN PARTY, INC. v. CRAIG
PIGG et al.
S25X0184. CRAIG PIGG et al. v. BRADFORD J.
RAFFENSPERGER, et al.
Upon consideration, the deadline for motions for
reconsideration in these matters has been expedited. It is ordered
that a motion for reconsideration, if any, must be filed no later than
close of business (4:30 p.m.) on Thursday, September 26, 2024.
This deadline applies notwithstanding any other orders from this
court extending filing deadlines in other cases.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA
Clerk’s Office, Atlanta
I certify that the above is a true extract from the
minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto
affixed the day and year last above written.
, Clerk
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: September 25, 2024
S25A0177. AL-BARI et al. v. PIGG et al.
S25A0178. WEST v. WITTENSTEIN et al.
S25A0179. CLAPP et al. v. PIGG et al.
S25A0180. RAFFENSPERGER v. PIGG et al.
S25A0181. GEORGIA REPUBLICAN PARTY, INC. v. PIGG et al.
S25A0182. RAFFENSPERGER v. PIGG et al.
S25A0183. GEORGIA REPUBLICAN PARTY, INC. v. PIGG et al.
S25X0184. PIGG et al. v. RAFFENSPERGER et al.
WARREN, Justice.
When Georgians go to the polls to vote for candidates for
President and Vice President of the United States, they do not vote
for those candidates directly. Although those candidates are listed
on the ballot, a vote cast for a presidential candidate is in fact a vote
for a slate of presidential electors. See OCGA § 21-2-285 (e). The
winning slate of electors will in turn cast their votes for the
President and Vice President in the Electoral College. See OCGA
§§ 21-2-10, 21-2-11, 21-2-285 (e); U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. I, Cl. 3.
1
Under Georgia law, the electors for independent presidential and
vice-presidential candidates must themselves qualify for election to
the office of presidential elector if they wish to have their candidates
for President and Vice President placed on Georgia’s ballot. See
OCGA §§ 21-2-132.1 (b); 21-2-132.
In separate cases below, Georgia voters challenged the
qualifications of the presidential electors certified by Dr. Cornel
West and Claudia De la Cruz, two independent candidates running
for President of the United States. The challengers asserted that
those candidates for presidential elector were required to file in their
own names a nomination petition signed by a number of qualified
Georgia voters to have their independent candidates for President
placed on the ballot—and because not even one of those electors filed
such a petition, their independent candidates for President should
not be listed on the ballot for the November 5, 2024, General
Election. Initial Decisions in these challenges were rendered by the
Chief Administrative Law Judge, who agreed with the challengers
and concluded that neither West’s electors nor De la Cruz’s electors
2
had met the qualification requirements to be candidates for
presidential elector under Georgia’s Election Code. The Secretary of
State then overruled each of the Chief ALJ’s Initial Decisions and
concluded that both West’s electors and De la Cruz’s electors had
qualified under Georgia law for the office of presidential elector. But
two different superior court judges reviewing the West and De la
Cruz challenges, respectively, reversed the Secretary’s Final
Decisions, concluding that because no West or De la Cruz elector had
filed a nomination petition in his or her own name, no West or De la
Cruz elector had qualified to place their candidate on the ballot.
West, West’s electors, De la Cruz’s electors, the Georgia Secretary of
State, and the Georgia Republican Party applied for discretionary
review in this Court and sought expedited consideration.
Whether our Election Code requires presidential electors for an
independent candidate for President of the United States to file
nomination petitions in their own names is an unsettled and
important question, so we granted review. We did so because the
November 2024 election is fast approaching, and Georgia’s election
3
officials and voters need to know whether these two independent
candidates are properly listed on the ballot. If not, then election
officials need to know that so they can take steps to inform voters
that votes cast for those candidates will not count. Accordingly, we
ordered briefing and heard oral argument on an accelerated
schedule.
For the reasons set out in this opinion, we now hold that each
presidential elector for an independent candidate running for the
office of President of the United States is a “candidate” required to
file a notice of candidacy under OCGA § 21-2-132 (d) (1); OCGA § 21-2-132 (e) applies to each presidential elector for an independent
candidate running for the office of President of the United States;
and, under OCGA § 21-2-132 (e), each presidential elector is
therefore required to file a nomination petition in his or her own
name “in the form prescribed in Code Section 21-2-170.” We further
hold that if no presidential elector for an independent candidate for
President files such a petition for a particular election, no elector
has qualified as a candidate for the office of presidential elector, and
4
so that elector’s independent candidate for President may not
appear on the ballot for election in Georgia.
The parties to this appeal agree that no West elector and no De
la Cruz elector filed a nomination petition in his or her own name.
We therefore affirm the decisions of the superior courts below, which
correctly concluded that neither West’s nor De la Cruz’s electors
satisfied the statutory requirements for their respective
independent candidates to appear on Georgia’s ballot for the office
of President of the United States. 1 As a result, the remedies the
superior courts ordered are affirmed. We note that at oral
argument, counsel for the Secretary represented to this Court that
if the superior courts’ orders in these cases were to be affirmed, the
Secretary would comply with OCGA § 21-2-5 (c), which involves
“plac[ing] prominent notice[s]” at “each affected polling place
advising voters of the disqualification of the candidate[s] and all
1 We also affirm the superior court’s order in Wittenstein, et al. v. West,
No. 24CV011079 (Sept. 11, 2024), which dismissed as moot a challenge to
West’s qualifications in his capacity as a candidate for the office of President
of the United States. See below, n.2.
