Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. The Illinois Commerce Commission

majority opinion

2025 IL App (3d) 240093

Opinion filed December 1, 2025

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2025

NORTHERN ILLINOIS GAS COMPANY, ) Petition for Review of Orders of the

d/b/a Nicor Gas Company, ) Illinois Commerce Commission,

)

Petitioner, ) Appeal No. 3-24-0093

) ICC Docket # 23-0066

v. )

)

THE ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION )

and THE PEOPLE ex rel. KWAME )

RAOUL, Attorney General of the State of )

Illinois, )

)

Respondents. )

)

JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Peterson and Bertani concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Petitioner, Northern Illinois Gas Company, doing business as Nicor Gas Company (Nicor),

appeals from a November 16, 2023, decision issued by the Illinois Commerce Commission

(Commission) in Nicor’s rate case. In its decision, the Commission adopted an imputed capital

structure for Nicor, disallowed portions of Nicor’s proposed pipeline investment costs, and

required Nicor to file a long-term gas infrastructure plan. For the following reasons, we affirm in

part and vacate in part.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 A. General Background and Procedural History

¶4 Nicor is a public utility that distributes natural gas to approximately 2.3 million customers

located throughout northern Illinois and operates a distribution system that is approximately

34,000 miles long. As a public utility, Nicor is governed by the Public Utilities Act (Act) (220

ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 2022)) and regulated by the Commission. See id. §§ 3-105, 4-101

(defining the term “public utility” and stating that the Commission has “general supervision” of

all public utilities).

¶5 A public utility is entitled to recover certain operating costs through the rates that it charges

its customers. Citizens Utility Board v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 166 Ill. 2d 111, 121 (1995).

The Commission is responsible for setting the rates charged by a utility. United Cities Gas Co. v.

Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 163 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1994). Generally, a utility seeking a rate increase

must file new schedules or supplements with the Commission that indicate the proposed changes

to be made in the schedule or schedules already in place, as well as the time when the proposed

changes would take effect. 220 ILCS 5/9-201(a) (West 2022). “When a utility files a request for a

rate increase in the form of a new tariff schedule, the Commission has the authority upon complaint

or its own initiative to hear evidence, hold hearings and determine the propriety of the requested

increase.” Business & Professional People for the Public Interest v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n,

146 Ill. 2d 175, 195 (1991).

¶6 On January 3, 2023, Nicor filed tariff sheets with the Commission in which it proposed “a

general increase in rates” effective February 17, 2023. Starting on July 18, 2023, the Commission

conducted an evidentiary hearing, during which written testimony and exhibits were admitted into

the record. Staff of the Commission (Staff) participated in the proceedings, and the Office of the

Illinois Attorney General (Attorney General) filed an appearance. Additionally, two groups of

advocates filed petitions to intervene in the proceedings. The first of these groups included Retail

Energy Supply Association; Nucor Steel Kankakee, Inc.; Local Union No. 19 International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO; Walmart Inc.; the Environmental Law & Policy

Center; the Environmental Defense Fund; the Natural Resources Defense Council; and the Illinois

State Public Interest Research Group, Inc. (collectively, “Public Interest Organizations”). The

second group included ExxonMobil Power & Gas Services, Inc., as a member of the Illinois

Industrial Energy Consumers; the Citizens Utility Board; and the Community Development

Corporation of Pembroke-Hopkins Park (collectively, “Ratepayer Advocates”).

¶7 On November 16, 2023, the Commission issued its order in which it rejected parts of

Nicor’s proposed rate increase (Order). Nicor subsequently filed a petition for rehearing, which

the Commission denied.

¶8 B. Nicor’s Proposed Rate Increase

¶9 i. Nicor’s Capital Structure

¶ 10 A public utility may charge rates that allow it to earn a return on the amount of its invested

capital. People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2011 IL App (1st) 100654, ¶ 76

(citing Citizens Utility Co. of Illinois v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 124 Ill. 2d 195, 200-01

(1988)). The amount of a utility’s return is dependent on its capital structure. See Citizens Utility

Board v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 276 Ill. App. 3d 730, 743-46 (1995) (explaining the costs

associated with different forms of capital and how a utility’s capital structure impacts the amount

that it recovers in revenue). A utility’s capital structure typically consists of short-term debt, longterm debt, and equity. See Ameren Illinois Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2013 IL App (4th)

121008, ¶ 22. “Generally, equity is a more expensive form of capital than debt.” Illinois Bell

Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 283 Ill. App. 3d 188, 204 (1996). “Therefore, the

more equity in a utility’s capital structure, the higher the [rate of return] must be to cover the cost

of capital.” Id.

¶ 11 When calculating the rates that a public utility may charge its customers, the Commission

considers the company’s operating costs, rate base, and allowed rate of return. Citizens Utility Co.,

124 Ill. 2d at 200. “Recovery of the utility’s operating costs and the return on its rate base is known

as the utility’s annual revenue requirement.” Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce

Comm’n, 405 Ill. App. 3d 389, 394 (2010). “Generally speaking, a utility determines its revenue

requirement by adding operating costs to invested capital multiplied by the rate of return.” Id. “The

components of the revenue requirement have frequently been expressed in the formula ‘R (revenue

requirement) = C (operating costs) + Ir (invested capital or rate base times rate of return on

capital).’ ” Business & Professional People, 146 Ill. 2d at 195.

¶ 12 1. Capital Structure Proposed by Nicor

¶ 13 Nicor proposed increased rates that would yield a 7.49% rate of return on its capital

investments. To support its proposal, Nicor submitted testimony by Gregory MacLeod, the Finance

Director and Assistant Treasurer for Nicor’s parent company, Southern Company (Southern).

MacLeod explained that the rate of return that Nicor sought on its capital investments was based

on a “Test Year” capital structure that consisted of 54.520% of common equity, 42.437% of longterm debt, and 3.043% of short-term debt. MacLeod further explained that the Test Year capital

structure was “neither hypothetical nor derived for ratemaking purposes only,” but was, instead,

“consistent” with Nicor’s actual capital structure, which had remained the same for “several years”

and the Commission had approved in the past. According to MacLeod, Southern owned all Nicor’s

common equity, and Nicor had no authority to issue common equity to an entity other than

Southern.

¶ 14 MacLeod testified that the Test Year capital structure was reasonable in that it would permit

Nicor to maintain its financial strength and access to the capital markets, rendered Nicor financially

resilient enough to respond to the risks that the company expected to face, was comparable to the

capital structures of other “financially sound” local gas distribution companies, and was based on

the same goals and capital-planning approaches that had underlain Nicor’s past capital structures

that the Commission had approved. As to Nicor’s financial resilience, MacLeod recounted that, in

February 2021, Nicor had incurred “extraordinary and unexpected costs” to service its customers

during Winter Storm Uri, an extreme arctic weather event that lasted days and constrained the gas

supply during a time of high demand, causing the cost of gas to increase. MacLeod explained that

Nicor’s short-term debt and strong credit profile benefited customers by, for example, enabling the

company to quickly and efficiently fund the increased costs of its gas services during Winter Storm

Uri and to amortize its recovery of the costs by only gradually increasing the customers’ rates over

an extended period of time. MacLeod added that Nicor was able to perform these actions “all while

avoiding potential credit downgrades from the rating agencies.”

¶ 15 John Quackenbush, a former utility regulator and advisor to the Commission, testified that

the capital structure of a utility is important to its investors. Quackenbush explained that investors

expect a return on their investment that is proportional to the risk and that an important type of risk

is regulatory risk, which is the risk that certain actions—such as changes in the law or the

imposition of regulations—would materially impact the utility by increasing operating costs,

decreasing the “attractiveness” of an investment, or changing the competitive landscape.

Quackenbush further explained that investors consider a utility’s capital structure when assessing

risk because they know that the Commission considers the capital structure when authorizing the

rate of return on a utility’s capital investments.

¶ 16 Next, Quackenbush testified that investors receive information regarding regulatory risks

from credit rating agencies, whose role is to “provide debt capital market[***] participants with

an independent, objective, and forward-looking opinion of creditworthiness [of a debt security].”

Quackenbush stated that credit rating agencies indicate a debt security’s creditworthiness by

assigning the security a letter that corresponds with the relative risk that the debt issuer will default.

He also further elaborated on the grade rating system by adding the following:

“Letters closer to the front of the alphabet indicate higher levels of creditworthiness and a

lower probability of default. When a change in credit quality is perceived, the rating

agencies will change the ratings up or down, thereby upgrading or downgrading the debt.

The rating agencies’ investment grade ratings are ‘AAA’ or ‘Aaa,” followed by ‘AA’ or

‘Aa,’ then ‘A,’ then ‘BBB’ or ‘Baa.’ Every rating beneath ‘BBB’ or ‘Baa’ is considered

below investment grade, junk, speculative, and high yield, with the associated debt carrying

significantly higher probability of default. The rating agencies also use a ‘+’ or ‘1’

designation to indicate a rating in the high portion of a rating category, and ‘-’ or ‘3’

designation to indicate a rating in the low portion of a rating category.”

Quackenbush pointed out that numerous credit rating agencies had assigned Nicor credit ratings

of A2, A-, and A, with the “2” in A2 denoting creditworthiness in the middle of the A category. He

also pointed out that one of these credit rating agencies, Moody’s Investor Service (Moody’s), had

characterized the Illinois regulatory framework as being “credit supportive.”

