State v. Antwon B.

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State v. Antwon B.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANTWON B.*

(AC 48494)

Elgo, Wilson and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted of the crimes of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm,

attempt to commit assault in the first degree and larceny in the third degree,

the defendant appealed. The defendant’s conviction arose from an incident

in which he shot the victim forty-two times and attempted to shoot his

former girlfriend, L, in the face. After the shooting, the defendant drove his

vehicle to his place of employment, an offsite airport parking lot, and took

a vehicle owned by S, which he eventually drove to a police station and

turned himself in. At trial, L testified that, after firing many bullets at the

victim, the defendant put a gun to her face and pulled the trigger, but nothing

happened, and that the defendant subsequently reloaded the gun and put

it back in her face but thereafter shot the victim again and not her. The

defendant claimed, inter alia, that there was insufficient evidence to convict

him of attempt to commit assault in the first degree with a firearm and

larceny in the third degree. Held:

There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction of

attempt to commit assault in the first degree with a firearm, as the jury was

free to credit L’s testimony that the defendant pulled the trigger the first

time he put the gun to her face and reasonably could have inferred from

this evidence that the defendant intended to shoot L and cause her serious

physical injury.

There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of larceny in the third degree,

as the evidence established that S did not know the defendant and was

out-of-state at the time the defendant took his vehicle and, thus, the jury

reasonably could conclude that the defendant’s taking occurred without S’s

knowing consent and in the course of his flight from the scene of the

shooting, and, although the defendant eventually drove S’s vehicle to a police

station and left it there, at the time he took the vehicle, it was with the

intent to retain it permanently.

This court concluded that, although certain questions the prosecutor posed

while cross-examining the defendant were improper, that the prosecutor

* In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as

amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,

Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person

protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective

order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through

whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.

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State v. Antwon B.

improperly made use of the defendant’s responses to those questions during

his rebuttal argument, and that the prosecutor improperly relied on facts

not in evidence during his closing argument, these improprieties, under the

circumstances of this case, did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial, as

these improprieties were minor and unimpactful and did not implicate the

fairness of the trial.

The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the prosecutor’s statements

made during his opening and rebuttal closing arguments, which made use

of the terms ‘‘we’’ and ‘‘us’’ to align himself with the jury, were improper,

as the prosecutor’s use of the first person was limited and the jury was

properly instructed as to its exclusive role as fact finder.

Argued April 15—officially released November 25, 2025

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

the crimes of murder, attempt to commit assault in the

first degree with a firearm and larceny in the third

degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial

district of Hartford and tried to the jury before Hon.

Dale W. Radcliff, judge trial referee; verdict and judgment of guilty of manslaughter in the first degree with

a firearm, attempt to commit assault in the first degree,

and larceny in the third degree, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Kevin M. Black, Jr., assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Timothy F. Costello, supervisory assistant state’s

attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L.

Walcott, state’s attorney, Linda F. Rubertone, former

senior assistant state’s attorney, and Jesse Giddings,

former supervisory assistant state’s attorney, for the

appellee (state).

Opinion

BISHOP, J. The defendant, Antwon B., appeals from

the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial,

of attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-59 (a) (1)

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State v. Antwon B.

and larceny in the third degree in violation of General

Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 53a-124 (a) (1). On appeal,

the defendant claims that (1) there was insufficient

evidence to prove that he had committed the crimes of

attempt to commit assault in the first degree and larceny

in the third degree, and (2) prosecutorial impropriety

deprived him of a fair trial. We affirm the judgment of

conviction.1

The following facts, which reasonably could have

been found by the jury, and procedural history are relevant to our review of the defendant’s claims on appeal.

On October 22, 2019, the defendant shot Leroy Jefferson2 forty-one times with a Glock Gen 4 nine millimeter

semiautomatic pistol (Glock), killing him. At the time,

Jefferson was descending a flight of stairs with L, the

defendant’s former live-in girlfriend.

The defendant and L had known each other for

approximately ten years prior to the shooting, and they

had been involved in a romantic relationship for most

of that time. They had a son together, who was born

about one year after they met. When their son was two

or three years old, L, L’s daughter from a previous

relationship and the couple’s son moved into an apartment the defendant shared with his daughter in Windsor

Locks. The couple experienced problems on and off

throughout their relationship and they eventually broke

up in 2019.

L and the defendant were not speaking with one

another at all immediately after they broke up, and she

moved out of the apartment. On June 1, 2019, L moved,

1

The defendant also was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree

with a firearm, by reason of extreme emotional disturbance, in violation of

General Statutes § 53a-55a. He has not challenged his conviction of that

offense in this appeal.

2

Jefferson is referred to as both ‘‘Leroy Jefferson’’ and ‘‘Leroy Jefferson,

Jr.,’’ in the record. For simplicity’s sake, we refer to him as Jefferson throughout this opinion.

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State v. Antwon B.

with her daughter and the couple’s son, into another

apartment in the same building, ‘‘right down the hall’’

from the defendant’s apartment. Eventually, L and the

defendant resumed contact and by early October, 2019,

they were having daily communications by phone, text

message, and in person. From L’s perspective, they were

coparenting, but they were not together. L had been in a

romantic relationship with Jefferson for approximately

two to three months leading up to the October 22, 2019

shooting. From the defendant’s perspective, however,

once he and L ‘‘started back talking . . . everything

went back to . . . normal.’’ He and L were having dinner together and hanging out with the kids and, in his

words, ‘‘[i]t was regular again.’’ The defendant was not

aware that L was seeing anyone else and he expected

that he and L were ‘‘going to get back together and

basically start our family all over and get married

. . . .’’ L was aware, in early October, 2019, that the

defendant ‘‘wanted to fix [their] family.’’

On October 22, 2019, after working an 11 p.m. to 7 a.m.

shift as a security guard at Roncari Parking (Roncari) on

Schoephoester Road in Windsor Locks,3 the defendant

texted L to ask if he could stop by her apartment to

see their son before he left for school. L agreed, and

the defendant proceeded to her apartment where he

visited with L and their son. After seeing their son off

to school, the defendant left L’s apartment and went

down the hall to his own apartment to rest.

After the defendant left her apartment, L received a

text from Jefferson, made him some breakfast, and

drove to Windsor to pick him up. Jefferson ate his

breakfast in L’s car. Because the ‘‘place where [Jefferson] was staying didn’t have running water,’’ L and

Jefferson decided to go back to her apartment so he

3

Roncari, now known as The Parking Spot, is located across the street

from Bradley International Airport.

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State v. Antwon B.

could shower. It was the first time that Jefferson had

ever been to L’s apartment. After Jefferson showered,

he and L left L’s apartment, where they had been for

about forty-five minutes to one hour. They walked

through the hallway to a stairwell that led down to the

parking lot where L had parked her car.

In the meantime, the defendant had awoken from

his nap and decided to go to the shooting range. The

defendant had been licensed to carry firearms for more

than fifteen years, and he went to the shooting range

on a regular basis. He had taken L with him to the

shooting range on a couple of prior occasions.

In preparation for his trip to the shooting range, the

defendant left his apartment and went downstairs to

the garage. He retrieved from the garage a gun and a

bag containing magazines that were loaded with ammunition4 and then proceeded to head back upstairs to his

apartment to get another gun to bring with him to the

range. When the defendant reached the door at the top

of the stairwell and placed his hand on the doorknob

to open the door, he felt resistance from the other side.

At the same time, L, who was on the other side of the

door with Jefferson, felt a ‘‘tug’’ as she tried to open

the door to head down to the parking lot.

When the door opened, the defendant and L came

face to face. L looked at the defendant ‘‘like, oh shit.

I’m caught,’’ but she ‘‘kept proceeding down the stairs’’

after Jefferson, who had gone first. In the defendant’s

words, he ‘‘was just . . . stuck. [He was] holding a

door that’s stuck’’ and ‘‘the guy,’’ whom the defendant

had never seen before, turned and said ‘‘[W]hat’s up?’’

When L looked back at the defendant, he was just staring and holding the door until he said, ‘‘[F]uck this, or

4

The state’s firearm expert, Jill Therriault, testified at trial that a magazine

is ‘‘kind of like a box’’ that holds live ammunition and is ‘‘put into the grip

of the firearm’’ in order to fire the gun.

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State v. Antwon B.

fuck that,’’ pulled a gun from his waistband and started

shooting at Jefferson as he was trying to exit the door

at the bottom of the stairwell. The defendant was

descending the stairs while he was shooting, and a

couple of shots were fired in the stairwell before he

reached the door at the bottom of the stairwell and

continued shooting the victim in the parking lot.

During the course of these events, the defendant

grabbed L and held onto her by her hoodie while he

continued to shoot Jefferson. At some point, the defendant stopped and he put the gun to L’s face and pulled

the trigger, ‘‘but nothing happened.’’ L knew the defendant had pulled the trigger because she heard a ‘‘click

sound.’’ She did not know, however, why the gun did

not fire.