5
votes cast for such candidate[s] shall be void and not counted,” and
that he would include notices in absentee ballot envelopes uniformly
as to both West and De la Cruz.
I. Background and Procedural History
(a) Proceedings Below
Independent candidates West and De la Cruz purported to
meet the statutory requirements to appear on the Georgia ballot in
late June 2024, and the Secretary of State concluded that they were
qualified to appear on the Georgia ballot for the November 5, 2024,
General Election.
On July 12, 2024, a group of Georgia voters (the “Pigg
challengers”) filed separate complaints 2 against the Secretary’s
2 In a third case below, a different set of Georgia voters (the “Wittenstein
challengers”) challenged the qualifications of candidate West to appear on the
Georgia ballot. The merits of that case are not before this Court on appeal, but
candidate West filed, and we granted, a discretionary application pertaining to
the action challenging West’s qualification. See Case No. S25A0178. West
contends that the superior court erroneously dismissed his appeal below after
concluding that it did not need to reach the merits of the challengers’ appeal
as to West, given its conclusion that the West electors did not qualify under
the Georgia Election Code. See Wittenstein, et al. v. West, No. 24CV011079,
Order at 3 (Sept. 11, 2024). No such challenge was brought against candidate
De la Cruz.
6
qualification of the West electors and the De la Cruz electors
pursuant to OCGA § 21-2-5 (b).3 On August 19 and August 22, 2024,
the Chief ALJ held separate hearings on the challenges against the
West electors (Al-Bari et al.) and the De la Cruz electors (Clapp et
al.), respectively. On August 26, 2024, the Chief ALJ issued
separate Initial Decisions concluding that “to qualify as a candidate
for the office of presidential elector, each candidate for that office . .
. is required to timely file ‘a nomination petition in the form
prescribed in Code Section 21-2-170.’” Because none of West’s
electors and none of De la Cruz’s electors had met this requirement,
3 OCGA § 21-2-5 (b) provides in relevant part:
Within two weeks after the deadline for qualifying, any elector who
is eligible to vote for a candidate may challenge the qualifications
of the candidate by filing a written complaint with the Secretary
of State giving the reasons why the elector believes the candidate
is not qualified to seek and hold the public office for which he or
she is offering. Upon his or her own motion or upon a challenge
being filed, the Secretary of State shall notify the candidate in
writing that his or her qualifications are being challenged and the
reasons therefor and shall advise the candidate that he or she is
requesting a hearing on the matter before an administrative law
judge of the Office of State Administrative Hearings pursuant to
Article 2 of Chapter 13 of Title 50 and shall inform the candidate
of the date, time, and place of the hearing when such information
becomes available. The administrative law judge shall report his
or her findings to the Secretary of State.
7
none were “qualified as candidates for the office of presidential
elector.”
As relevant here, the West electors and the De la Cruz electors
appealed to the Secretary of State, who on August 29, 2024, issued
separate Final Decisions reversing the Chief ALJ’s determination
that neither the West nor the De la Cruz electors were qualified.
Citing an injunction imposed by a federal district court in Green
Party of Georgia v. Kemp, 171 FSupp.3d 1340 (N.D. Ga. 2016), 4 the
Secretary concluded that the nomination petitions West and De la
Cruz submitted in their own names, which each contained at least
7,500 valid signatures, were sufficient to qualify the West and De la
Cruz electors to be candidates for the office of presidential elector.
The Secretary reasoned that, notwithstanding the Chief ALJ’s
conclusion that OCGA § 21-2-132 (e) requires presidential electors
4 The Green Party injunction stated: the Secretary of State “is
PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from enforcing the one percent signature
requirement in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-170 against presidential candidates. Until the
Georgia General Assembly enacts a permanent measure, a candidate for
President may access the ballot by submitting 7,500 signatures on a petition
that otherwise complies with Georgia law.” Green Party, 171 FSupp.3d at
1374. We address the Green Party injunction below in Division IV.
8
to submit nomination petitions in their own names, he could not
require the West or De la Cruz electors to also submit nomination
petitions in their own names to place West and De la Cruz on the
ballot because, under the Green Party injunction as interpreted by
the Secretary, “the Secretary is prohibited from requiring
independent candidates for President to submit more than 7,500
signatures on a single petition to access the General Election ballot.”
The Pigg challengers appealed both decisions to the Fulton County
Superior Court.
On September 11, 2024, two different judges of the Fulton
County Superior Court reversed the Secretary of State.5 Each judge
determined that (1) OCGA § 21-2-132 requires a candidate for the
5 The Georgia Republican Party sought, and was granted, intervention
pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-24 in Pigg, et al. v. Raffensperger, et al., No.
24CV011040 (Sept. 11, 2024) (the De la Cruz elector challenge); it joined the
case on the side of the De la Cruz electors. It also sought intervention in Pigg,
et al. v. Raffensperger, et al., No. 24CV011035 (Sept. 11, 2024) (the West elector challenge), on the side of the West electors, but did not obtain a ruling on that
motion. In the De la Cruz elector challenge, the Georgia Republican Party also
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to join Claudia De la Cruz as an
indispensable party, which De la Cruz joined; the superior court denied it,
finding that “Ms. De la Cruz’s interests are adequately protected by her
candidates for presidential electors, who are Respondents herein.”
9
office of presidential elector to file a nomination petition in the form
prescribed by OCGA § 21-2-170; (2) the injunction imposed by a
federal district court in Green Party applies only to the signature
requirement in OCGA § 21-2-170 (b) and does not prevent the
Secretary of State from requiring presidential electors to file
nomination petitions; and (3) neither West’s nor De la Cruz’s
electors had properly qualified to place their presidential candidate
on the ballot.
