Cite as 2025 Ark. 193
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CV-24-782
Opinion Delivered: December 4, 2025
PINNACLE IN HOME CARE, LLC
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 72CV-21-1883]
HONORABLE JOHN THREET,
1 SOURCE SENIOR CARE, LLC
JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED.
BARBARA W. WEBB, Justice
This is an interlocutory appeal from the Washington County Circuit Court’s order
disqualifying attorneys Timothy Hutchinson and Scott Tidwell, along with their law firm
RMP LLP, as counsel for appellant Pinnacle In Home Care, LLC (Pinnacle). On appeal,
Pinnacle argues that (1) the circuit court erred when it disqualified Pinnacle’s counsel
because Pinnacle’s position is not “materially adverse” to its codefendants; and (2) appellee
1 Source Senior Care, LLC (1 Source), moved to disqualify opposing counsel for tactical
purposes. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(a)(5), as this
appeal pertains to this court’s power to regulate the practice of law. We affirm.
I. Background
Pinnacle and 1 Source are competitors that are both licensed to provide targeted
case-management and personal-care services. On August 27, 2021, 1 Source filed its initial
complaint against Pinnacle and individual defendants Sarah and Anthony Sanchez, both of whom were Pinnacle employees at the time of filing. The complaint alleged that the
Sanchezes, former 1 Source employees, had breached noncompete agreements to leave for
Pinnacle; defamed 1 Source; violated confidentiality agreements, as well as their duty of
loyalty; and committed conversion. In addition, 1 Source asserted that defendants had
tortiously interfered with its business relationships, were unjustly enriched, and were
collectively involved in a civil conspiracy.
Tim Hutchinson, of the law firm RMP LLP, filed an answer on behalf of all
defendants, wherein it acknowledged that Sarah is deceased. As a result, 1 Source moved to
appoint a special administrator and for substitution of that administrator in place of Sarah.
RMP subsequently moved to withdraw as counsel for the Sanchezes due to Sarah’s
death and the fact that Anthony was no longer employed by Pinnacle. RMP noted that
Anthony leaving Pinnacle’s employ “created a potential conflict of interest” between the
two parties. The circuit court granted the motion and permitted Hutchinson to withdraw
as the attorney of record for the Sanchezes.
The circuit court later held a hearing on 1 Source’s motion for appointment of special
administrator for Sarah. No one appeared for any of the defendants. The circuit court
granted the motion and appointed Anthony as special administrator for his late wife and
substituted him as a party in her place.
During the pending litigation, Amanda Sumpter also left 1 Source to work for
Pinnacle, allegedly in violation of her noncompete agreement. As a result, 1 Source filed an
amended complaint adding Sumpter as a defendant. Hutchinson and Scott Tidwell, also an
attorney with RMP, filed an answer to the amended complaint on behalf of Pinnacle and
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Sumpter. No answer was filed on behalf of the Sanchezes. After Sumpter left her
employment with Pinnacle, RMP moved to withdraw as counsel for her, again noting the
potential conflict of interest between Sumpter and Pinnacle. The circuit court granted the
motion
In March 2023, 1 Source submitted requests for admission to Anthony individually
and in his capacity as special administrator for Sarah. Anthony never answered the requests
for admission, and they were therefore deemed admitted. Although the requests were not
directed to Pinnacle, it nevertheless filed responses averring that any “admission or failure
to deny any of these requests should not be imputed to Pinnacle.”
1 Source subsequently filed a second amended complaint. RMP filed a response on
behalf of Pinnacle. Neither the Sanchezes nor Sumpter filed an answer.
On January 8, 2024, RMP filed notices to depose its former clients, Anthony and
Sumpter. 1 Source later moved to disqualify RMP from representing Pinnacle. In its
motion, 1 Source asserted that RMP had a conflict of interest between its current client,
Pinnacle, and its former clients, the Sanchezes and Sumpter. According to 1 Source, this
conflict violated Rule 1.9 of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct. Following a
hearing on the motion, the circuit court entered an order disqualifying Hutchinson and
Tidwell, along with their firm RMP, from representing any of the defendants in this case.
Accordingly, Hutchinson and Tidwell were removed as counsel of record for Pinnacle. This
appeal followed.