The defendant then reloaded the gun and put it back

in L’s face, at which point she asked, ‘‘[W]hat about

our son?’’ The defendant then turned the gun back on

Jefferson and shot him several more times as he lay on

the ground in the parking lot. Although the defendant

remembered hearing six shots in the stairwell, he did

not remember shooting Jefferson or much about the

shooting incident itself, with the exception of L asking

him about their son.

After the defendant stopped shooting the second

time, he told L she was ‘‘coming with him’’ and to give

him her keys, but she refused. He then let L go, ran

across the parking lot to his vehicle, a green Nissan

Pathfinder, and drove away from the scene to Roncari.

The defendant drove away from the Roncari lot in a

blue Ford Explorer. It was determined later that the

blue Ford Explorer belonged to Brad Shavrek, who had

left the vehicle with Roncari, at its lot, while he traveled

to Florida. Shavrek did not know the defendant.

While driving, the defendant phoned his sister and

told her that he had just killed someone and that he

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State v. Antwon B.

was going to kill himself. He explained to her that when

he saw L and Jefferson in the stairwell ‘‘he just blanked

out.’’ The defendant asked his sister to take care of his

children. The defendant’s sister urged the defendant

not to harm himself and instead to turn himself in to

the police. She suggested that he contact Officer James

Barrett of the Hartford Police Department (police

department), with whom the defendant was acquainted.

The defendant then drove to Hartford and spoke to

Barrett, outside the police department, as his sister had

recommended.

The defendant appeared very nervous and distraught

when he approached Barrett. He was smoking a cigarette and carrying a small dark duffel bag on his left

shoulder when he told Barrett that he had done something wrong and that Barrett should cuff him. As Barrett

and another police officer were speaking with the defendant, a BOLO alert5 was broadcast on the radio describing a suspect who had been involved in a homicide.

The defendant heard the alert and said to Barrett, ‘‘I

told you.’’ Barrett, who also heard the alert, recognized

that the defendant fit the description of the suspect and

he took the defendant into custody. Shortly thereafter,

the defendant experienced a panic attack and was transported from the police department to Hartford Hospital.

When he was taken into custody and before he was

transported to the hospital, the defendant left his duffel

bag, which was unzipped, on the ground outside the

entrance to the police department. Officer Jeffery Valerie could see what appeared to be a firearm and ammunition inside the bag, and he stood by the bag for a few

hours until it could be processed. It was later determined that the firearm Valerie observed inside the bag

was a Glock.

5

‘‘BOLO stands for be on the look out.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Williams, 350 Conn. 363, 366 n.3, 324 A.3d 760 (2024).

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State v. Antwon B.

The defendant’s sister, in the meantime, drove from

Massachusetts to Hartford. She spoke with her father,

who told her to pick up the vehicle the defendant had

left at the police department when he turned himself

in. She had the last few digits of the vehicle’s license

plate. After locating and retrieving the Ford Explorer

and driving it off the police department’s premises, the

defendant’s sister observed a photograph of a family she

did not recognize and a sheriff’s badge in the vehicle,

alerting her to the fact that the vehicle did not belong to

the defendant and was not a rental car. The defendant’s

sister believed that the vehicle should not have been

in the defendant’s possession, contacted Barrett to

explain the situation, and returned the Ford Explorer

to the police department as Barrett instructed.

The state charged the defendant by way of an

amended long form information with one count of murder in violation of § 53a-54a, one count of attempt to

commit assault in the first degree in violation of §§ 53a49 (a) (2) and 53a-59 and one count of larceny in the

third degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to

2019) § 53a-124. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a

notice of his intent to rely on the affirmative defense

of extreme emotional disturbance with respect to the

murder charge, which, if accepted by the jury, would

result in the defendant’s conviction of manslaughter in

the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a55 (a) (2) instead of murder.

At the close of the state’s case, the defendant made

an oral motion for a judgment of acquittal as to all

charges. With respect to the charge of attempt to commit assault in the first degree, the defendant argued

that ‘‘the only evidence in regard to any possible

assault’’ was L’s testimony which, the defendant

claimed, was ‘‘just not credible.’’ With respect to the

charge of larceny in the third degree, the defendant

argued that (1) there was no evidence of ownership or

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State v. Antwon B.

‘‘testimony by an owner saying it’s his car and [the

defendant] had no right to use it,’’ and (2) there was

no proof of intent to permanently deprive the owner

of his vehicle. The court denied the motion, and the

defendant presented his evidence.

On December 8, 2022, the jury found the defendant

guilty of manslaughter in the first degree, attempt to

commit assault in the first degree, and larceny in the

third degree. The court accepted the jury’s verdict. On

December 13, 2022, the defendant filed a timely written

motion for a judgment of acquittal on the ground of

insufficiency of the evidence as to all counts of the

amended information. With respect to count two, which

charged the defendant with attempt to commit assault

in the first degree, the defendant argued that ‘‘there is

no evidence that there was any ammunition associated

with the firearm at the time it was alleged to have been

pointed at [L] and neither was there any evidence of a

jam or misfire and therefore evidence of any actual

intent to cause harm is lacking. He claimed as well

that [L’s] testimony further proves the firearm [was]

incapable of firing at the time she stated that the defendant pulled the trigger.’’ With respect to count three,

which charged the defendant with larceny in the third

degree, the defendant argued that the state ‘‘failed to

provide evidence of ownership through evidence of title

or testimony of an owner or one in rightful possession

of the vehicle’’ and that ‘‘there is no evidence beyond

[mere] use of any intent to deprive in that the vehicle

was left by the defendant with the keys at the [police

department].’’

On March 8, 2023, the day of the defendant’s sentencing hearing, the court first addressed the defendant’s

written motion for a judgment of acquittal. Both the

prosecutor and defense counsel declined to offer additional arguments and the court denied the defendant’s

written motion. The court explained, with respect to

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State v. Antwon B.

the count of attempt to commit assault in the first

degree, that ‘‘the jury [was] free to credit [L’s] testimony

and conclude that [the defendant] did point a gun at

her head and pull a trigger’’ and that there was a ‘‘legal

and factual basis’’ for the conclusion that an attempt

was complete, regardless of why the gun did not fire.

With respect to the larceny count, the court relied on

the same reasons it gave at the time it denied the defendant’s oral motion for a judgment of acquittal, namely,

that there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the Ford Explorer did not belong to the defendant. The court thereafter imposed a total effective

sentence of fifty years of imprisonment.6 This appeal

followed. Additional facts and procedural history will

be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that there was insufficient

evidence to convict him of attempt to commit assault

in the first degree and larceny in the third degree.

Regarding the attempted assault charge, the defendant

claims that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that he intended to inflict serious physical injury

on L. Regarding the larceny charge, the defendant

claims that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that he (1) wrongfully took the Ford Explorer

from Roncari and (2) intended to permanently deprive

Shavrek of his property. We conclude that the evidence

was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on both

counts.

We begin our analysis by setting forth the well established standard of review we apply to claims of insufficient evidence. ‘‘In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a [two

6

The court imposed a sentence of forty years of incarceration, of which

five years was a mandatory minimum, for the manslaughter count, a consecutive sentence of ten years for the count of attempt to commit assault, and

a sentence of five years for the count of larceny to run concurrently with

the sentences for manslaughter and attempt to commit assault.

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State v. Antwon B.

part] test. First, we construe the evidence in the light

most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we

determine whether upon the facts so construed and the

inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of

fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. . . .

‘‘We also note that the [finder of fact] must find every

element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to

find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but]

each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those

conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable

doubt. . . . If it is reasonable and logical for the [finder

of fact] to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact

is true, the [finder of fact] is permitted to consider the

fact proven and may consider it in combination with

other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant

guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond

a reasonable doubt. . . .

‘‘Additionally, [a]s we have often noted, proof beyond

a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all

possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of

innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been

found credible by the [finder of fact], would have

resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask

whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that

would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of

the evidence that supports the [finder of fact’s] verdict

of guilty.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Lueders, 225 Conn. App. 612, 623–24, 317 A.3d 69, cert.

denied, 349 Conn. 920, 321 A.3d 402 (2024).

A

We now turn to the defendant’s claim that there was

insufficient evidence to convict him of attempt to commit assault in the first degree because no reasonable

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State v. Antwon B.

jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt

that he intended to inflict serious physical injury on L.

In support of this claim, the defendant argues that to

prove his intent to cause L serious physical injury, the

state was required to establish that he did more than

point his gun at L and that it failed to do so. Focusing

on the testimony of the ‘‘state’s key witness,’’ L, the

defendant maintains that she did not actually see him

pull the trigger while he was pointing the gun at her

face but, rather, assumed that he had done so because

she heard a click. He posits that L’s assumption was

impermissible speculation in light of the testimony of

the state’s firearm expert, Jill Therriault.7 As such, he

argues that ‘‘the jury was not free to infer [from L’s

testimony] that the defendant had pointed a gun at

[L] and pulled the trigger’’ and that, consequently, his

conviction of attempt to commit assault in the first

degree cannot be sustained. (Emphasis in original.) In

response, the state contends that it introduced evidence, beyond the defendant’s undisputed act of pointing the gun at L’s face, to establish the defendant’s

intent. This evidence included L’s testimony that the

defendant pulled the trigger, which the state argues the

jury was free to credit, as well as the defendant’s conduct prior to and immediately following his encounter

with L. We agree with the state.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to the defendant’s claim. The state called

nine witnesses to testify during its case-in-chief. L was

the state’s fifth witness, and she agreed that she had

7

Therriault was a former supervisor of the firearm and tool mark unit of

the state forensic laboratory. She explained that ‘‘[a] firearm and tool mark

examiner is a forensic scientist who . . . is charged with comparing bullets

and cartridge cases that are collected from the crime scenes and their

different types of fired evidence. Using a forensic comparison microscope

to look at those items . . . and determine whether or not they were fired

from a particular firearm.’’