¶ 17 2. Capital Structure Proposed by Ratepayer Advocates

¶ 18 The Ratepayer Advocates recommended that Nicor’s capital structure consist of 52.0% of

common equity, rather than the 54.520% that the company proposed. Michael Gorman—a public

utility regulation consultant and a Managing Principal with an energy, economic, and regulatory

consulting firm—testified in support of the Ratepayer Advocates that, although he agreed with

MacLeod that a utility’s capital structure “should be adequate to support its financial integrity,

credit standing and access to capital, it should also do so at just and reasonable rates to customers.”

Gorman explained that, “[h]ence, there should be a demonstration that the ratemaking capital

structure is no more expensive than necessary to support [Nicor’s] financial integrity and credit

standing objectives.”

¶ 19 Gorman further testified that MacLeod had failed to demonstrate that Nicor’s proposed

capital structure was as cost-effective as possible in that MacLeod had not provided evidence of

whether a capital structure with less common equity and cost than that proposed by Nicor would

still achieve Nicor’s financial goals. Gorman assessed the reasonableness of Nicor’s proposed

capital structure by reviewing the utility’s credit metric projections, a comparison to industry credit

metric estimates, and the capital structures of other companies. Gorman also considered numerous

factors, such as that Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s (S&P) had stable credit outlooks for Nicor,

that Illinois’s regulatory environment was supportive of Nicor’s credit ratings, and that Nicor had

a “sizable” customer base, which, in turn, suggested that Nicor’s existing investment grade bond

rating would still be supported if the utility’s capital structure were to contain less common equity.

Gorman therefore concluded that Nicor’s proposed capital structure “contain[ed] more equity than

necessary” and was, thus, “more expensive than necessary.”

¶ 20 In surrebuttal, MacLeod testified that Gorman “seem[ed] shortsightedly focused only on

the cost difference between differing sources of capital” and that Gorman had “ignore[d] the

potential negative customer impacts of adding more financial and business risk to [Nicor].”

MacLeod explained that “[f]ocusing exclusively on the near-term rate of return ignores the

customer protection that a strong credit rating provides to customers.” He further explained that if

Nicor were to have a less resilient credit profile, then the utility would have a weakened “ability

to navigate volatile market conditions and provide necessary liquidity in times of financial and

operational stresses,” which would, in turn, “result in increased costs to customers over the longerterm as [Nicor’s] borrowing rates increase through a combination of lower credit ratings and an

increasing interest rate environment.”

¶ 21 3. Capital Structure Proposed by Staff

¶ 22 Staff recommended that Nicor’s capital structure consists of only 50% common equity,

46.96% long-term debt, and 3.04% short-term debt. In support of Staff’s recommendation, Sheena

Kight-Garlisch, a Senior Financial Analyst for the Commission, testified that an “optimal” capital

structure for a utility would both “minimize the cost of capital and maintain [the] utility’s financial

strength” and that the Commission should not determine a utility’s overall rate of return based on

its actual capital structure “if that capital structure adversely affects the overall cost of capital.”

¶ 23 Kight-Garlisch assessed whether the Commission should have used Nicor’s proposed

capital structure to set the utility’s overall rate of return. During her assessment, Kight-Garlisch

found that Nicor’s proposed capital structure contained “a significantly higher percentage of

common equity” than the two sample groups of gas utilities upon which she had relied and which

each contained an average of 42.51% and 41.56% of common equity, respectively. Kight-Garlisch

further found that Nicor’s proposed common equity ratio was also higher than the average equity

ratio of Southern, which was 37.41%. Kight-Garlisch stated that, although a higher percentage of

common equity implies lower risk and Southern was a “riskier” company than Nicor, Nicor’s

proposed equity ratio was “much higher” than Southern’s and the proposed capital structure

contained “more common equity than needed” to support its financial strength and maintain its

credit ratings. Kight-Garlisch thus concluded that the Commission should not use Nicor’s proposed

capital structure to set the utility’s overall rate of return.

¶ 24 In rebuttal, Wendell Dallas, the President and Chief Executive Officer of Nicor, testified

that, in the utility’s “most recent” rate case in 2021, Kight-Garlisch had “supported the use of

[Nicor’s] actual capital structure with some modest adjustments, and testified that an equity ratio

of 54.459% [was] ‘consistent with the common equity ratios of other similar companies in the gas

distribution industry’ and ‘was commensurate with a strong, but not excessive, degree of financial

strength.’ ” Dallas stated that Kight-Garlisch had also found that Nicor’s common equity ratio of

54.459% was consistent with the average common equity ratio of her sample group, which was

47.26%.

¶ 25 Dallas also testified that, in a 2018 rate case, Staff witness Rochelle Phipps concluded that

a common equity ratio of 54.41% “was ‘consistent with the common equity ratios of other

companies in the gas distribution industry’ where the mean common equity ratio for the gas

distribution industry was 46.98% ***.” Additionally, Dallas testified that, in a 2017 rate case,

Phipps separately found that a common equity ratio of 54.206% “ ‘compared favorably with other

companies in the gas distribution industry’ where the mean common equity ratio for the gas

industry was 51.07% ***.”

¶ 26 4. The Commission’s Findings

¶ 27 In its order, the Commission articulated that “[t]he optimal capital structure minimizes the

cost of capital while maintaining a utility’s financial strength” and that the central question in this

case was “whether [Nicor’s] proposal [was] stronger than necessary.” The Commission then found

that Staff and the Ratepayer Advocates had successfully shown that Nicor could maintain its credit

rating with a common equity ratio of 50%; that Nicor’s proposed common equity ratio was “much

higher” than those of the sample gas distributors and Southern, which were all riskier entities; and

that Nicor’s proposed common equity ratio was “significantly greater than those typically

approved by commissions around the country for the past decade.”

¶ 28 The Commission further found that, conversely, Nicor had not shown that its proposed

common equity ratio was needed to support its financial integrity. The Commission remarked that

“[i]t appear[ed] that [Nicor’s] proposed equity ratio [was] high due to its association with nonregulated affiliates, thus requiring ratepayers to pay higher costs than warranted ***.” Ultimately,

the Commission adopted the imputed capital structure proposed by Staff, which consisted of 50%

common equity, 46.96% long-term debt, and 3.04% short-term debt.

¶ 29 ii. Nicor’s Pipeline Investments

¶ 30 A natural gas utility is required by law to “refurbish, rebuild, modernize, and expand” the

infrastructure of its natural gas system to ensure that it is providing “safe, reliable, and affordable

service” to its customers. 220 ILCS 5/5-111 (West 2022). A public utility may also recover, through

the rates that it charges its customers, “the value of such investment which is both prudently

incurred and used and useful in providing service to public utility customers.” Id. § 9-211.

¶ 31 Nicor uses natural gas pipelines to deliver gas from interstate pipelines, transport gas from

storage fields, move gas within its service territory, and deliver gas to the distribution mains and

pipes to serve customers. In this case, Nicor sought to recover for certain investments that it made

to ensure that its natural gas system was safe and reliable.

¶ 32 1. Distribution Investments

¶ 33 Typically, there is a delay between when a natural gas utility invests in its infrastructure

and when it can begin recovering the costs of its investments through a rate case. During the delay,

the investors in the utility must finance the costs, which tends to discourage further investment.

¶ 34 In 2013, to reduce the delay in which natural gas utilities could recover their investment

costs, the General Assembly enacted section 9-220.3 of the Act, which allowed a natural gas utility

to file a tariff for surcharges that would adjust the utility’s rates and charges to allow it to recover

its investment costs in “qualifying infrastructure plant” (QIP), independent of other matters related

to the utility’s revenue requirement. Id. § 9-220.3; see Citizens Utility Board, 166 Ill. 2d at 133.

This cost-recovery method is referred to as a “rider.” See Citizens Utility Board, 166 Ill. 2d at 133.

Section 9-220.3 of the Act was repealed on December 31, 2023, after which Nicor could no longer

recover its investment costs by using a rider. 220 ILCS 5/9-220.3 (West 2022).

¶ 35 a. Nicor’s Proposed Recovery of Distribution Investment Costs

¶ 36 Nicor sought to recover $149.5 million in distribution investment costs that it could have

recovered through a rider, prior to the repeal of section 9-220.3 of the Act. To support Nicor’s

position, Patrick Whiteside, the senior vice president of operations for Nicor, testified that, to

ensure that its gas service was safe and reliable, Nicor had regularly invested in its storage,

transmission, and distribution systems. Whiteside explained that Nicor’s investments in these

systems included “main replacement, system regulator station installations and replacements ***,

rehabilitation and replacement of facilities critical to operating the [c]ompany’s eight storage

fields, installation of new main and services [for] new customers, and gas main and service

replacement resulting from public improvements as required by various governmental entities.”

¶ 37 Whiteside detailed the following regarding Nicor’s method of deciding which distribution

investment projects to prioritize:

“Nicor [***] takes a systematic approach to prioritizing investments eligible for recovery

under [r]ider QIP. Each project category carries a unique set of characteristics that are

evaluated for risks and other factors, including, but not limited to, safety, reliability,

obsolescence, age, and asset integrity. This analysis includes data from Subject Matter

Experts, and the newest requirements for federal pipeline safety and inspections ***. These

prioritizations are conducted on both a holistic basis in determining overall investment

resources and within each qualifying investment category to determine the optimal

deployment of resources. The [c]ompany’s approach also includes consideration of factors

specified in [s]ection 9-220.3 of the Act.”

