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FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
No. 23-12278
Non-Argument Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL SHANE RAGLAND,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 2:09-cr-14016-KMM-1
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12278
Before JORDAN, LUCK, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:
In 2009, a jury convicted Michael Ragland of eighteen federal crimes associated with a string of armed robberies of Florida
convenience stores. He was sentenced to 196 years in federal
prison. In 2022, Ragland successfully moved the District Court to
vacate one of his eighteen counts in light of new Supreme Court
precedent. He was resentenced, but his new sentence looked a lot
like his old one: 173 years.
Ragland appealed, arguing he should have been resentenced
according to the more lenient provisions of the 2018 First Step Act
(“FSA”). We affirmed the District Court, holding that the FSA was
not intended to apply retroactively to Ragland, who was originally
sentenced before the FSA’s enactment. Only two days after we issued our ruling, the Supreme Court decided Hewitt v. United States,
squarely rejecting our interpretation of the FSA. 145 S. Ct. 2165,
2169 (2025).
Ragland now petitions for rehearing or rehearing en banc,
seeking a ruling that he may be resentenced under the FSA. The
United States agrees that Hewitt binds here, and it does not oppose
rehearing for consistency with that opinion. Ragland also seeks rehearing as to whether the District Court has jurisdiction to consider
new challenges to his other counts. The United States opposes rehearing on these grounds.
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23-12278 Opinion of the Court 3
After careful consideration, we grant Ragland’s petition for
rehearing and amend our opinion filed on June 24, 2025, but only
in part. Specifically, we vacate and replace Part II.B of that opinion
regarding the retroactivity of the FSA. We also affirm and clarify
Part III of that opinion to highlight a potential circuit split. In all
other respects, our opinion filed on June 24, 2025, shall remain in
full force and effect. Ragland’s sentence is vacated and remanded
for the District Court to resentence him according to the FSA.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Crime and Sentence
Between December 2007 and February 2008, Michael
Ragland and his quasi-confederated entourage robbed seven Florida grocery and convenience stores and attempted to rob two others. Proceeds from each hit ranged from a few hundred to a few
thousand dollars and, almost invariably, a pack of Newport cigarettes. On April 30, 2009, a grand jury indicted Ragland on twentytwo counts. Despite initially confessing to police, Ragland pleaded
not guilty to all charges. At trial, jurors convicted him on eighteen
counts: 1
• Count One: Conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a);
• Counts Two, Four, Nine, Eleven, Seventeen,
Nineteen, and Twenty-One: Robbery in violation
1 The jury found Ragland not guilty of Counts Six and Seven. The United
States dismissed Counts Thirteen and Fourteen.
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of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a);
• Counts Eight and Fifteen: Attempted robbery in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a);
• Counts Three, Five, Ten, Twelve, Sixteen, Eighteen, Twenty, and Twenty-Two: Brandishing a
firearm in connection with a crime of violence in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
The District Court sentenced Ragland to 2,352 months (196
years) in federal prison. Ragland’s eight § 924(c) convictions comprised over ninety percent of his sentence. 2 Section 924(c) punishes
one who uses, carries, or possesses a firearm “during and in relation
to any crime of violence.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). It is an independent, substantive offense, but one that requires a predicate violent crime.
At the time of Ragland’s 2010 sentencing, § 924(c) was
equipped with an inelastic “stacking” mechanism. See An Act to
Throttle Criminal Use of Guns, Pub. L. No. 105-386, § 1, 112 Stat.
3469 (1998). For a defendant’s first § 924(c) conviction, a judge was
required to sentence him to at least five, seven, or ten years depending on whether the firearm was carried, brandished, or discharged, respectively. Id. After that, the sentence would ratchet up
quickly. Each subsequent § 942(c) violation demanded a minimum
sentence of twenty-five years—even where the first charge was
brought in the same indictment. Id. All sentences were “stacked,”
2 Specifically, Ragland’s § 924(c) convictions accounted for 2,184 months of his
2,352-month total sentence.
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or served consecutively. Id.
In Ragland’s case, he was given seven years for Count Three
and twenty-five years for each of Counts Five, Ten, Twelve, Sixteen, Eighteen, Twenty, and Twenty-Two. All but one of
Ragland’s § 924(c) counts relied on the predicate crime of robbery
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (“Hobbs Act Robbery”). The outlier, Count Sixteen, relied on the predicate offense of attempted
Hobbs Act Robbery.3
B. Ragland’s § 2255 Challenges
Ragland has launched several habeas petitions challenging
the legality of his § 924(c) convictions. He has argued that neither
Hobbs Act Robbery nor attempted Hobbs Act Robbery constitute
a “crime of violence” under the statute, and hence, cannot serve as
a predicate offense. So, what is a “crime of violence?” Section 924(c)
offers a starting point:
(3) For purposes of this subsection the term “crime of
violence” means an offense that is a felony and—
(A) has as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the
person or property of another, or
(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk
that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of
3 Specifically, Count Sixteen relied on Count Fifteen, whereby Ragland attempted to rob a Coastal Gas convenience store but retreated because the
scene was “too hot.”
