UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ARTHUR AYO-AGHIMIEN II,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 24-cv-01341 (DLF)
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of Homeland
Security,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Arthur Ayo-Aghimien brings this action against the Secretary of Homeland Security under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. See generally Am. Compl., Dkt. 38. He alleges that the defendant
discriminated against him and caused the withdrawal of his appointment as an Immigration Judge
on the basis of his race, national origin, religion, gender, and disability status. Before the Court is
the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. Dkt. 39. For the reasons that follow,
the Court will grant the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Ayo-Aghimien is a licensed attorney and a black, Christian male born in Nigeria. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 9, 24. From April 2001 to September 2016, he served with the U.S. Air Force Judge
Advocate General Corps. Id. ¶ 24. He suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) related
to his military service. Id. ¶¶ 10, 63.
While serving as a reservist in November 2007, Ayo-Aghimien began employment as an
attorney with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), an agency of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Id. ¶¶ 26–27. He deployed to Iraq in May 2008 and, upon his return,
was transferred to ICE’s Office of Field Counsel in Las Vegas, Nevada. Id. ¶ 27. His immediate
supervisor in the Las Vegas office was Deputy Field Counsel Mary-Jean Lambert. Id. ¶ 28. AyoAghimien alleges that Lambert conveyed to him “negative comments from other ICE officials”
regarding his 2008 deployment. Id. In November 2009, Ayo-Aghimien was again deployed
outside of the United States in support of military operations, during which he suffered injuries
requiring extensive treatment and rehabilitation. Id. ¶ 29.
When Ayo-Aghimien returned to ICE in September 2012, Lambert allegedly again made
“derogatory comments” regarding his deployment. Id. ¶ 30. Specifically, she asserted that he had
“left the office with more workload,” which had “pissed off her attorneys”; that she “did not care
to hire ‘military types’”; and that the Los Angeles Deputy Chief Counsel “had apologized for
‘dumping’” him on the Las Vegas office. Id. She also denied him an office and required him to
work in the library, despite unoccupied offices being available, and despite providing large,
private, windowed offices to two other attorneys—An Mai Nguyen, a Vietnamese-American
woman, and Peter Eitel, a white man born in the United States. Id. ¶¶ 31–34. When Ayo-Aghimien
requested to use one of the unoccupied offices, Lambert accused him of “trying to start trouble.”
Id. ¶ 41.
Ayo-Aghimien further alleges that Lambert made a series of derogatory comments
regarding his race, national origin, and perceived religion. For example, he asserts that Lambert
made “derogatory remarks in [his] presence regarding persons of [his] race (black).” Id. ¶ 42. In
particular, she “made sarcastic comments about then-President Barack Obama,” whom she
accused of “selling out the country” and not being an American. Id. Ayo-Aghimien also alleges
that Lambert made “discriminatory comments about certain of the private attorneys who
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represented clients in immigration proceedings who were non-white and/or foreign born”—
“question[ing] their competence and the quality of their legal educations” and calling one Hispanic
immigration attorney from Peru a “lazy” “crybaby” who was unable to “handle” a legal case. Id.
¶ 43 (citation modified). Finally, Ayo-Aghimien alleges that Lambert made “derogatory
comments about Muslims in his presence,” making it clear that “she thought, because of his
national origin, race, color and accent, that [he] was a follower of Islam.” Id. ¶ 44. He identifies
one such comment in particular: “Can you tell your people to stop blowing up my country?” Id.
Ayo-Aghimien also alleges that Lambert treated other attorneys more favorably than him.
For example, Lambert would frequently visit Nguyen and Eitel “personally in their respective
private offices and have lengthy conversations with them,” id. ¶ 35, and “often talked privately”
with Christian Parke, a “white male attorney who was similarly situated to [Ayo-Aghimien] in all
relevant respects, except that he was U.S. born, not black and not disabled,” id. ¶ 40. In contrast,
Ayo-Aghimien asserts that Lambert “seldom went to [his] work area to discuss work-related
matters,” instead sending other individuals on her behalf. Id. ¶ 35. He further alleges that Lambert
discriminated against him regarding certain privileges of employment. Id. ¶ 36. In addition to
denying Ayo-Aghimien a personal office space, Lambert initially assigned an indoor parking space
to Eitel, relenting and assigning it to Ayo-Aghimien only when he questioned why he was
receiving disparate treatment. Id. ¶¶ 36–37. Lambert also assigned Eitel, rather than AyoAghimien, to “preferable” assignments. Id. ¶ 38. Ayo-Aghimien also alleges that Lambert “made
negative comments about [him] and the quality of his work” and “falsely criticized [him] in his
annual performance appraisals,” even though he “handled his assigned workload as well as or
better than his white, U.S. born colleagues.” Id. ¶ 45.