In considering what remedy to order in light of these legal
conclusions, the superior court in Pigg, et al. v. Raffensperger, et al.,
No. 24CV011035 (Sept. 11, 2024) (the West elector challenge)
expressly found under OCGA § 21-2-5 (c) that there was “insufficient
time to strike” West’s name “or reprint the ballots.” See Order at 11
. Citing OCGA § 21-2-5 (c), the court ordered the Secretary to “post
notices . . . at every polling location to alert all Georgia Voters that
Dr. Cornel West is not a valid candidate for the Office of President
of the United States.” Id.
In Pigg, et al. v. Raffensperger, et al., No. 24CV011040 (Sept.
10
11, 2024) (the De la Cruz elector challenge), a different superior
court directed the Secretary to “withhold the name of Claudia De la
Cruz from the ballot or strike Ms. De la Cruz’s name from the ballot
if the ballots have been printed.” See Order at 11. That superior
court declined to make an express finding about time under OCGA
§ 21-2-5 (c) but ordered in the alternative that, if there was
insufficient time to strike De la Cruz’s name or reprint ballots, the
Secretary “shall ensure that a prominent notice is placed at each
affected polling place advising voters of the disqualification of Ms.
De la Cruz.” Id. To the extent De la Cruz’s name had “already been
included on any printed ballots and those ballots [could] be reprinted
and still meet applicable deadlines for mailing ballots,” the superior
court further directed the Secretary to “take all steps to ensure”
ballots would be reprinted. Id. at 12. And to the extent De la Cruz’s
name had “already been included on any printed ballot and those
ballots [could not] be reprinted,” the superior court directed the
Secretary to “ensure that a prominent printed notice advising
voters” that De la Cruz was disqualified would be included with
11
these printed ballots. Id.
(b) Proceedings in this Court
Following the orders from the superior courts, the West
electors, the De la Cruz electors, the Secretary of State, and the
Georgia Republican Party filed in this Court discretionary
applications, motions for emergency stay, and requests for expedited
consideration. The first of these applications was filed the day after
the superior courts issued their decisions, and the last was filed two
days later. West, in his capacity as a candidate, also filed a
discretionary application, motion for emergency stay, and request
for expedited consideration.
We granted each of the applications in an expedited manner on
September 17, 2024, directing the parties to file their notices of
appeal by September 18, 2024, and their principal briefs by
September 20, 2024. The Pigg challengers filed their notice of crossappeal on September 19, 2024. We heard oral argument on
12
September 24, 2024.6
II. Standard of Review
Qualification challenges under OCGA § 21-2-5 come to us on
appeal from a superior court’s appellate review of an agency
decision. See OCGA § 21-2-5 (e) (allowing a petition for review of
the Secretary of State’s decision to the Fulton County Superior
Court and appeal of that decision to this Court or the Court of
Appeals, as provided by law). In such cases, we generally “accept
6 We recently have dismissed other election contests on prudential
grounds because of the parties’ failure to pursue their claims expeditiously.
See, e.g., Catoosa County Republican Party v. Henry, --- Ga. ---, --- (--- SE2d
---) (2024) (explaining that our precedent requires parties challenging a
candidate’s qualifications for office “to do all they [can] to ensure that their
claims [are] resolved” before an election occurs); Jordan v. Cook, 277 Ga. 155,
156 (587 SE2d 52) (2003) (“[T]he party challenging either a primary or general
election should make every effort to dispose of election disputes with
dispatch[.]”) (citation and punctuation omitted).
We emphasize that the parties in this election contest have moved with
alacrity and dispatch—especially once the cases reached this Court. As
detailed above, the initial complaints filed timely with the Secretary of State
were lodged just over two months ago, on July 12, 2024, and three levels of
review (ALJ, Secretary of State, and superior courts) spanned less than a
month, from mid-August to mid-September. The superior courts below issued
orders on September 11, 2024, and some of the affected parties began filing
discretionary applications the very next day. When they did, they moved for
emergency stays and asked for expedited consideration. We ordered an
accelerated schedule and the parties briefed and argued the appeals within one
week of the first discretionary appeal being granted.
13
the agency’s findings of fact if there is any evidence to support the
findings” and “examine [de novo] the soundness of the conclusions of
law drawn from the findings of fact supported by any evidence.” See
Handel v. Powell, 284 Ga. 550, 552 (670 SE2d 62) (2008) (noting that
OCGA § 21-2-5 (e) mirrors the Administrative Procedure Act with
respect to superior court review of agency decision and applying the
same standard of review). We note that “the agency’s interpretation
[of statutes] is not binding on the courts, which have the ultimate
authority to construe statutes.” Id. at 553.
III. Statutory Construction
As detailed above, the primary legal question presented by the
election challenges before us on appeal is whether the presidential
electors for two independent candidates for President of the United
States have met the statutory requirements for qualification under
Georgia’s Election Code, such that those electors’ candidates for
President may be placed on Georgia’s ballot in the November 2024
election. In particular, the challengers contend that each
presidential elector for an independent candidate for President is
14
required to file a nomination petition signed by a certain number of
registered voters.