¶ 38 Additionally, Whiteside testified that, after section 9-220.3 of the Act was enacted, Nicor

completed numerous projects, such as working at an accelerated rate to replace the remaining cast

iron main and known copper services in its systems, which the company fully accomplished in

2018 and 2019. Whiteside explained that, despite this completed work, Nicor had determined that

its gas distribution system still contained future needs, a “significant amount” of which entailed

projects with costs that the company could recover through a rider. Whiteside stated that, in light

of the then impending repeal of section 9-220.3 of the Act, however, Nicor planned to “roll[***]

its QIP investments into rate base as of the end of 2023 *** and recover capital investments that

would have been eligible for recovery under [r]ider QIP through base rates in 2024.”

¶ 39 Whiteside more specifically explained that some of the projects designed to address Nicor’s

future needs included the replacement of “other” qualifying vintage material, which, in turn,

included approximately 1,624 miles of mechanically coupled steel gas mains that were “known to

present enhanced safety risks and [had] been identified as the cause of known industry incidents

and failures.” Whiteside stated that this infrastructure “need[ed] to be addressed in a timely manner

to decrease the probability of a future incident or failure.” He thus concluded that, although Nicor

had not decreased its infrastructure replacement rate, the Commission should nevertheless approve

the company’s proposed recovery of its distribution costs as prudent and reasonable.

¶ 40 b. Attorney General’s Proposed Recovery of Distribution Investment Costs

¶ 41 The Attorney General recommended that the Commission disallow 33%, or $55.1 million,

of Nicor’s proposed distribution investment costs on the grounds that the costs were unreasonable,

lacked sufficient identification and justification, and lacked evidentiary support. Rod Walker, Chief

Executive Officer and President of a management consultancy and technical advisory firm,

analyzed Nicor’s efforts to ensure the safety and reliability of its infrastructure. Walker noted that

Nicor had approximately 33,616 miles of mains and 2,054,463 services in its gas distribution

system, which was the largest in Illinois. Walker further noted that, prior to the enactment of

section 9-220.3 of the Act, there were 488 miles of leak-prone pipe (LPP) mains and 57,588 LPP

services in Nicor’s gas distribution system, but that Nicor had already reduced this inventory to 83

miles of LPP mains and 6,645 LPP services by the end of 2022, which yielded an 83% reduction

in LPP mains and 88.5% reduction in LPP services.

¶ 42 Walker concluded that, “[g]iven the nearly complete replacement of LPP main and services

in the Nicor system as well as other improvements to the system,” it was no longer warranted for

Nicor to work at an accelerated pace to improve its infrastructure. Walker observed, however, that,

even though Nicor’s accelerated pace had no longer been warranted, the amount of infrastructure

that the company replaced in 2024 declined by only approximately 0.5% between 2023 and 2024

and service replacement costs were forecasted to increase by approximately 30% in 2024. Walker

explained that, although it appeared that Nicor had been devoting its continued accelerated pace

to “other” main and service replacements, the company had not defined such replacements. Based

on his analysis, Walker concluded that Nicor planned to continue working at an accelerated rate to

improve its infrastructure, even after section 9-220.3 of the Act was repealed and the accelerated

rate was no longer justified.

¶ 43 Separately, David Dismukes, a consulting economist with Acadian Consulting Group,

testified that section 9-220.3 of the Act “was premised on a desire that the mechanism be used to

facilitate the accelerated replacement of aging infrastructure assets to which there was a perceived

growing safety or reliability concern,” but that, according to Nicor, it had already replaced a

“significant” amount of its aging infrastructure assets. Dismukes further testified that, thus, Nicor

would still be able to maintain a safe and reliable gas distribution system if it were to reduce the

amount that it invested to improve the system.

¶ 44 Additionally, Catherine Elder, an employee of Aspen Environmental Group, testified that

the evidence offered by Nicor indicated that the company’s “spending on other ‘qualifying vintage

materials’ [was] merely taking the place of prior QIP spending on copper services, cast iron main

and services, [and] bare steel mains and services.” Elder explained, however, that this showing by

Nicor “downplay[ed]” the fact that Nicor had “dramatically increased” its investment in replacing

other qualifying vintage material. Further, Elder concluded that Nicor had failed to justify the

amount that it had been investing to replace such qualifying vintage material.

¶ 45 c. The Commission’s Findings

¶ 46 In its Order, the Commission acknowledged Nicor’s statutory requirement to show that its

investments were prudently made and its argument that its distribution investments helped ensure

the safety and reliability of the company’s infrastructure. However, the Commission clarified that

the question before it was “not whether pipeline replacements generally improve[d] safety and

reliability, but what types of pipes [were] to be replaced, to what degree safety and reliability

[were] affected, and importantly, at what cost.” The Commission then found that Nicor had failed

to show that the other qualifying vintage material posed similar risks to LPP material, that

replacement of the qualifying vintage material was required in place of other methods of redress,

or that the company needed to replace the other qualifying vintage material at the same rate as it

had the LPP material. The Commission also found that Nicor’s justifications for its distribution

investments lacked meaningful definitions and “concrete” evidentiary support. On these bases, the

Commission adopted the Attorney General’s recommendation to disallow $55.1 million of Nicor’s

proposed distribution investment costs.

¶ 47 2. MAOP Investments

¶ 48 Effective July 1, 2020, section 192.624(b) of the Code of Federal Regulations (49 C.F.R.

§ 192.624(b) (2022)) required all gas utilities to develop and document procedures concerning the

maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) of their gas transmission pipelines (MAOP Rule).

Specifically, the MAOP Rule required gas utilities to reconfirm the MAOP of 50% of their

applicable pipelines by July 3, 2028, and 100% of their applicable pipelines by July 2, 2035. Id.

The six methods that a gas utility was permitted to use to reconfirm MAOP were: (1) pressure

testing, (2) pressure reduction, (3) engineering critical assessment, (4) pipe replacement,

(5) pressure reduction for pipeline segments with small potential impact radius, and (6) alternative

technology (reconfirmation methods). Id. § 192.624(c).

¶ 49 a. Nicor’s Proposed Recovery of MAOP Investment Costs

¶ 50 Nicor sought to recover $57.7 million in MAOP reconfirmation investment costs and

submitted a 15-year plan to complete MAOP reconfirmation. Whiteside testified that Nicor had “a

comprehensive process to analyze pipeline segments requiring reconfirmation to determine

appropriate actions to achieve reconfirmation.” Whiteside explained that, as part of this process,

Nicor performed a records research and review to determine compliance with “49 CFR Part 192

regulations,” identified pipeline segments that required MAOP reconfirmation, and then selected

one of the six reconfirmation methods to address the pipelines that required MAOP reconfirmation.

Whiteside also added that “[f]urther risk and prioritization criteria” was based on factors such as

Nicor’s ability to reduce pressure, Nicor’s ability to take the pipeline segment out of service,

impact to customers, and financial impact. According to Whiteside, Nicor was on course to achieve

50% compliance with the MAOP Rule by 2023, five years in advance of the 2028 compliance

deadline.

¶ 51 b. The Attorney General’s Proposed Recovery of MAOP Investment Costs

¶ 52 The Attorney General recommended that the Commission deny 75%, or $43.3 million, of

Nicor’s proposed MAOP reconfirmation investment costs. Walker testified that Nicor had

identified approximately 368 miles of pipeline in its gas transmission system that were subject to

the MAOP Rule, and that, after initiating a records review, the company had determined that 67

miles of pipeline required remediation. Walker explained that Nicor had not completed its records

review and that he estimated that there would be a total of 93 miles of pipeline that would require

remediation. Walker stated that Nicor had indicated that, of the six reconfirmation methods, the

company intended to make pressure testing and replacement its two primary means of MAOP

reconfirmation.

¶ 53 Walker expressed that he was concerned about the pace of Nicor’s MAOP reconfirmation

plan. He noted that, when Nicor was asked its reasons for frontloading its MAOP reconfirmation

work, the company stated that it did not have a time-based plan for replacement and refused to

state the year in which it would achieve 100% compliance with the MAOP Rule. Walker thus

concluded that Nicor had frontloaded its MAOP reconfirmation costs without justification.

¶ 54 Walker testified that he was also concerned that Nicor was replacing too many of its

pipelines that required remediation, rather than using one of the other reconfirmation methods. He

explained that the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) had

estimated that only 300 miles, or 0.18%, of the 168,000 miles of onshore transmission pipelines

installed prior to the 1970 requirement of hydrostatic pressure testing would need to be replaced

to conform with the MAOP Rule. Walker further explained that if this ratio were applied to Nicor’s

gas transmission system, then the company would be expected to replace less than one quarter of

one mile of its pipeline, which it had exceeded. Walker thus ultimately recommended that the

Commission disallow $43.3 million of Nicor’s proposed MAOP reconfirmation investment costs.

¶ 55 Bradley Cebulko, senior manager at Strategen Consulting and a witness for the Public

Interest Organizations, testified that Nicor had not demonstrated that its MAOP reconfirmation

investment costs were prudent, partly in that “the [c]ompany did not appear to have evaluated all

six MAOP reconfirmation methods *** and the [c]ompany mistakenly claim[ed] that the lack of

records prevent[ed] reconfirmation through means other than pipeline replacement.” Cebulko

stated that Nicor also did “not appear to have instituted an Engineering Critical Assessment (ECA)

process, one of the six MAOP reconfirmation methods, suggesting that the [c]ompany’s existing

methodology may not be comprehensive.” Cebulko explained that the fact that Nicor did not have

an ECA process also increased the risk that the company was reconfirming pipeline segments using

less cost-effective measures such as replacement.

