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State v. Giovanni D.
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GIOVANNI D.*
(SC 20899)
Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker,
Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js.
Syllabus
Convicted of sexual assault in the first degree, risk of injury to a child, and
aggravated sexual assault of a minor in connection with the sexual abuse
of the victim, J, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant claimed,
inter alia, that the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting into
evidence certain statements that J had made during a forensic interview
concerning the sexual abuse at issue under the exception to the hearsay
rule for statements made for the purpose of obtaining medical diagnosis or
treatment set forth in § 8-3 (5) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence (medical
treatment exception). Held:
This court clarified that hearsay statements can be admitted under the
medical treatment exception only when the declarant was motivated, at
least in part, by a desire to obtain medical diagnosis or treatment and the
declarant’s statements were reasonably pertinent to achieving that end.
The trial court abused its discretion in admitting, under the medical treatment exception, certain statements that J had made during the forensic
interview through the testimony of A, who conducted the interview, as the
state failed to demonstrate that the circumstances surrounding the forensic
interview would have allowed an objective observer to infer that J understood the medical purpose of the forensic interview.
The forensic interview occurred at a child advocacy center rather than a
medical facility, there was no indication that the interview setting would
have alerted J to the medical nature of the interview, the record was silent
as to any representations that A had made to J regarding the nature of the
interview and was limited as to the specific questions that A asked J, the
record also was silent as to whether J discussed any physical or mental
health concerns during the interview, and the timing of the interview, at
least ten months after the last instance of abuse and five months after J’s
* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the
victims of sexual abuse and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline
to use the defendant’s full name or to identify the victim or others through
whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2024); we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected
under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was
issued or applied for, or others through whom that person’s identity may
be ascertained.
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State v. Giovanni D.
initial disclosure of the abuse, weighed against an inference that J understood
that the purpose of the forensic interview was medical in nature.
This court nevertheless concluded that the trial court’s error in admitting
J’s statements through A’s testimony was harmless because this court had
a fair assurance that, under the circumstances of this case, this evidence
did not substantially affect the jury’s verdict.
Specifically, the challenged evidence did not present any new material to
the jury regarding the specific instances of abuse, and the prosecutor did
not emphasize A’s testimony during closing argument but, rather, relied on
a limited portion of it that was not challenged on appeal.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s request
to provide the jury with a special child credibility instruction concerning
J’s testimony.
J was twelve years old at the time of the trial, which is an age that, in itself,
does not generally warrant a special credibility instruction, and the defendant
conceded that J was a competent witness and that she understood the
concept of truthfulness.
Moreover, this court declined the defendant’s request to exercise its supervisory authority over the administration of justice and to modify its approach
to special child credibility instructions as set forth in State v. James (211
Conn. 555).
Argued September 18—officially released December 9, 2025
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with
two counts each of the crimes of sexual assault in the
first degree and risk of injury to a child, and one count
of the crime of aggravated sexual assault of a minor,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
New Britain and tried to the jury before Baldini, J.;
verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Kevin M. Black, Jr., assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Nathan J. Buchok, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were Christian M. Watson, state’s
attorney, Helen McLellan, supervisory assistant state’s
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State v. Giovanni D.
attorney, and David Clifton, senior assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
ALEXANDER, J. In this appeal, we clarify the standard for the admissibility of statements made by a child
during a forensic interview under the medical diagnosis
and treatment exception to the hearsay rule set forth in
§ 8-3 (5) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence (medical
treatment exception). The defendant, Giovanni D., appeals
from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury
trial, of various sexual offenses against the minor victim, J. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial
court abused its discretion in (1) admitting into evidence certain statements made by J to a forensic interviewer under the medical treatment exception, and (2)
denying his request for a special child witness credibility instruction. Although we agree with the defendant’s
first claim that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting certain statements under the medical treatment exception, we conclude that the error was harmless. We are not persuaded by his second claim.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.
