IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-0122
Filed December 3, 2025
THIERRY MUNGANGA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, REACH FOR YOUR POTENTIAL, and
CENTRO, INC.,
Respondents-Appellees.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Mark D. Fisher,
Judge.
An unemployment-benefits claimant appeals the district court’s order
denying his petition for judicial review of an agency decision requiring the claimant
to repay overpaid benefits. AFFIRMED.
Dan Feltes (argued) of Iowa Legal Aid, Iowa City, and Lorraine Gaynor,
Iowa City, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, Eric Wessan, Solicitor General, Halle Kissell
(argued) and William C. Admussen, Assistant Solicitors General, and Andrew
Greenberg, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Heard at oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
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AHLERS, Judge.
It is undisputed that Thierry Munganga was overpaid $5143 in
unemployment benefits for which he did not qualify. When an audit revealed the
overpayment, Iowa Workforce Development (IWD) notified Munganga that he
would need to repay those monies to IWD. Munganga sought administrative
review, and an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that IWD had presented
sufficient evidence of the amount of overpayment and concluded that Munganga
must repay the overpayment. Munganga then sought judicial review in the district
court under Iowa Code chapter 17A (2024). The district court agreed with the ALJ
that Munganga is required to repay the overpayment. Munganga now appeals to
this court.
At the heart of Munganga’s appeal is his claim that his filing errors, which
gave rise to the overpayment, stem from a language barrier. Munganga is a native
French speaker. Yet IWD did not provide filing information or weekly online
processing forms in French. So Munganga filed his weekly claims in English, a
language in which he claims he is not fluent. Munganga contends IWD’s failure to
provide filing information in French amounts to a violation of his due process rights
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
We start by addressing whether Munganga’s arguments relating to Title VI
are properly before this court because IWD contests error preservation. “In
reviewing agency action, the district court and the appellate court may only review
issues considered and decided by the agency.” Klein v. Iowa Pub. Info. Bd., 968
N.W.2d 220, 235 (Iowa 2021) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Here,
Munganga argued to the ALJ that IWD violated Title VI. But the ALJ never
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addressed that argument in its ruling, and Munganga did not file a motion for
rehearing requesting the ALJ to do so. And “[w]hen an agency fails to address an
issue in its ruling and a party fails to point out the issue in a motion for rehearing,
we find that error on these issues has not been preserved” for our review. KFC
Corp. v. Iowa Dep’t of Rev., 792 N.W.2d 308, 329 (Iowa 2010).
Munganga responds to IWD’s error-preservation challenge by citing cases
that state that a party is not required to file a motion for rehearing before seeking
judicial review under chapter 17A. See Ellis v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 285 N.W.2d
153, 155–56 (Iowa 1979); Kehde v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 318 N.W.2d 202, 205
(Iowa 1982); Cerro Gordo Cnty. Care Facility v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 374
N.W.2d 673, 675 (Iowa 1985). But none of these cases are on point, as they
address whether a motion for rehearing is necessary to exhaust administrative
remedies before seeking judicial review, not whether a motion for rehearing is
needed to preserve error. No one disputes that Munganga exhausted
administrative remedies. But because the ALJ never addressed Munganga’s
Title VI argument and Munganga did not file a motion for rehearing asking the ALJ
to do so, his Title VI claim is not preserved for our consideration.
Munganga also argues that Iowa Code section 96.3(7), as applied to him,
violates due process. We review his claim de novo. Endress v. Iowa Dep’t of
Human Servs., 994 N.W.2d 71, 76 (Iowa 2020). Section 96.3(7) provides in
relevant part, “If an individual receives benefits for which the individual is
subsequently determined to be ineligible, even though the individual acts in good
faith and is not otherwise at fault, the benefits shall be recovered.” But the
substance of Munganga’s argument is not focused on section 96.3(7) or its
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requirement that an overpayment be paid back. Instead, he focuses on the
underlying events that gave rise to the overpayment, namely the purported
deficiencies in the filing materials and weekly wage reporting process that were
not available to Munganga in French. He argues that IWD should have reasonably
known he is a French speaker and provided information to him in French to
comport with his due process rights. He concludes his argument by urging “[a]s a
consequence of IWD’s failure to comply with these vital [due process]
requirements, IWD should be prohibited from now collecting on Mr. Munganga’s
overpayment from mistakes in the weekly claims processing as legal relief.”
Munganga’s argument fails to explain how section 96.3(7) itself violates his
right to due process as applied to him. An individual is entitled to procedural due
process when “a state action threatens to deprive [the individual] of a protected
interest in life, liberty, or property.” Id. at 77. But Munganga received both notice
of IWD’s audit of his benefits and the ensuing hearing wherein the overpayment
was established. And Munganga participated in that hearing. So as to the
determination of the overpayment and section 96.3(7)’s requirement that he pay it
back, we find no procedural due process violation.
Additionally, even if we did find a violation of Munganga’s due process rights
when he filed for benefits each week without the benefit of French instructions, he
provides no authority supporting his requested remedy of being excused from
repaying the overpayment. And we can think of none. This is an instance where
Munganga received more benefits than he was entitled to receive, not less. There
is no basis for Munganga to receive the windfall of having his repayment obligation
excused.
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On a related note, relief from agency action on judicial review can only be
granted when “substantial rights of the person seeking judicial relief have been
prejudiced.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10). There is no dispute that Munganga
received all benefits to which he was entitled. Even if he had been provided the
instructions and filing materials in French, he would not have been entitled to any
additional benefits. So Munganga has not shown that he was prejudiced by the
agency action.1
Finally, Munganga argues that we are able to grant equitable relief under
section 17A.19(10)(b), (c) for agency actions that violate any provision of law or an
erroneous interpretation of the law not clearly vested in the discretion of the
agency. So, he contends, we are able to exercise our authority to grant equitable
relief to allow him to keep the overpayment. But our authority to grant equitable
relief is not so expansive as to permit us to ignore a statutory mandate.
Section 96.3(7) clearly requires the overpayment of unemployment benefits be
repaid. We understand that repaying the overpayment may be a hardship for
Munganga because he in good faith believed he was entitled to receive the
benefits and may have spent them, but section 96.3(7) clearly applies to individuals
1 We are not persuaded by Munganga’s claim that he has been prejudiced because, if he doesn’t repay what he owes, he will not be able to seek unemployment benefits should he become unemployed again, see Iowa Code § 96.3(7)(a) (providing that the IWD may withhold future unemployment benefits until the overpayment is recovered), and his future state income tax refunds will be subject to garnishment until the overpayment is repaid, see id. § 96.11(16). It is speculation to assume that Munganga will not repay the overpaid benefits, will have future unemployment for which he would otherwise be eligible for benefits, and will have future state income tax refunds that will be subject to garnishment. We decline to find prejudice to Munganga based on multiple instances of speculation.
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even when they act in good faith and are “not otherwise at fault.” We decline to
grant Munganga relief from the statutorily mandated obligation to repay the
overpayment.
As the district court correctly denied Munganga’s petition for judicial review,
we affirm.
AFFIRMED.