To address this argument, we turn to the relevant provisions
of our Election Code. Code Section 21-2-132 (e) says in relevant part:
Each candidate required to file a notice of candidacy by
this Code section shall, no earlier than 9:00 A.M. on the
fourth Monday in June immediately prior to the election
and no later than 12:00 Noon on the second Tuesday in
July immediately prior to the election, file with the same
official with whom he or she filed his or her notice of
candidacy a nomination petition in the form prescribed in
Code Section 21-2-170 . . . .7
7 The complete text of OCGA § 21-2-132 (e) is as follows:
Each candidate required to file a notice of candidacy by this Code
section shall, no earlier than 9:00 A.M. on the fourth Monday in
June immediately prior to the election and no later than 12:00
Noon on the second Tuesday in July immediately prior to the
election, file with the same official with whom he or she filed his
or her notice of candidacy a nomination petition in the form
prescribed in Code Section 21-2-170, except that such petition shall
not be required if such candidate is:
(1) A nominee of a political party for the office of presidential
elector when such party has held a national convention and
therein nominated candidates for President and Vice President of
the United States;
(2) Seeking office in a special election;
(3) An incumbent qualifying as a candidate to succeed himself or
herself;
(4) A candidate seeking election in a nonpartisan election; or
(5) A nominee for a state-wide office by a duly constituted political
body convention, provided that the political body making the
nomination has qualified to nominate candidates for state-wide
public office under the provisions of Code Section 21-2-180.
15
(Emphasis added).
The question, then, is a narrow one: are presidential electors
for independent candidates for President of the United States
“candidate[s] required to file a notice of candidacy” by OCGA § 21-2-132, such that OCGA § 21-2-132 (e) requires them to file nomination
petitions? Based on a plain reading of the text and context of OCGA
§ 21-2-132, we conclude that they are. See Premier Health Care
Investments, LLC v. UHS of Anchor, L.P., 310 Ga. 32, 39 (849 SE2d
441) (2020) (“[W]e must afford the statutory text its plain and
ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory text in the context in
which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most
natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English
language would.”) (citations and punctuation omitted).
(a) Our conclusion is apparent from the relevant statutory text.
OCGA § 21-2-132 (e) requires “[e]ach candidate required to file a
notice of candidacy” to also file a nomination petition. In turn,
OCGA § 21-2-132.1 makes clear that presidential electors are
16
“candidates for the office of presidential elector.” See OCGA § 21-2-132.1 (a) (independent candidates for the office of President of the
United States must certify and file a slate of “candidates for the
office of presidential elector”) (emphasis added);8 OCGA § 21-2-132.1
(b) (describing electors as “candidates for presidential electors” and
stating that after the independent candidate for President of the
United States certifies those candidates, they “shall then qualify for
election to such office in accordance with Code Section 21-2-132”)
(emphasis added). 9 And importantly, under OCGA § 21-2-132 (d)
(1), “[e]ach elector for President . . . of the United States . . . desiring
to have the names of his or her candidates for President . . . placed
8 The complete text of OCGA § 21-2-132.1 (a) is as follows:
An independent candidate for the office of President or Vice
President of the United States shall file with the Secretary of State
not later than the Friday before the opening of qualifying for such
office as provided in subsection (d) of Code Section 21-2-132 a slate
of candidates for the office of presidential elector which such
independent candidate has certified as being the presidential
electors for such independent candidate.
9 The complete text of OCGA § 21-2-132.1 (b) is as follows:
The candidates for presidential electors certified by an
independent candidate for the office of President or Vice President
of the United States shall then qualify for election to such office in
accordance with Code Section 21-2-132.
17
on the election ballot shall file a notice of his or her candidacy.” 10 Id.
Thus, the plain language of the Election Code makes clear that
candidates for the office of presidential elector are “candidate[s]
required to file a notice of candidacy” by OCGA § 21-2-132. See
OCGA § 21-2-132 (e).
As a result, under OCGA § 21-2-132 (e)—the application of
which is predicated on a candidate being “required to file a notice of
candidacy” by OCGA § 21-2-132—each candidate for presidential
elector is required to file “a nomination petition in the form
prescribed in Code Section 21-2-170.” See OCGA § 21-2-132 (e).11
10 The complete text of OCGA § 21-2-132 (d) (1) is as follows:
Each elector for President or Vice President of the United States,
or his or her agent, desiring to have the names of his or her
candidates for President and Vice President placed on the election
ballot shall file a notice of his or her candidacy, giving his or her
name, residence address, and the office he or she is seeking, in the
office of the Secretary of State during the period beginning at 9:00
A.M. on the fourth Monday in June immediately prior to the
election and ending at 12:00 Noon on the Friday following the
fourth Monday in June, notwithstanding the fact that any such
days may be legal holidays[.]
11 Only one certified elector is required to file a valid nomination petition
under OCGA § 21-2-132 (e) for the elector’s independent candidate for office of
the President of the United States to appear on Georgia’s ballot. See OCGA
§ 21-2-132.1 (c) (“An independent candidate for the office of President or Vice
18
(b) The linchpin of our statutory analysis is that presidential
electors must file notices of candidacy pursuant to OCGA § 21-2-132
(d) (1).12 So it bears emphasis that every party in this appeal—West,
President of the United States may certify a number of candidates for the office
of presidential elector that is equal to or less than the number of presidential
electors who may be elected from the State of Georgia.”).
12 As explained above, we reach this conclusion based on a plain reading
of the statutory text. But we also note that this requirement makes sense when
viewed in the context of the Election Code’s recent statutory history. The
requirement for presidential electors to file notices of candidacy is part of a
broader statutory scheme that charges independent candidates for President
with certifying a “slate of candidates for the office of presidential elector,” and then requires the presidential electors themselves to “qualify for election to
such office in accordance with Code Section 21-2-132.” OCGA § 21-2-132.1.
