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In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: April 8, 2025
S25A0041. COOPER v. THE STATE.
COLVIN, Justice.
Appellant Jaquez Cooper appeals his convictions for malice
murder and a related offense in connection with the November 28,
2018 shooting death of Rene Betancourt.1 On appeal, Appellant
1 On April 18, 2019, a DeKalb County grand jury returned a true bill of
indictment, charging Appellant with malice murder and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony. On February 25, 2020, a DeKalb
County grand jury returned a superseding indictment, which charged
Appellant with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), aggravated
assault (Count 3), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony
(Count 4), and theft by taking (Count 5). A jury trial on the superseding
indictment was held from April 18 through 22, 2022. The jury found Appellant
guilty of Counts 1 through 4 and not guilty of Count 5. The trial court sentenced
Appellant to life in prison with the possibility of parole for Count 1 and to a
consecutive five-year prison term for Count 4. Count 2 was vacated by
operation of law, and Count 3 merged with Count 1 for sentencing purposes.
Appellant timely filed a motion for new trial on May 5, 2022, and amended the
motion through new counsel on March 29, 2024. Following a hearing on the
motion for new trial on April 10, 2024, the trial court denied the motion on
April 29, 2024. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. The case was docketed
to this Court’s term beginning in December 2024 and was submitted for a
decision on the briefs.
contends that the superior court erred in denying his plea in bar,
which challenged the superior court’s jurisdiction under OCGA § 17-7-50.1. He also asserts a related claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel, arguing that trial counsel was deficient for failing to
timely file the plea in bar. As explained below, we affirm Appellant’s
convictions because our precedent forecloses his challenge to the
superior court’s jurisdiction, and he has failed to show prejudice
from trial counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance.
1. Appellant, who was 16 years old when the crimes occurred,
was arrested on December 21, 2018. On April 18, 2019 — 118 days
after Appellant’s arrest — a grand jury returned a true bill of
indictment charging Appellant with murder. And on February 25,
2020 — 431 days after Appellant’s arrest — a grand jury returned a
superseding true bill of indictment that likewise charged Appellant
with murder.
Shortly before trial, Appellant filed a plea in bar.2 Appellant
argued that the superior court lacked jurisdiction over the
2 As noted below, we need not decide whether the plea in bar was timely.
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superseding indictment because that indictment had not been
returned within the 180-day period prescribed by OCGA § 17-7-50.1,
which provides in relevant part:
(a) Any child who is charged with a crime that is within
the jurisdiction of the superior court . . . who is detained
shall within 180 days of the date of detention be entitled
to have the charge against him or her presented to the
grand jury. The superior court shall, upon motion for an
extension of time and after a hearing and good cause
shown, grant one extension to the original 180 day period,
not to exceed 90 additional days.
(b) If the grand jury does not return a true bill against the
detained child within the time limitations set forth in
subsection (a) of this Code section, the detained child’s
case shall be transferred to the juvenile court and shall
proceed thereafter as provided in Chapter 11 of Title 15.
OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (a), (b). The trial court considered the plea in bar
on the merits and summarily denied it. Appellant was then tried on
the superseding indictment and found guilty of murder, among other
crimes.
In his motion for new trial, Appellant argued both that the trial
court had erred in denying his plea in bar and that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to timely file the plea in bar. The superior court
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rejected both claims. As to Appellant’s challenge to the court’s denial
of his plea in bar, the court concluded that, under the plain language
of OCGA § 17-7-50.1, the court had jurisdiction over Appellant’s case
because the original indictment charging Appellant with murder
was filed within the time limitation imposed by OCGA § 17-7-50.1,
and it was irrelevant that the case was reindicted after the 180-day
period. Turning to Appellant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim, the court concluded in relevant part that Appellant had not
established prejudice because the trial court had considered
Appellant’s plea in bar on the merits rather than rejecting it as
untimely.
2. On appeal, Appellant argues again that the superior court
erred in denying his plea in bar because he was reindicted more than
180 days after his arrest, in violation of OCGA § 17-7-50.1, and the
court therefore lacked jurisdiction over his superseding indictment.
This argument, however, is foreclosed by our decision in State v.
Harris, 319 Ga. 665 (906 SE2d 402) (2024), which issued the day
after Appellant filed his principal brief in this Court. In Harris, we
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held, based on the plain language of OCGA § 17-7-50.1, that the
“statute only requires that a true bill be returned on at least one
charge that is within the jurisdiction of the superior court [within
180 days of the date of the child’s detention] for the court to retain
jurisdiction.” Harris, 319 Ga. at 669. And we further held that “a
reindictment of that same defendant outside the 180 days” does not
“deprive[ ] the superior court of jurisdiction.” Id. at 670.
Here, it is undisputed that the grand jury returned the original
true bill of indictment within 180 days of Appellant’s arrest. And the
original indictment charged Appellant with malice murder, a
“charge that is within the jurisdiction of the superior court.” Harris,
319 Ga. at 669. See OCGA § 15-11-560 (b) (1) (“The superior court
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over the trial of any child
13 to 17 years of age who is alleged to have committed . . .
[m]urder[.]”). Accordingly, the superior court “retain[ed]
jurisdiction” over the case, despite the fact that the grand jury
“reindict[ed]” Appellant more than 180 days after his arrest. Harris,
319 Ga. at 669-670. We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of
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Appellant’s plea in bar.
3. Appellant also argues on appeal that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to file the plea in bar challenging the court’s
jurisdiction under OCGA § 17-7-50.1 within ten days of his
arraignment or to seek an extension to file the plea in bar, in
accordance with OCGA § 17-7-110 (“All pretrial motions, including
demurrers and special pleas, shall be filed within ten days after the
date of arraignment, unless the time for filing is extended by the
court.”). This claim fails.
“To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a
defendant must show deficient performance by trial counsel and
resulting prejudice.” Zayas v. State, 319 Ga. 402, 409 (3) (902 SE2d
583) (2024) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III)
(104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)). To establish prejudice, “a
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have been
different.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). “If a defendant
fails to establish either deficient performance or prejudice, we need
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not address the other part of the Strickland test.” Id.
Assuming without deciding that trial counsel did not timely file
the plea in bar and performed in a constitutionally deficient manner
by failing to timely file the plea in bar or to seek an extension of time
to file the plea in bar, the trial court correctly determined that
Appellant failed to establish prejudice. Appellant has not shown a
reasonable probability that the result would have been different if
trial counsel had filed the motion earlier or sought an extension to
file the motion because the trial court did not reject the plea in bar
as untimely but instead considered the motion and denied it on the
merits, see Wilson v. State, 277 Ga. 485, 485-486 (2) (591 SE2d 812)
(2004) (holding that the appellant did not suffer prejudice from
counsel’s failure “to file a timely motion to suppress the murder
weapon” because, “at trial, the trial court considered the merits of
the motion and denied it on substantive grounds”); and because, as
discussed above, the plea in bar was meritless, see State v. Henry,
312 Ga. 632, 635 (2) (864 SE2d 415) (2021) (“[A] defendant is not
normally prejudiced by his lawyer’s failure to pursue a legal
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argument that appeared to have merit at the time but is later
determined to be meritless due to a subsequent change or
development in the law.” (emphasis omitted)). Accordingly, this
claim fails.
Judgment affirmed. Peterson, CJ, Warren, PJ, and Bethel,
Ellington, McMillian, LaGrua, and Pinson, JJ, concur.
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