NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: March 18, 2025
S25A0204. THE STATE v. HYLTON.
BOGGS, Chief Justice.
Appellee Shawn Hylton was indicted for felony murder and
other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Lathan
Davenport.1 Prior to trial, Hylton filed a motion for immunity from
prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, which the trial court granted.
On appeal, the State contends that the trial court’s order granting
the motion lacked sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law
to permit meaningful appellate review. It also argues that the
The shooting occurred on July 23, 2023. On December 19, 2023, a
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DeKalb County grand jury indicted Hylton for felony murder (Count 1),
aggravated assault (Count 2), and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (Count 3). On March 12, 2024, Hylton filed a motion for
a hearing on immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2. After an
evidentiary hearing on July 2, 2024, the trial court entered an order granting
the motion on July 10, 2024. The State filed a timely notice of appeal, and the
case was docketed in this Court to the term beginning in December 2024 and
submitted for a decision on the briefs.
evidence showed that Hylton was not at risk of death or great bodily
harm when he shot Davenport, such that deadly force was not
necessary to prevent an attack, and immunity was not warranted
under OCGA § 16-3-24.2. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
ruling, the evidence presented at the immunity hearing showed the
following. 2 Hylton and Davenport were both homeless and lived in
vehicles that were parked near a mechanic shop owned by Terry
Ferguson in Stone Mountain. On July 23, 2023, Hylton walked to
Ferguson’s shop to get Ferguson’s help with fixing Hylton’s moped,
which Hylton had previously parked a short distance away from the
shop. Ferguson arrived a few hours after Hylton and took an initial
look at the moped to determine what tools would be required to
repair it. Ferguson then walked back to the shop, which was about
a 15 to 16 second walk from where the moped was parked, got the
2 See State v. Remy, 308 Ga. 296, 298 (840 SE2d 385) (2020) (“On appeal
of an order granting or denying immunity, we review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, and we accept the trial court’s
findings with regard to questions of fact and credibility if there is any evidence to support them.” (cleaned up)).
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tools, and brought them to Hylton. Ferguson briefly helped Hylton
and then walked back to the shop while Hylton continued to repair
his moped.
As Ferguson entered the shop, Hylton noticed that he needed
an additional tool, so he ran after Ferguson, shouting, “Yo, Mr.
Terry. Mr. Terry,” wanting to get Ferguson’s attention. The area
where Hylton was shouting was near Davenport’s minivan. While
Hylton waited for Ferguson to come back outside with his tools,
Hylton, for the first time that day, saw Davenport walking from his
minivan toward him. Hylton had his hands in his pockets and
“looked off” in a different direction, “trying not to make eye contact
[with Davenport],” because Davenport had a violent reputation in
the community and Hylton wanted to “g[i]ve him a wide berth.”
Davenport approached Hylton, who was looking to his left, from
Hylton’s right side and punched Hylton in the right jaw behind his
ear. “After [Davenport] punched [Hylton] in the jaw, [Davenport]
continued to physically attack [Hylton], including slamming
[Hylton] on [a] car, punching [Hylton] in [his] face, particularly [in
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Hylton’s] mouth, pull[ing] [Hylton’s] hair out, and kicking [Hylton]
with [Davenport’s] boots.” Additionally, “[Davenport] had . . . one of
[Hylton’s] legs twisted and threaten[ed] to . . . break [Hylton’s] leg if
[Hylton] [did not] put the other one down because [Hylton] had one
leg up trying to defend [himself].” Hylton had a gun in his
waistband, but he did not draw it at that time.
Ferguson was about halfway through the shop when the fight
started. He testified that he heard a “big bang” and assumed that a
refrigerator or car engine had fallen. He went back outside to see
what the noise was and saw Hylton on the ground and Davenport
stomping on Hylton’s face, neck, and head area. Ferguson also
noticed that Hylton was bleeding from his head because Davenport
had pulled Hylton’s hair out.
Unbeknownst to him at the time, Ferguson inadvertently
audio-recorded the fight when he was leaving a voicemail for
someone he called while walking into the shop. On the recording,
which was played at the hearing, Hylton can be heard repeatedly
screaming, “What did I do,” and calling out to Ferguson for help.
4
Ferguson can be heard asking, “What is going on Davenport,” and
telling Davenport, “Don’t do that to [Hylton].” Davenport can be
heard saying, among other things, “let my leg go, before I hurt you,”
“I told you about all that yelling,” “I will not kill you; I will rape you,”
and “I will stomp your ass out right now.” After about 20 to 30
seconds, Davenport stopped attacking Hylton and walked back in
the direction of his minivan. Ferguson testified that Hylton
appeared “beat up . . . , bloody, [and] swollen” after the fight.
Ferguson also testified that, during the fight, Davenport threatened
him, too, and that Ferguson grabbed his gun because he feared
Davenport.
After the fight, Ferguson went back into the shop to get the tool
Hylton needed, and then they walked to the moped. However, this
tool was not the right one, so Ferguson went back to the shop. As
Hylton waited for Ferguson to come back, he realized that he had
“lost control of [his] bowels” during the fight and needed to go to his
car to change clothes.3 Hylton’s car was parked across the street
3 Ferguson, however, testified that he did not smell “human feces.”
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from Davenport’s minivan.