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In August 2014, Ayo-Aghimien applied to serve as an Immigration Judge with the
Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), an agency of the Department of Justice. Id.
¶¶ 47–48. The application process was “lengthy and thorough.” Id. ¶ 47. In November 2015,
while his application was pending, Ayo-Aghimien emailed a complaint to the ICE Office of Chief
Counsel accusing Lambert of subjecting him to a hostile work environment. Id. ¶ 46. He also
started seeking other employment “[b]ecause of” Lambert’s “discrimination and retaliation against
him.” Id. In January 2016, he transferred to his current role at the Transportation Security Agency,
another agency within DHS. Id. ¶ 47.
On August 30, 2016, Ayo-Aghimien received an offer of employment as an Immigration
Judge. Id. ¶ 48. He alleges that, at all times relevant to this dispute, he met or exceeded the
qualifications necessary to serve in that position, id. ¶¶ 13, 65, and could perform its essential
functions, id. ¶¶ 12, 65, 108.
Ayo-Aghimien contends that, after Lambert learned of his offer of employment, she
contacted EOIR and made “false, derogatory comments” about him. Id. ¶ 58. In an interview with
an Immigration Judge, Lambert represented that Ayo-Aghimien was not “reliable, honest,
trustworthy and of good character,” id. ¶ 51; stated that he “ha[d] made many trips outside of the
U.S.” and that “there was a problem regarding his passport use,” id.; said that she was “worried
about his temperament,” id. ¶ 52; and represented that there was a “weird situation” when he
worked for ICE in Los Angeles and that it “got strange there,” id. Lambert stated on an EOIR
form that the information she had provided could not be released to Ayo-Aghimien. Id.
Ayo-Aghimien alleges that EOIR “immediately rescinded” his tentative appointment
“[b]ased entirely upon” Lambert’s statements, id. ¶ 53, without “independently investigating the
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derogatory information [Lambert] provided” or allowing Ayo-Aghimien to respond, id. ¶ 58.
EOIR did not notify Ayo-Aghimien of the reason for the recission. Id. ¶ 59.
On July 1, 2017, Ayo-Aghimien filed a formal EEOC charge against the Department of
Justice. Id. ¶ 21. In the course of the Department’s investigation of the complaint, Lambert
“signed and submitted a sworn, written statement under penalty of perjury, in which she denied
that she ever communicated with EOIR to provide information about [Ayo-Aghimien].” Id. ¶ 54.
Ayo-Aghimien filed a formal EEOC charge against DHS on March 5, 2018. Id. ¶ 17. The
charge alleged that Lambert had “provided inaccurate and derogatory information about him in
connection with [his] temporary appointment as an Immigration Judge,” in retaliation and based
on his race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, and disability status. DHS Final Agency
Decision 2, Dkt. 23-2.1 On June 6, 2022, DHS’s Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties issued
a final agency decision concluding that DHS had not discriminated against Ayo-Aghimien. Am.
Compl. ¶ 19. Ayo-Aghimien appealed, and the EEOC affirmed the decision. Id. ¶ 20.
On November 11, 2023, Ayo-Aghimien filed the instant action in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Florida against the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland
Security in their official capacities. See Compl., Dkt. 1. His complaint alleged seven counts
against the defendants: race discrimination under Title VII, national origin discrimination under
Title VII, religious discrimination under Title VII, gender discrimination under Title VII,
retaliation under Title VII, disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, and hostile work
environment under Title VII. See generally id. After the Florida court granted Ayo-Aghimien’s
unopposed motion to change venue, see Pl.’s Unopposed Mot. for Change of Venue, Dkt. 14, and
1
Because Ayo-Aghimien’s EEOC charge is referenced in the complaint and is integral to his claims, the Court will consider it in deciding the motion to dismiss. See Kaempe v. Myers, 367 F.3d 958, 965 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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transferred this action to the undersigned, see Order Transferring Case, Dkt. 16, the defendants
moved to dismiss the claims, see Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 22.