The enactment of OCGA § 21-2-132.1 in 2019 followed the General Assembly’s
2017 amendment to OCGA § 21-2-132 (d) (1):
(d) All political body and independent candidates shall file their
notice of candidacy and pay the prescribed qualifying fee by the
date prescribed in this subsection in order to be eligible to have
their names placed on the election ballot by the Secretary of State
or election superintendent, as the case may be, in the following
manner:
(1) Each candidate for federal or state office elector for President
or Vice President of the United States, or his or her agent, desiring
to have his or her name the names of his or her candidates for
President and Vice President placed on the election ballot shall file
a notice of his or her candidacy, giving his or her name, residence
address, and the office he or she is seeking, in the office of the
Secretary of State either during the period beginning at 9:00 A.M.
on the Monday of the thirty-fifth week immediately prior to the
election and ending at 12:00 Noon on the Friday immediately
following such Monday, notwithstanding the fact that any such
days may be legal holidays, or during the period beginning at 9:00
A.M. on the fourth Monday in June immediately prior to the
19
the West electors, the De la Cruz electors, the Secretary of State, the
Georgia Republican Party, and the challengers—agrees on that
point. 13 One might think that by conceding this point—that OCGA
election and ending at 12:00 Noon on the Friday following the
fourth Monday in June notwithstanding the fact that any such
days may be legal holidays . . .
OCGA § 21-2-132 (d) (1) (modifications to reflect 2017 amendment).
With these 2017 changes, the revised OCGA § 21-2-132 (d) (1) conferred
on presidential electors the responsibility of filing a notice of candidacy if they “desir[e] to have the names of his or her candidates for President . . . placed on the election ballot.” See OCGA § 21-2-132 (d) (1). That is a significant change
from the pre-2017 text, which placed the obligation to file a notice of candidacy
on the independent candidate for President him or herself. Compare OCGA
§ 21-2-132 (d) (1) (2016) (“All . . . independent candidates shall file their notice of candidacy . . . in the following manner: Each candidate for federal or state
office . . . desiring to have his or her name placed on the election ballot shall
file a notice of his or her candidacy.”).
13 See Brief of West and Al-Bari, et al., Case Nos. S25A0177, S25A0182,
& S25X0184, at 16 (“The electors and candidate then file their notices of
candidacy.”); Brief of Clapp, et al., Case No. S25A0179, at 17 (“The General
Assembly passed O.C.G.A. § 21-2-132.1 to require independent candidates for
President to name their presidential electors before the deadline for electors to
file their notices of candidacy as required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-132(d)(1).”)
(emphasis added); Brief of Secretary of State, Case Nos. S25A0180 &
S25A0182, at 12 (acknowledging that “the electors must also file notices of
candidacy and qualify”); Brief of Georgia Republican Party, Inc., Case No.
S25A0181, at 12 (“[U]nder the current statute, both types of candidates must
file a notice of candidacy.”); Brief of Pigg, et al., Case Nos. S25A0177,
S25A0179, S25A0180, S25A0181, & S25A0182, at 7 (“[E]ach candidate for
presidential elector must file a notice of candidacy.”); Brief of Wittenstein, et
al., Case No. S25A0178, at 16-17 (“[I]ndependent presidential elector
candidates must file . . . a timely notice of candidacy.”).
And the Georgia Republican Party appears to go further by conceding
that electors must file both a notice of candidacy and an election petition under
20
§ 21-2-132 (d) (1) requires electors for independent candidates for
President to file a notice of candidacy—the Appellants have already
lost their argument: given that OCGA § 21-2-132 (e) states that
“candidate[s] required to file a notice of candidacy by this Code
section” must file a nomination petition, and that all parties to this
appeal agree that each presidential elector is required to file a notice
of candidacy, it stands to reason that each presidential elector is
required to file a nomination petition under Georgia’s Election Code.
However, Appellants West, the West electors, and the
Secretary of State resist that conclusion. They contend that even
though presidential electors are required to file a notice of candidacy
under OCGA § 21-2-132 (d) (1), those presidential electors are not
“candidate[s] required to file a notice of candidacy by this Code
Section” under OCGA § 21-2-132 (e) (emphasis added), because they
the Election Code. See Brief of Georgia Republican Party, Inc., Case No.
S25A0181, at 12 (the 2017 amendment to § 21-2-132 (d) (1) “clarified that the
requirement to file a notice of candidacy applied to presidential electors,” and
“even under the current statute, both types of candidates must file a notice of
candidacy, and must file a petition with it under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-132 (e) unless
they are exempt.”).
21
are described only as “electors”—not “candidates”—in OCGA § 21-2-132 (d) (1).
That strained argument finds no real support in the text or
context of OCGA § 21-2-132. Indeed, presidential electors are
expressly described as “candidates” three times in OCGA § 21-2-132.1—the statutory provision the General Assembly enacted in
2019 against the backdrop of OCGA § 21-2-132 (e), which already
established that nomination petitions were required to be filed by
“candidate[s] required to file a notice of candidacy.” See OCGA § 21-2-132.1 (a) (requiring independent candidates for President to
certify a slate of “candidates for the office of presidential elector”)
(emphasis added); OCGA § 21-2-132.1 (b) (“The candidates for
presidential electors certified by an independent candidate for the
office of President or Vice President of the United States shall then
qualify for election to such office in accordance with Code Section 21-2-132.”) (emphasis added); OCGA § 21-2-132.1 (c) (“An independent
candidate for the office of President or Vice President of the United
States may certify a number of candidates for the office of
22
presidential elector that is equal to or less than the number of
presidential electors who may be elected from the State of Georgia.”)
