IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1756
Filed December 3, 2025
WILLIAM D. BEEMAN,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Mark Fowler,
Judge.
An applicant appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claims for postconviction relief and the denial of relief based on his sole surviving claim over the
destruction of evidence. AFFIRMED.
Erica Nichols Cook (argued), Assistant State Public Defender—Wrongful
Conviction Unit, Des Moines, and Tricia Rojo Bushnell of The Midwest Innocence
Project, Kansas City, Missouri, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven (argued), Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Heard at oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
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GREER, Presiding Judge.
William Beeman appeals the dismissal and denial of claims in his third
application for post-conviction relief (PCR). First, he challenges the dismissal of
his actual- and factual-innocence claim, arguing he was denied an evidentiary
hearing. On his second challenge, he alleges that the State acted in bad faith
when it destroyed critical biological evidence and thus, he should get a new trial.
Because we find Beeman’s actual-innocence claim was previously rejected
in an earlier PCR challenge and that Beeman failed to prove the State’s bad faith
in destroying evidence, we affirm the PCR court’s decision.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
This is Beeman’s second appeal in his third PCR claim.1 These
proceedings stem from a murder that occurred in April 1980 when Michiel Winkel’s
body was found in a state park. She had been stabbed repeatedly, sustained a
head injury, and was not wearing any clothing. The investigators used a sexual
assault kit, including a vaginal swab, which confirmed she had been sexually
assaulted. The sample contained blood and seminal fluid. Beeman was excluded
as the source of the blood, but Winkel was not. Winkel’s belongings, found at the
1 Beeman filed for PCR in 1983 and again in 2007. Beeman’s 1983 application sought relief under Iowa Code section 663A(4) (1983), namely that his trial counsel: allowed Beeman’s inculpatory statements about kicking the victim in the head to be admitted at trial; failed to object to the felony murder instruction; and failed to object to witnesses who were “hypnotized” to remember seeing the victim with a man prior to her death. His second PCR, filed in 2007, alleged that his conviction was in violation of the United States Constitution or the laws of Iowa, the court was without jurisdiction to impose a sentence, the sentence exceed the maximum authorized by law, and there existed new evidence of material facts that required his conviction be vacated under a new case law in State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 558 (Iowa Aug. 25, 2006). Both were denied.
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scene, were also evaluated at the state crime laboratory. Her clothing also had
blood stains.
Law enforcement interviewed a number of people, including Beeman. On
the second day of interviews, Beeman initialed a typed statement where he
described attempting to have sexual intercourse with Winkel but did not recall
stabbing or sexually assaulting her. Afterward, charges were filed against Beeman
and a trial was held. A jury convicted Beeman of first-degree murder and he was
sentenced to life in prison. Additional facts underlying Beeman’s criminal
conviction are fully set forth in the opinion on his direct appeal. See State v.
Beeman (Beeman I), 315 N.W.2d 770, 772–79 (Iowa 1982) (affirming his
conviction and denial of his motion for a new trial).
But the procedural history gets complicated starting in 2019,2 when Beeman
sought DNA testing under Iowa Code section 81.10 (2019). But the DNA evidence
was no longer available. The district court ordered the State to locate and provide
access to all available evidence to Beeman’s counsel and investigator. After
reviewing the files, Beeman moved for a new trial on other grounds. The district
court denied this motion, and he appealed. In that appeal, Beeman argued that
he had
“discovered, for the first time, evidence that the State long withheld
in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),” namely
witnesses who believed to have seen the victim alive after April 21
and when Beeman had an alibi, detailed information about several
other suspects law enforcement pursued, other witnesses unknown
2 Prior to 2019, Beeman also had a federal habeas action Beeman v. Iowa, 108
F.3d 181, 185 (8th Cir. 1997), and a motion to correct an illegal sentence, both were denied. See Beeman v. State, No. 21-1129, 2022 WL 2826015, at *1 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 20, 2022).
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to the defense, and new scientific evidence disputing the State’s
theory of the date of the victim’s death.
State v. Beeman (Beeman II), No. 20-1288, 2021 WL 4891010, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct.