On February 5, 2025, the Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. See generally
Order, Dkt. 32; Mem. Op., Dkt. 33. The Court dismissed each of Ayo-Aghimien’s claims against
the Attorney General with prejudice for failure to timely file suit. Mem. Op. 17. The Court also
dismissed Ayo-Aghimien’s retaliation claim against the Secretary of Homeland Security with
prejudice for failure to state a claim, and his hostile work environment claim against the Secretary
with prejudice for failure to exhaust. See id. The Court dismissed Ayo-Aghimien’s remaining
claims against the Secretary without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Id.
Ayo-Aghimien has now filed an amended complaint that asserts five claims against the
Secretary of Homeland Security2: racial discrimination under Title VII (Count I); national origin
discrimination under Title VII (Count II); religious discrimination under Title VII (Count III);
gender discrimination under Title VII (Count IV); and disability discrimination under the
Rehabilitation Act (Count V).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to move to
dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain factual matter sufficient to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). A facially plausible claim is one that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). While this standard does not amount to a specific probability requirement, it does require
2
The Court will refer to the Secretary of Homeland Security in her official capacity as “DHS.”
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“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; see Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”).
A complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but alleging facts that are “merely
consistent with a defendant’s liability . . . stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation modified).
Well-pleaded factual allegations are “entitled to [an] assumption of truth,” id. at 679, and
the Court construes the complaint “in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all
inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged,” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471,
476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citation modified). The assumption of truth does not apply, however, to a
“legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation modified). And
an “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” is not credited. Id. Likewise,
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id. Ultimately, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim for relief [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court may consider only the complaint itself,
documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, and
judicially noticeable materials. EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624
(D.C. Cir. 1997). A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal “is a resolution on the merits and is ordinarily
prejudicial.” Okusami v. Psychiatric Inst. of Wash., Inc., 959 F.2d 1062, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
III. ANALYSIS
DHS moves to dismiss each of Ayo-Aghimien’s counts for failure to state a claim. To state
a discrimination claim under Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must plausibly allege
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that (1) he “suffered an adverse employment action” (2) because of his “race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, age, or disability.” Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
While an employer’s action need only “affec[t] an employee’s terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment” to constitute an adverse action sufficient to support a discrimination claim,
Chambers v. District of Columbia, 35 F.4th 870, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (en banc) (citation
modified), not every malicious employment reference “will engender a grievance cognizable under
Title VII”—a plaintiff must still allege that the negative reference was motivated by animus toward
the plaintiff’s protected status, Shehadeh v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Md., 595 F.2d 711,
723 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, a discrimination claim is analyzed
under the McDonnell Douglas framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973); see, e.g., Townsend v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 3d 280, 297–98 (D.D.C. 2017). Under
that framework, the plaintiff has the burden of first establishing a prima facie case of discrimination
by showing that “(1) [he] is a member of a protected class; (2) [he] suffered an adverse employment
action; and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination.” Wiley v.
Glassman, 511 F.3d 151, 155 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citation modified). If “the plaintiff succeeds in
proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the action in question.” Id. (citation modified). “[S]hould the
defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its
true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Id. (citation modified); see McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804–05.
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At the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff need not plead facts supporting every element of
a prima facie case or anticipate the nondiscriminatory reasons that his employer may proffer. See
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510–14 (2002). But, taken collectively, “the
inferences of discrimination drawn by the plaintiff” must be “reasonable and plausibly supported.”
Townsend, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 298; see Joyner v. Morrison, 140 F.4th 523, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2025)
(“[A] plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to allow a plausible inference that the challenged action
was taken because of his race.”).
For the reasons that follow, the Court will conclude that Ayo-Aghimien has failed to allege
facts that support a reasonable inference that Lambert discriminated against him on the basis of
his race, national origin, perceived religion, gender, or disability.