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State v. Antwon B.

some degree of familiarity with guns and what it sounds

like when a trigger is pulled.8

The state’s last witness was its firearm expert, Therriault, who had tested the Glock that was found in the

defendant’s duffel bag and determined that the fortytwo shell casings that were collected from the scene

of the shooting were fired from that weapon. During

cross-examination, defense counsel asked Therriault to

‘‘do a little teaching lesson’’ with the gun, which had

been admitted into evidence as an exhibit. She asked

Therriault to ‘‘hold [the gun] up for the jury . . . [a]nd

. . . describe the components.’’9 In response, Therriault identified different parts of the gun and explained

that ‘‘[t]he part that you hold is where a magazine goes.

Some people refer to it as a clip, but the correct word

is magazine. And the magazine is what holds live cartridges. So, essentially, it’s kind of . . . like a box, that

is spring-loaded. So, live cartridges would get pushed

into that. And that magazine would then get put into

the grip of the firearm.

‘‘And so, to fire this gun, you would put the magazine

in and push it until it clicks. What you would need to

do, then, is pull the slide backwards. It’s under spring

tension, so . . . you have to pull it . . . backwards.

And then as that slide moves forward, it’s going to take

the top cartridge from the magazine and put it into

what’s called the chamber of the firearm.

‘‘And so, at that point, this firearm would be ready

to fire. So, you would, then, pull the trigger. The firearm

would go off.’’

Defense counsel also asked Therriault if the slide of

the gun would remain open if the magazine was empty.

8

L was licensed to carry firearms. The defendant had purchased a firearm

for L, which she knew how to use. L testified at trial that she ‘‘used to’’

own a firearm but that she did not any longer.

9

At the time of trial, the gun was unloaded and equipped with a safety

strap and a zip tie to prevent it from being fired.

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After responding in the affirmative, Therriault

explained that, ‘‘once the magazine is empty, once all

of the cartridges have been fired out of it, there is a

small, little bottom piece within the magazine that will

push up on part of the slide . . . and lock it open.’’

Then, to reload, after releasing the empty magazine,

‘‘you would either refill that magazine, or take another

magazine that has cartridges in it. Push that into place

until it locks into place. And then in the same manner

that you did previously, you could pull this [slide] back,

let it go . . . . [And] that forward motion would then

take the live round of ammunition at the top of the

magazine, put it in the chamber, and then this firearm

would be ready to shoot again.’’

Defense counsel then asked Therriault ‘‘to talk a little

bit about the trigger’’ and to explain ‘‘what a trigger is

and . . . how [she] would pull that trigger.’’ After identifying the trigger, Therriault explained that ‘‘that’s the

part of the firearm that you use your finger with to pull

that trigger backwards in order to make this gun fire.’’

Therriault further explained that, because the gun was

semiautomatic, each time the trigger is pulled, the gun

would fire in succession ‘‘until there’s no more ammunition left.’’ She further explained that the gun did not

come with a magazine when it was submitted to the

laboratory for testing, but ‘‘typically Glock magazines

would hold anywhere from . . . fifteen to seventeen’’

cartridges. Therriault confirmed, however, that there

was also a ‘‘thirty-three round magazine that would fit

in that’’ particular gun. Therriault was not asked, at any

point during her testimony, if there would be a clicking

sound associated with pulling the gun’s trigger, at any

time, or under any circumstances, and Therriault offered

no testimony in this regard.

‘‘Turning to the relevant statutory provisions, § 53a49 (a) provides in relevant part that [a] person is guilty

of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind

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State v. Antwon B.

of mental state required for commission of the crime,

he . . . (2) intentionally does . . . anything which,

under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is

an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a

course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime. Section 53a-59 (a) provides in relevant

part that [a] person is guilty of assault in the first degree

when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury

to another person, he causes such injury to such person

or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon. . . .

‘‘Thus, [i]n order to sustain a conviction for attempt

to commit assault in the first degree, the state must

have presented evidence from which the jury reasonably could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that

the defendant did something constituting a substantial

step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his

commission of the crime . . . namely, assault with the

intent to cause serious physical injury to another person

. . . . Regarding the substantial step requirement, we

have held that [a] substantial step must be something

more than mere preparation, yet may be less than the

last act necessary before the actual commission of the

substantive crime . . . . In order for behavior to be

punishable as an attempt, it need not be incompatible

with innocence, yet it must be necessary to the consummation of the crime and be of such a nature that a

reasonable observer, viewing it in context could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that it was undertaken

in accordance with a design to violate the statute. . . .

‘‘Regarding the intent requirement, an individual acts

intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct . . .

when his conscious objective is to cause such result

or to engage in such conduct . . . . Intent may be,

and usually is, inferred from [a] defendant’s verbal or

physical conduct [as well as] the surrounding circumstances. . . . Nonetheless, [t]here is no distinction

between circumstantial and direct evidence so far as

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probative force is concerned. . . . Moreover, [i]t is not

one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of

facts which establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence. . . . Finally, we underscore that intent [can] be formed instantaneously and

[does] not require any specific period of time for

thought or premeditation for its formation. . . . Intent

is a question of fact, the determination of which should

stand unless the conclusion drawn by the trier is an

unreasonable one.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Catchings, 170 Conn. App. 564, 570–71, 155 A.3d

236, cert. denied, 325 Conn. 909, 158 A.3d 319 (2017).

At the outset, we note that, although the defendant’s

claim is premised on the conclusion that the mere act of

pointing a gun at someone is not sufficient to establish

intent to inflict serious physical injury beyond a reasonable doubt, this remains an open question in Connecticut that neither our Supreme Court nor this court has

addressed squarely. See State v. Carter, 317 Conn. 845,

857, 120 A.3d 1229 (2015); State v. Catchings, supra,

170 Conn. App. 569 n.16. In Carter, the defendant

claimed that the evidence was not sufficient to support

his conviction of attempt to commit assault in the first

degree because ‘‘the mere act of pointing a gun at

another person is too equivocal to permit a rational

fact finder to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant intended to cause [a person] . . . serious

physical injury.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Carter, supra, 852. Our Supreme Court

expressly declined to address this issue in Carter, however, because ‘‘there was evidence beyond the mere act

of pointing a gun by which the intent element could

have been reasonably established.’’ Id., 857.

Specifically, as this court recounted in Catchings,

there was evidence that the defendant aimed his gun

at an area of the victim’s body that was ‘‘particularly

susceptible to substantial physical injury . . . that the

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defendant placed his finger on the trigger guard . . .

[and], after aiming the gun, [the defendant] positioned

himself in a shooting stance and maintained that position for approximately five seconds despite repeated

orders [from police officers] to drop the gun . . . .’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Catchings, supra, 170 Conn. App. 572. Moreover, the victim, who was a police officer ‘‘was so sure

the defendant was going to shoot her that she began

to remove the safety mechanism on her own gun. . . .

The court also noted that, after the officers closed in

on the defendant, he attempted to maintain possession

of his gun rather than acquiesce, and that it would not

have been unreasonable [given his earlier actions] for

the jury to infer that he was attempting to maintain

possession of the gun to use it. . . . Finally, the court

observed that, approximately one hour before the

standoff, the defendant had expressed an intention and

willingness to use the gun by threatening to shoot a

particular white dude.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

In Catchings, the defendant also claimed that ‘‘[t]he

simple act of pointing a gun, without any accompanying

assertive behavior that could permit an inference of

specific intent to seriously injure [the victim] by shooting him, is too equivocal an act to prove intent.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 568–69. This court

concluded, however, after reviewing Carter, that there

was, in fact, ‘‘additional evidence, beyond the defendant’s mere act of pointing the gun at [the victim], to

establish the defendant’s intent, including the defendant’s conduct prior to the encounter with [the victim]

and the fact that the defendant raised his gun at [the

victim] while attempting to resist arrest.’’ Id., 569.

As in Carter and Catchings, there was additional

evidence in the present case beyond the defendant’s act

of pointing the gun in L’s face by which the defendant’s

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intent to cause L serious physical injury could reasonably have been established. To begin with, L unequivocally testified that the defendant ‘‘put the gun to my face

. . . [and] [p]ulled the trigger, but nothing happened.’’