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committing the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3).
But the Code is not the whole story. In 2015, the Supreme
Court probed the definition of “violent felony” under the Armed
Career Criminal Act (the “ACCA”). Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S.
591, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). The ACCA’s definition mirrored
§ 924(c)(3): each had an identical first prong and a second, “residuary” prong to catch crimes that pose a substantial risk of injury to
another. Id. at 594. In Johnson, the Court held that the ACCA’s residuary prong violated the Constitution’s Due Process Clause because it was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 594, 606.
In 2016, Ragland filed his first motion to vacate his sentence
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 4 He argued that Johnson voided § 924(c)’s
residuary clause and, hence, invalidated each of his convictions
thereunder. The District Court disagreed. It found that Johnson did
not necessarily invalidate § 924(c)’s residuary clause, and even if it
did, Hobbs Act Robbery would still constitute a crime of violence
under clause (3)(A).
Then the landscape changed again. In 2019, the Supreme
Court explicitly held that § 924(c)’s residuary clause was unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445, 470, 139 S. Ct.
2319, 2336 (2019). And a few years later, the Court held that
4 Section 2255 allows a prisoner to move a court to vacate, set aside, or correct
a sentence that was, inter alia, “imposed in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
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attempted Hobbs Act Robbery is not a crime of violence under
§ 924(c)’s elements prong because it does not require the government to prove the use, attempted use or threatened use of force.
United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 824, 860, 142 S. Ct. 2015, 2025
(2022).
Armed with new caselaw, Ragland petitioned this Court for
permission to file a successive § 2255 petition, as is required by law.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (requiring “a second or successive motion” to
be certified “by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals”). He
specifically sought permission to challenge Count Sixteen in light
of Davis and Taylor. Ragland singled out Count Sixteen because it
was the only § 924(c) count predicated on attempted Hobbs Act
Robbery. We held that Ragland “made a prima facie showing that
he [was] entitled to relief under Davis as to his § 924(c) conviction
on Count 16.” Order, No. 22-13236-J (11th Cir., Oct. 12, 2022). Accordingly, we granted Ragland leave to file a new claim. Id.
Ragland’s second § 2255 claim was successful; the District
Court dismissed his conviction under Count Sixteen and vacated
his sentence. But just prior to resentencing, Ragland sought to
amend his second § 2255 motion to include every other § 924(c)
count. The District Court rejected his motion, holding that it
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider such claims. It reasoned that its jurisdiction emanated from the relief our Court
granted, which only covered Count Sixteen. Ragland also moved
to hold his resentencing in abeyance pending our opinion in a case
asking whether completed Hobbs Act Robbery is a “crime of
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violence” post-Taylor.5 The District Court rejected this motion as
well. 6
C. Resentencing and Appeal
Consistent with our decision in United States v. Brown, the
District Court afforded Ragland a full resentencing hearing, where
he was able to testify. See 879 F.3d 1231, 1239–40 (11th Cir. 2018).
Ragland spoke about his positive prison record and rehabilitation
efforts, and he made numerous objections to his presentence investigation report. Ragland also argued that he should be resentenced
under the FSA, which eliminated the “stacked” twenty-five-year
mandatory minimum sentence for subsequent § 924(c) charges. 7
See First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403(a), 132 Stat. 5194,
5221-22 (2018). The United States acknowledged that if the FSA did
apply, Ragland’s guideline sentence would be between 776 and 823
5 That case, United States v. Louis, 146 F.4th 1328 (11th Cir. 2025), never reached
the Hobbs Act Robbery question because the relevant appeal was voluntarily
dismissed. However, in United States v. Wiley, our Court held that completed
Hobbs Act Robbery is a “crime of violence,” thereby upholding our Court’s
pre-Taylor precedent. 86 F.4th 1355, 1363 (11th Cir. 2023).
6 In rejecting Ragland’s motion to hold resentencing in abeyance, it informed
Ragland that he would be free to “raise the same arguments as Louis during
his sentencing hearing.” As we discuss infra, this was improper, as the District
Court lacked jurisdiction to hear such arguments.
