Cite as 2025 Ark. 194
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CV-24-659
Opinion Delivered: December 4, 2025
STEVEN HEDRICK AND XDUMPSTERS APPEAL FROM THE CARROLL
APPELLANTS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 08WCV-23-85]
V. HONORABLE SCOTT JACKSON,
JUDGE
CITY OF HOLIDAY ISLAND REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR
APPELLEE PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT
WITH THIS OPINION.
NICHOLAS J. BRONNI, Associate Justice
This case presents one question: Does Defendant City of Holiday Island have the power
to exclude Plaintiffs Steven Hedrick and X-Dumpsters from providing supplemental wastemanagement services within Holiday Island? Holiday Island argues that the Arkansas Solid
Waste Management Act gives it the power to select a municipal waste provider and to exclude
all other providers; Hedrick and X-Dumpsters argue that Holiday Island’s actions violate the
Arkansas Constitution’s prohibition on monopolies. The circuit court agreed with Holiday
Island and dismissed Taylor’s complaint. We reverse and remand because the Waste
Management Act does not grant Holiday Island the power to exclude alternative providers.
Background
Hedrick and X-Dumpsters brought this action after Holiday Island barred them from
providing supplemental waste-disposal services within the city. X-Dumpsters provides a rolloff dumpster service—basically, large movable dumpsters of the kind frequently associated with
construction sites. Holiday Island contracts with another provider to offer weekly trash service and as-needed supplemental waste-removal services to city residents; in April 2022, the city
passed an ordinance barring anyone else from providing solid-waste-removal services.
X-Dumpster sued, arguing, among other things, that the city’s ordinance violates the
prohibition on monopolies set forth in article 2, section 19 of the Arkansas Constitution. The
city responded that the Waste Management Act gave it the authority to contract with an
exclusive provider and argued—by implication—that the Act is consistent with the Arkansas
Constitution. It cited Ark. Code Ann. § 8-6-211’s language requiring municipalities to provide
a solid-waste-management system and argued that provision granted the city the power to
exclude all other providers. Agreeing with the city, the circuit court dismissed the complaint
for failure to state a claim. This appeal followed.
Discussion
We review circuit court decisions dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim de
novo. See Dollarway Patrons for Better Schs. v. Morehead, 2010 Ark. 133, at 5, 361 S.W.3d 274,
278. Applying that standard, we conclude that the Waste Management Act does not grant
Holiday Island the power to exclude supplemental solid-waste-removal services.
Under our constitution, municipalities are “created by the authority of the Legislature;
and they derive all their powers from the source of their creation, except where the Constitution
of the State otherwise provides.” Eagle v. Beard, 33 Ark. 497, 504 (1878) (quoting Laramie
County Comm’rs v. Albany County Comm’rs, 92 U.S. 307, 308 (1875)); accord Jones v. Am. Home
Life Ins. Co., 293 Ark. 330, 335, 738 S.W.2d 387, 389 (1987) (“Municipalities are creatures of
the legislature and as such have only the power bestowed upon them by statute or the Arkansas
Constitution.”). Thus, they have “no powers except those expressly conferred and those fairly
implied for the attainment of declared purposes.” Bain v. Ft. Smith Light & Traction Co., 116
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Ark. 125, 134, 172 S.W 843, 846 (1915); accord Deaderick v. Parker, 211 Ark. 394, 398, 200
S.W.2d 787, 789 (1947) (“Municipalities have no power except those granted expressly or by
necessary implication by the legislature.”). And we have previously invalidated municipal
enactments that go beyond what the legislature authorized. See Protect Fayetteville v. City of
Fayetteville, 2019 Ark. 30, 565 S.W.3d 477 (invalidating local ordinance because it exceeded
what state law authorized municipalities to enact).
So the question here is whether the General Assembly has authorized Holiday Island’s
actions—and only if it has do we need to decide the broader constitutional question about
whether Holiday Island’s action violates the prohibition on monopolies. Holiday Island argues
that the Solid Waste Management Act—and in particular section 8-6-211—gives it the power
to select a single waste-removal provider and bar anyone else from providing any kind of solidwaste-removal services. That provision requires municipalities to provide “a solid waste
management system which will adequately provide for the collection and disposal of all solid
wastes generated or existing within the [city limits.]” Ark. Code Ann. § 8-6-211(a) (Repl.
2022). It also authorizes municipalities to “enter into agreements with one (1) or more other
municipalities, counties, a regional solid waste management district, private persons or trusts, or
with any combination thereof, to provide a solid waste management system, or any part of a
system, for the municipality.” Id.
Nothing in that provision says that where, like here, a municipality opts to contract with
a single provider, it can also bar city residents from using other providers to collect solid waste.