App. Oct. 20, 2021) (holding the district court exercised appropriate discretion in
the denial of Beeman’s motion for a new trial).3
In 2020, Beeman filed this third application for postconviction relief while he
was still awaiting an appellate decision on the dismissed motion for new trial.
Beeman argued in his third PCR application:
he was entitled to a new trial due to the following: (1) actual
innocence under Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778 (Iowa 2018)
based on newly discovered witnesses and scientific evidence, (2) the
State’s suppression of exculpatory evidence—the witnesses and
alternate suspects—in violation of Brady, (3) the State’s alleged
presentation of false testimony, (4) the State’s bad faith destruction
of the biological evidence, (5) the admission and use of his unreliable
confession violated his constitutional rights to due process, and (6)
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present scientific expert
testimony on time of death.
Beeman v. State (Beeman III), No. 21-1129, 2022 WL 2826015, at* 1 (Iowa Ct.
App. July 20, 2022) (cleaned up); see also id. at *1 n.4–n.9 (discussing the grounds
for each of Beeman’s claims). That PCR court dismissed the action as premature
because Beeman’s motion for new trial was ongoing. The PCR court noted that
Beeman’s issues in his “motion for a new trial [were] very similar or the same as
the issues presented for [PCR],” and because the claims were not “ripe for
adjudication” the district court “dismissed the PCR application as premature.”
3 We treated this appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari and granted the writ. See Beeman II, 2021 WL 4891010, at *2. Because we were “unable to conclude the alleged exculpatory evidence ‘could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict’ and evidence does not entitle Beeman to a new trial,” we ultimately annulled the writ. Id. at *5 (citation omitted).
5
Beeman III, 2022 WL 2826015, at *2. We affirmed the dismissal of the majority of
his claims “as either time-barred by the statute of limitations or already the subject
of a final adjudication in another proceeding Beeman has taken to secure relief.”
Id. at *4. That panel of our court reversed and remanded for further proceedings
solely on “the entry of summary disposition on the destruction-of-evidence claim,”
which “related to the allegation that the State destroyed a sexual assault kit of the
victim.” Id. at *1 n.7, *4.
With that sole issue remaining in the underlying PCR action, in
November 2023, Beeman filed an amended PCR application to include claims of
actual innocence. The State filed a motion to dismiss, and the PCR court
dismissed many of Beeman’s claims finding some had already been adjudicated,
some of the evidence could have been discovered through due diligence by the
defendant, and some claims were not based on new evidence or science that
would justify a new trial. This left the destruction of evidence as the sole issue for
the PCR trial. After the June 2024 PCR trial, the district court denied his PCR
application. Beeman appeals the dismissal of his actual-innocence claims and the
denial of his PCR application.
II. Standard of Review.
We review a PCR “court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss . . . for correction of
errors at law.” Hedlund v. State, 875 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2016). “For purposes
of reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the petition’s wellpleaded factual allegations, but not its legal conclusions.” Shumate v. Drake Univ.,
846 N.W.2d 503, 507 (Iowa 2014). “A motion to dismiss may be granted when the
6
petition’s allegations, taken as true, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.” Mueller v. Wellmark, Inc., 818 N.W.2d 244, 253 (Iowa 2012).
While we ordinarily review PCR rulings “for correction of errors at law,” “our
review is de novo when the basis for [PCR] implicates a constitutional violation.”
Linn v. State, 929 N.W.2d 717, 729 (Iowa 2019).
III. Analysis.
A. Dismissal of Actual-Innocence Claims. Prior to turning to the merits
of Beeman’s actual-innocence claims we note that these claims go beyond the
scope of our remand. Beeman’s claims of actual innocence stem from the
amendment to his PCR application after our July 2022 opinion, where a panel of
this court solely remanded for further proceedings on the destruction-of-evidence
claim. Beeman III, 2022 WL 2826015, at *4. “It is a fundamental rule of law” that
mandates by appellate courts are honored and respected. City of Okoboji v. Iowa
Dist. Ct., 744 N.W.2d 327, 331 (Iowa 2008). Here, Beeman’s amended PCR
application includes claims that mirror those we had affirmed the dismissal of and
go beyond the scope of the sole issue we told the court to address on remand.