7 Twenty-five-year mandatory minimum sentences still exist, but only where
subsequent charges are brought after a prior § 924(c) conviction has become
final. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C). Because Ragland’s convictions were brought
concurrently, this would not apply.
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months. 8 The District Court denied Ragland’s objection and resentenced him without regard to the FSA. The District Court entered
a revised judgment of 2,072 months imprisonment.
Ragland appealed. He asserted a litany of errors: (1) he was
not afforded a de novo resentencing; (2) the District Court should
have applied the FSA; (3) the District Court failed to consider postsentencing rehabilitation; (4) the District Court failed to consider
the length of Ragland’s mandatory minimum sentences in fashioning his total appropriate sentence; (5) his multiple robbery offenses
should have counted as one continuing offense for § 924(c) purposes; (6) his criminal history was inappropriately categorized; (7)
the District Court should have allowed Ragland to amend his motion so as to challenge his other § 924(c) convictions; and (8) his
sentence was substantively unreasonable.
On June 24, 2025, we issued an opinion rejecting each of
Ragland’s challenges and affirming the District Court in full. United
States v. Ragland, No. 23-12278, 2025 WL 1742251, at *2 (11th Cir.
June 24, 2025). Ragland now petitions for panel rehearing or rehearing en banc.
II. DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40 provides that a petition for panel rehearing must “state with particularity each point
of law or fact that the petitioner believes the court has overlooked
8 Of course, were Ragland able to challenge his other § 924(c) convictions, his
Guideline sentence would be dramatically lower.
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or misapprehended[.]” Fed. R. App. P. 40(b)(1)(A). “Panel rehearing is the ordinary means of reconsidering a panel decision; rehearing en banc is not favored.” Fed. R. App. P. 40(a). Ragland filed a
timely petition for rehearing on two grounds.
First, he asserts that our ruling on the FSA’s inapplicability
conflicts with Hewitt v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2165 (2025). Second,
he argues that the District Court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear his other § 924(c) challenges and that our contrary
holding conflicts with the Fourth and Seventh Circuit’s approach.
We begin with the FSA.
A. Resentencing Under FSA
Ragland argues that both the District Court and our panel
opinion misinterpreted the FSA. This Court reviews de novo questions of statutory interpretation. Regueiro v. American Airlines, Inc.,
147 F.4th 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2025).
Prior to 2018, when a defendant was convicted of multiple
§ 924(c) charges, each subsequent conviction carried a minimum
twenty-five-year stacked sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i)
(2010). The FSA changed that. Specifically, it eliminated the
twenty-five-year minimum unless the defendant had a prior
§ 924(c) conviction that had “become final.” First Step Act, Pub. L.
No. 115-391, § 403(a), 132 Stat. 5194, 5221-22 (2018). Crimes committed before the enactment of the FSA were encompassed by the
change, but only to the extent that “a sentence for the offense has
not been imposed as of the date of enactment.” Id. § 403(b).
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The question soon arose whether a sentence which was imposed pre-FSA but vacated post-FSA is a sentence that “has
been . . . imposed as of the date of [the FSA’s] enactment.” See id.
Our Circuit reached the issue in United States v. Hernandez, 107
F.4th 965 (11th Cir. 2024). We reasoned that the present-perfect
tense used in the phrase “has been” could reasonably refer to either
(1) a sentence that is “now completed” or (2) a sentence that “continues up to the present.” Id. at 969 (citing The Chicago Manual of
Style § 5.132 (17th ed. 2017)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Looking at the context of the clause and the Act, we decided the
first interpretation was correct.9 Id. We held that where a sentence
was imposed before the FSA, it “has been imposed” notwithstanding post-FSA vacatur. Id. at 973.
Ragland’s original sentence took place in 2010, eight years
prior to the FSA. When he appealed the District Court’s new sentence on the grounds that it failed to apply the FSA, Hernandez was
binding on this Court, and we affirmed. Ragland, 2025 WL 1742251,
at *11 (11th Cir.). Ragland argues that the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Hewitt, which was decided two days after his appeal, overrules
Hernandez.
9 Presciently, we acknowledged that the strongest counterargument comes
from the legal function of vacatur, which is sometimes said to “wipe the slate
clean” and makes a sentence “void from the start.” Hernandez, 107 F.4th at 971.
Ultimately, this reasoning swayed the Supreme Court. See Hewitt, 145 S. Ct. at
2174.