A. Title VII Discrimination Claims
1. Adverse Action
Before addressing the specifics of Ayo-Aghimien’s individual claims, the Court must
clarify the alleged adverse employment action(s) at issue. To establish an “adverse action” in
support of his discrimination claims, Ayo-Aghimien relies primarily on the purportedly false and
negative statements that Lambert made in her 2016 EOIR interview, which allegedly resulted in
the withdrawal of his appointment as an Immigration Judge. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 73, 81, 91,
100, 109. Some of Ayo-Aghimien’s Title VII claims, however, could also be read to identify
additional adverse employment actions, including Lambert’s (1) denial of office space and an
interior parking space; (2) greater face-to-face interaction with Nguyen, Eitel, and Parke;
(3) allocation of preferable assignments to Eitel; and (4) negative comments in Ayo-Aghimien’s
annual performance appraisals. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 72, 90, 99. To the extent that Ayo-Aghimien
asserts that any of these alleged actions constituted adverse employment actions, he cannot proceed
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on that theory. As the Court previously found, Ayo-Aghimien’s formal EEOC charge against DHS
“alleged that Lambert had provided inaccurate and derogatory information about him in
connection with his temporary appointment as an Immigration Judge, in retaliation and based on
his race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, and disability status.” Mem. Op. 4 (citation
modified); see DHS Final Agency Decision 2. Because that charge encompasses only the
statements that Lambert made in her 2016 EOIR interview, Ayo-Aghimien cannot proceed on any
claim based on the other allegedly adverse actions. See Mount v. Johnson, 36 F. Supp. 3d 74, 83–
84 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[A]s a general rule, a Title VII plaintiff must timely exhaust administrative
remedies for each discrete act alleged, even if the acts are related.” (citation modified)); Mem.
Op. 9 n.2.
2. Failure to State a Claim
Ayo-Aghimien has failed to state a claim of discrimination on the basis of race, national
origin, religion, or gender. None of the comments that Lambert made in the 2016 EOIR interview
suggests discrimination, prejudice, or animus on the basis of any of these protected characteristics.
See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51–52 (Lambert represented that Ayo-Aghimien was not “reliable, honest,
trustworthy and of good character”; stated that he “ha[d] made many trips outside of the U.S.” and
that “there was a problem regarding his passport use”; said that she was “worried about his
temperament”; and represented that there was a “weird situation” when he worked for ICE in Los
Angeles and that it “got strange there”). Nor do the handful of allegedly discriminatory comments
that Lambert made between approximately 2012 and 2016 give rise to an inference of
discrimination. Lambert’s alleged comments regarding a Hispanic immigration attorney from
Peru, see id. ¶ 43, were neither discriminatory on their face nor directed at Ayo-Aghimien. And
while Lambert’s alleged statement “tell your people to stop blowing up my country,” id. ¶ 44, and
10
suggestion that then-President Barack Obama was not an American, id. ¶ 42, could be interpreted
as discriminatory on the basis of religion and national origin, respectively, Ayo-Aghimien has not
connected either isolated comment to Lambert’s 2016 EOIR interview, see Ajisefinni v. KPMG
LLP, 17 F. Supp. 3d 28, 44 (D.D.C. 2014) (“A single remark albeit insensitive, is insubstantial to
establish direct evidence of racial or national origin discrimination on the part of the defendant. In
order for Plaintiff to establish discriminatory animus in an adverse employment decision . . . there
must be a clear nexus between the stray workplace remark and the adverse action.” (citation
modified)); Bilal v. Metro. Police Dep’t, No. 25-cv-189, 2025 WL 1917959, at *4 (D.D.C. July
11, 2025) (alleged “racially charged comments,” though “concerning,” did not give rise to
inference of discrimination where plaintiff failed to link the statements to the adverse employment
actions). These two “isolated . . . remark[s] unrelated to the relevant employment decision” do
not, without more, give rise to an inference of discrimination. Morris v. McCarthy, 825 F.3d 658,
669 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Contrast, e.g., Belov v. World Wildlife Fund, Inc., No. 21-cv-1529, 2021
WL 4773236, at *4 (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 2021) (“pattern of comments show[ed] evidence of a
discriminatory attitude against women, pregnant women, and lactating women, as well as a
targeting of [the plaintiff] on the basis of her sex and pregnancy”).
