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William Edgar Burton v. State of Iowa

2025-12-03

Summary

Holding. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Burton's postconviction relief application challenging his conviction for second-degree murder on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.

William Burton was convicted in 2019 of second-degree murder for shooting and killing Cory Channon during a dispute over a handgun. Burton had devised a plan with his girlfriend to lure Channon to his home, brought a neighbor for backup, and shot Channon when he began to stand up—claiming self-defense. A jury rejected his self-defense claim and found him guilty of the lesser charge. After Burton's direct appeal was rejected, he filed a postconviction relief application alleging six instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The appellate court examined each of Burton's ineffective assistance claims and found them all lacking. Several claims involving objections to evidence regarding Burton's methamphetamine use and testimony about Channon's violent character had already been rejected on direct appeal as legally sound. Other claims, including one about limited cross-examination of his girlfriend's testimony and another about failing to call his mother as a witness about his gun ownership, did not demonstrate either that counsel performed deficiently or that any alleged deficiency prejudiced the outcome. The court emphasized that the record contained overwhelming evidence of Burton's guilt.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately object to witness testimony concerning defendant's drug use
  • Whether trial counsel failed to preserve error regarding ex parte judicial communications with jury foreperson
  • Whether counsel's cross-examination of key witness was constitutionally deficient
  • Whether counsel failed to present evidence regarding defendant's habit of carrying firearms

Procedural posture

Burton appealed the district court's denial of his postconviction relief application challenging his 2019 conviction for second-degree murder on grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

Authorities cited

Opinion

majority opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1414

Filed December 3, 2025

WILLIAM EDGAR BURTON III,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D. Rosenberg,

Judge.

William Burton appeals the district court’s denial of his application for

postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.

Jamie Hunter of Dickey, Campbell & Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines,

for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., Badding, J., and

Bower, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2025).

2

BOWER, Senior Judge.

William Burton appeals the district court’s denial of his application for

postconviction relief (PCR) following his 2019 conviction for second-degree

murder. Burton asserts six claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Upon

our review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

“William Burton shot and killed Cory Channon in Channon’s home.” State

v. Burton, No. 19-1754, 2021 WL 2453365, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 16, 2021).

The shooting took place after Burton “demanded Channon return a handgun he

claimed Channon had stolen from him.” Id. “Over several hours, the two

exchanged text messages that became increasingly profane and threatening.” Id.

Burton and his girlfriend, Crystal Purdy, devised a plan for Purdy to tell Channon

she had been kicked out of Burton’s home. Id. Channon took the bait, and he

“invited her to come to his place.” Id.

Burton—armed with a gun and a neighbor who came along as “muscle in

case anything went bad”—followed Purdy into Channon’s home shortly after she

arrived.1 Id. With his gun “at his side,” Burton “demanded Channon return his

handgun. As Channon began to stand up [from the couch], Burton raised his

handgun and with its laser sight activated shot Channon. Channon fell back onto

the couch. Burton, Purdy, and [the neighbor] then drove away.” Id.

1 On the drive to Channon’s home, Burton told Purdy “[s]omeone is going to die

tonight.” Burton, 2021 WL 2453365, at *1.

3

The State charged Burton with first-degree murder.2 Burton pled not guilty

and raised a justification defense, claiming “he had a permit to carry a concealed

weapon and, when Channon ‘charged’ at him, he reasonably feared for his life and

shot Channon in self-defense.” See id. at *2. The case proceeded to trial, and the

jury found Burton guilty of the lesser-included offense of murder in the second

degree. Id. at *6. Burton appealed, claiming:

(1) the court erred in denying his motion for mistrial based on juror

misconduct, (2) the court abused its discretion in admitting three

irrelevant and unduly prejudicial photos of Burton’s home, (3) the

court abused its discretion in allowing Croy to testify,[3] (4) by limiting

Burton’s testimony about Channon’s violent prior acts, the court

denied him the right to adequately present his defense, (5) there is

insufficient evidence to support the verdict, and (6) the court erred in

instructing the jury it could infer malice aforethought from use of a

dangerous weapon.

Id. The court rejected Burton’s claims and affirmed his conviction.

Burton filed a PCR application, raising various claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Following the PCR trial, at which Burton and others

testified, the district court denied the application. Burton appeals.

II. Standard of Review

“We ordinarily review PCR rulings for correction of errors at law.” Brooks v.

State, 975 N.W.2d 444, 445 (Iowa Ct. App. 2022). “However, when the applicant

asserts claims of a constitutional nature, our review is de novo.” Ledezma v. State,

2 The State also charged Purdy with murder. She “entered into a plea agreement and testified at Burton’s trial.” Burton, 2021 WL 2453365, at *2. 3 Mikayla Croy testified she stayed at Burton’s “trap house” for several weeks

before Channon’s death because she was homeless. Burton, 2021 WL 2453365, at *4. Croy testified they “all used [methamphetamine] together” and Burton became “very aggressive” when he used. See id.

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626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2011). Accordingly, “we review claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel de novo.” Id.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Burton must show

“(1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted.” State

v. Keller, 760 N.W.2d 451, 452 (Iowa 2009) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). However, “[i]f the claim lacks prejudice, it can be decided

on that ground alone without deciding whether the attorney performed deficiently.”

Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 142.

III. Discussion

Burton raises six ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on appeal. We

address his claims in turn.