¶ 56 c. The Commission’s Findings

¶ 57 In its order, the Commission found that the Attorney General had presented sufficient

evidence to show that Nicor might have been frontloading its MAOP reconfirmation work for the

2035 compliance period. The Commission separately noted that Nicor had provided “no basis for

the 2024 budget increase other than the number of miles it believe[d] still need[ed] remediation”

and that Nicor had already achieved 50% compliance ahead of the 2028 MAOP reconfirmation

deadline and had “nearly 12 years” to achieve full compliance with the MAOP Rule. The

Commission then stated that, because “Nicor *** [was] well ahead of its MAOP reconfirmation

and [had] not sufficiently demonstrated the reasonableness of the 2024 MAOP budget, including

identifying specific projects and scope of work, the Commission believe[d] a pause was necessary

until the Company [had] properly planned and justified its MAOP costs.”

¶ 58 Based on its findings, the Commission adopted the Attorney General’s recommendation to

disallow $43.3 million of Nicor’s MAOP reconfirmation investment costs. The Commission also

directed Nicor to submit an MAOP and Records Compliance Plan (Compliance Plan) to assist the

Commission in assessing whether Nicor was “fairly” considering its options regarding MAOP

reconfirmation work.

¶ 59 3. Transmission Pipeline Investments

¶ 60 Nicor’s gas distribution system contains intrastate transmission pipelines that transport gas

from interstate pipelines to the company’s delivery points. At the time when it filed its January 3,

2023, tariff sheets, Nicor planned to complete eight future projects on four of its transmission lines.

Each project entailed the replacement of pipes between 20 inches and 36 inches in diameter along

segments ranging from 1 mile to 19.2 miles long. The parties contested issues regarding four out

of Nicor’s eight planned projects (contested projects).

¶ 61 a. Nicor’s Proposed Recovery of Transmission Pipeline Investment Costs

¶ 62 Nicor sought to recover approximately $394.5 million in transmission pipeline investment

costs related to its eight future projects. Whiteside testified that three out of Nicor’s four contested

projects were each a phase of the company’s broader Crawford Line project, which involved the

replacement of three miles of a 20-inch pipeline near Crawford Avenue in the southern suburbs of

Chicago. Whiteside explained the following regarding Nicor’s reasons for deciding to replace the

pipeline involved in the Crawford Line project:

“Crawford is a vintage line that was installed in 1950. This line has other limiting

factors such as the inability to reduce pressure, the inability to take the pipeline out of

service, the inability to run in-line inspections, and missing material property data and

pressure test records. This line runs through a developed area primarily down the middle

of major roadways with shallow depth of cover. It is not piggable and relies on costly direct

assessment techniques for integrity management. It is common for third party utilities to

encroach upon and be in contact with the line. With mechanical damage commonly found

on this line during direct assessment digs and the densely populated area this line is in, risk

was a major factor in deciding to replace the line. Given the age, condition, and limitations

on this line, the only other alternative was to do nothing which was not an acceptable

alternative.”

Whiteside also explained that Nicor’s decision to replace the pipeline in the Crawford Line project

was further motivated by the fact the company was obligated to consider the pipeline “to be of the

lowest yield strength because [Nicor] did not have the records to verify this information.”

Whiteside thus characterized Nicor’s decision to replace the pipeline in the Crawford Line project

as “prudent.”

¶ 63 The fourth of the contested projects was the Bensenville project, which involved 0.8 miles

of a 20-inch pipeline in Bensenville that Nicor sought to replace because it conflicted with certain

storm sewer installation that was associated with a separate tollway relocation project. Whiteside

testified that, as was similarly so with respect to the Crawford Line project, Nicor needed to

consider the pipeline in the Bensenville project to “be of the lowest yield strength because the

[c]ompany [did] not have the records to verify this information.” Whiteside explained that

applicable code required the performance of additional integrity inspections of the pipeline in the

Bensenville project and that, because this pipeline, which ran through a populated area, was of

unknown yield strength, it was at high risk for potential failure. Whiteside also explained that the

Bensenville project was prioritized “based on the tollway relocation” and stated that replacement

of the pipeline would allow for the establishment of records and MAOP.

¶ 64 b. The Attorney General’s Proposed Recovery of Transmission Pipeline Investment Costs

¶ 65 The Attorney General recommended that the Commission disallow $28.4 million of

Nicor’s proposed transmission pipeline investment costs for the four contested projects. In support

of this recommendation, Walker testified that he performed an industry-standard cost analysis of

the Crawford Line and Bensenville projects. He also explained the following regarding the

methodology that he employed in conducting this industry-standard cost analysis:

“The industry-standard method employed utilizes the concept of financial

measurement based on a pipeline size-relative constant developed using a statistically

significant number of similarly situated pipeline projects. The constant is a multiplier,

developed using a regression analysis that takes into account significant pipeline data and

statistics such as physical measurements and regional cost differences to produce a costdetermination constant based upon Diameter-Inches-Miles (Dia-inch-Miles). This constant

can then receive a regional cost amplification multiplier. Further, accommodations for

urban versus rural siting, and cost escalation to coincide value and time can also be

appropriate. Once a cost-determination constant has been established, comparative

benchmarking of Nicor’s proposed transmission pipeline costs and budgets can be made.

Utilizing the nominal diameter of the pipeline and the pipeline’s length as

multipliers to the [dollar] per Dia-in-Mile cost-determination constant results in a base cost

budget for the pipeline project. Following the determination of the base cost budget, the

application of regional cost and financial cost alignment amplification multiples can be

made that result in a reasonable estimate of the natural gas pipeline cost that is then used

to compare with the proposed cost budget ***.”

¶ 66 Walker testified that, upon conducting the industry-standard cost analysis, he calculated a

benchmark of $262,701 per Dia-inch-Mile. Walker also testified that he concluded that the four

contested projects had a per Dia-inch-Mile cost that was “significantly higher” than the calculated

benchmark and that Nicor’s proposed transmission pipeline investment costs were unreasonable.

¶ 67 In rebuttal, Whiteside testified that Walker’s industry-standard cost analysis was faulty in

numerous respects. Whiteside pointed out that, first, Walker had made “a fundamental mistake in

the selection of the projects that he call[ed] ‘similarly situated projects.’ ” Whiteside explained that

“[a]bout the only thing in common” between the contested projects and those that Walker had

deemed similarly situated were the pipeline diameters. Whiteside also asserted that the contested

projects were shorter than those to which Walker had compared them and that Walker had failed

to account for the “ ‘economies of scale for a large project’ versus the high degree of friction costs

*** for a small project.’ ” Additionally, Whiteside pointed out that the contested projects were

located in urban areas, which encompass geographical and other challenges that substantially

increase costs, unlike the rural projects upon which Walker had relied to establish his benchmark.

Whiteside also pointed out that the costs for two of the contested projects were based on

competitive bidding and that the costs for all four contested projects were based on Chicagoland

pricing rather than on rural pricing.

¶ 68 In his own rebuttal, Walker testified that he “accept[ed Nicor’s] position regarding the

increased costs of construction in an urban environment and added ten percent to the revised costs

in [his] analysis.” Walker testified that he also “included an additional conservative modifier in

[his] benchmarking analysis to account for these incremental costs in the amount of $300,000 per

project.” Walker explained that, by making these additions, he then accounted for “six different

factors” that added costs to his benchmark basis and that his approach incorporated “many” of the

variables that both he and Nicor had earlier identified.

¶ 69 In surrebuttal, Whiteside testified that Walker’s act of adding 10% to his calculated

benchmark was inadequate to address the differences between rural and urban pricing and did not

“cure its deficiencies.” Whiteside explained that this was partly because Walker had made an

unreasonable and inaccurate assumption that the 10% addition would fully account for the cost

differentials between urban and rural projects. Whiteside further explained that urban projects

could cost two to five times more than rural projects of the same length.

¶ 70 c. The Commission’s Findings

¶ 71 In its Order, the Commission detailed the evidence presented by both Nicor and the

Attorney General and found that Nicor had not met its burden of establishing that the transmission

investment costs for the contested projects were reasonable and prudent. The Commission stated

that “[s]imply presenting actual incurred or budgeted costs [was] not evidence of prudence and

[could] not absolve [Nicor] of its statutory obligation to demonstrate prudence and used-andusefulness.” The Commission pointed to the fact, for example, that Nicor had alleged that certain

work could cost more for smaller projects, but then did not identify the specific costs for such work

in relation to its own projects. The Commission also pointed out that, although Nicor had further

alleged that some of the costs for the contested projects were “budgeted or bid,” the company made

no showing that it selected the lowest bids. Additionally, the Commission found that Nicor had

inadequately shown that the 10% increase that Walker added to his calculated benchmark

insufficiently accounted for Nicor’s work in urban areas, especially considering that Nicor’s

service area also included cities, towns, and suburban areas in addition to urban areas. The

Commission consequently adopted the Attorney General’s recommendation to disallow $28.4

million of Nicor’s proposed transmission pipeline investment costs.