Although she did not see the defendant pull the trigger,

L testified that she knew he had pulled the trigger

because she ‘‘heard a click sound.’’ She had also testified that she had some degree of familiarity with guns

and what it sounds like when a trigger is pulled.

The defendant acknowledges that, on its face, L’s

testimony would support an inference that the defendant intended to inflict serious physical injury on L.

See, e.g., State v. Turner, 24 Conn. App. 264, 268, 587

A.2d 1050 (determining that it was reasonable for jury

to infer from testimony that defendant pointed ‘‘loaded

gun at [the victim], pulled the trigger, and that the gun

clicked but did not fire’’ that defendant intended to

inflict serious physical injury on victim), cert. denied,

218 Conn. 910, 591 A.2d 812 (1991). But, the defendant

argues that ‘‘with [L’s] and Therriault’s testimony properly contextualized, any inference [by the jury] that the

‘click’ that [L] assumed was the pulling of the trigger,

was impermissible speculation’’ because Therriault

only testified about one click—namely, the click associated with loading the gun. The defendant posits that

Therriault’s testimony in this regard failed to corroborate and, in fact, undermined L’s assumption that he

had pulled the trigger the first time he held the gun to

her face and thus rendered any inference the jury may

have drawn from that assumption unreasonable.

Therriault, who testified after L, was not asked to

evaluate or respond to L’s testimony. Although Therriault did testify that, ‘‘to fire this gun, you would put the

magazine in and push it until it clicks,’’ she did so

as part of her general ‘‘teaching lesson’’ to the jury.

Moreover, although Therriault was asked to, and did,

‘‘talk a little bit about the trigger,’’ she was not asked

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if there would be a clicking sound associated with pulling the gun’s trigger, at any time, or under any circumstances, and she offered no testimony in this regard.

Therriault’s testimony, therefore, had little, if any,

bearing on L’s testimony that she knew when she heard

a click that the defendant had pulled the trigger while

he was pointing the gun at her face. Indeed, Therriault’s

testimony did not specifically contradict or call into

question L’s testimony and her version of events,10 and

it certainly did not render L’s testimony speculative.

At best, Therriault’s testimony may have supported a

competing inference that the click L heard occurred

after the defendant first held the gun to L’s face. The jury

was not, however, required to draw such an inference as

the defendant suggests in his principal appellate brief.

’’It is within the province of the jury to draw reasonable and logical inferences from the facts proven.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Clark, 56

Conn. App. 108, 112, 741 A.2d 331 (1999). ‘‘In conducting

our review, we are mindful that the finding of facts, the

gauging of witness credibility and the choosing among

competing inferences are functions within the exclusive

province of the jury, and, therefore, we must afford

those determinations great deference.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sanchez, 92 Conn. App.

112, 118, 884 A.2d 1 (2005), appeal dismissed, 282 Conn.

787, 924 A.2d 844 (2007). We conclude that the jury was

free to credit L’s testimony that the defendant pulled

the trigger the first time he first pointed the gun at her

face and that the jury could reasonably have inferred

from this evidence that the defendant intended to shoot

L and cause her serious physical injury. See State v.

Turner, supra, 24 Conn. App. 268.

10

We note, moreover, that ‘‘it is not the law that corroboration is essential

to the proof of guilt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Caballero,

49 Conn. App. 486, 492, 714 A.2d 1254, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 924, 719 A.2d

1170 (1998).

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Moreover, contrary to the defendant’s contention that

L’s testimony regarding the trigger pull was the only

evidence from which the jury could infer that he

intended to cause her serious physical injury, the defendant’s conduct prior to and immediately following his

encounter with L also supports such a finding. ‘‘It is

axiomatic that a factfinder may infer an intent to cause

serious physical injury from circumstantial evidence

such as the type of weapon used, the manner in which

it was used, the type of wound inflicted and the events

leading up to and immediately following the incident.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Commerford, 30 Conn. App. 26, 34, 618 A.2d 574, cert. denied,

225 Conn. 903, 621 A.2d 285 (1993). The evidence established that the defendant thought that he and L were

reuniting and that he was surprised and angry when

he saw L and Jefferson together. The evidence further

established that before grabbing L, the defendant shot

Jefferson multiple times, and that after grabbing L, he

continued to shoot Jefferson while holding onto L’s

hoodie. At some point thereafter, the shooting stopped,

the defendant put the gun to L’s face, and, as L testified,

he pulled the trigger, but nothing happened.11 The defendant then reloaded the gun and put it back in L’s face

after doing so. It was only when L asked, ‘‘[W]hat about

our son?’’ that the defendant removed the gun from her

face, turned it back on Jefferson, and shot him several

more times.

On the basis of this evidence, the jury could reasonably have inferred that the defendant realized the magazine was empty because the gun did not fire when he

pulled the trigger the first time he held it to L’s face,12

11

As we have explained previously in this opinion, the jury was free to

credit this testimony.

12

Although the defendant argues in his reply brief that Therriault’s testimony also undermined any inference that the reason the gun did not fire

when he pointed it at L and pulled the trigger was because the magazine

was empty, he also stated expressly in his opening brief to this court that

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State v. Antwon B.

that he reloaded the gun in response to that realization,

and that he put it back in L’s face after doing so with

intent to cause her serious physical injury.13 See, e.g.,

State v. Catchings, supra, 170 Conn. App. 571 (‘‘[i]ntent

may be, and usually is, inferred from [a] defendant’s

verbal or physical conduct [as well as] the surrounding

circumstances’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

That he eventually abandoned his intent ‘‘would not

negate his earlier intention, and the brevity of that intent

is irrelevant.’’ State v. Carter, supra, 317 Conn. 858.

For these reasons, we conclude that the defendant’s

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support

his conviction of attempt to commit assault in the first

degree is without merit.

B

Next, the defendant claims that there was insufficient

evidence to convict him of larceny in the third degree

because no reasonable jury could have concluded

beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) his taking of the

Ford Explorer was wrongful, and (2) he intended to

permanently deprive Shavrek of the vehicle. We disagree.

reloaded, and then continued firing at . . . Jefferson.’’ The jury could reasonably have inferred that there would have been no reason to reload unless

the magazine was empty.

13

We note that the fact that the gun did not fire when the defendant pulled

the trigger the first time that he held the gun to L’s face does not negate

the significance of the trigger pull itself. As we have stated previously in

this opinion, ‘‘[t]o be guilty of criminal attempt, the defendant need only

take a ‘substantial step’ in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the

commission of the crime . . . .’’ State v. Catchings, supra, 170 Conn. App.

577. Moreover, ‘‘[t]he attempt statute merely requires the state to prove

that the defendant took a substantial step ‘under the circumstances as he

believe[d] them to be . . . .’ ’’ Id., 578. Pulling the trigger before the defendant realized the magazine was empty, which is an inference the evidence

reasonably supports, was a ‘‘substantial step.’’ See, e.g., State v. Carter,

supra, 317 Conn. 858 (placing finger on trigger guard was ‘‘one of the last

steps that an individual must take before firing a gun’’).

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To convict the defendant of larceny in the third

degree, the state bore the burden of proving beyond a

reasonable doubt that (1) he committed larceny and

(2) the value of the vehicle was ten thousand dollars

or less.14 General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 53a-124.15 ‘‘A

person commits larceny when, with intent to deprive

another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or

withholds such property from an owner.’’ General Statutes § 53a-119. ‘‘Connecticut courts have interpreted

the essential elements of larceny as (1) the wrongful

taking or carrying away of the personal property of

another; (2) the existence of a felonious intent in the

taker to deprive the owner of [the property] permanently; and (3) the lack of consent of the owner. . . .

Because larceny is a specific intent crime, the state

must show that the defendant acted with the subjective

desire or knowledge that his actions constituted stealing. . . . Larceny involves both taking and retaining.

The criminal intent involved in larceny relates to both

aspects. The taking must be wrongful, that is, without

color of right or excuse for the act . . . and without

the knowing consent of the owner. . . . The requisite

intent for retention is permanency.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Flowers, 161 Conn. App. 747,

752, 129 A.3d 157 (2015), cert. denied, 320 Conn. 917,

131 A.3d 1154 (2016).

At the outset, we note that, although the defendant

testified at trial that he had no memory of driving from

14

The defendant has not challenged as part of this appeal the sufficiency

of the evidence to prove the element of value, and we deem any such claim

abandoned. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Essaghof, 221

Conn. App. 475, 485, 302 A.3d 339 (‘‘claims of error not briefed are considered

abandoned’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 348 Conn.

923, 304 A.3d 445 (2023).

15

General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 53a-124 (a) provides in relevant part:

‘‘A person is guilty of larceny in the third degree when he commits larceny,

as defined in section 53a-119, and: (1) The property consists of a motor

vehicle, the value of which is ten thousand dollars or less . . . .’’

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State v. Antwon B.

the scene of the shooting to Roncari and taking the

Ford Explorer from the lot and driving it to the police

department, he does not claim on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding by the jury

that he had done precisely that. In other words, the

defendant does not raise an issue with respect to

whether and how the taking itself occurred. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Essaghof, 221 Conn.