(emphasis added); OCGA § 21-2-132 (e).14 It would be both strange
(as a matter of statutory interpretation) and confusing (for
presidential electors) to treat presidential electors as “candidates”
in the provisions that require those presidential electors to qualify,
see OCGA § 21-2-132.1, but not “candidates” for purposes of the very
Code provision—OCGA § 21-2-132—with which the presidential
electors are instructed to comply to qualify. See OCGA § 21-2-132.1
(b) (“The candidates for presidential electors certified by an
independent candidate for the office of President or Vice President
of the United States shall then qualify for election to such office in
14 In fact, presidential electors have been described as “candidates” in
OCGA § 21-2-285 (e) for almost 20 years, since at least 2005. See OCGA § 21-2-285 (e) (“When presidential electors are to be elected, the ballot shall not list the individual names of the candidates for presidential electors but shall list
the names of each political party or body and the names of the candidates of
the party or body for the offices of President and Vice President of the United
States.”) (emphasis added); Ga. L. 2005, p. 253, § 36. And the phrase
“candidates for presidential electors” has been used in other provisions of the
Georgia Code for almost 100 years. See, e.g., Ga. L. 1929, p. 339, § 2 (referring
to “candidates for presidential electors” in the context of regulations pertaining to voting machines).
23
accordance with Code Section 21-2-132.”) (emphasis added). We
reject such a reading.
(c) The Secretary’s argument that OCGA § 21-2-170 requires a
different construction of OCGA § 21-2-132 (e) likewise fails. The
Secretary contends that presidential electors are not required to file
nomination petitions because OCGA § 21-2-170 does not state that
independent candidates for President must submit separate
nomination petitions for individual presidential electors, and
because OCGA § 21-2-170 (c) suggests that presidential electors for
independent candidates are not required to file nomination
petitions.
The Secretary’s first argument gets the statutory scheme
backwards because OCGA § 21-2-132 (e), not OCGA § 21-2-170,
speaks to who must file a nomination petition to ensure that an
independent candidate for President appears on the Georgia ballot;
OCGA § 21-2-170 merely prescribes the form of the nomination
24
petitions required by OCGA § 21-2-132 (e). 15 See OCGA § 21-2-132
(e) (candidates required to file a notice of candidacy must file a
nomination petition “in the form prescribed in Code Section 21-2-170”). And the Secretary’s second argument fails because the only
portion of OCGA § 21-2-170 (c) he cites lays out an exception for
political bodies,16 and that exception does nothing to change
statutory requirements for electors for independent candidates for
President. See OCGA § 21-2-170 (c) (“except any political body
seeking to have the names of its candidates for the offices of
presidential electors placed upon the ballot through nomination
petitions shall . . . compile its petitions so that the entire slate of
15 We need not resolve the West electors’ claim that OCGA § 21-2-170
(b)’s reference to a signature requirement for voters “eligible to vote in the last election for the filling of the office the candidate is seeking” does not refer to the office of candidate for presidential elector. Because no presidential elector
filed a nomination petition in these cases, there is no question to be decided
about how the signature requirements in OCGA § 21-2-170 (b) would apply to
such a petition.
16 The Georgia Election Code defines a “political body” as “any political
organization other than a political party.” OCGA § 21-2-2 (23). The Code
defines “independent” as “a person unaffiliated with any political party or body
and includes candidates in a special election for a partisan office for which
there has not been a prior special primary.” OCGA § 21-2-2 (10).
25
candidates of such body for such office shall be listed together on the
same petition”) (emphasis added). 17
(d) A final theory advanced by some of the Appellants also fails.
They contend that the Election Code does not require presidential
electors to file nomination petitions because OCGA § 21-2-132 (d) (1)
and (e) could have, but do not, include additional text that would
more clearly require presidential electors to file nomination
petitions. The Secretary and the De la Cruz electors, for example,
17 The full text of OCGA § 21-2-170 (c) reads:
Each person signing a nomination petition shall declare therein
that he or she is a duly qualified and registered elector of the state,
county, or municipality entitled to vote in the next election for the
filling of the office sought by the candidate supported by the
petition and shall add to his or her signature his or her residence
address, giving municipality, if any, and county, with street and
number, if any, and be urged to add the person’s date of birth
which shall be used for verification purposes. No person shall sign
the same petition more than once. Each petition shall support the
candidacy of only a single candidate, except any political body
seeking to have the names of its candidates for the offices of
presidential electors placed upon the ballot through nomination
petitions shall not compile a separate petition for each candidate
for such office, but such political body shall compile its petitions so
that the entire slate of candidates of such body for such office shall
be listed together on the same petition. A signature shall be
stricken from the petition when the signer so requests prior to the
presentation of the petition to the appropriate officer for filing, but
such a request shall be disregarded if made after such
presentation.
26
contend that the legislature could have modified OCGA § 21-2-132
(e) to include “electors” as well as “candidates” as it did in its
amendment to OCGA § 21-2-132 (d) (1), but did not do so.