¶ 72 iii. Long-Term Gas Infrastructure Plan

¶ 73 The Public Interest Organizations recommended that the Commission require Nicor to file

a long-term gas infrastructure plan (infrastructure plan) every two years. Cebulko testified that

“comprehensive, public planning [could] discipline Nicor’s spending, help[***] the Commission

assess risk to customers and the utility ***, manage the pace of the [c]ompany’s investments ***,

and limit customer bill impacts ***.” Cebulko stated that he assumed that Illinois gas utilities

engaged in planning, but that no utility plans longer than a year were made available to the public

or Commission or contained sufficient detail. Cebulko explained that, consequently, it was difficult

for one to determine whether the utility was choosing the “least-cost, least-risk” solution to address

customer needs and whether the utility’s assumptions regarding the future were reasonable.

Cebulko believed that public planning could help mitigate this “inherent information asymmetry”

between utilities and the Commission and public and, in turn, help the Commission ensure that

utilities’ decisions resulted in safe, affordable, and reliable service to their customers.

¶ 74 Cebulko further recommended that Nicor identify in each of its infrastructure plans “the

lowest societal cost gas distribution system investments necessary to meet customer demand and

comply with public policy objectives.” He also recommended that Nicor include information such

as its proposed system expenditures and investments, a demonstration that the infrastructure plan

would minimize rate impacts on customers, a showing that the plan would comply with all

applicable rules and requirements, and mapping that shows area of risk and the locations of planned

projects.

¶ 75 In its order, the Commission agreed with Cebulko that Nicor likely engaged in planning

and that the fact that the company did not share its plans with the public created an information

asymmetry between the company and the Commission. The Commission expressed that Nicor’s

lack of public planning made it difficult for the Commission, as well as the company’s customers

and investors, to determine whether Nicor was prioritizing investments that were likely to be used

and useful. The Commission further expressed that, “to aid in [its] informed review of this and

future rate increases,” it would adopt some of the reporting recommendations made during the

case. The Commission ultimately ordered Nicor to file an infrastructure plan every two years,

beginning on July 1, 2025.

¶ 76 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 77 A. Standards of Review

¶ 78 Section 9-101 of the Act states that “[a]ll rates or other charges made, demanded or received

*** shall be just and reasonable.” 220 ILCS 5/9-101 (West 2022). Relatedly, section 9-201(c) of

the Act states that, “[i]f the Commission enters upon a hearing concerning the propriety of any

proposed rate or other charge, *** [then] the Commission shall establish the rates or other charges

*** which it shall find to be just and reasonable.” Id. § 9-201(c).

¶ 79 “The Commission is not merely an arbitrator between the utility and parties opposing a rate

change[;] it is an investigator and regulator of utilities[,] responsible for the setting of just rates for

all affected by the rates.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Citizens Utility Board v. Illinois

Commerce Comm’n, 2018 IL App (1st) 170527, ¶ 25. Thus, when setting rates, the Commission

must balance the interests of the utility and the utility’s investors and customers. See Business &

Professional People, 146 Ill. 2d at 208 (“The Commission is charged by the legislature with setting

rates which are ‘just and reasonable’ not only to the ratepayers but to the utility and its

stockholders.” (Emphasis in original.)). Specifically, this court has articulated the following:

“The Commission has the responsibility of balancing the right of the utility’s investors to

a fair rate of return against the right of the public that it pay no more than the reasonable

value of the utility’s services. While the rates allowed can never be so low as to be

confiscatory, within this outer boundary, if the rightful expectations of the investor are not

compatible with those of the consuming public, it is the latter which must prevail.” Camelot

Utilities, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 51 Ill. App. 3d 5, 10 (1977).

¶ 80 The utility bears the burden of proving that its proposed rates are just and reasonable. 220

ILCS 5/9-201(c) (West 2022). To prove this, “the utility must show that its operating costs are

reasonable, its rate base is the reasonable value of its property used for serving the public, and its

rate of return on capital is the reasonable cost of the capital needed to provide the services.”

Citizens Utility Board, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 746.

¶ 81 The Commission “must allow the utility to recover costs prudently and reasonably

incurred.” Citizens Utility Board, 166 Ill. 2d at 121 (citing 220 ILCS 5/1-102(a)(iv) (West 1992)).

“ ‘Prudence is that standard of care which a reasonable person would be expected to exercise under

the same circumstances encountered by utility management at the time decisions had to be made.’ ”

Illinois Power Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 339 Ill. App. 3d 425, 428 (2003) (quoting Illinois

Power Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 245 Ill. App. 3d 367, 371 (1993)). “[T]he prudence

standard recognizes that reasonable persons can have honest differences of opinion without one or

the other necessarily being ‘imprudent.’ ” Id. at 435. “[T]he Commission should disallow recovery

of any cost of capital in excess of that reasonably necessary for the provision of services.” Citizens

Utility Board, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 746.

¶ 82 Judicial review of final orders issued by the Commission “involves the exercise of special

statutory jurisdiction and is constrained by the provisions of the [Act].” Commonwealth Edison

Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2019 IL App (2d) 180504, ¶ 51. Section 10-201(d) of the Act

states that the “rules, regulations, orders or decisions of the Commission shall be held to be

prima facie reasonable” and that the burden of proof upon all issues raised by an appeal from an

order issued by the Commission is upon the party appealing from that order. 220 ILCS 5/10-201(d)

(West 2022). A reviewing court is required to give substantial deference to the orders of the

Commission because of the Commission’s expertise and experience in the area of setting rates.

Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 398 Ill. App. 3d 510, 514 (2009). Thus,

a Commission regulation may be set aside “only if it is clearly arbitrary, capricious, or

unreasonable.” Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 268 Ill. App.

3d 471, 476-77 (1994).

¶ 83 When reviewing a Commission order, courts are limited to determining the following four

issues: “(1) whether the Commission acted within the scope of its authority, (2) whether the

Commission made adequate findings in support of its decision, (3) whether the Commission’s

decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record, and (4) whether constitutional rights

have been violated.” Id. at 476. “Substantial evidence” is “evidence that a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion” and is “more than a scintilla of evidence but *** less

than a preponderance of the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Save Our Illinois Land

v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2022 IL App (4th) 210008, ¶ 37. If reasonable minds could differ

as to where the weight of the evidence lies, then a reviewing court should defer to the

Commission’s finding of fact. Id. “The substantial-evidence standard is the same as the manifestweight standard.” Id.

¶ 84 “The findings and conclusions of the Commission on questions of fact shall be held

prima facie to be true and as found by the Commission,” except when a finding or conclusion is

not supported by substantial evidence or, otherwise stated, is against the manifest weight of the

evidence. 220 ILCS 5/10-201(d) (West 2022); see People ex rel. Raoul v. Illinois Commerce

Comm’n, 2025 IL App (4th) 230491, ¶ 54. “[A] finding is against the manifest weight of the

evidence if all reasonable persons would agree that the finding is erroneous and that the opposite

conclusion is evident.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Raoul, 2025 IL App (4th) 230491, ¶ 54.

¶ 85 Separately, we decide questions of law, such as the interpretation of statute or a regulation

of the Commission, de novo. Save Our Illinois Land, 2022 IL App (4th) 210008, ¶ 42. “While we

are not bound by the Commission’s conclusion on questions of law, we will give substantial weight

and deference to an interpretation of an ambiguous statute by the agency charged with the

administration and enforcement of the statute.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People ex rel.

Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2011 IL App (1st) 101776, ¶ 6. The reason for this

deference is that “courts appreciate that agencies can make informed judgments upon the issues,

based upon their experience and expertise[,] and *** agencies must have wide latitude to adopt

regulations reasonably necessary to effectuate their statutory functions.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id.

¶ 86 Additionally, mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed for clear error. Id. ¶ 8. A mixed

question of law and fact is one that asks the legal effect of a given set of facts or, otherwise stated,

“is one in which the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and

the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or whether the rule of law as applied to

the established facts is or is not violated.” Id. An agency decision is clearly erroneous when “the

reviewing court, on the entire record, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 9.

¶ 87 B. Capital Structure

¶ 88 First, Nicor argues that the Commission erred in numerous ways in rejecting its proposed

capital structure, which Nicor asserted before the Commission reflected its actual capital structure.

Nicor argues that, to start, the Commission applied the incorrect legal standard in deciding whether

to adopt Nicor’s proposed capital structure, in that the Commission noted in its Order the qualities

of an “optimal” capital structure and that Nicor’s proposed capital structure contained more

common equity than “necessary.” According to Nicor, by requiring that it have an “optimal” capital

structure and no more common equity than “necessary,” the Commission deviated from the proper

legal standard, which compelled Nicor’s proposed capital structure only to have been reasonable.

¶ 89 Section 16-108.5(c) of the Act mandates that the rates set by the Commission “[r]eflect the

utility’s actual year-end capital structure for the applicable calendar year, *** subject to a

determination of prudence and reasonableness consistent with Commission practice and law.” 220

ILCS 5/16-108.5(c) (West 2022). “[T]he Commission shall not include any *** incremental risk

*** [or] increased cost of capital *** which is the direct or indirect result of the public utility’s

affiliation with unregulated or nonutility companies.” Id. § 9-230. Additionally, “the Commission

should disallow recovery of any cost of capital in excess of that reasonably necessary for the

provision of services.” Citizens Utility Board, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 746. “If a utility has included

excessive equity in its capital structure, it has inflated the rate of return and its capital cost.” Id.