But we recognize that the PCR court addressed the actual-innocence claims, so
we consider the arguments made in this appeal.
Beeman argues claims in his amended PCR application were “based on
newly discovered evidence of actual and factual innocence that surfaced as part
of the motion for new trial litigation,” and they are not time barred under Iowa Code
section 822.3 because they could not have been made “within the applicable time
period.” See Iowa Code § 822.3. Beeman also argues that he met the necessary
standard of proof under Schmidt. See 909 N.W.2d at 797 (noting that to succeed
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on a freestanding actual-innocence claim, “the applicant must show by clear and
convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt supporting the conviction,
no reasonable fact finder could convict the applicant of the crimes for which the
sentencing court found the applicant guilty in light of all the evidence, including the
newly discovered evidence.”). Beeman described his newly discovered evidence
under five categories:
1) the crime scene does not corroborate Beeman’s confession;
(2) investigators contaminated Beeman’s interrogation and
statement with information and failed to investigate credible alternate
suspects; (3) scientific advancements clarifying how false
confessions occur shows that Beeman was particularly susceptible
to providing a false confession; (4) blood stain pattern analysis
contradicts trial evidence; and (5) cognitive bias was prevalent in the
investigation.
The district court agreed with the State’s arguments that the “new” claims were
previously addressed or could have been presented or were available at the time
of trial. The court granted the motion to dismiss the actual-innocence challenges.
But Beeman argues his challenge is more nuanced than the court appreciated
because some of the evidence was not produced to Beeman until 2019 and 2020.
Finally, Beeman faults the PCR court for not holding an evidentiary hearing to allow
an opportunity to create a record on the viability of his claims.
PCR applications must be filed “within three years from the date the
conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ
of procedendo is issued.” Iowa Code § 822.3. Grounds “of fact or law that could
not have been raised within the applicable time period” are not subject to this
limitation. Id. Under section 822.3 the applicant must show “the alleged ground
of fact could not have been raised earlier” and “the applicant must also show a
8
nexus between the asserted ground of fact and the challenged conviction.”
Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 520 (Iowa 2003). To show that the facts
could not have been raised earlier, Beeman must prove “they could not have been
discovered earlier than they were discovered in the exercise of due diligence.” Id.
at 521. “[P]ostconviction relief applications based on ‘a ground of fact’ that could
not have been raised within the three-year limitation period, must also be filed
within three years of the discovery of the new ground of fact or be barred.”
Blackwell v. State, No. 10–0681, 2012 WL 836766, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App.
Mar. 14, 2012); see Whiteside v. State, No. 15–0534, 2016 WL 4051578, at *2
(Iowa Ct. App. July 27, 2016) (finding evidence did not fall within the exception to
section 822.3 because “nothing in the record . . . indicates this information could
not have been discovered, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, at the time of
trial or during [the applicant’s] first PCR action”).
We have considered Schmidt new law “sufficient to avoid the time bar of
section 822.3.” Quinn v. State, 954 N.W.2d 75, 76 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020). But,
“[w]e have found Schmidt does not apply to overcome the statute of limitations
where the evidence put forward to support a claim of actual innocence was
available to the applicant or could have been discovered with due diligence within
the limitations period.” Id. at 77; see also Brewbaker v. State, No. 18-1641, 2020
WL 5944205, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2020) (finding the PCR applicant’s
reliance on Schmidt misplaced, “[u]nlike Schmidt, [the applicant’s] actualinnocence claim is not based on a newly discovered fact that could not have been
discovered within the three-year time frame.”).