App. 475, 485, 302 A.3d 339 (‘‘claims of error not briefed

are considered abandoned’’ (internal quotation marks

omitted)), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 923, 304 A.3d 445

(2023). Rather, the defendant’s claim is predicated on

the argument that, although he took Shavrek’s Ford

Explorer from the Roncari lot, the evidence failed to

establish that the taking was wrongful and with the

intent to be permanent.

1

In support of his argument that there was insufficient

evidence that a wrongful taking had occurred, the

defendant posits that the state failed to present sufficient evidence (1) as to the rightful owner of the vehicle

and (2) that the defendant did not have any right of

possession to the vehicle when he took it from the

Roncari lot. The evidence at trial, however, established

that the 2016 Ford Explorer belonged to Shavrek, who

had left the vehicle at the Roncari lot while he traveled

to Florida, that Roncari, where the defendant worked

as a security guard, was located across the street from

Bradley International Airport, and that Shavrek did not

know the defendant.16

Moreover, the defendant testified that he drove away

from the scene of the shooting in his own vehicle, a

16

Although Shavrek did not testify at trial, Detective Daniel Bontempo of

the Windsor Locks Police Department spoke with Shavrek as part of his

investigation into this matter. Bontempo testified at trial, without objection,

about what he and Shavrek discussed.

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State v. Antwon B.

green Nissan Pathfinder, that he recalls at some point

thereafter being at a stop sign in a ‘‘different vehicle

than my vehicle’’ and being at the police department

after that. The defendant’s sister testified that she realized, shortly after driving the Ford Explorer from the

police department premises, that the vehicle did not

belong to her brother, it was not a rental car, and that

it ‘‘should not have been in [her] brother’s possession.’’

Accordingly, she returned it.

We conclude that the jury reasonably could have

found from this evidence that the taking was wrongful.

Indeed, ‘‘[t]he jury is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence before it and, in performing

its function, the jury brings to bear its common sense

and experience of the affairs of life. . . . It is often

said that common sense is not left at the courthouse

door.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). State v. Flowers, supra, 161 Conn. App. 757. In

this case, the jury could reasonably have inferred that

Shavrek, to whom the vehicle belonged, was the owner

of the vehicle; see General Statutes § 53a-118 (a) (5)

(‘‘[a]n ‘owner’ means any person who has a right to

possession superior to that of a taker, obtainer or withholder’’); and that he entrusted it to Roncari while he

traveled to Florida with the expectation that the vehicle

would remain parked at the lot until he returned. This is

common practice for many airport travelers. Moreover,

particularly because Shavrek was in Florida at the time

of the taking and he did not know the defendant, it

would have been reasonable for the jury to infer that the

defendant did not have Shavrek’s ‘‘knowing consent’’

to take his vehicle, let alone to use it, in place of the

defendant’s own vehicle, in the course of the defendant’s flight from the scene of the shooting. In other

words, there was sufficient evidence from which the

jury could reasonably find that the taking occurred

‘‘without color of right or excuse for the act . . . and

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State v. Antwon B.

without the knowing consent of the owner.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Flowers, supra, 752.

2

In advancing his argument that the evidence was

insufficient to support a finding that the defendant

intended to permanently deprive Shavrek of his vehicle,

the defendant contends that ‘‘[i]t logically does not follow that, if the requisite intent for retention is permanency . . . but [the defendant] returned such property

when turning himself [in to] the police . . . that he had

intended to permanently deprive the owner of [his]

property.’’ The defendant emphasizes, in this regard,

that he returned the vehicle on ‘‘the same day [he took

it], without any evidence being presented that the vehicle had been damaged, and thus depriving the owner

of the vehicle’s economic value. He returned the vehicle

to the police, therefore, the return was done in such a

fashion as to allow the recovery of the vehicle with

near certainty.’’ (Emphasis in original.) In other words,

the defendant claims that he could not be convicted of

larceny because he did not keep the Ford Explorer.

In addressing this claim, we are guided by this court’s

decision in State v. Spells, 76 Conn. App. 67, 90–91, 818

A.2d 808, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 901, 832 A.2d 67 (2003),

wherein a similar claim was made. Specifically, the

defendant in Spells claimed that he could not have been

convicted of robbery because he did not keep the property he had stolen from the victim. Id., 90. This court

deemed the defendant’s claim ‘‘misguided because the

defendant misapprehends the intent necessary to commit robbery’’ and concluded that our Supreme Court’s

holding in State v. Anderson, 212 Conn. 31, 561 A.2d

897 (1989), was controlling. State v. Spells, supra, 90.

The same is true in the present case.17 In Spells, we

17

Although Anderson involved a defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency

of the evidence to sustain his conviction of robbery in the first degree,

‘‘[l]arceny is a lesser included offense and therefore a required element of

the crime of robbery . . . .’’ State v. Sam, 98 Conn. App. 13, 35, 907 A.2d 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 25

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State v. Antwon B.

explained that, ‘‘[i]n Anderson, the defendant had used

a knife to rob the victim, but moments after he took the

money, he returned it to her. On appeal, the defendant

claimed that he did not have the intent necessary to

deprive the victim of her money because he returned

it. . . .

‘‘In discussing the intent to deprive another of property . . . [our Supreme Court has] stated that the

accused must intend both to take the property of

another and to retain it. . . . The requisite intent for

retention is permanency. . . . [S]ee General Statutes

§ 53a-118 (a) (3) (deprive means withhold [property]

or cause it to be withheld from [the victim] permanently.

. .). Intent, however, can be inferred both from the

defendant’s conduct and his statements at the time of

the crime . . . and whether such an inference should

be drawn is properly a question for the jury to decide.

. . . To be convicted of [larceny in the third degree],

therefore, it is not necessary for the jury to find that

the defendant actually kept the property in question,

but rather, that at the moment he took the property

he intended to retain it permanently. . . . Moreover, a

postoffense change of heart is not a defense to a crime.’’

(Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Spells, supra, 76 Conn.

App. 90–91.

On the basis of the evidence, which we have reviewed

in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, we

determine that the jury reasonably could have found

99, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 944, 912 A.2d 478 (2006); see also General Statutes

§ 53a-133 (‘‘[a] person commits robbery when, in the course of committing

a larceny, he uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force upon

another person for the purpose of: (1) [p]reventing or overcoming resistance

to the taking of the property or to the retention thereof immediately after

the taking; or (2) compelling the owner of such property or another person

to deliver up the property or to engage in other conduct which aids in the

commission of the larceny’’).

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State v. Antwon B.

that when the defendant took Shavrek’s vehicle, it was

with the intent to retain it permanently. In light of the

foregoing, we conclude that the evidence demonstrated

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed larceny in the third degree.

II

Next, the defendant claims that he was deprived of

his right to a fair trial as a result of prosecutorial impropriety. Specifically, he argues that the prosecutor

improperly (1) asked the defendant, during cross-examination, to opine on the veracity of L and thereafter

made use of his response during his rebuttal argument

to the jury, (2) relied on L’s speculative testimony that

the defendant had pulled the trigger when holding the

gun to her face during his closing argument to the jury,

and then relied on facts not in evidence to explain why

the gun did not fire, and (3) aligned himself with, and

appealed to the emotions of, the jurors during his closing and rebuttal arguments. The state asserts that, when

considered in context, the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the defendant and comments to the jury during

closing and rebuttal arguments were proper, and that,

even if they were improper, they nevertheless did not

prejudice the defendant so as to undermine the fairness

of his trial. Although we agree that certain questions the

prosecutor posed while cross-examining the defendant

were improper, that the prosecutor should not have

relied on the defendant’s responses to those improper

questions during his rebuttal argument, and that the

prosecutor improperly relied on facts not in evidence

during his closing argument, we conclude that, under

the circumstances of this case, these improprieties do

not constitute grounds for reversal on the basis of the

deprivation of the right to a fair trial.

Before we address the merits of the defendant’s

claims, we set forth the standard of review and the law

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State v. Antwon B.

governing the claims of prosecutorial impropriety. ‘‘In

analyzing claims of prosecutorial impropriety, we

engage in a two step analytical process. . . . The two

steps are separate and distinct. . . . We first examine

whether prosecutorial impropriety occurred. . . . Second, if an impropriety exists, we then examine whether

it deprived the defendant of his due process right to

a fair trial. . . . In other words, an impropriety is an

impropriety, regardless of its ultimate effect on the fairness of the trial. Whether that impropriety was harmful

and thus caused or contributed to a due process violation involves a separate and distinct inquiry. . . .

‘‘[O]ur determination of whether any improper conduct by the [prosecutor] violated the defendant’s fair

trial rights is predicated on the factors set forth in State

v. Williams, [204 Conn. 523, 540, 529 A.2d 653 (1987)],

with due consideration of whether that [impropriety]

was objected to at trial. . . . These factors include: [1]

the extent to which the [impropriety] was invited by

defense conduct or argument . . . [2] the severity of

the [impropriety] . . . [3] the frequency of the [impropriety] . . . [4] the centrality of the [impropriety] to

the critical issues in the case . . . [5] the strength of the

curative measures adopted . . . and [6] the strength

of the state’s case. . . . The question of whether the

defendant has been prejudiced by prosecutorial [impropriety] . . . depends on whether there is a reasonable

likelihood that the jury’s verdict would have been different absent the sum total of the improprieties. . . .