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Petitioners in Hewitt were convicted of multiple counts of
bank robbery and conspiracy to commit bank robbery, along with
corresponding § 924(c) offenses. 145 S. Ct. at 2170. They successfully challenged some of their convictions under § 2255 and, at resentencing, sought retroactive application of the FSA. Id. The District Court and Fifth Circuit held that the FSA was inapplicable. Id.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “offenders who appear
for sentencing after the First Step Act’s enactment date—including
those whose previous § 924(c) sentences have been vacated and
who thus need to be resentenced—are subject to the Act’s revised
penalties.” Id. at 2179.
Both Ragland and the United States believe Hewitt abrogates
Hernandez and binds our Court to remand for resentencing consistent with the FSA. We agree, but we wish to clarify a few points.
The District Court in Hewitt received a § 2255 motion from
each petitioner to set aside one § 924(c) conviction predicated on
conspiracy to commit bank robbery. 10 United States v. Duffey, 92
F.4th 304, 308 (5th Cir. 2024). It granted relief in two steps. Id. First,
it vacated each petitioner’s conspiracy-predicated § 924(c) conviction and applicable sentence. Id. Second, it vacated the petitioners’
sentences for all other convictions and ordered resentencing. Id.
Therefore, the Supreme Court’s holding (i.e., that sentences vacated post-FSA are subject to the FSA) necessarily applied to all of
10 In addition to rejecting attempted crimes as “crimes of violence” under
§ 924(c), the Supreme Court’s opinion in Davis similarly rejected conspiracypredicated crimes. 139 S. Ct. at 2336.
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petitioners’ convictions. See Hewitt, 145 S. Ct. at 2174. The Court
did not have to consider the FSA’s applicability where a sentence
was only partially vacated.
Of course, complete vacatur and resentencing is a common
form of relief, even where a § 2255 motion only targets a subset of
the movant’s total convictions. Our Circuit has recognized that a
“criminal sentence is a package of sanctions that the district court
utilizes to effectuate its sentencing intent consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. Stinson, 97 F.3d 466, 469 (11th
Cir. 1996). And when the package becomes unbundled, the district
court has the authority to “recalculate and reconsider” the defendant’s entire sentence, so it may “comport with the district court’s
original intentions at sentencing.” United States v. Fowler, 749 F.3d
1010, 1017 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Watkins, 147 F.3d
1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
However, we have never held that complete vacatur is always mandatory. We leave open whether that Hewitt necessarily
entitles a successful § 2255 movant to full application of the FSA. In
Hewitt’s dissent, Justice Alito highlighted that district courts need
not vacate an entire sentence and “may instead choose to vacate
only those parts of the sentence related to an intervening change in
law.” 145 S. Ct. at 2189–90 (Alito, J., dissenting). He described the
total vacatur afforded to petitioners in that case as a “stroke of good
fortune that opened the door” to the FSA. Id.
Here, the District Court granted Ragland’s § 2255 motion
“to the extent that [it] dismisse[d] the conviction and sentence
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imposed under Count Sixteen.” It did not expressly vacate
Ragland’s other sentences. But the Court ultimately did conduct a
de novo resentencing on all counts. At Ragland’s hearing, the Government explained to the Court:
[P]ursuant to the Sentencing Package Doctrine, now
that Count 16 has been vacated, this Court has the
authority to consider the original sentences imposed
for all of the other counts in determining what sentence to ultimately impose.
Candidly, your Honor, that doctrine generally helps
the Government, because if the Court wanted to impose 2,352 months once again, you could do so by increasing the sentences for the remaining counts.
The District Court agreed and proceeded to reevaluate the
total package. Ragland’s new sentence included 188 months for his
robbery, attempted robbery, and conspiracy offenses, which was
twenty months more than his original sentence. Because Ragland’s
original sentence was unbundled, the District Court must now resentence him according to the FSA. His presentence investigation
report should be updated accordingly. With perfect hindsight, the
Sentence Package Doctrine did not, it would seem, help the Government.
B. Ragland’s Motion to Amend His § 2255 Claim
Next, Ragland argues that we erred by holding that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider § 2255
challenges beyond Count Sixteen. Specifically, he argues that our
prior opinion conflicts with the approach followed by the Fourth
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and Seventh Circuits. We review de novo questions of a district
court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
“Only a single § 2255 motion is authorized and successive
attempts at relief are limited.” Boyd v. United States, 754 F.3d 1298,
1301 (11th Cir. 2014). Section § 2255 plainly requires successive motions to be certified by the appropriate appeals court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(h). As gatekeeper, under subsection (h)(2), we can only certify constitutional challenges that invoke “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Id. This heightened standard was introduced by Congress in 1996 to “curb the
abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus[.]” H.R. Rep. No. 104-518, at 111 (1996). Without certification, district courts have no
subject matter jurisdiction to hear a successive § 2255 claim. Farris
v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003).