While walking to his car, Hylton put his gun, which fell inside
his pants during the fight, back in his waistband. As Hylton
approached his car, he “noticed [Davenport] coming from behind”
Davenport’s minivan toward him. Hylton testified that Davenport
“look[ed] angry,” approached Hylton “in a threatening manner,” and
uttered something to the effect of “Oh, you’re back.” He also
described Davenport as “running towards [him]” in an aggressive
manner. Hylton could not say how far Davenport was away from
him, only that Davenport was not close enough to strike Hylton.
Hylton did not see a weapon on Davenport’s person, but Hylton said
he was afraid for his “safety because the last time . . . Davenport
casually walked up [to Hylton, he] assaulted” him. So, Hylton drew
his weapon and shot Davenport once. He “fired two more shots in
rapid succession,” killing Davenport, because Davenport “didn’t
appear to stop” after the first shot. Hylton testified that he
intentionally fired the shots and was “mad” about the earlier
altercation, but he did not shoot Davenport to get revenge and only
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fired his weapon because he was “overcome with fear.” Ferguson did
not see the shooting but testified that he heard three gunshots about
one to two minutes after the fight.
After the shooting, Hylton went back to his moped to get his
phone and called 911 and his wife. He then continued to work on his
moped, with Ferguson joining him a few moments later. Hylton,
however, did not mention anything about the shooting to Ferguson.
Officers arrived approximately two minutes after the shots were
fired.4 When officers found Davenport’s body, which was about 30
yards from the shop in a brush area off the side of the road, they did
not find any weapons on or near his body. Officers also recovered
three 9mm Luger shell casings from near Davenport’s body.
Hylton remained on scene, where he was placed under arrest.
Police body camera footage showed Hylton limping into the police
station, which the escorting officer noted as she led him to the
interview room, and pulling strands of his hair from his pants pocket
4 Hylton testified that it took police officers thirty minutes to arrive on
scene.
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that came out during his fight with Davenport. Later, Hylton was
transported to the hospital where he received a medical
examination, including an x-ray and MRI. A medical report noted
that his only injury was a three centimeter “superficial laceration”
to the ear, for which he was prescribed a topical ointment.5
At the hearing on Hylton’s motion for immunity, evidence was
introduced of two interactions Hylton had with Davenport before the
shooting. During the first incident, Hylton was parked in the same
area where the shooting took place. Hylton and a female companion
were sitting in the car when Davenport “came banging on the
windows.” Hylton told Davenport to leave him alone, but Davenport
did not stop, prompting Hylton to leave the area. The second
incident occurred three days prior to the shooting and involved
Davenport pushing Hylton twice. Hylton contended that he did not
engage Davenport and left on his moped.
2. The State contends that the trial court’s order granting
5 In addition to the laceration behind his ear, Hylton claimed he suffered
a swollen jaw, busted lips, and ongoing shooting headaches.
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Hylton’s motion lacked sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of
law to permit meaningful appellate review. The facts pertaining to
this enumeration of error are as follows. After counsel made their
respective closing remarks at the immunity hearing, the trial court
made the following statement on the record:
COURT: All right. Mr. Hylton is seeking immunity
[under] OCGA § 16-3-[2]4.2. You must establish [by a]
preponderance of the evidence that he’s entitled to
immunity. The court’s going to take this under
advisement. The court wants to actually listen to the
voicemail and render [a] decision. . . .
About a week after the hearing, the trial court held another hearing
and stated the following on the record:
COURT: So last week[,] Mr. Hylton brought before the
court an immunity motion in which he requested that he
be immune from criminal prosecution. The court has had
ample opportunity to listen to evidence, testimony, listen
to the video. Actually, I listened to the phone call three
times yesterday with regard[] to Mr. Hylton’s motion. And
at this time, the court is going to grant Mr. Hylton
immunity from prosecution based on the evidence and the
testimony that was provided during that immunity
motion. . . .
The trial court asked Hylton’s counsel to draft an order, which
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was entered the same day. The order stated:
On July 2, 2024, the above-styled case was before the
Court for an evidentiary hearing on the Defendant’s
[m]otion for [i]mmunity from [p]rosecution (the “Motion”).
During the hearing, the Court heard and considered the
evidence and counsels’ [sic] arguments. For the reasons
the Court articulated on the record at the conclusion of
the hearing, which reasons are incorporated by reference
as though fully set forth in this Order, Defendant’s Motion
is hereby GRANTED. This case shall stand DISMISSED.
The State asserts that the trial court’s order fails as a matter
of law, as it does not articulate any specific findings of fact or
conclusions of law that support its order and erroneously cites and
incorporates by reference its oral findings, notwithstanding that no
such findings were stated at the hearing. We disagree.