Under the Williams general due process standard, the

defendant has the burden to show both that the prosecutor’s conduct was improper and that it caused prejudice

to his defense. . . . The two steps of [our] analysis are

separate and distinct, and we may reject the claim if

we conclude [that] the defendant has failed to establish

either prong. . . .

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State v. Antwon B.

‘‘Because [some of] the claimed prosecutorial improprieties occurred during [both closing and] rebuttal

closing argument, we also set forth the following legal

principles. It is well established that prosecutorial

[impropriety] of a constitutional magnitude can occur

in the course of closing arguments. . . . When making

closing arguments to the jury, [however, counsel] must

be allowed a generous latitude in argument, as the limits

of legitimate argument and fair comment cannot be

determined precisely by rule and line, and something

must be allowed for the zeal of counsel in the heat of

argument. . . . Thus, as the state’s advocate, a prosecutor may argue the state’s case forcefully, [provided

the argument is] fair and based [on] the facts in evidence

and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. . . .

‘‘Nevertheless, the prosecutor has a heightened duty

to avoid argument that strays from the evidence or

diverts the jury’s attention from the facts of the case.

[The prosecutor] is not only an officer of the court,

like every attorney, but is also a high public officer,

representing the people of the [s]tate, who seek impartial justice for the guilty as much as for the innocent.

. . . By reason of his office, he usually exercises great

influence [on] jurors. . . . While the privilege of counsel in addressing the jury should not be too closely

narrowed or unduly hampered, it must never be used

as a license to state, or to comment [on], or to suggest

an inference from, facts not in evidence, or to present

matters [that] the jury ha[s] no right to consider. . . .

‘‘Lastly, we note that defense counsel did not object to

any of the [alleged improprieties at trial]. [O]ur Supreme

Court has explained that a defendant’s failure to object

at trial to each of the occurrences that he now raises

as instances of prosecutorial impropriety, though relevant to our inquiry, is not fatal to review of his claims.

. . . This does not mean, however, that the absence of

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an objection at trial does not play a significant role in

the determination of whether the challenged statements

were, in fact, improper. . . . To the contrary, we continue to adhere to the well established maxim that

defense counsel’s failure to object to the [alleged improprieties at the time they occurred] suggests that defense

counsel did not believe that [they were] [improper] in

light of the record of the case at the time.’’18 (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Maurice B., 228 Conn. App. 720, 726–29, 324 A.3d 850,

cert. denied, 350 Conn. 929, 326 A.3d 249 (2024). We

proceed with our review of the defendant’s claims with

these principles in mind.

A

We turn first to the defendant’s contention that the

prosecutor improperly asked him, during cross-examination, to comment on the veracity of L and thereafter

made use of the defendant’s response during his rebuttal argument. The following additional procedural history is relevant.

As we have previously noted, the defendant testified

that he did not remember shooting Jefferson or much

about the shooting incident itself. To this end, although

he acknowledged during cross-examination that he was

aware that L ‘‘stated that [he] put the gun to her face

and pulled the trigger,’’ he testified that he did not

remember doing so. Moreover, he further testified that

he could ‘‘honestly say that [he] did not do that to [L]

. . . because [he knew he] wouldn’t.’’ Shortly thereafter, the following colloquy between the prosecutor

and the defendant took place:

18

‘‘[U]nder settled law, a defendant who fails to preserve claims of prosecutorial [impropriety] need not seek to prevail under the specific requirements

of State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), and, similarly,

it is unnecessary for a reviewing court to apply the four-pronged Golding

test.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Maurice B., 228 Conn.

App. 720, 729 n.12, 324 A.3d 850, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 929, 326 A.3d

249 (2024).

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‘‘[The Prosecutor]: [Y]ou heard [L]. I mean, do you

. . . think she’s not being truthful as to what happened?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: You . . . think she’s not being

truthful?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay. So, you think that she’s

making up what she had said happened?

‘‘[The Defendant]: She’s making up some of that

story. Yeah.’’

Defense counsel did not object to this line of questioning and during his closing argument to the jury, he

argued as follows:

‘‘You heard [L’s] testimony. [The defendant] started

shooting. He didn’t say anything. He just kept shooting

and shooting and shooting. She said it was so fast. She

said, at one point, [he] stopped and pointed a gun at

her. Did he? I don’t know. That’s her testimony. What

did she believe? Did she reconstruct her memory? I

don’t know. We weren’t there. [The defendant] called

her a liar. Did he call her a liar because she was lying,

or because he couldn’t believe that he would’ve ever

pointed a gun at her?’’

Thereafter, during the state’s rebuttal closing argument, when addressing the defendant’s lack of recall

with respect to the shooting and many of the events

that followed, the prosecutor argued: ‘‘And again, [the

defendant] doesn’t remember pulling the trigger on [L].

‘‘In fact, he went as far as to say that [L] must not

be telling the truth. That’s his explanation for her stating

that he, in fact, did put the gun to her face. Not once,

but twice, if you recall. And, as I stated earlier, this was

a traumatic experience for everyone involved. However,

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[L] seems to have quite the clear memory of that morning and all the events preceding that particular moment

as well as afterwards and during.’’ Defense counsel did

not object to this argument.

Relying primarily on State v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693,

706, 793 A.2d 226 (2002), the defendant argues that the

state improperly ‘‘elicited testimony that the defendant

believed that [L], a sympathetic witness, was lying to

the jury, and then emphasized that point during its

rebuttal.’’19 ‘‘In Singh, the prosecutor compelled the

defendant to comment on the veracity of other witnesses’ testimony and emphasized the defendant’s

response during closing argument. . . . Our Supreme

Court adopted the rule that ‘it is improper to ask a

witness to comment on another witness’ veracity.’ ’’

(Citation omitted.) State v. Singleton, 95 Conn. App.

492, 498, 897 A.2d 636, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 904, 901

A.2d 1228 (2006).

Our Supreme Court also held in Singh ‘‘that it is

improper for a prosecutor essentially to argue during

closing that, in order to find the defendant not guilty,

the jury must find that witnesses had lied . . . . [Our

Supreme Court] explained that [t]he reason for this

restriction is that [t]his form of argument . . . involves

a distortion of the government’s burden of proof and

preclude[s] the possibility that the witness’ testimony

conflicts with that of the defendant for a reason other

than deceit. . . . [Our Supreme Court] later held, in

19

The defendant also posits that ‘‘[e]liciting and then highlighting [the

defendant’s] comments on [L’s] veracity served no purpose other than to

enflame the [jurors’] passions.’’ He offers no analysis or citation to authority

with respect to this contention, however, and thus it is inadequately briefed.

See State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton, 229 Conn. App. 267, 304, 327 A.3d 982

(2024) (‘‘Claims are inadequately briefed when they are merely mentioned

and not briefed beyond a bare assertion. . . . Claims are also inadequately

briefed when they . . . consist of conclusory assertions . . . with no mention of relevant authority and minimal or no citations from the record . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

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State v. Albino, 312 Conn. 763, 97 A.3d 478 (2014),

that, in closing argument, there is a distinction between

characterizing a witness’ testimony as a lie and characterizing it simply as wrong. [W]hen the prosecutor

argues that the jury must conclude that one of two

versions of directly conflicting testimony must be

wrong, the state is leaving it to the jury to make that

assessment [of the witness’ veracity]. . . . [B]y framing the argument in such a manner, the jury is free to

conclude that the conflict exists due to mistake (misperception or misrecollection) or deliberate fabrication.

. . . Nonetheless, the mere use of the term wrong

instead of lying will not always be proper if the prosecutor’s closing arguments provid[e], in essence, that in

order to find the defendant not guilty, the jury must

find that witnesses had lied . . . .’’ (Citations omitted;

emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Diaz, 348 Conn. 750, 771–72, 311 A.3d 714

(2024).

In the present case, the prosecutor violated the first

rule articulated in Singh by asking the defendant, twice,

whether he thought that L was not being truthful and

also whether he thought she was ‘‘making up’’ her version of events. We conclude therefore, that these questions were improper. See, e.g., State v. Warholic, 278

Conn. 354, 383, 897 A.2d 569 (2006) (prosecutor’s question to defendant during cross-examination regarding

whether he had stated that child complainant made up

allegations of sexual assault was improper); State v.

Singleton, supra, 95 Conn. App. 498 (prosecutor’s questions to defendant during cross-examination about

whether state’s witnesses had lied or were wrong were

improper).

For this reason, we also agree with the defendant’s

claim that the reference the prosecutor made during

his rebuttal closing argument about the testimony the

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defendant gave in response to these improper questions, namely, that the defendant ‘‘went as far as to say

that [L] must not be telling the truth,’’ also ran afoul of

our Supreme Court’s holding in Singh. Although it is

true that this assertion by the prosecutor followed and

responded to defense counsel’s closing argument in

which defense counsel reiterated the defendant’s

response to the questions about which the defendant

now complains; see, e.g., State v. Pernell, 194 Conn.