The jury reasonably could have found the following
facts. When J was between the ages of five and ten
years old, she resided in New Britain with the defendant
and her mother, D. The defendant and D were in a
long-term romantic relationship, and J considered the
defendant to be her father. During this time period,
the defendant sexually abused J on multiple occasions
when watching her and her younger brother while D
was at work outside of the home. The acts of abuse
included anal intercourse, fellatio, and having J masturbate him. In addition to those acts, the defendant also
choked J, slapped her, pulled her hair, and threatened
to kill her.
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State v. Giovanni D.
In July, 2020, the defendant and D had a domestic
dispute that resulted in the defendant’s incarceration
and the termination of their romantic relationship. After
that arrest, there was no contact between J and the
defendant. In December, 2020, J disclosed to D, without
providing specific details, that the defendant used to
‘‘touch’’ her. At the time of this disclosure, the defendant
was still incarcerated. For this reason, among others,
D believed that the defendant was not a present threat
to J and waited until she learned of his release in April,
2021, to report the allegations to the New Britain Police
Department. Detective Lisa Steeves was assigned to the
case and, as part of her investigation, arranged for the
Klingberg Children’s Advocacy Center (Klingberg) in
Hartford to conduct a forensic interview of J.
On May 12, 2021, Nishka Ayala, a trained forensic
interviewer, met with J at Klingberg. On June 15, 2021,
Nina Livingston, a pediatrician at the Connecticut Children’s Medical Center specializing in child abuse, conducted a medical examination of J.1 To inform her
examination, Livingston relied on a report from Ayala’s
forensic interview to obtain the relevant history of the
abuse. The results of the physical examination were
normal; Livingston testified that they neither proved
nor dis-proved the sexual abuse allegations.
The state charged the defendant with two counts
each of sexual assault in the first degree in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (2) and risk of injury
to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a)
(2), and with one count of aggravated sexual assault
of a minor in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70c
(a) (3). The case was tried to a jury, which returned a
verdict of guilty on all counts. The trial court rendered
judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict and sen1
J had also been referred for trauma therapy.
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State v. Giovanni D.
tenced the defendant to a total effective term of fortythree years of imprisonment, followed by sixteen years
of special parole and lifetime sex offender registration.
This direct appeal followed. See General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3).
I
The defendant first claims that the trial court abused
its discretion in admitting into evidence J’s forensic
interview statements through the testimony of Ayala.2
We agree with the defendant that the trial court abused
its discretion in admitting Ayala’s testimony under the
medical treatment exception, but we nevertheless conclude that the error was harmless and does not
require reversal.
A
The record reveals the following additional relevant
facts and procedural history. Ayala conducted J’s forensic interview in accordance with the statutorily prescribed multidisciplinary team approach. See General
Statutes § 17a-106a. Multidisciplinary teams ‘‘work collaboratively to investigate and treat cases of reported
[child] sexual abuse.’’ State v. Maguire, 310 Conn. 535,
543, 78 A.3d 828 (2013); see General Statutes § 17a106a (c). To facilitate the multidisciplinary team’s dual
investigatory and treatment responsibilities, a forensic
interview is often conducted to ‘‘solicit information
[from the victim] in an unbiased, fact-finding manner
that is culturally sensitive and appropriate for each
child’s developmental stage . . . .’’ General Statutes
§ 17a-106a (e) (4) (C). As Ayala and Livingston testified
2
The state argues that the defendant did not preserve this claim for
appellate review. We disagree. The record demonstrates that defense counsel
objected at trial to the admission of Ayala’s testimony and ‘‘articulate[d]
the basis of the objection so as to apprise the trial court of the precise
nature of the objection and its real purpose . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Edwards, 334 Conn. 688, 703, 224 A.3d 504 (2020).
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State v. Giovanni D.
at trial, a primary purpose of the forensic interview is
to minimize the number of times a child victim, like J,
is potentially retraumatized by having to recount his or
her abuse to multiple providers. See, e.g., State v. Manuel T., 337 Conn. 429, 438 n.9, 254 A.3d 278 (2020).
At the time of her forensic interview at Klingberg, J
was eleven years old. The interview was video-recorded.