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Still, as for the five allegations raised by Beeman in his actual-innocence
challenge, in his appellate briefing he only discussed a new report from an
entomologist that concluded based upon entomological evidence that Winkel’s
date of death would likely have been two days later than originally established, and
that Beeman learned there were animal scavengers at the park who would have
altered a body left for days. Beeman also briefly mentioned that law enforcement’s
investigation was “flawed and credible suspects were ignored.” We need only
address the arguments made with the guiderails from our case law in mind. Iowa
R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(3) (“Failure to cite authority in support of an issue may
be deemed waiver of that issue.”). Likewise, “[a] party forfeits an issue on appeal
when the party fails to make more than a perfunctory argument in support of the
issue.” State v. Jackson, 4 N.W.3d 298, 311 (Iowa 2024) (listing a number of ways
a party may forfeit an issue on appeal). We first address Beeman’s claims about
(1) the crime scene and date of death proof and (2) his arguments over the
investigation and other potential suspects. We will then briefly address Beeman’s
other, waived claims in the interest of completeness.
1. Crime Scene and Date of Death. In his first claim, Beeman relies on
reports of forensic entomology4 and scavenger animals to conclude that the
victim’s date of death could not have occurred on the date stated in his confession.
Here, Beeman fails to state why these facts were “newly discovered evidence” that
could not have been presented earlier. As the PCR court determined:
Beeman claims the crime scene does not corroborate [his]
confession and looks to data regarding scavenger animals and/or
blow fly/forensic entomology. Beeman states that study of this data
4 Entomology involves the study of insects.
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eliminates April 21, 1980, as the victim’s date of death. Forensic
entomology has been used for hundreds of years. It was commonly
[in] use by the 2000’s. Scavenger evidence has been utilized to
determine the time of death in criminal cases since approximately
1936 and has been used commonly since 1975. Important papers
were written on the topic in or about 2006.
From there, the PCR court noted that this scientific analysis was available or could
have been discovered by due diligence within the statute of limitation period. We
agree Beeman has failed to circumvent the time bar on this claim.
2. Other Potential Suspects. Beeman’s second claim includes allegations
that the State failed to pursue alternate suspects. We addressed a similar claim
when Beeman appealed the denial of his motion for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence. Beeman II, 2021 WL 4891010, at *3–4 (discussing
Beeman’s knowledge of alternative suspects when affirming there was no Brady
violation: “[a]s to the State’s consideration of alternate suspects, the record is
undisputed that the defense was informed that law enforcement had up to eleven
suspects in mind. The defense did not pursue that information any further. Any
evidence about alternative suspects could have been obtained and produced at
trial with reasonable diligence, and [Beeman] knew about the existence of
alternative suspects.” (internal citation omitted)). “A claimed lack of knowledge is
not provided as a ground for exception from the effects of the statute of limitations.”
Lopez-Penaloza v. State, 804 N.W.2d 537, 542 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (cleaned up).
But even so, this claim was finally adjudicated in the previous proceeding, and so
the lid is shut on that claim. See Iowa Code § 822.8. Under section 822.3 “the
focus of our inquiry has been whether the applicant was or should have been
alerted to the potential claim before the limitation period expired.” Cornell v. State,
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529 N.W.2d 606, 611 (Iowa Ct.App.1994); see Lopez-Penaloza, 804 N.W.2d
at 542. Because Beeman failed to exercise due diligence and investigate these
claims earlier, he fails to circumvent the time bar under section 822.3 and, in any
event, this argument was already made and decided in an earlier proceeding.
3. False Confession. Beeman’s first, second, and third claims all attack the
credibility of his confession.5 This was not properly developed in the appellate
briefing, and we find Beeman has waived these challenges. But we note that we
have previously adjudicated the credibility of his confession and “that ship has
sailed.” Beeman III, 2022 WL 2826015, at *4 (quoting Beeman II, 2021
WL 4891010, at *5); see also Beeman , 108 F.3d at 184–85 (finding his counsel
was not ineffective for failing to suppress his confession and based on the facts
there “was simply not enough to justify suppression of the confession”); Beeman I,
315 N.W.2d at 778–79.
4. Updated Scientific Methods and Cognitive Bias. Even if we considered
his undeveloped fourth and fifth claims, Beeman’s challenge would fail. His fourth
claim about blood stain pattern analysis is not supported by “new” scientific
evidence and could have been discovered with due diligence. The blood stain
analysis relies on scientific treatises from 2009 and publications from 2013 as
“current practice.” Likewise, his fifth and final claim of cognitive bias relies on
science from as early as 2013 and 2015. Beeman’s claims fail because he could
5 Beeman relies on false confession case law from 2002 and science from 2009.
The science relied on by Beeman for establishing false confessions is not new. Beeman could have brought this claim earlier if he had exercised due diligence.