Instead, it simply permits municipalities to contract with one or more contractors capable of
collecting and disposing of the city’s solid waste. Indeed, there is a significant difference
between the ability to contract with a single party—and only that party—and the power to bar
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all others from offering a service. And Holiday Island’s reliance on statutory language requiring
the city to select a provider or providers capable of disposing of “all solid wastes” does not
suggest otherwise. Far from it, that language merely requires the city to ensure a trash
collection, and no one suggests that the existence of supplemental providers, like X-Dumpsters,
prevents the city from doing that. Cf. Bridges v. Yellow Cab Co., 241 Ark. 204, 206, 406 S.W.2d
879, 880 (1966). We thus reject Holiday Island’s argument that section 8-6-211 authorized it
to bar alternative supplemental solid-waste-removal providers.
Holiday Island does not point to any other source for its authority to bar alternative,
otherwise lawful, solid-waste-removal providers. Nor has our own review identified any such
authority.1 So we conclude that the city lacked the statutory authority to enact the portion of
the ordinance barring city residents from contracting with X-Dumpsters or others to provide
supplemental solid-waste-removal services. As that is sufficient to resolve this appeal, we need
not—and do not—reach the question of whether such an ordinance would violate the
constitution’s prohibition on monopolies.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
BAKER, C.J., and HUDSON, J., dissent.
1
This dissent purports to find such authority in a provision defining “solid waste management system.” Dissent at 1. But nothing in that provision gives Holiday Island the authority to bar other, otherwise lawful providers. It simply defines “[s]olid waste management system” as “the entire process of [disposing of trash].” Ark. Code Ann. § 8-6-203(20). No one disputes that Holiday Island can contract with an entity or entities capable of providing an entire disposal system. The question is whether it can exclude others from providing trash services, and the dissent does not point to anything that gives Holiday Island that authority. Far from it, like Holiday Island, the dissent’s argument ultimately amounts to little more than a bald assertion that because municipalities can contract with providers, “[they] necessarily have the related power to bar anyone else from providing these services.” Dissent at 3 (emphasis added).
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COURTNEY RAE HUDSON, Justice, dissenting. This case hinges on the statutory
definition of “solid waste management system,” which our General Assembly has defined as
“the entire process of source reduction, storage, collection, transportation, processing, waste
minimization, recycling, and disposal of solid wastes by any [entity].” Ark. Code Ann. § 8-6-203(20) (Repl. 2022) (emphasis added). Webster’s Dictionary defines “entire” as “having
no element or part left out: whole.” “Entire.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, MerriamWebster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entire (last visited Dec. 3, 2025) (ar
chived at https://perma.cc/7W92-6ENX). Here, X-Dumpsters seeks to provide services it
refers to as “supplemental.” However, another entity, the Carroll County Solid Waste District
(the District), already provides all solid-waste services for the City of Holiday Island (the City).
In other words, the District provides the entire solid-waste-management system for the City.
As such, there is no void in services for X-Dumpsters to fill or supplement. The District does
it all. As explained below, the City has the statutory authority to contract with a single solidwaste provider and thereby exclude X-Dumpsters from also providing solid-waste services
within the City. Neither the statute nor the ordinance violates the Arkansas Constitution’s
prohibition on monopolies. Accordingly, I would affirm the circuit court’s order dismissing
Hedrick and X-Dumpsters’ complaint. I respectfully dissent.
First, I note our complete standard of review, which the majority has presented in a
truncated fashion. In reviewing a court’s decision on a motion to dismiss, we treat the facts
alleged in the complaint as true and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Dollarway
Patrons for Better Schs. v. Morehead, 2010 Ark. 133, at 5, 361 S.W.3d 274, 278. In testing the
sufficiency of a complaint on a motion to dismiss, all reasonable inferences must be resolved in
favor of the complaint, and all pleadings are to be liberally construed. Id. However, when a complaint is dismissed on a question of law, this court conducts a de novo review. Id.; see also
Thurston v. League of Women Voters of Ark., 2022 Ark. 32, at 5, 639 S.W.3d 319, 321; State v.
West, 2014 Ark. 174; Fatpipe, Inc. v. State, 2012 Ark. 248, 410 S.W.3d 574.
Turning to the statutory language at issue, the Solid Waste Management Act requires all
municipalities to provide “a solid waste management system which will adequately provide for
the collection and disposal of all solid wastes generated or existing within the [city limits.]” Ark.
Code Ann. § 8-6-211(a) (Repl. 2022). The Act authorizes municipalities to “enter into
agreements with one (1) or more [entities] to provide a solid waste management system, or any
part of a system, for the municipality[.]” Id. Again, “solid waste management system” is defined
as “the entire process of source reduction, storage, collection, transportation, processing, waste
minimization, recycling, and disposal of solid wastes by any [entity].” Ark. Code Ann. § 8-6-203(20) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Act delegates to municipalities the power to select
a single provider for all solid-waste collection and disposal. With that, municipalities necessarily
have the related power to bar anyone else from providing these services. Stated differently, the
statutory scheme does authorize the City to enforce its ordinance in a manner that excludes XDumpsters from providing solid-waste services. Allowing municipalities to have a single solidwaste provider protects public health and promotes efficiency by ensuring that cities can
adequately supervise a singular entity. Regardless of the reasons, the General Assembly has
spoken on this issue.