App. 394, 410, 221 A.3d 457 (‘‘[t]he state may properly

respond to inferences raised by the defendant’s closing

argument’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert.

denied, 334 Conn. 910, 221 A.3d 44 (2019); State v.

Mucha, 137 Conn. App. 173, 193, 47 A.3d 931 (‘‘[i]t is

not improper for a prosecutor appropriately to respond

to statements made by defense counsel during the

defendant’s closing argument’’), cert. denied, 307 Conn.

912, 53 A.3d 998 (2012); under the circumstances of

this case, where the questions themselves were

improper and the responses should not have been

before the jury, the prosecutor’s reference to the

responses the improper questions elicited was inappropriate as well. See, e.g., State v. Salamon, 287 Conn.

509, 565, 949 A.2d 1092 (2008) (‘‘it is improper for a

prosecutor, in his closing argument, to refer to evidence

that has been stricken or ruled inadmissible’’). We thus

conclude that the prosecutor’s reference to the defendant’s testimony that ‘‘[L] must not be telling the truth’’

during his rebuttal closing argument was improper.

B

Next, we address the defendant’s claim that, during

his closing argument, the prosecutor improperly relied

on L’s speculative testimony when he argued that the

defendant had pulled the trigger while holding the gun

to L’s face and that he improperly introduced facts

outside of the record to explain why the gun did not

fire. Although the defendant did not object to these

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remarks at trial, he posits on appeal that it was improper

for the prosecutor to argue that the defendant’s gun

had ‘‘jammed or misfired because that fact was neither

in evidence nor a reasonable inference’’ that could have

been drawn therefrom. The state responds that ‘‘[t]he

prosecutor’s remark that the gun ‘jammed or misfired’

constituted fair argument when considered in context.’’

We agree with the defendant that the prosecutor’s argument that the gun had ‘‘jammed or misfired’’ was

improper.

The following additional procedural history is relevant. As stated previously in this opinion, the state’s

expert, Therriault, performed testing on the gun. This

included test firing, which Therriault testified allowed

her to determine, inter alia, whether the gun was functioning properly. To this end, Therriault determined

that the gun was ‘‘operable.’’ Therriault was not asked,

and offered no testimony about, whether the gun may

have either jammed or misfired. Indeed, there was no

evidence in this regard. Even so, during his closing

argument, when describing what happened when the

defendant encountered Jefferson and L in the stairwell,

the prosecutor stated that the defendant, ‘‘under the

belief that he came upon some situation, one which he

was unable to articulate, pulled out a gun and fired an

unknown amount of times at . . . Jefferson as he was

exiting the building. He then turned the gun on [L]. He

pulled the trigger. The gun either jammed or misfired.

After [L] essentially begged for her life and asked what

about the son that they share, [the defendant] then

turned the gun back on . . . Jefferson and continued

to shoot him.’’

‘‘A prosecutor, in fulfilling his duties, must confine

himself to the evidence in the record. . . . Statements

as to facts that have not been proven amount to

unsworn testimony, which is not the subject of proper

closing argument. . . . [Moreover] [a] prosecutor may

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invite the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the

evidence; however, he or she may not invite sheer speculation unconnected to evidence.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fasanelli,

163 Conn. App. 170, 188–89, 133 A.3d 921 (2016).

‘‘[W]hen a prosecutor suggests a fact not in evidence,

there is a risk that the jury may conclude that he or

she has independent knowledge of facts that could not

be presented to the jury.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Valentine v. Commissioner of Correction,

219 Conn. App. 276, 322, 295 A.3d 973, cert. denied, 348

Conn. 913, 303 A.3d 602 (2023).

At the outset, we have already concluded, in part I

A of this opinion, that L’s testimony that the defendant

pulled the trigger of the gun the first time he was pointing it at her face was not speculative and that the jury

was free to credit her testimony in this regard. It was

equally appropriate for the prosecutor to rely on that

testimony when he argued that the defendant had pulled

the trigger, and we reject the defendant’s argument to

the contrary.

It was not appropriate, however, for the prosecutor

to argue that ‘‘[t]he gun either jammed or misfired’’

after the defendant pulled the trigger because there was

no direct evidence that this occurred, nor was there

evidence from which the jury may have reasonably

inferred that this occurred. L expressly testified that

she did not know why the weapon did not fire, and

Therriault confirmed that the gun was ‘‘operable.’’ The

evidence in this case was that the defendant pulled the

trigger, the gun did not fire, and the defendant reloaded

thereafter. Although it would have been reasonable to

infer from this evidence that the gun did not fire because

it was empty; see part I A of this opinion; there is simply

no basis for an inference that the ‘‘operable’’ gun did

not fire because it either ‘‘jammed or misfired.’’ As such,

the prosecutor’s statement to the jury in his closing

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argument that this had occurred was speculative and,

thus, improper. See Valentine v. Commissioner of

Correction, supra, 219 Conn. App. 322.

C

Finally, we address the defendant’s claim that the

prosecutor improperly aligned himself with, and

appealed to the emotions of, the jurors during his closing and rebuttal arguments to the jury. Specifically, the

defendant argues that the prosecutor ‘‘improperly made

use of ‘we’ and [‘us’] statements to align [himself] with

the jur[ors], distort their fact-finding mission, and

appeal to their emotions.’’ He claims that the following

statements were improper:

‘‘ ‘[W]e know that [L] went and picked up . . . Jefferson.’ . . .

‘‘ ‘[W]e know that [the defendant] called his sister.’

‘‘ ‘Let’s look at this from a basic standpoint.’ . . .

‘‘ ‘Let’s talk about some of the witnesses that you

heard from.’ . . .

‘‘ ‘[W]e do have an eyewitness who can fill in the gaps

for where [the defendant] seems to have forgotten.’

‘‘ ‘If you recall, [the defendant] told us here in the

courtroom that [he] did not want to become a police

officer because the idea of shooting another person is

too much for him to handle.’ . . .

[And] ‘‘ ‘[l]et’s not excuse away [the defendant’s] conduct. Again, I’d ask you to use common sense here. Use

logic. Use reasoning. I’d ask for a finding of guilty on

all charges’ . . . .’’ (Emphasis in original.)

Although the defendant did not object to these

remarks, or any portion of the prosecutor’s closing and

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rebuttal arguments, at trial, he argues on appeal that

the ‘‘ ‘we’ and ‘us’ statements improperly aligned the

state as a member of the jury’’ and that the final ‘‘we’’

and ‘‘us’’ statement was also improper ‘‘because it signaled to the jury that, notwithstanding the state’s burden to prove [its] case beyond a reasonable doubt and

[the defendant’s] presumption of innocence until

proven otherwise, any verdict other than a guilty one

would ‘excuse’ his conduct’’ and amounted to an inappropriate ‘‘duty to convict’’ argument. We disagree with

the defendant. On the basis of our review of the challenged remarks, we do not find any of them to be

improper.

‘‘Although [w]e repeatedly have emphasized that

counsel, and especially prosecutors, must be particularly careful to avoid the unnecessary use of the first

person . . . we also have recognized that comments

of the type at issue here represent the kind of lapse

that sometimes occurs, without premeditation, in the

heat of the moment and at the close of an emotional

trial. . . . Thus, isolated comments of this type generally do not give rise to a due process violation or otherwise result in manifest injustice because a properly

instructed jury is likely to appreciate fully its duty to

decide the case on the evidence and not on the basis

of such rhetoric.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Ancona, 270 Conn. 568, 608–

609, 854 A.2d 718 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1055,

125 S. Ct. 921, 160 L. Ed. 2d 780 (2005); see also State

v. Gibson, 302 Conn. 653, 660, 31 A.3d 346 (2011) (‘‘we

recognize that the use of the word I is part of our

everyday parlance and . . . because of established

speech patterns, it cannot always easily be eliminated

completely from extemporaneous elocution’’). Moreover, ‘‘[c]losing arguments of counsel are seldom carefully constructed in toto before the event; improvisation

frequently results in syntax left imperfect and meaning

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less than crystal clear. While these general observations

in no way justify prosecutorial misconduct, they do

suggest that a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most

damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy

exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora

of less damaging interpretations.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Mendoza, 49 Conn. App. 323,

327, 714 A.2d 1250, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 903, 720

A.2d 516 (1998).

In the present case, the prosecutor’s use of the first

person was limited, and the jury was properly instructed

as to its exclusive role as the fact finder, as distinguished

from the attorneys’ role in presenting their arguments.

As such, we deem the few instances about which the

defendant complains insignificant and conclude that

they did not rise to the level of misconduct. See State

v. Ancona, supra, 270 Conn. 609.

The defendant also argues that the final ‘‘we’’ and

‘‘us’’ comment about which he complains ‘‘signaled to

the jury that, notwithstanding the state’s burden to

prove [its] case beyond a reasonable doubt and [the

defendant’s] presumption of innocence until proven

otherwise, any verdict other than a guilty one would

‘excuse’ his conduct’’ and amounted to an inappropriate

‘‘duty to convict’’ argument. We disagree.