¶ 90 Here, the Commission’s statement in its Order that Nicor’s proposed capital structure

contained more common equity than “necessary” corresponds with the rule noted in case law that

a utility cannot recover costs beyond those that were “reasonably necessary.” See id. Additionally,

although the Commission referred to an “optimal” capital structure in its Order, as Nicor itself

concedes, the Commission nevertheless correctly articulated that “a utility’s actual capital structure

is adopted unless it is found to be unreasonable, imprudent, or unfairly burdensome.” See 220

ILCS 5/16-108.5(c) (West 2022). Further, in deciding whether to adopt Nicor’s proposed capital

structure, the Commission expressly considered whether the utility’s proposed common equity

ratio was high due to its association with unregulated entities, which accords with section 9-230

of the Act. See id. § 9-230. Thus, we find that the Commission applied the correct legal standard

in assessing Nicor’s proposed capital structure.

¶ 91 Next, Nicor argues that the Commission incorrectly ruled that its proposed capital structure

was unreasonable and that the Commission’s reasons for rejecting its proposed capital structure

had “no basis in the record.” Specifically, Nicor argues that the Commission’s findings that its

proposed equity ratio was high because of its association with unregulated entities and that Nicor

could maintain its current credit rating with a common equity ratio of 50% were both unsupported

by evidence.

¶ 92 Related to the Commission’s finding regarding Nicor’s affiliation with unregulated entities,

MacLeod testified in support of Nicor’s position that the fact that the company had a higher credit

rating than its parent company, Southern, was not evidence that Nicor’s affiliation with unregulated

entities increased Nicor’s cost of capital or caused Nicor to have a higher common equity ratio.

He also testified that the Commission had previously taken measures to prevent Nicor’s affiliation

with Southern from impacting Nicor’s credit quality, that Nicor had a common equity ratio of more

than 54.520% “long before it was affiliated with Southern,” and that Nicor had not sent dividends

to Southern since 2017, which indicated that Nicor was not maintaining a higher common equity

ratio than needed to service Southern.

¶ 93 However, counter to Nicor’s position, Kight-Garlisch explained that “[c]orporations have

an economic incentive to maintain relatively low equity ratios *** at the [parent] company level

while maintaining relatively high equity ratios at the utility operating company level” and that this

arrangement was common between parent companies and their subsidiaries and enabled the parent

companies to borrow at lower rates and then earn high equity returns through the subsidiaries.

Kight-Garlisch further explained that, “[t]o service its parent’s obligations, the utility subsidiary

will often maintain a higher equity ratio than it otherwise would have needed, thereby increasing

the utility’s cost of capital.” Kight-Garlisch testified that, specific to this case, Southern had

“infus[ed] *** over $1 billion in equity” into Nicor since 2016, which then allowed Nicor to

maintain an “excessive” common equity ratio of 54.5% and Southern to maintain its own common

equity ratio of only 37%. We find that, in light of Kight-Garlisch’s testimony and despite Nicor’s

assertions to the contrary, there was evidence of record to support the Commission’s finding that

Nicor’s proposed common equity ratio was high because of its affiliation with unregulated entities

such as Southern.

¶ 94 As to the second finding by the Commission that Nicor challenges, Kight-Garlisch testified

that Nicor could maintain its current credit rating with a common equity ratio as low as 50%, based

on a return on equity of 9.89%. In its order, the Commission ultimately adopted a common equity

ratio of 50% but authorized a return on equity of only 9.51%. Nicor now asserts that there was

“[n]o evidence” that the company could maintain its current credit rating with a common equity

ratio of 50%, based on a return on equity of 9.51%, rather than 9.89%. Although we acknowledge

that Kight-Garlisch did not directly give an opinion on whether Nicor could maintain its current

credit rating with both a common equity ratio of 50% and a return on equity of 9.51%, her

testimony still constituted at least some evidence of this fact. Moreover, Kight-Garlisch testified

that certain measures that Moody used to assess Nicor’s creditworthiness “should not” have

changed based on the company’s revenue requirement. Thus, we determine that there was also

evidence of record to support the Commission’s finding regarding Nicor’s ability to maintain its

current credit rating.

¶ 95 Nicor further argues that it was improper for the Commission to note that the company’s

proposed common equity ratio was higher than those of other utilities. Nicor asserts that the capital

structures of other utilities were “irrelevant” in this case because “every utility faces different

financial circumstances.”

¶ 96 Section 200.610(b) of the Illinois Administrative Code provides that “the rules of evidence

*** applied in civil cases in the circuit courts of the State of Illinois shall be followed” in contested

cases before the Commission. 83 Ill. Adm. Code 200.610(b) (2000). The Illinois Rules of Evidence

govern proceedings in the courts of Illinois, and Illinois Rule of Evidence 402 states that “[a]ll

relevant evidence is admissible.” Ill. R. Evid. 402 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). “Relevant evidence” is

“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”

Ill. R. Evid. 401 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).

¶ 97 In this case, the Commission does not dispute Nicor’s assertion that every utility faces

circumstances unique to itself. However, regardless of whether all utilities indeed differ from one

another in some ways, there was nothing that precluded the Commission from believing, based on

its experience, that they were all similar enough in other ways to warrant comparing their

respective capital structures. There was also nothing that precluded the Commission from finding,

based on such a belief, that the fact that other utilities had capital structures that contained less

common equity than that proposed by Nicor made it more probable that Nicor’s proposed common

equity ratio was unreasonable. Consequently, we reject Nicor’s argument that evidence of other

utilities’ capital structures was irrelevant in this case and conclude that substantial evidence

supported the Commission’s ultimate determination that Nicor’s proposed capital structure was

unreasonable.

¶ 98 However, as part of its final argument on the issue of its capital structure, Nicor points out

that, in earlier cases, the Commission “had repeatedly approved [the company’s] actual capital

structure with ratios similar to or even greater than the one [the company] proposed [in this case],”

despite there having been “a greater difference between [the company’s] actual capital structure

and the average capital structure for other gas utilities nationwide ***.” (Emphasis in original.)

Nicor further points out that the Commission had “also previously refused to accept an industry

average as an appropriate benchmark for prudence, because each utility is different and faces

different constraints.” Nicor argues that, in rejecting the company’s proposed common equity ratio

on the basis that it was higher than typically approved, the Commission “arbitrarily departed” from

its precedent and, thus, was required to acknowledge and justify the divergence.

¶ 99 Illinois courts have consistently articulated that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply

to Commission decisions. See, e.g., GridLiance Heartland LLC v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n,

2023 IL App (5th) 230073, ¶ 53. Rather, the Commission has the power to deal with each situation

before it, regardless of how it might have dealt with a similar or the same situation in the past.

Citizens Utility Board v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 291 Ill. App. 3d 300, 307 (1997).

Additionally, the Commission may change its policies regarding substantive issues, so long as the

changes are not implemented in an arbitrary and capricious manner. United Cities Gas Co. v.

Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 225 Ill. App. 3d 771, 782 (1992). However, when “the Commission

departs from its ‘usual rules of decision to reach a different, unexplained result in a single case,’

thus depriving a party of equal treatment before the Commission, [its decision will] be entitled to

less deference on review.” Abbott Laboratories, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 289 Ill. App.

3d 705, 715 (1997) (quoting Central Illinois Public Service Co., 268 Ill. App. 3d at 479).

¶ 100 Here, even if it is true that the Commission has previously approved common equity ratios

greater than that proposed by Nicor in this case, Nicor fails to identify a particular rule of decision

from which the Commission supposedly deviated in rejecting the company’s proposed common

equity ratio. See 5 ILCS 100/1-70 (West 2022) (defining the term “rule” in the context of

administrative agencies). Moreover, even if it is also true that the Commission has previously

refused to rely upon an industry average to measure a utility’s prudence, in noting in its Order that

Nicor’s proposed common equity ratio was greater than those typically approved, the Commission

expressly stated that this consideration was “not dispositive.” Thus, we find that the Commission

did not deviate from any of its rules of decisions to such a degree so as to warrant us giving less

deference to its decision in this case. See Citizens Utility Board, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 304 (“[T]he

Commission’s decisions are entitled to less deference when the Commission drastically departs

from past practice.” (Emphasis added.)).

¶ 101 C. Distribution Investment Costs

¶ 102 Second, Nicor argues that the Commission erred by disallowing $55.1 million of the

company’s proposed distribution investment costs. To start, Nicor asserts that, in its order, the

Commission “held” that [the company] should not incur [infrastructure replacement] costs until

replacement was immediately ‘required’ or ‘urgently’ needed.” Nicor also asserts that the

Commission’s ruling on the issue of its distribution investment costs amounted to a “categorical

finding of imprudence” that was based on the fact Nicor had proactively addressed known safety

risks in its distribution infrastructure prior to any harm being imminent.