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have brought these claims earlier if he had acted with due diligence. See
Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 521.
Beeman has either already litigated claims, failed to bring potential claims
within the limitations period, or based claims on science that has been around for
years. Any of his claims previously adjudicated cannot be relitigated now. Wycoff
v. State, 382 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Iowa 1986) (“Issues that have been raised,
litigated, and adjudicated on direct appeal cannot be relitigated in a postconviction
proceeding.”).
We find Beeman’s actual-innocence claims are time barred under
section 822.3.
5. Evidentiary Hearing. As for Beeman’s claim that he should have been
granted an evidentiary hearing, he fails to cite any authority requiring an
evidentiary hearing before the court can grant a motion to dismiss, especially when
a PCR applicant has “attempt[ed] to repackage and relitigate the same issue”
previously litigated and affirmed on appeal. Dewberry v. State, 941 N.W.2d 1,
6–10 (Iowa 2019). An evidentiary hearing is not required in all cases for a PCR
court to dismiss claims in an application. See Iowa Code § 822.6. (“The applicant
shall be given an opportunity to reply to the proposed dismissal. In light of the
reply, or on default thereof, the court may order the application dismissed or grant
leave to file an amended application or direct that the proceedings otherwise
continue.”). In 2021, upon reviewing Beeman’s motion for new trial, we were
“unable to conclude the alleged exculpatory evidence ‘could reasonably be taken
to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the
verdict’ and evidence does not entitle Beeman to a new trial.” Beeman II, 2021
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WL 4891010, at *5. Even more, Beeman admitted to killing the victim in a signed
confession, where he explained specific details that included how they got to the
park and their sexual encounter, ultimately confessing that he kicked the victim in
the head with his steel-toed boot. The jury heard testimony from the pathologist
who performed the autopsy that the victim had a head injury. Additionally, the jury
heard testimony from a deputy about a conversation he had with Beeman. When
discussing how he could escape custody, Beeman claimed, “The way I would do
it is to kick you in the head just the way I did to her.” The deputy responded to
Beeman, “Well, I don’t think you can outrun a bullet.” To which Beeman replied,
“Well, if I kicked you in the head, you’ll be on the ground dead and you won’t be
able to use your gun.”
Under Schmidt, Beeman would need to show by clear and convincing
evidence that “in light of all of the evidence” no reasonable fact finder could convict
him. Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 797. As the district court noted under this standard
Beeman “falls short.” We agree. Upon our review for correction of legal errors,
we find the district court properly dismissed Beeman’s actual-innocence claims.
B. Destruction of Evidence. Turning to the claim preserved on remand,
Beeman argues he is entitled to a new trial under Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S.
51, 58 (1988), because “the State failed to preserve critical biological evidence in
this case in bad faith.” As the PCR court noted, Iowa courts have adopted the bad
faith standard from Youngblood. If a “criminal defendant can[not] show bad faith
on the part of the police,” when the State failed to preserve evidence that “could
have been subjected to tests, [and] the results . . . might have exonerated the
defendant,” then the “failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not
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constitute a denial of due process of law.” State v. Dulaney, 493 N.W.2d 787, 791
(Iowa 1992) (citation omitted). “Where the lost evidence is only potentially
exculpatory, where by its nature the lost evidence cannot be evaluated by a fact
finder, a due process violation will not be found in the absence of a showing of bad
faith.” State v. Craig, 490 N.W.2d 795, 796–97 (Iowa 1992) (emphasis omitted).
“An example of lost evidence that would not be subject to evaluation would be a
blood sample, withdrawn to test its alcoholic content but not tested prior to its loss.”
Id. at 797 n.2.