Nonetheless, it appears that the majority has been led astray by X-Dumpsters’ strategic
framing of their solid-waste services as “supplemental” or “ad hoc” services that are somehow
legally distinct from the services that the City is required to provide. To the contrary, the type
of services that X-Dumpsters seeks to provide are undoubtedly included in the solid-waste6
management system that the City of Holiday Island has chosen the District to exclusively
provide. By statute, municipalities are permitted to select a single entity to provide a solidwaste-management system; therefore, other entities—even those that characterize their solidwaste services as “supplemental” services—can be excluded when a municipality has selected
another entity to provide those very services. “[T]he legislative intent to displace competition
can be inferred from the statutory scheme because it is a ‘necessary and reasonable consequence
of engaging in the authorized activity.’” L&H Sanitation, Inc. v. Lake City Sanitation, Inc., 769
F.2d 517, 522 (8th Cir. 1985) (internal citation omitted). To hold otherwise creates an
exception for “supplemental” solid-waste providers that is simply not supported by the text of
the statute. Thus, the majority has erred in its interpretation of the relevant portions of the Act.
Hedrick and X-Dumpsters also contend that the ordinance and statute are
unconstitutional to the extent that they allow an illegal monopoly in violation of the Arkansas
Constitution.1 Article 2, section 19 of the Arkansas Constitution provides that “monopolies are
contrary to the genius of a republic, and shall not be allowed.” Despite this language, this court
has long upheld ordinances that create monopolies under circumstances such as the one before
us. In Dreyfus v. Boone, 88 Ark. 353, 114 S.W. 718 (1908), this court addressed a municipal
ordinance granting Dreyfus the exclusive right to remove the deposits from unsewered privies
within the city limits for a period of ten years. The Dreyfus court held that such a municipal
ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power if the ordinance is reasonable in its terms and
1
In addition, they argue on appeal that the ordinance violates the Arkansas Constitution’s cumulative protections for the right to engage in a lawful occupation. Because the circuit court did not rule on this argument, it is not preserved for our review. Neal v. Sparks Reg’l Med. Ctr., 2012 Ark. 328, at 11, 422 S.W.3d 116, 122 (“The failure to obtain a ruling on an argument precludes appellate review because there is no order of a lower court on the issue for this court to review on appeal.”).
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designed solely for the protection of the public health. Subsequent cases have recognized that
municipalities may enter into exclusive contracts for waste disposal. See Massongill v. Cnty. of
Scott, 329 Ark. 98, 105, 947 S.W.2d 749, 752 (1997) (“[M]onopolies are upheld when deemed
necessary in executing a duty incumbent on city authorities or the legislature for the
preservation of public health.”); Smith v. City of Springdale, 291 Ark. 63, 65, 722 S.W.2d 569,
570 (1987) (“Without question a city is authorized to enter into proper exclusive contracts for
sanitation services.”); Geurin v. City of Little Rock, 203 Ark. 103, 155 S.W.2d 719 (1941)
(ordinance providing for the collection of garbage, assessment of fees, and providing penalty for
its violation upheld as a valid exercise of the police power); see also Op. Ark. Att’y Gen. No.
062, at 4 (2006) (explaining that “the legislature has authorized any municipality exclusively to
contract with a single private individual for the provision of recycling systems, foreclosing any
other individual from engaging in the activity” (emphasis added)). To be clear, Hedrick and XDumpsters do not challenge the City’s ability to enter into an exclusive contract for solid-waste
services; rather, they take issue with the City’s position that X-Dumpsters is prohibited from
providing “supplemental” solid-waste services.
Given our precedent, Hedrick and X-Dumpsters have failed to allege facts that, if
proven, would entitle them to relief. As explained above, solid-waste disposal is solid-waste
disposal—regardless of how creatively it is characterized. Because I would affirm the circuit
court’s order dismissing the amended complaint, I respectfully dissent.
BAKER, C.J., joins.
King Law Group, PLLC, by: Whitfield Hyman; and Adam C. Shelton appearing pro hac
vice for Scharf-Norton Center for Constitutional Litigation at the GOLDWATER INSTITUTE, for
appellants.
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Gabrielle Gibson; and Harrington, Miller, Keiklak, Eichmann & Brown, P.A., by: R. Justin
Eichmann and Imogen Ryan, for appellees.
Katrin Marquez; and Norwood & Norwood, P.A., by: Douglas Norwood and Alison Lee,
counsel for amicus curiae Institute for Justice.
Punchwork Law, by: Chris Burks; and Pacific Legal Foundation, by: Allison D. Daniel,
counsel for amicus curiae Pacific Legal Foundation.
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