¶ 103 A review of the Order in this case shows that the Commission never once stated that Nicor

was required to wait until harm was imminent or the replacement of distribution infrastructure was

“immediately required” or “urgently needed” in order to recover the costs of then performing the

replacement. Rather, the Commission expressly stated that it was tasked with considering multiple

factors in deciding whether to approve Nicor’s proposed distribution investment costs. According

to the Commission, these factors included the “types of pipes to be replaced, to what degree safety

and reliability [were] affected, and importantly, at what cost.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 104 Additionally, Nicor is correct that the Commission noted that the company had failed to

establish that the replacements that it sought to complete were “required” and as “urgent[***]” as

those of LPP materials. However, the Commission noted this within its broader analysis of whether

Nicor had presented sufficient evidence as to each of the relevant considerations. Indeed, the

Commission did not disallow a portion of Nicor’s proposed distribution investment costs on the

sole basis that the company had failed to prove that the replacements were “immediately required”

or “urgently needed.” To the contrary, it denied the proposed costs on the additional basis that the

Attorney General had presented more compelling evidence as to the multiple questions that the

Commission had to consider. Thus, we reject Nicor’s argument that the Commission categorically

found that the company’s infrastructure replacement costs were imprudent solely because the

company had proactively addressed known safety risks in its gas distribution system.

¶ 105 Nicor also argues that its distribution investment costs were prudently incurred. We find

the decision in Ameren Illinois Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2025 IL App (5th) 240014, to

be instructive in addressing Nicor’s argument.

¶ 106 In Ameren, Ameren Illinois Company (AIC), a natural gas utility, filed proposed tariff

sheets in which it sought to recover $186 million in distribution investment costs, based on a future

test year. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3, 6. AIC specified that it needed to invest in its infrastructure to replace the

mechanically coupled steel mains and services that it contained. Id. ¶ 6. The company presented

evidence that its mechanically coupled steel mains and services were “a ‘top threat to the integrity

of the distribution system,’ ” were “ ‘prone to leakage,’ ” and were “ ‘two of the [c]ompany’s top

leak risks.’ ” Id. The company also presented evidence that it had between 600 and 800 miles of

mains with mechanically coupled steel out of its 8,900 miles of steel mains. Id.

¶ 107 The Attorney General recommended that the Commission disallow $45.5 million of AIC’s

proposed distribution investment costs. Id. ¶ 7. In support of this recommendation, the Attorney

General argued that AIC’s infrastructure did not include LPP materials and that the mechanically

coupled steel in its infrastructure was not as likely as LPP materials to leak. Id. The Attorney

General further argued that AIC had already completed “a large part of” the remediations to its gas

distribution system; that, more specifically, AIC had already remediated 533 miles of mechanically

coupled steel pipes out of its estimated 1,233 miles of such pipes; and that AIC was “well ahead”

of the remediation deadlines set by the applicable regulations. Id. Additionally, the Attorney

General argued that AIC had failed to identify, “with specificity,” which of its projects underlay

the proposed increase in costs related to mains and services, as well as to quantify the alleged risk

that AIC sought to mitigate by performing the proposed replacements. Id. The Attorney General

argued that, thus, AIC’s remediation process should be slowed. Id.

¶ 108 In its decision, the Commission in Ameren credited the testimony of the Attorney General’s

experts, which it found to be persuasive and reasonable. Id. ¶ 13. Ultimately, the Commission

adopted the Attorney General’s recommendation to disallow $45.5 million, or 33%, of AIC’s

proposed distribution investment costs. Id.

¶ 109 On appeal, AIC argued that the Commission had erroneously disallowed portions of its

proposed distribution investment costs. Id. ¶ 64. In addressing this argument, the court noted that

the record revealed that AIC had not compared the level of risk for mechanically coupled steel to

that of LPP materials, that AIC had failed to specifically define the subset of mechanically coupled

steel in its infrastructure that was at issue, and that there was no evidence that AIC had graded the

risks in its infrastructure or identified which specific parts of its infrastructure were most prone to

leaking or had the highest-risk leaks. Id. ¶ 68. The court also noted that AIC had answered the

Attorney General’s questions regarding the company’s distribution investment costs by stating

merely that bases for the costs were “safety and reliability.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

Describing this answer as “seriously lacking in detail,” the court upheld the Commission’s

disallowance of portions of AIC’s proposed distribution investment costs. Id. ¶¶ 68, 71.

¶ 110 We find the facts in Ameren to be analogous to those in this case. To start, like AIC, who

had already remediated 533 out of the 1,233 miles of its mechanically coupled steel pipes by the

time of its proposal, Walker testified that Nicor had already reduced the LPP mains and services

in its gas distribution system by 83% and 88.5%, respectively, by the time of its own proposal.

Also like AIC, who the Commission found had not compared the risk level for mechanically

coupled steel to that of LPP materials, the Commission in this case similarly found that Nicor had

not shown that the qualifying vintage material that it sought to replace posed similar risks as LLP

materials. Additionally, AIC and Nicor both attempted to justify their distribution investment costs

by stating that they were incurred to ensure the safety and reliability of their gas distribution

systems, but the Commission similarly found in both cases that the companies’ justifications lacked

sufficient detail. Because of these similarities, we follow the court in Ameren by analogously

finding that the Commission’s determination in this case to disallow $55.1 million of Nicor’s

proposed distribution costs was proper, despite the evidence presented by the company.

¶ 111 D. MAOP Investment Costs

¶ 112 Third, Nicor argues that the Commission erred by disallowing $43.3 million of its MAOP

reconfirmation investment costs. Nicor also asserts that the Commission’s determination was

“fatally flawed in several respects” where the Commission stated that, because “Nicor *** [was]

well ahead of its MAOP reconfirmation and [had] not sufficiently demonstrated the reasonableness

of the 2024 MAOP budget, including identifying specific projects and scope of work, the

Commission believe[d] a pause was necessary until the Company [had] properly planned and

justified its MAOP costs.”

¶ 113 Returning to the Ameren decision, the Commission there disallowed 75% of AIC’s

proposed MAOP investment costs and required AIC to submit a Compliance Plan to “assist the

Commission in assessing whether AIC was fairly considering its options when pursuing MAOP

reconfirmation work.” Id. ¶ 22. In arriving at its decision, the Commission found that the record

was insufficient to approve AIC’s proposed MAOP investment costs, in light of “AIC’s lack of

detail on a per-project basis and other reasonable potential (and less costly) alternatives,” as well

as the fact that “AIC did not ‘enable the Commission, Staff, or stakeholders to recreate, verify, or

assess [AIC’s] analysis.’ ” Id. ¶ 21.

¶ 114 The Commission in Ameren also found that it had been shown that AIC would accomplish

50% compliance with the MAOP Rule in 2023 and full compliance by 2028, “nearly seven years

before the 2035 compliance deadline.” Id. ¶ 22. The Commission further found that the evidence

supported its concerns “ ‘with the cost and pace of the Company’s MAOP reconfirmation

efforts.’ ” Id.

¶ 115 On appeal, the court in Ameren considered whether the Commission’s disallowance of 75%

of AIC’s proposed MAOP investment costs was proper. Id. ¶¶ 73-87. The court began by noting

that, in documentation that it had submitted to the Commission, AIC had outlined each of its

MAOP projects and explained the company’s reasons for using replacement to remediate the

pipeline segments at issue. Id. ¶ 85. The court stated that, thus, “[t]he Commission decision

ignore[d] the evidence where AIC explained why it chose each MAOP reconfirmation method,”

and further noted that AIC had explained “that the appropriate method of reconfirmation depended

on numerous factors.” Id.

¶ 116 The court in Ameren also noted that AIC had provided a timeline for its planned MAOP

reconfirmation showing that reconfirmation would occur over the next eight years as follows:

“2023-20.3 miles, 2024-11.2 miles, 2025-11.4 miles, 2026-6.5 miles, 2027-14.2 miles, 2028-8.9

miles, and 2030-0.9 miles.” Id. ¶ 86. The court also found “[e]qually concerning” the fact that the

Commission had “simply eliminated” all of AIC’s MAOP projects, despite the fact that some of

the projects included “MAOP reconfirmation work that was not based on main replacement as well

as projects that did not involve MAOP reconfirmation.” Id. ¶ 87. The court found that the

Commission’s decision to disallow 75% of AIC’s proposed MAOP investment costs was not

supported by substantial evidence. Id. However, the court did express, as a final note, that it found

“it disingenuous for the Commission to penalize AIC for allegedly failing to *** meet a standard

not previously required—i.e., a MAOP and Records Compliance Plan—prior to the issuance of

the Commission decision, especially when it provided the statutorily required information.” Id.

¶ 117 As was similarly so in Ameren, the Commission in this case expressed a concern that Nicor

had been frontloading its MAOP work and ordered Nicor to file a compliance plan. Nicor also

presented evidence that it used “a comprehensive process to analyze pipeline segments requiring

reconfirmation to determine appropriate actions to achieve reconfirmation” and considered factors

such as the company’s ability to reduce pressure, the company’s ability to take the pipeline segment

out of service, impact to customers, and financial impact.

¶ 118 However, unlike AIC in Ameren, which submitted documentation to the Commission that

outlined each of its MAOP projects and explained the company’s reasons for using replacement to

mediate the pipeline segments at issue, the Commission in this case found that Nicor had not

identified its specific MAOP projects or the scope of the work involved in each project, which

Nicor does not now dispute. Also unlike AIC, which provided a timeline for its planned MAOP

reconfirmation, in this case, Walker testified that Nicor had outright stated that it did not have a

time-based plan for replacement and refused to state the year in which it would achieve 100%

compliance with the MAOP Rule. Without this depth of information having been provided, we are

unable to determine, as the court analogously did in Ameren, whether the Commission in this case

improperly disallowed a sweeping 75% of Nicor’s proposed MAOP investment costs despite some

of the costs arising outside of any pipeline replacement or MAOP reconfirmation work. Thus, we

uphold the Commission’s determination in this case to disallow $43.3 million of Nicor’s proposed

MAOP investment costs.