Indicators of bad faith by the police include “the police’s knowledge of the
exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed,” and
“whether the circumstances show that the State acted to gain a tactical advantage
or to harass the defendant.” State v. Dantzler, No. 09–1363, 2010 WL 3155229,
at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2010) (citations omitted). “There is no showing of
bad faith if the evidence is disposed of in accordance with department policy.
Inadvertent or negligent destruction also does not support a finding of bad faith.”
Id. (citation omitted). In Craig, a defendant brought a claim that the State’s failure
to maintain evidence that was never documented as being within police custody
was a due process violation. 490 N.W.2d at 797. The court in Craig hypothesized
that even if the evidence “had been destroyed by the police, at most the destruction
would have been no more than negligent.” Id. While the department procedures
here were wholly lacking by any standards, we note that it has only been
established that the evidence no longer exists at the law enforcement center, not
that it was destroyed. The State points to the failure of Beeman to establish any
“intentionality” in conduct by the State. See Dulaney, 493 N.W.2d at 791
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(analyzing if the State intentionally destroyed the sample to deprive the defendant
of the evidence).
Beeman argues the State’s loss of the “biological evidence,” including the
sexual assault kit with blood and sperm samples and the victim’s clothing that had
blood and hair on it, was in bad faith. Sometime after Beeman’s 1980 trial the
evidence was either lost or destroyed, and it is unknown when or how. In 1986,
the district court ordered that “all of the property” held by the sheriff’s office or clerk
of court’s office be returned to Beeman. His mother signed an affidavit and testified
that she picked up his belongings from the sheriff’s office “[a]t some point after the
trial” but did not receive everything she expected. The State contends it is
unknown what happened to this evidence, but it most likely was given to Beeman’s
mother, although that position was disputed through testimony of the law
enforcement witnesses.6
As his counsel said at trial “Beeman has the burden to prove that the
evidence was destroyed or lost in bad faith.” Beeman failed to meet that burden.
Beeman’s expert, Dr. Charlotte Word, testified that deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
identification was first used in a United States court case six years after Beeman’s
trial. There is no proof that the State knew the evidence would exonerate Beeman.
6 Beeman presented testimony that this would not have occurred. Beeman’s counsel questioned Sergeant Jacob McCleary, who is employed by the Muscatine County Sheriff’s office as a custodian for the evidence room since 2021. Counsel asked, “And have you ever given a sexual assault kit to a defendant’s mother?” McCleary answered, “No, not that I’m aware of. I don’t know that I ever released a sexual assault kit, period, unless it’s gone to the lab.” Beeman’s counsel also questioned Chet Epperson, a police practitioner consultant and retired police chief, who testified that, “You would never, ever, and I know it’s a superlative but it is, release sexual assault kit to a non-law enforcement person.”
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As the district court found, “[i]t is impossible for the Court to impute knowledge of
the potential exculpatory value of evidence to those who lived before that value
was widely known.” See Foster v. State, 378 N.W.2d 713, 718 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1985) (“There is no due process violation if the exculpatory nature of the
evidence is not known before it was destroyed.”).
As a further consideration, the blood from the sexual assault kit matched
the blood type of the victim. The blood type matching the victim does not exonerate
Beeman or prove that another person may have been at the scene. Likewise, hairs
on Beeman’s clothing that did not match him or the victim in no way exonerate him.
Even if the State destroyed that evidence, it would not be enough to prove bad
faith. See Craig, 490 N.W.2d at 797 (hypothesizing that undocumented
destruction would be at most negligence, not bad faith).
Here, there is no proof that the State destroyed the evidence in bad faith.
We conclude Beeman has failed to show bad faith on part of the State in the loss
or destruction of evidence.
IV. Conclusion.
We affirm the dismissal of Beeman’s actual-innocence claims because they
are time-barred and, even if Beeman had presented his evidence at the hearing
on the motion to dismiss, he could not meet his burden under Schmidt.
Additionally, we affirm the denial of Beeman’s PCR application related to the
missing evidence because he is unable to show the State acted in bad faith.
AFFIRMED.