These Appellants are correct that the General Assembly could
have further amended the Election Code after 2019 in any number
of ways to clarify the requirements for electors for independent
candidates for President to qualify and place their candidates on the
ballot. But the possibility of improved precision does not support a
different construction of the otherwise-clear statutory requirements
in OCGA § 21-2-132 and OCGA § 21-2-132.1.18
18 Appellants West and the West electors point out that under OCGA
§ 21-2-132 (f), candidates who are required to file an affidavit accompanying a
notice of candidacy are required to include in the affidavit “the name as the
candidate desires it to be listed on the ballot”—even though elector names are
not listed on the ballot. But that apparent peculiarity does not change the
clear statutory requirement for electors to file notices of candidacy under
OCGA § 21-2-132 (d) (1) and nomination petitions under OCGA § 21-2-132 (e)
to have their independent candidate for President placed on the ballot. See
OCGA § 21-2-132 (f) (directing “candidate[s] required by this Code section to
file a notice of candidacy” to “accompany his or her notice of candidacy with an
affidavit” that, among other things, includes stating “[h]is or her full name and
the name as the candidate desires it to be listed on the ballot”). See also OCGA
§ 21-2-285 (e) (“When presidential electors are to be elected, the ballot shall
not list the individual names of the candidates for presidential electors but
shall list the names of each political party or body and the names of the
candidates of the party or body for the offices of President and Vice President
27
IV. Green Party and Constitutional Considerations
Appellants contend that if, in fact, presidential electors are
required to file nomination petitions under OCGA § 21-2-132 (e), and
are required to do so “in the form prescribed in Code Section 21-2-170,” then the Secretary’s enforcement of the nomination-petition
signature requirement set forth in OCGA § 21-2-170 (b) will run
afoul of the injunction a federal district court entered with respect
to OCGA § 21-2-170 (b) in Green Party, 171 FSupp.3d at 1374.19
Not so. In Green Party, the district court permanently enjoined
Georgia’s Secretary of State from “enforcing the one percent
of the United States. The individual names or the nominees of each political
party or body for such offices shall be posted at each polling place arranged
alphabetically under the names of the candidates of the party or body for
President and Vice President of the United States. A vote for the candidates for
President and Vice President of a political party or body shall be deemed to be
a vote for each of the candidates for presidential electors of such political party or body.”) (emphasis added).
19 Indeed, the Secretary’s Final Decisions in the West and De la Cruz
elector cases below were predicated on his assessment that requiring
presidential electors to file nomination petitions in their own names “is
contrary to a federal court order permanently enjoining the Secretary from
requiring more than 7,500 signatures on a nomination petition for a candidate
to obtain ballot access for the office of President of the United States.” See
Smith, et al. v. Al-Bari, et al., No. 2502870, Final Decision at 2 (Aug. 29, 2024); Pigg, et al. v. Clapp, et al., No. 2502266, Final Decision at 2 (Aug. 29, 2024)
(citing Green Party).
28
signature requirement in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-170 against presidential
candidates,” and as an “interim measure” reduced the number of
valid signatures required on a nomination petition submitted by a
presidential candidate to 7,500. See Green Party, 171 FSupp.3d at
1374. But the defect that prevents independent presidential
candidates West and De la Cruz from appearing on Georgia’s ballot
does not pertain to the number of signatures acquired; it is that
West’s electors and De la Cruz’s electors filed no nomination
petitions at all.
Moreover, Green Party, which was decided before the General
Assembly amended OCGA § 21-2-132 (d) (1) in 2017 and enacted
OCGA § 21-2-132.1 in 2019, pertained to requirements for
nomination petitions filed by “independent candidate[s] for
President or a candidate for President representing a ‘political
body’” under OCGA § 21-2-170; it did not evaluate or decide any
issue related to nomination-petition requirements for presidential
electors. See Green Party, 171 FSupp.3d at 1372-1374. The
injunction entered in Green Party in 2016 cannot be understood to
29
apply to statutory requirements (i.e., OCGA § 21-2-132 (d) (1) (as
amended in 2017) and OCGA § 21-2-132.1 (enacted in 2019)) added
to the Election Code years after that injunction was issued.
The West electors agree that the Green Party injunction cannot
be applied to a later-enacted statute such as OCGA § 21-2-132.1, but
contend “that does not end the inquiry.” They and the other
Appellants protest that all of the same constitutional concerns that
animated the federal district court’s injunction in Green Party are
still present here, because applying a signature requirement under
OCGA § 21-2-170 to presidential electors instead of to independent
candidates for President is a distinction without a difference. But
no constitutional challenge to the current statutory scheme for
qualifying candidates for the office of elector of independent
candidates for President is properly before this Court in these cases.
We therefore express no view on any such constitutional questions
today.
For all of the reasons explained above in Divisions III and IV,
we affirm the decisions of the superior courts below.
30
V. Cross Appeal in Case No. S25X0184, Pigg, et al. v.
Raffensperger et al., Regarding Remedy
Shortly after this Court granted the discretionary applications
Appellants filed in this set of cases, the Pigg challengers filed a
cross-appeal contending that the relief the superior court ordered in
the West elector cases was not enough, and that the superior court
“erred by not instructing the Secretary of State to withhold or strike
[Dr. West’s] name from the ballot if there is sufficient time to do so.”
We see no error.
In entering a statutory remedy based on its conclusion that
Georgia law requires a candidate for presidential elector to file a
nomination petition in his or her own name, the superior court found
that “it would be extremely difficult to reprint ballot[s] and remove
Dr. West as an option before the election.” It thus concluded “that
there is insufficient time to strike the candidate’s name or reprint
the ballots.”
Whether there is “insufficient time to strike the candidate’s
name or reprint the ballots,” see OCGA § 21-2-5 (c), is a question of
31
fact, so the “any evidence” standard applies. See Premier Health
Care Investments, LLC, 310 Ga. at 38. And evidence was presented
from which the trial court could have concluded, as it did, that there
was insufficient time to strike West’s name from Georgia ballots.