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II. Discussion
On appeal, we review a circuit court’s decision to disqualify an attorney under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Sturdivant v. Sturdivant, 367 Ark. 514, 241 S.W.3d 740
(2006). An abuse of discretion may arise from an erroneous interpretation of the law. Craig
v. Carrigo, 340 Ark. 624, 12 S.W.3d 229 (2000). The Arkansas Rules of Professional
Conduct are applicable in disqualification proceedings. Park Apts. at Fayetteville, LP v. Plants,
2018 Ark. 172, 545 S.W.3d 755. And the issue of whether an attorney violated the Arkansas
Model Rules of Professional Conduct is relevant to the issue of his or her disqualification.
SEECO, Inc. v. Hales, 334 Ark. 134, 969 S.W.2d 193 (1998).
At issue in this case is whether RMP’s continued representation of Pinnacle created
a conflict of interest under Rule 1.9 of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct, which
provides:
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in
which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client
unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
Ark. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.9(a) (emphasis added). Pinnacle argues that the circuit court erred
by disqualifying RMP as counsel because its position is not “materially adverse” to its
codefendants.
In its complaint, 1 Source alleges that separate defendants acted within the course
and scope of their employment with Pinnacle and at Pinnacle’s encouragement to commit
tortious acts. This necessarily creates a tension between defendants as to the attribution of
liability. Were separate defendants acting for their own benefit or for the benefit of Pinnacle
and at its behest?
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In First American Carriers, Inc. v. Kroger Co., we affirmed the disqualification of
counsel, concluding that a conflict of interest existed between the firm’s former client and
its current clients in the same matter. 302 Ark. 86, 787 S.W.2d 669 (1990). We recognized
that the “appearance of impropriety” prohibition of Canon 9 of the American Bar
Association Code of Professional Responsibility was not part of the Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility, which we have adopted. 302 Ark. at 90, 787 S.W.2d at 671.1
Nevertheless, we found the principle of Canon 9 applies “because its meaning pervades the
Rules and embodies their spirit.” Id. at 92, 787 S.W.2d at 672.2 In consideration of both
Rule 1.9 and Canon 9, we concluded that the interests of the defendants were “adversarial
as the issue of relative fault between these parties will be litigated.” Id. at 93, 787 S.W.2d at
673. Likewise, defendants in this case will be in an adversarial position as the issue of
individual liability is litigated.
Moreover, certain admissions that were deemed admitted after Anthony failed to file
a response contained material facts adverse to Pinnacle’s position, such as the admission that
Pinnacle instructed and encouraged Anthony “to contact 1 Source clients and make
derogatory and defamatory statements about 1 Source in an attempt to induce the clients to
stop doing business with 1 Source and move their business to Pinnacle.” In its answer,
Pinnacle denied that the Sanchezes made defamatory statements while within the scope of
1
Canon 9 provides that “[a] lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.”
2
Comment 10 of Rule 1.9 does provide that a “duty to avoid the appearance of impropriety discussed in Comment [37] to Rule 1.7 is likewise applicable to Rule 1.9 and Rule 1.10.” Ark. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.9 cmt. [10].
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their employment. This further illustrates the adversity between Pinnacle and separate
defendants.
Pinnacle responds that its interests are aligned with those of separate defendants in
denying the allegations made in 1 Source’s complaint. It further suggests that it will pursue
a common defense. Yet this claim is belied by Pinnacle’s answer to 1 Source’s second
amended complaint, wherein it affirmatively pleaded that 1 Source’s “damages or losses, if
any, were caused by persons over whom Pinnacle had no control and for whom Pinnacle
is not responsible.” Thus, Pinnacle has made clear that it will disavow the actions of separate
defendants if necessary to avoid liability. Even more, RMP acknowledged in its motions to
withdraw “potential conflict[s] of interest” arising between Pinnacle and separate defendants
now that separate defendants were no longer employed with Pinnacle. As such, we conclude
that the interests of defendants in this case are materially adverse, and therefore, RMP’s
representation of Pinnacle cannot continue under Rule 1.9.
Pinnacle also argues that 1 Source moved to disqualify RMP for tactical reasons. We
review a circuit court’s decision to disqualify under an abuse-of-discretion standard; we do
not attempt to ascertain opposing counsel’s motive for filing a motion. Because the circuit
court did not abuse its discretion by disqualifying RMP, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Special Justice TIFFANY BROWN joins.
WOOD, J., not participating.
RMP LLP, by: Timothy C. Hutchinson and Mallory D. Shamoon, for appellant.
Littler Mendelson, P.C., by: Eva C. Madison and Kyle D. Kennedy, for appellee.
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