Ayo-Aghimien’s alleged comparators cannot salvage these pleading deficiencies. A Title
VII plaintiff “can raise an inference of discrimination by showing that [he] was treated differently
from similarly situated employees who are not part of the protected class.” Brown v. Sessoms, 774
F.3d 1016, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation modified). To survive a motion to dismiss on a
comparator theory, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that “a comparator was similarly
positioned to the plaintiff in at least some relevant respects” such that the comparator “provide[s]
a benchmark” against which the court may “plausibly infer that discrimination caused the
11
defendant’s differential treatment of the plaintiff.” Joyner, 140 F.4th at 531. While “[t]he traits a
[plaintiff] must plead about comparators to provide a benchmark against which the court can make
such a determination will vary widely from case to case,” id., the plaintiff must at least plead
sufficient facts for the court to “infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” id. at 532
(citation modified).
Here, Ayo-Aghimien’s allegations as to his proposed comparators—Nguyen, Eitel, and
Parke—do not give rise to a plausible inference of discrimination. To start, while Ayo-Aghimien
alleges that Lambert did not “attempt to interfere with” Nguyen’s application to serve as an
Immigration Judge, Am. Compl. ¶ 68, he has not alleged that either Eitel or Parke was similarly
situated with respect to a pending job application. The Court is skeptical that Ayo-Aghimien can
demonstrate that either Eitel or Parke was treated “more favorably in the same factual
circumstances” absent any allegation that they were similarly situated in this key respect. Burley
v. Nat’l Passenger Rail Corp., 801 F.3d 290, 301 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citation modified); see, e.g.,
Harris v. Buttigieg, No. 23-cv-2752, 2025 WL 343131, at *5 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2025) (plaintiff
“fail[ed] to identify any similarly situated comparator” who “received a promotion or superior
performance review when he did not” or “received a superior annual performance review in
October 2022, when his was downgraded”); Stanford v. Howard Univ., No. 23-cv-3041, 2025 WL
3062907, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 3, 2025) (“Mr. Stanford does not point to any other ‘similarly
situated’ applicant—i.e., someone who also submitted an incomplete application—who was given
more consideration or selected for an interview.”).
Furthermore, even if a single comparator or allegations of more favorable treatment in
contexts unrelated to the adverse employment action were sufficient, Ayo-Aghimien fails to allege
sufficient detail to permit an inference of discrimination. While he asserts the broad proposition
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that Nguyen, Eitel, and Parke were similarly situated in “relevant respects,” see, e.g., Am. Compl.
¶¶ 32, 40, “a plaintiff’s assertion that that [he] is similarly situated to others is just a legal
conclusion[,] and a legal conclusion is never enough to state a claim,” Doe #1 v. Am. Fed’n of
Gov’t Emps., 554 F. Supp. 3d 75, 103 (D.D.C. 2021) (citation modified). Ayo-Aghimien does not,
for example, allege any details regarding their job titles, responsibilities, or performance. See
Burley, 801 F.3d at 301 (“Factors that bear on whether someone is an appropriate comparator
include the similarity of the plaintiff’s and the putative comparator’s jobs and job duties.”); Joyner,
140 F.4th at 532 (plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts to show that he was similarly situated to
comparators where “the complaint include[d] no information about the [alleged comparators’]
experience or qualifications relative to” the plaintiff ’s); Yuvienco v. Vilsack, No. 23-cv-186, 2024
WL 727712, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2024) (plaintiff failed to plead claim by comparison to coworker where she did not allege any details about “the co-worker’s job title, how th[e] co-worker’s
responsibilities compared to hers, and whether she and the co-worker reported to the same
supervisors,” or regarding “how the co-worker’s performance was poor, or how it compared to her
own performance”); Doe #1, 554 F. Supp. 3d at 103 (plaintiff’s allegation that alleged comparator
was a “counterpart” was “fatally nonspecific”). Ayo-Aghimien’s assertion that his alleged
comparators were “attorneys,” “co-workers,” and “colleague[s]” who presumably also reported to
Lambert, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33, 37, 40, 67, does not establish a “benchmark” against which the Court
may “plausibly infer . . . discrimination.” Joyner, 140 F.4th at 531. Contrast, e.g., Wheeler v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 812 F.3d 1109, 1115–16 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (proposed comparator nurses
13
working in similar units with same seniority were similarly situated in terms of roles and
responsibilities).3
Finally, the Court rejects Ayo-Aghimien’s passing argument that Lambert’s denial “that
she ever communicated with EOIR to provide information about [him]” is of “‘considerable
evidentiary significance’” and provides “‘credible evidence of consciousness of guilt.’” Opp’n 2
(quoting Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1292–93 (D.C. Cir. 1998)); see Am. Compl.