Because Ragland filed an unsuccessful challenge in 2016, he
needed—and so sought—our Court’s permission to file a successive petition. We granted Ragland leave to file a second motion,
but we were specific in our language:
[I]f Ragland was sentenced under § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause, pursuant to Davis, his predicate offense
of attempted Hobbs Act robbery would not qualify as
a crime of violence. Notably, in Taylor, the Supreme
Court also held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery
does not qualify as a crime of violence under
§ 924(c)(3)(B)’s elements clause. Under these circumstances, Ragland has made a prima facie showing that
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his claim satisfies the statutory criteria of § 2255(h)(2)
on the ground that he was potentially sentenced under the now-invalid residual clause of § 924(c)(3)(B),
thereby rendering his § 924(c) conviction on Count 16
unconstitutional under Davis.
Order, No. 22-13236-J (11th Cir., Oct. 12, 2022) (internal citations
omitted). Simply put, we granted jurisdiction to the District Court
to hear a challenge to Count Sixteen—and only Count Sixteen.
Critical to our assessment was the Supreme Court’s decision
in Taylor, holding that attempted Hobbs Act Robbery could not
qualify as a § 924(c) predicate offense. Id. There has been no such
ruling as to completed Hobbs Act Robbery. Moreover, our Circuit
has repeatedly held that completed Hobbs Act Robbery is a “crime
of violence.” See, e.g., United States v. Solomon, 136 F.4th 1310, 1321
(11th Cir. 2025); United States v. Wiley, 78 F.4th 1355, 1365 (11th
Cir. 2023); In re Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2016). In any
event, we received only an application for leave to challenge Count
Sixteen, and that is what we granted.
Ragland argues that the Seventh Circuit in Reyes v. United
States reached a different result on similar facts. 998 F.3d 753 (7th
Cir. 2021). There, Reyes was granted leave by the Court of Appeals
to file a successive § 2255 motion. Id. at 756. A month later, Reyes
went back to the appellate panel, seeking to add discrete challenges
to his sentence that were not mentioned in his initial application.
Id. The Seventh Circuit instructed Reyes to instead file a motion to
amend his claim in the district court under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15, which the district court allowed. Id.
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Later, on appeal, the United States argued that the district
court did not have jurisdiction to consider Reyes’ new claims because they were not authorized by the court of appeals. Id. at 760.
The court disagreed. Id. It held that § 2255 only requires that “successive applications, and not amendments or even necessarily individual claims, be screened by an appellate panel. . . . Once one
claim has cleared that high hurdle, we do not dissect the application
further.” Id. at 761. Instead, it encouraged district courts to “use
their discretion under Rule 15 to prevent abusive or needlessly
time-consuming tactics.” Id. The Fourth Circuit has also adopted
this approach. See United States v. MacDonald, 641 F.3d 596, 616 (4th
Cir. 2011) (explaining that Rule 15 governs the addition of new
claims to a § 2255 motion, and additional appellate review is unnecessary).
To the extent our sister courts permit movants to add new
claims that have not been screened, and which exceed the bounds
of the leave granted by the court of appeals, we respectfully disagree. 11 We believe this case demonstrates the flaw in that approach.
To satisfy § 2255, Ragland would have had to demonstrate a prima
facie case that a new rule of constitutional law made completed
Hobbs Act Robbery an invalid predicate offense. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(a), (b)(3)(C); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). In contrast, Rule 15 allows
11 This is not the first time we have rejected this approach. In United States v.
Pearson, we similarly held that challenges to counts not authorized by the
court of appeals exceeds the district court’s jurisdiction. 940 F.3d 1210, 1216
(11th Cir. 2019).
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amendments as a matter of right for twenty-one days, and afterwards, implores the district court to “freely give leave [to amend]
when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Under that standard, a movant could easily bypass the legislatively mandated
screening process.
To be sure, a district court may apply the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, including Rule 15 to a § 2255 proceeding in ordinary course. Farris, 333 F.3d at 1215. But “[f]ederal courts are courts
of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by
Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994). A movant may not
use Rule 15 to extend his action beyond the boundaries of the district court’s jurisdiction. To the extent a movant wishes to expand
the scope of his § 2255 motion, he may file a subsequent application
with the court of appeals. The statute of limitations for such application will always renew when new rights are recognized by the
Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we grant Ragland’s rehearing, vacate our earlier opinion as to the issue of the FSA’s applicability,
vacate Ragland’s sentence, and remand to the District Court for
resentencing consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, our
opinion in United States v. Ragland, No. 23-12278, 2025 WL 1742251
(11th Cir. June 24, 2025) shall remain in full force and effect.