First, he argues his trial counsel “was ineffective for failing to preserve error

and object to a mistrial based [solely] on the district court’s ex parte

communications with the jury foreperson.” Here, Burton maintains “[t]rial counsel’s

failure to include the ex parte communication in Burton’s request for a mistrial was

a breach of an essential duty” requiring reversal. According to Burton, “[p]rejudice

is presumed.” However, because this claim is in a PCR proceeding, Burton is

required to show prejudice. Smith v. State, 7 N.W.3d 723, 730 (Iowa 2024) (“[A]

showing of constitutional prejudice is required even where prejudice would have

been presumed if error had been preserved. This is due to the fundamental

distinction between claims involving preserved error and unpreserved error.”

(internal citation omitted)). Because Burton does not otherwise allege prejudice,

we decline to consider this claim.

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Second, Burton claims trial counsel failed to adequately object to Croy’s

testimony. Burton argues Croy’s testimony “was not relevant, prejudicial, and full

of prior bad acts.” Much of Croy’s testimony Burton argues was prejudicial

concerned Burton’s use of methamphetamine. Because of this, Burton asserts,

“[a]ll of these accusations paint[ed him] as a bad, scary person, prompting the jury

to decide the case on an improper basis.” Despite Burton’s argument, the jury was

made aware Burton used methamphetamine through other evidence which was

not challenged at trial. Burton, 2021 WL 2453365, at *12. And as this court held

on direct appeal, the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial to Burton. Id. (“We agree

the State presented sufficient evidence Burton’s aggressiveness under the

influence was admissible for the purpose of intent, motive, absence of mistake, or

lack of accident.”). We concur. Burton’s claim is unpersuasive.

Third, Burton argues trial counsel failed to object to the admissibility of

evidence regarding his drug use. Here, Burton asserts, “[t]he jury was likely to

punish [him] for being an intravenous meth user who ran a trap house—none of

which had any relevance to whether the shooting was in self-defense.” Because

Burton claimed self-defense at trial, he would have had no duty to retreat if he was

not engaged in an illegal activity. See Iowa Code § 704.1(3) (2018). On this issue,

the court held on direct appeal:

We agree the State presented sufficient evidence Burton’s

aggressiveness under the influence was admissible for the purpose

of intent, motive, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. The trial

court . . . carefully considered Burton’s reliance on his claim he was

“[a] person who [was] not engaged in illegal activity” with no duty to

retreat, as well as the State’s burden in showing Burton was not

justified in shooting Channon.

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Burton, 2021 WL 2453365, at *12 (all but first alteration in original). The court

found such evidence was properly admitted, and we concur. Burton’s claim must

fail.

Fourth, Burton asserts trial counsel failed to preserve error on the violation

of his constitutional right to present a defense. Specifically, Burton claims he “had

knowledge of specific instances of Channon’s aggressive and violent character but

was prevented from testifying to most of it.” We determine Burton was able to

testify to some issues of Channon’s aggressive nature, but the court properly

limited his testimony. Much of testimony he wished to give was based on

speculation and rumor. On direct appeal, the court held Burton’s right to present

his defense was not violated, finding Burton “has no actual knowledge of this

purported conduct: he only states Channon told him.” Id. at *13. As the court

determined, “None of the proposed testimony falls within allowable evidence under

Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.405. The trial court properly analyzed the proposed

testimony under the [holding in State v. Williams, 929 N.W.2d 621 (Iowa 2019)],

and we find no error.” Id. at *13; see Williams, 929 N.W.2d at 636 (holding “a

defendant asserting self-defense or justification may not prove the victim’s

aggressive or violent character by specific conduct of the victim unless the conduct

was previously known to the defendant”). As this underlying claim was already

rejected on direct appeal, Burton’s claim fails.

Fifth, Burton argues trial counsel failed to properly object to Crystal Purdy’s

testimony. Burton first argues, “Purdy should have been cross-examined in her

reasonable fear that Channon was going to harm Burton or herself. If she denied

it, she should have been impeached[.]” Burton further argues trial counsel “failed

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to question Purdy about her motives for changing her story and testifying against

Burton once she knew he was not the father of her child[.]” On this issue, the PCR

court found: “It has not been demonstrated there was any deficiency in [trial

counsel’s] cross-examination of Purdy and, if so, how it was prejudicial to Burton.”

We concur. We affirm the court’s denial of this claim.

Lastly, Burton claims trial counsel failed to present evidence regarding his

habit of carrying a gun. While Burton himself testified about his gun ownership, he

argues “it was important for the jury to hear about [his] habit of carrying a gun from

someone other than [himself].” Burton wanted his mother Sharon Burton to testify

about his long-term use of guns for hunting and target practice. She was not

called. It appears from a subsequent deposition of Ms. Burton her testimony would

have been duplicative. Thus, Burton concludes, “when considering the sheer

volume of prejudicial and improper evidence the jury was exposed to, [he] did not

receive his constitutional right to a free trial.”

Under these facts and circumstances, we believe either the merits of

Burton’s underlying claims have already been rejected or any alleged deficiency

by counsel did not affect the outcome of Burton’s trial. As this court noted on direct

appeal, there was “overwhelming evidence of Burton’s guilt.” Burton, 2021 WL

2453365, at *11. Burton has not shown “there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 143 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

Accordingly, Burton’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail. We affirm the

court’s denial of his PCR application.

AFFIRMED.