Moreover, the trial court was authorized to take judicial notice of
the date and the deadline for mailing ballots, as it did here, in
support of its finding of insufficient time to strike West’s name or
reprint the ballots. See OCGA § 24-2-201; OCGA § 24-2-220.
Because there was at least some evidence to support the trial
court’s finding, we affirm.20
VI. Other Procedural Issues
(a) The Georgia Republican Party’s appeal in Case No.
S25A0183 must be dismissed.
The challengers to the West electors (Al Bari, et al.) contend
20 The Secretary’s contention, raised in its appeal regarding the De la
Cruz electors, that the relief the superior court ordered was too expansive also
fails. The superior court cited and followed OCGA § 21-2-5 (c). To the extent
the superior court ordered relief regarding printed ballots contingent on the
Secretary’s ability to comply with the order “and still meet applicable deadlines
for mailing ballots,” the Secretary’s complaint that the remedy is erroneous
presents nothing for our review; by its own terms, such relief is contingent on
whether there is “[]sufficient time,” id., and that is not a determination this
Court can make in the first instance.
32
that the Georgia Republican Party’s appeal in this Court in Case No.
S25A0183 (Georgia Republican Party, Inc. v. Pigg, et al.), must be
dismissed because the Georgia Republican Party was not a party to
those proceedings below. To support this contention, the Al Bari
challengers note that the Georgia Republican Party was not
originally named as a respondent in the election contests
challenging various aspects of West’s qualifications for the Georgia
ballot; its motion to intervene was never ruled upon in the appeal of
the West elector action in the superior court; and it was not a party
to the West appeal in Case No. S25A0178.
We have held that an entity that was not a party to the
proceedings below cannot bring an appeal in a case in which the
appellant filed a motion to intervene, but the trial court did not rule
on the motion. See Mar-Pak Michigan, Inc. v. Pointer, 226 Ga. 146,
146 (173 SE2d 219) (1970) (“Only a party to the case can appeal from
a judgment or one who has sought to become a party, as by way of
intervention . . . , and has been denied the right to do so.”) (citation
and punctuation omitted). That holding applies to the Georgia
33
Republican Party here with respect to the West electors’ appeal in
this Court. See Georgia Republican Party, Inc. v. Pigg, et al., Case
No. S25A0183. Thus, the application for discretionary appeal (Case
No. S25D0154) was improvidently granted. Accordingly, the order
granting the application is vacated, the application is denied, and
the Georgia Republican Party’s appeal in Case No. S25A0183 is
dismissed.
(b) The superior court did not err in denying the motion to
dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party with
respect to De la Cruz.
In their discretionary application and in their appeal before
this Court, the De la Cruz electors (Clapp, et al.) contend that
because Claudia De la Cruz was not joined as an indispensable party
in the Pigg challengers’ appeal to the superior court, see No.
24CV011040, the Pigg challengers’ appeal in this Court must be
dismissed or, alternatively, this Court should vacate the superior
court’s order concluding that none of De la Cruz’s electors properly
qualified to place De la Cruz on the ballot, and the case below
challenging the qualifications of the De la Cruz electors (No.
34
24CV011040) should be dismissed.
Under OCGA § 9-11-19 (a), a “person who is subject to service
of process shall be joined as a party in the action if:”
(1) In his absence complete relief cannot be afforded
among those who are already parties; or
(2) He claims an interest relating to the subject of the
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action
in his absence may:
(A) As a practical matter impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest; or
(B) Leave any of the persons who are already parties
subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by
reason of his claimed interest.
The De la Cruz electors do not cite OCGA § 9-11-19 (a). They
nevertheless contend that De la Cruz did not receive the required
notice from the Secretary of State that her candidacy was being
challenged, see OCGA § 21-2-5 (b), that she has an independent
interest in her candidacy, that she has a right to be made a party to
the proceedings, and that striking her name from the ballot without
making her a party violates her due process rights.
These claims fail. In denying the motion to dismiss, the
superior court found that De la Cruz’s “interests are adequately
35
protected by her candidates for presidential electors, who are
Respondents herein.” See Pigg, et al. v. Raffensperger, et al., No.
24CV011040 (Sept. 11, 2024). We agree. Under OCGA § 9-11-19 (a)
(1), complete relief can be afforded among those who are already
parties to this appeal: the De la Cruz electors. That is because the
Pigg challengers are contesting the qualifications of the De la Cruz
electors, not the qualifications of De la Cruz as a candidate. And
although De la Cruz has “an interest relating to the subject of the
action,” see OCGA § 9-11-19 (a) (2), the disposition of the De la Cruz
electors’ appeal in this Court (Case No. S25A0179) in her absence
does not “[a]s a practical matter impair or impede [her] ability to
protect that interest” or leave her “subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by
reason of [her] claimed interest,” see OCGA § 9-11-19 (a) (2) (A) &
(B), especially given that De la Cruz herself certified the electors
who are parties to the action. Finally, the De la Cruz electors cite
no authority for the proposition that the failure to join De la Cruz as
an indispensable party to this action violates her due process
36
rights. For these reasons, we cannot say that the trial court erred
by denying the motion to dismiss in No. 24CV011040, and the De la
Cruz electors’ claim in this Court fails.
Judgments affirmed in Case Nos. S25A0177, S25A0178,
S25A0179, S25A0180, S25A0181, S25A0182, and S25X0184.
Appeal dismissed in Case No. S25A0183. All the Justices concur,
except Peterson, P.J., disqualified in Case Nos. S25A0177,
S25A0179, S25A0180, S25A0181, S25A0182, S25A0183, and
S25X0184, and not participating in Case No. S25A0178.
37