¶¶ 54–55. Even accepting that Lambert made a false representation that reflects consciousness of
guilt, Ayo-Aghimien has offered nothing but conclusory allegations to establish that any such guilt
was connected to intentional discrimination. Cf. Allen v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 34, 40 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (“Successfully attacking an employer’s proffered reason alone will not always suffice to
permit an inference of discrimination.” (citation modified)). Contrast, e.g., Stoe v. Barr, 960 F.3d
627, 646 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“A reasonable jury could view Tillery’s shifting explanations of the
selection decision as evidence of pretext to cover up his gender bias.”); Allen, 795 F.3d at 40 (“[I]t
is often reasonable to think that an employer who lies or obviously bluffs about or shifts its
rationale for challenged action is culpable of the charged discrimination or retaliation.” (emphasis
added)); Aka, 156 F.3d at 1293 (“If the jury can infer that the employer’s explanation [for its acts]
is not only a mistaken one in terms of the facts, but a lie, that should provide even stronger evidence
of discrimination.” (emphasis added)).
3
In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Ayo-Aghimien further alleges that his proposed comparators also “competed for the preferred assignments to Homeland Security Investigations.” Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Opp’n) 16, Dkt. 41. In his amended complaint, however, AyoAghimien alleged only that Eitel was “regularly assigned” to assist in such investigations. Am. Compl. ¶ 38. In any event, absent any allegations regarding Nguyen, Eitel, and Parke’s experience, qualifications, job titles, or responsibilities, this further allegation is insufficient to establish that Nguyen, Eitel, or Parke is an appropriate comparator. Cf. Joyner, 140 F.4th at 532 (plaintiff failed to allege facts regarding comparators’ “experience or qualifications” relative to his own).
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Because the complaint fails to raise a reasonable inference that Lambert discriminated
against Ayo-Aghimien because of his race, national origin, perceived religion, or gender, the Court
will dismiss Counts I, II, III, and IV with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
B. Rehabilitation Act Claim
Ayo-Aghimien also fails to plead with sufficient specificity his disability discrimination
claim under the Rehabilitation Act. To state such a claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that
(1) he is “disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act”; (2) he is “otherwise qualified”;
(3) he was “excluded from, denied the benefit of, or subject to discrimination under a program or
activity”; and (4) “the program or activity is carried out by a federal executive agency or with
federal funds.” Muir v. DHS, 145 F.4th 1359, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (citation modified).
Ayo-Aghimien’s factual allegations again fall short on the third prong of this standard. He
alleges that Lambert made “cryptic” remarks to EOIR, Opp’n 12, such as representing that AyoAghimien had a history of “questionable” foreign travel, Am. Compl. ¶ 51, that she “worried”
about Ayo-Aghimien’s “temperament,” id. ¶ 52, and that there was a “weird situation” with AyoAghimien when he worked with ICE in Los Angeles and that “it got strange there,” id. None of
these statements gives rise to a plausible inference of discrimination based on PTSD or any other
disability, and Ayo-Aghimien’s conclusory allegations of discrimination, see, e.g., id. ¶ 57
(“Describing worries about his ‘temperament’ and using the terms ‘weird’ and ‘strange’ likewise
were calculated to imply ongoing mental health issues.”), do not carry his claims over “the line
between possibility and plausibility,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation modified). Furthermore, for
the reasons already stated, Ayo-Aghimien’s alleged comparator allegations cannot compensate for
this pleading deficiency.
Accordingly, the Court will also dismiss Count V with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 39, is GRANTED.
Counts I, II, III, IV, and V against the Secretary of Homeland Security are dismissed with prejudice
for failure to state a claim. A separate order consistent with this decision accompanies this
memorandum opinion.
DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH
United States District Judge
March 12, 2026
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