As the State acknowledges, OCGA § 16-3-24.2 does not require
a trial court’s order granting or denying immunity to include explicit
factual findings or conclusions of law. See OCGA § 16-3-24.2
(providing that “[a] person who uses threats or force in accordance
with Code Section 16-3-20, 16-3-21, 16-3-23, 16-3-23.1, 16-3-24,
or 17-4-20 shall be immune from criminal prosecution therefor
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unless in the use of deadly force, such person utilizes a weapon the
carrying or possession of which is unlawful by such person under
Part 2 of Article 4 of Chapter 11 of this title”). And the trial court’s
order is not otherwise inadequate to allow for meaningful appellate
review.
Where the trial court fails to make any explicit factual findings
or credibility determinations, “we presume implicit findings were
made supporting the trial court’s decision.” Davis v. State, 306 Ga.
430, 432-433 (831 SE2d 804) (2019). While the trial court’s order is
brief, we are nevertheless able to infer that it must have concluded
that Hylton carried his burden by showing by a preponderance of
the evidence that deadly force was reasonably necessary to prevent
Davenport from causing death or great bodily injury to Hylton. See
OCGA § 16-3-21 (a) (“A person is justified in threatening or using
force against another when and to the extent that he or she
reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary to defend
himself or herself or a third person against such other’s imminent
use of unlawful force . . . .”); Gude v. State, 313 Ga. 859, 871-872 (874
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SE2d 84) (2022) (although the trial court “did not include any
discussion about why it determined that [the defendant] had not
carried his burden of showing that he reasonably believed deadly
force was necessary, and the denial of the motion at trial was a
summary denial,” the Court was able to infer from the denial of the
defendant’s motion that the trial court did not find the defendant’s
version of events credible). See also State v. Hamilton, 308 Ga. 116,
129 (839 SE2d 560) (2020) (“A trial court is free to consider a
defendant’s testimony when deciding a motion for immunity from
prosecution and to make credibility determinations and factual
findings based on all of the evidence before it—findings that this
Court will accept so long as they are supported by any evidence.”
(cleaned up)). Thus, the State’s contention that the trial court’s order
does not allow for meaningful appellate review fails.
3. The State contends that Hylton’s use of force was not
reasonably necessary and, therefore, he was not entitled to
immunity under the statute. The State acknowledges that
Davenport, unprovoked, attacked Hylton in the first confrontation
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but contends that immediately prior to the shooting, there was no
evidence that Davenport made any threats, warnings, menaces, or
brandished any weapons that would warrant Hylton using deadly
force. Again, we disagree.
As discussed above, to prevail on his motion for pretrial
immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, Hylton was required to
establish a justification defense under OCGA § 16-3-21 by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Hamilton, 308 Ga. at 128; OCGA
§ 16-3-21 (a). On appeal of an order granting or denying immunity
under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, “we accept the trial court’s findings with
regard to questions of fact and credibility if there is any evidence to
support them.” State v. Sutton, 297 Ga. 222, 222 (773 SE2d 222)
(2015) (cleaned up).
Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the trial court’s ruling, the evidence presented at the hearing
showed the following. In the days prior to the shooting, Davenport,
without apparent justification, acted aggressively toward Hylton
twice, with one of those incidents taking place just days before the
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shooting. Davenport’s aggressive tendencies, however, were not
reserved solely for Hylton, as Ferguson, who grabbed his own gun
the day of the beating because he was fearful of Davenport, testified
that Davenport was known to have a violent reputation in the
community. On the day of the shooting, Davenport, unprovoked,
severely beat Hylton, stomping on Hylton’s head and pulling out his
hair, and even remarked that he would “rape” Hylton. Not long after
that, as Hylton was walking to his car to change his soiled clothing,
Davenport began to approach Hylton in an “aggressive manner” and
then ran at Hylton.
The trial court was authorized to implicitly credit evidence of
Davenport’s violent reputation, the earlier beating, and Davenport’s
aggressive demeanor as he ran at Hylton immediately prior to the
shooting. And this evidence supports the court’s implicit conclusion
that it was objectively reasonable for Hylton to believe that
Davenport would cause great bodily injury or death if Hylton did not
defend himself with deadly force. See, e.g., Hamilton, 308 Ga. at 118,
128-129 (trial court did not err in finding that a preponderance of
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evidence showed that the defendant shot her husband in selfdefense, entitling defendant to immunity from prosecution, where
evidence showed that the victim was “in the midst of attacking” the
defendant when she shot him, and the victim had inflicted routine
and ongoing physical abuse on the defendant); Sutton, 297 Ga. at
222-225 (affirming grant of immunity from prosecution where
evidence showed that the defendant “repeatedly told the victim not
to come any closer, but the victim nevertheless continued to proceed
through the doorway” of the defendant’s mother’s home prior to
shooting the unarmed victim, and the defendant was aware of three
other instances of violence committed by the victim) (cleaned up).
Cf. Johnson v. State, 304 Ga. 610, 613-614 (820 SE2d 690) (2018)
(the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for
immunity from prosecution where the evidence showed that despite
the victim making threatening statements to the defendant and his
girlfriend days prior to the shooting, at the time of the shooting, the
victim was unarmed and did not “make any aggressive moves”).
Therefore, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
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trial court’s ruling, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
implicitly finding that Hylton showed by a preponderance of the
evidence that he shot Davenport because he reasonably believed
such force was necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to
himself.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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