¶ 119 Last on this issue, Nicor argues that the Commission’s decision regarding the company’s

proposed MAOP investment costs in this case constituted a departure from its decisions in “at least

two prior rate cases.” Nicor points out that, in these prior rate cases, the Commission approved

Nicor’s proposed MAOP investment costs that were “presented with the same degree of

specificity” as in this case, despite the Attorney General having made “the same” arguments. Nicor

asserts that, in deviating from its decisions in these prior cases, the Commission was required to

acknowledge its “prior practice” and justify its deviation therefrom.

¶ 120 Otherwise stated, Nicor’s present argument seems to be that the Commission should have

approved the company’s proposed MAOP investment costs in this case because it had approved

such costs under similar circumstances in past cases. However, as we earlier articulated, orders by

the Commission do not have the effect of res judicata, and the Commission has the authority to

address each matter before it freely, even if a matter involves issues identical to those previous.

Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2016 IL 118129, ¶ 24. Thus, we find

Nicor’s argument to be meritless.

¶ 121 E. Transmission Pipeline Investment Costs

¶ 122 Fourth, Nicor argues that the Commission erred by disallowing $28.43 million in proposed

transmission pipeline investment costs. Specifically, Nicor argues that the Commission’s finding

that the company did not demonstrate that such costs were reasonable and prudent with respect to

the four contested projects was “manifestly incorrect” because, in so finding, the Commission

“ignored” the evidence that Nicor had presented in support of its proposal.

¶ 123 In its Order, the Commission detailed at great length the evidence that Nicor had presented

to support its proposed transmission pipeline investment costs. The Commission noted, for

example, that Nicor had presented evidence that, in conducting his industry-standard cost analysis,

Walker had improperly relied on model projects that had “nothing in common with the

[c]ompany’s projects *** other than the pipeline diameters[***] and presented different economies

of scale and construction challenges.” The Commission further noted Nicor’s additional evidence

that the transmission pipeline investment costs for two of the contested projects were based on

competitive bidding and that the costs for all four contested projects were based on Chicagoland

pricing. Additionally, the Commission acknowledged that Nicor had presented evidence that

Walker’s 10% increase to his calculated benchmark was “neither reasonable or accurate” because

the increase did not fully account for the cost differences between urban and rural projects, with

urban projects tending to be longer and more expensive because of numerous factors. The

Commission detailed Nicor’s evidence to the extent that it negated any suggestion that the

Commission did not consider it. Thus, we reject Nicor’s argument that the Commission “ignored”

its evidence.

¶ 124 However, Nicor further argues that the Commission’s disallowance of $28.43 million of its

proposed transmission pipeline investment costs was erroneous for the additional reason that the

decision was not supported by substantial evidence. In support of the disallowance, Walker

testified that, according to the industry-standard cost analysis that he had conducted, the contested

projects had a per Dia-inch-Mile cost that was “significantly higher” than his calculated benchmark

and that Nicor’s proposed transmission pipeline investment costs were unreasonable. Walker also

explained his methodology in conducting the industry-standard cost analysis and later increased

his calculated benchmark by 10% to account for numerous factors that Nicor identified specific to

projects in urban areas. Although Nicor argued that the 10% increase to Walker’s calculated

benchmark insufficiently accounted for the company’s work in urban areas, the Commission found

that Nicor had not sufficiently shown the ways in which the increase was insufficient.

¶ 125 In determining that Nicor’s evidence was inadequate, the Commission further noted that,

despite the fact that the company alleged that certain work could cost more for smaller projects, it

did not offer evidence of what such work would specifically cost in the context of its own projects.

Additionally, the Commission acknowledged Nicor’s evidence that the some of the costs for the

contested projects were “budgeted or bid,” but commented on the fact that Nicor had provided no

evidence to show that it necessarily selected the lowest bids. Based on such a showing by both

Nicor and the Attorney General, we find that the Commission’s disallowance of $28.43 million of

Nicor’s proposed transmission pipeline investments costs was supported by substantial evidence.

¶ 126 F. Long-Term Gas Infrastructure Plan

¶ 127 Fifth, Nicor argues that the infrastructure plan should be vacated because the Commission

exceeded the scope of its authority under the Act by ordering it. Nicor also argues that the

Commission’s “new rule” imposing an infrastructure plan was invalid because the Commission

did not conduct the required “notice-and-comment” process under the Illinois Administrative

Procedure Act (5 ILCS 100/1-1 et seq. (West 2022)).

¶ 128 “The Commission, because it is a creature of the legislature, derives its power and authority

solely from the statute creating it ***.” City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 79 Ill. 2d

213, 217-18 (1980). Thus, any acts that the Commission performs outside of its statutory authority

are void as being beyond its jurisdiction. Id.; see Business & Professional People for the Public

Interest v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 136 Ill. 2d 192, 243 (1989).

¶ 129 The Commission ordered the infrastructure plan in this case pursuant to sections 4-101, 9-201(c), 9-211, and 8-501 of the Act. The Commission also cited Abbott Laboratories, 289 Ill. App.

3d 705, in support of its order. In assessing whether these sources authorized the Commission to

order the infrastructure plan, we turn once more to the decision in Ameren, which we again find to

be instructive.

¶ 130 In Ameren, the Commission noted, on the issue of an infrastructure plan, that, “while AIC

likely engaged in internal system planning, AIC d[id] not submit a public long-term system plan,

which create[d] an inherent information asymmetry between [AIC] and the Commission.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ameren, 2025 IL App (5th) 240014, ¶ 31. The Commission

explained that “AIC’s lack of transparent planning processes made it challenging for the

Commission, customers, and other stakeholders to determine whether AIC was prioritizing prudent

investments that were likely to be used and useful.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The

Commission also expressed that “AIC’s capital spending (and associated planning, budgeting, and

project section processes) merit[ed] careful consideration in [that] and future rate cases.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id. The Commission then ordered AIC to file an infrastructure plan

every two years, beginning on July 1, 2025, and cited sections 4-101, 9-201(c), 9-211, and 8-501

of the Act and Abbott Laboratories, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 712, to support its order. Ameren, 2025 IL

App (5th) 240014, ¶ 31.

¶ 131 On appeal, the court analyzed whether the Commission had the authority to order AIC to

file an infrastructure plan. Id. ¶¶ 64-71. The court first noted that the Commission’s order regarding

the infrastructure plan was “not applicable to the current case” before the Commission, but rather,

“provide[d] a requirement solely for future cases.” (Emphases added.) Id. ¶ 92. The court then

noted that Public Act 102-662 (eff. Sept. 15, 2021) imposed long-term planning requirements for

electric utilities but not for gas utilities, and explained that, if the legislature had intended for the

Commission to have the power to order infrastructure plans for utilities, then it would have had no

need to mandate long-term planning requirements for electric utilities in Public Act 102-662.

Ameren, 2025 IL App (5th) 240014, ¶¶ 93, 95-96. The court also found “equally relevant” that the

Commission’s rules already outlined the information that utilities were required to provide to

support their capital recovery requests and stated that, if the Commission truly had the power to

order infrastructure plans, then it could have just amended its rules to require the additional desired

long-term planning information. Id. ¶ 97.

¶ 132 Next, the court found that the Commission’s mandate of an infrastructure plan constituted

a “rule” subject to the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act, which, the court explained, set forth

certain “public notice and comment” requirements that agencies must follow in enacting “rules.”

A “rule” was defined as an “agency requirement that prescribe[d] law or policy affecting the private

rights or procedures of people or entities outside [the] agenc[ies].” Id. ¶¶ 98, 101, 103. The court

concluded that the Commission had failed to comply with the notice and comment provisions of

the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act and, consequently, “vacate[d] the Commission’s

requirement to prepare a long-term *** infrastructure plan as void for being outside the

Commission’s authority.” Id. ¶ 103.

¶ 133 The Commission in this case ordered an infrastructure plan that was nearly identical to that

in Ameren, pursuant to identical authority and after making highly similar findings. See Northern

Illinois Gas Co., Ill. Comm. Comm’n No. 23-0066, at 248-49 (Order-Final Nov. 16, 2023). We

find no reason to depart from the court’s analysis and decision in Ameren. Therefore, we similarly

vacate the infrastructure plan in this case on the grounds that the Commission exceeded its

authority by ordering it.

¶ 134 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 135 For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the Commission’s orders adopting the imputed

capital structure proposed by Staff and disallowing $55.1 million of Nicor’s proposed distribution

investment costs, $43.3 million of the company’s MAOP investment costs, and $28.4 million of

the company’s proposed transmission pipeline investment costs. We vacate the Commission’s

order requiring Nicor to file an infrastructure plan.

¶ 136 Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2025 IL App (3d) 240093

Decision Under Review: Petition for review of order of the Illinois Commerce

Commission, No. 23-0066.

Attorneys John E. Rooney, of Benesch Friedland Coplan & Aronoff LLP, for and Clifford W. Berlow and Marjorie R. Kennedy, of Jenner & Appellant: Block LLP, both of Chicago, for petitioner.

Attorneys Brian J. Dodds, Robert W. Funk, and Thomas R. Stanton, for Special Assistant Attorneys General, of Illinois Commerce Appellee: Commission, of Chicago, for respondent.

Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. The Illinois Commerce Commission

Summary · law.co

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Authorities cited

Opinion · public domain