The following additional procedural history is relevant. At the beginning of his initial closing statement,

the prosecutor asked the jury to ‘‘[b]e logical. Use common sense’’ in the course of its deliberations. Thereafter, in concluding his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor summarized the defendant’s conduct, which he

argued ‘‘show[ed] what his intent was.’’ The prosecutor

stated: ‘‘Again, F this. The shooting itself. Pulling out

the gun. Shooting. Putting the gun into [L’s] face. Then

shooting again. Reloading in that process. The switching

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of cars to avoid detection. He demanded [L’s] car. And

then he went and took another vehicle. And yes, he

did, in fact, turn himself in at some point in time. However, his conduct right after suggests he was very conscious of what was going on. And he was attempting

to evade any detection.

‘‘Let’s not excuse away [the defendant’s] conduct.

Again, I’d ask you to use common sense here. Use logic.

Use reasoning. I’d ask for a finding of guilty on all the

charges . . . .’’

It is the single sentence ‘‘[l]et’s not excuse away [the

defendant’s] conduct’’ that forms the basis of the defendant’s argument. ‘‘When reviewing a claim of prosecutorial impropriety, [however] we do not scrutinize each

individual comment in a vacuum but, rather, review the

comments complained of in the context of the entire

trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Fauci, 282 Conn. 23, 45, 917 A.2d 978 (2007). The statement on which the defendant focuses was made at the

conclusion of the prosecutor’s final remarks to the jury,

after he recounted the evidence related to the defendant’s conduct. Moreover, it followed the prosecutor’s

initial request, and preceded his restated request, that

the jury use logic and common sense in assessing the

evidence and reaching its verdict.

‘‘[I]n deciding cases . . . [j]urors are not expected

to lay aside matters of common knowledge or their own

observations and experiences, but rather, to apply them

to the facts as presented to arrive at an intelligent and

correct conclusion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. O’Brien-Veader, 318 Conn. 514, 547, 122

A.3d 555 (2015). Therefore, it is entirely appropriate for

a prosecutor to ‘‘appeal to [the jurors’] common sense

in closing remarks, so long as the prosecutor’s arguments are based on evidence presented at trial and

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reasonable inferences that jurors might draw therefrom.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Courtney G., 339 Conn. 328, 347–48, 260 A.3d 1152

(2021). It was therefore appropriate for the prosecutor

to appeal to the jury as he did, and we conclude that

when he asked that the jury ‘‘not excuse away [the

defendant’s] conduct,’’ he was simply reiterating his

request that the jury use its common sense in deciding

the facts.

For these reasons, we conclude that the foregoing

statements, made during the course of the prosecutor’s

opening and rebuttal closing arguments, were not

improper.

D

Having determined that (1) the questions the prosecutor asked the defendant during cross-examination

regarding L’s veracity, and his reliance on the defendant’s responses thereto, were improper, and (2) the

prosecutor improperly relied on facts not in evidence

when he argued during closing argument that the gun

‘‘either jammed or misfired,’’ we now turn to an analysis

of whether, under the Williams factors, these improprieties, either individually or cumulatively, deprived the

defendant of a fair trial. See State v. Dabate, 351 Conn.

428, 437, 331 A.3d 1159 (2025). ‘‘The defendant bears

the burden of demonstrating that, when considered in

light of the whole trial, the improprieties were so egregious that they amounted to a denial of due process.

. . . [O]ur determination of whether any improper conduct by the [prosecutor] violated the defendant’s fair

trial rights is predicated on the factors set forth in State

v. Williams, [supra, 204 Conn. 540], with due consideration of whether that [impropriety] was objected to at

trial. . . . Those factors include the extent to which

the [impropriety] was invited by defense conduct or

argument . . . the severity of the [impropriety] . . .

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the frequency of the [impropriety] . . . the centrality

of the [impropriety] to the critical issues in the case

. . . the strength of the curative measures adopted

. . . and the strength of the state’s case. . . . Ultimately, [t]he issue is whether the prosecutor’s conduct

so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the

resulting conviction a denial of due process.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Courtney G., supra, 339 Conn. 361–62. We conclude,

on the basis of our examination of each factor, that the

improprieties the prosecutor committed in the present

case did not impermissibly infringe on the defendant’s

due process rights such that he was deprived of a fair

trial. See State v. Maurice B., supra, 228 Conn. App. 744.

At the outset, we note that the state has not argued

that any of the misconduct was invited by defense counsel’s conduct or argument and, in fact, posits that ‘‘the

defendant may not have invited’’ the improprieties. As

such, this factor weighs in favor of the defendant. The

remaining factors, however, weigh in favor of the state.

With respect to the severity of the improprieties, the

prosecutor asked the three short, improper, questions,

in back-to-back succession, toward the end of his crossexamination of the defendant. See State v. Dabate,

supra, 351 Conn. 437. Although the questions were not

invited by defense counsel’s conduct or argument, they

did follow and relate to the defendant’s testimony that,

although he did not remember much about the shooting

and events related thereto, he did not hold the gun to

L’s face because he knew he would not do something

like that. Moreover, the prosecutor did not belabor the

point after asking the questions and securing the defendant’s response and he did not address the defendant’s

testimony regarding L’s veracity during his initial closing argument. See, e.g., State v. Pernell, supra, 194 Conn.

App. 410. Although the prosecutor did improperly

revisit the defendant’s testimony during his rebuttal

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closing argument, he did so in response to defendant’s

counsel’s having done so in his closing argument. See

id. Finally, the prosecutor’s comment, though improper,

about the gun having jammed or misfired simply served

as an explanation for why nothing happened when the

defendant pulled the trigger. The trigger pull itself was

the critical issue, and the jury had before it evidence

from which it could have properly inferred that the gun

did not fire because the magazine was empty. As such,

these improprieties were not a pervasive characteristic

of the entire trial.

In addition, defense counsel did not object to the

prosecutor’s questions, or to his closing and rebuttal

closing arguments, which in and of itself ‘‘suggests that

[he] did not believe that [they were] [improper] in light

of the record of the case at the time.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Maurice B., supra, 228 Conn.

App. 729. And, because the defendant did not object to

the prosecutor’s questions and arguments, the court did

not take any curative measures. See State v. Santiago,

269 Conn. 726, 762, 850 A.2d 199 (2004) (‘‘the defendant,

by failing to bring them to the attention of the trial

court, bears much of the responsibility for the fact that

[the] claimed improprieties went uncured’’ (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

We note, nonetheless, that defense counsel directly

addressed the defendant’s responses to the prosecutor’s

improper questions during redirect examination of the

defendant as follows:

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: When you say that you don’t

believe that [L] was being entirely truthful, is that

because you remember what went on?

‘‘[The Defendant]: No.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Why don’t you believe she was

being truthful?

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‘‘[The Defendant]: In her testimony, a couple of things

that stuck out. She said she was talking to [Jefferson]

and all this. And she’s said on the record when she was

talking to the victim, she was never talking to me. And

later on, she changed it, like, oh yeah. Well, I was talking

to [the defendant] basically up until that happened. So,

if she was lying about something like that, what about

the other little parts.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Yes, but we’re specifically talking about what the state’s attorney is questioning you

about. On October 22nd . . . you saw the evidence of

the shooting?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: I showed you the state’s exhibit

23. Do you believe it did not happen?

‘‘[The Defendant]: I know it happened. I’m here.’’

As such, defense counsel was able to have the defendant clarify, during redirect examination, that he disagreed with L’s testimony and thought she was being

untruthful regarding the status of her relationships with

him and with Jefferson, but that he knew that the shooting and the events related thereto, as relayed by L,

occurred. In other words, the answers elicited by the

improper questions did not pertain to the entirety of

L’s testimony or the central issues in the case. It is true

that L was the only eyewitness to the shooting and

that her testimony and credibility were critical to the

prosecution’s case. The fact remains, however, that,

notwithstanding the improper questions and responses

they garnered, the jury remained free to reject or credit

her testimony and, thus, any impact the questions and

responses may have had was minimal. See State v. Courtney G., supra, 339 Conn. 365.

Finally, we observe that the state’s case was strong.

The state presented persuasive testimonial evidence,

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46 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1

State v. Antwon B.

in addition to that of L, concerning the defendant’s

conduct. See State v. Flowers, supra, 161 Conn. App.

769. For example, the defendant’s sister and Barrett

testified about the defendant’s demeanor and state of

mind immediately after the shooting. The defendant’s

sister and Detective Daniel Bontempo of the Windsor

Locks Police Department testified about Shavrek’s vehicle, which the defendant had taken from the Roncari

lot and, although the defendant could not remember

much about the shooting, and could not believe that it

happened, he testified that he knew that it did. In light

of the foregoing, we conclude that the improprieties

committed by the prosecutor during his cross-examination of the defendant and his closing and rebuttal closing arguments were minor and unimpactful and did not

implicate the fairness of the trial.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.