Bethany Siedlik, a representative of the Department
of Children and Families (department), observed the
interview through a one-way mirror, and Steeves listened to it via telephone. During the interview, J disclosed details of the defendant’s sexual abuse and also
reported instances of physical and emotional abuse. To
clarify the age appropriate terms J used to describe
the acts, Ayala asked her to identify body parts on an
anatomical drawing.
At trial, the state called Ayala to testify regarding
her forensic interview of J. The video recording of the
interview was not introduced. During direct examination, the prosecutor asked Ayala whether J had identified ‘‘specific acts of abuse [during her interview]?’’
Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds, and the
prosecutor argued that Ayala’s statements were admissible under the medical treatment exception. The prosecutor cited State v. Griswold, 160 Conn. App. 528, 127
A.3d 189, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 907, 128 A.3d 952
(2015), and State v. Hickey, 135 Conn. App. 532, 43 A.3d
701, cert. denied, 306 Conn. 901, 52 A.3d 728 (2012),
arguing that ‘‘part of [the forensic interview] process
is . . . for medical and treatment purposes.’’ The prosecutor contended that Ayala established the requisite
medical purpose when she testified that forensic interviews ‘‘identify . . . if any [medical] services were necessary . . . .’’ In response, defense counsel argued that
the forensic interview of J neither served a medical
purpose nor was conducted by a medical professional.
The trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection
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State v. Giovanni D.
and instructed the prosecutor to lay further foundation
‘‘indicat[ing] that [the interview] was in the course of
. . . the medical and diagnostic treatment of [J]’’ before
inquiring again.
Ayala then testified that one purpose of a forensic
interview is to make medical and mental health referrals, when necessary. She also indicated that ‘‘forensic
interviewers typically ask the child if they have any
worries or concerns about their body’’ and that medical
providers rely on the forensic interview report to inform
their subsequent treatment plan. Ayala went on to
describe J’s interview statements about the specific
instances of abuse as follows: ‘‘[J] identified penile to
anal penetration [and] that . . . [the defendant] . . .
had her put her hands around his penis and moved them
up and down . . . . She also . . . described penile to
oral penetration. . . . She said it happened . . . multiple times.’’
***
‘‘[J] described being threatened . . . having her hair
pulled and being choked . . . and that she couldn’t
breathe. . . . [W]hen I say threatened . . . she was
threatened that if she told someone . . . [the defendant] would kill her.’’ Ayala further told the jury about
J’s statements with respect to the frequency, location,
and time frame of the abuse.
B
A trial court’s ruling on evidentiary matters will be
overturned only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the
court’s discretion. See, e.g., State v. Samuel U., 348
Conn. 304, 317, 303 A.3d 1175 (2023). ‘‘In determining
whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every
reasonable presumption should be made in favor of the
correctness of the trial court’s ruling, and we will upset
that ruling only for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . .
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State v. Giovanni D.
In determining whether there has been an abuse of
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the [trial] court
could reasonably conclude as it did.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. See, e.g., State v. Carrion, 313 Conn. 823, 837, 100 A.3d 361 (2014). Unless
an exception applies, hearsay is generally inadmissible.
See, e.g., id.; see also Conn. Code Evid. § 8-2 (a). The
medical treatment exception excludes from the hearsay
rule ‘‘statement[s] made for purposes of obtaining a
medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical
history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause
or external source thereof, insofar as reasonably pertinent to the medical diagnosis or treatment.’’ Conn. Code
Evid. § 8-3 (5). The rationale behind this exception is
that ‘‘the patient’s desire to recover his health . . . will
restrain him from giving inaccurate statements to [those
who] advise or treat him.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Cruz, 260 Conn. 1, 7, 792 A.2d 823
(2002).
Hearsay statements are admissible under the medical
treatment exception when a two-pronged test is satisfied: (1) the declarant was motivated by a desire to
obtain medical diagnosis or treatment; and (2) the
declarant’s ‘‘statements were reasonably pertinent to
achieving that end.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Manuel T., supra, 337 Conn. 434. The first prong
‘‘turns . . . on the declarant’s state of mind and . . .
purpose’’ when making the statements; (emphasis
added) State v. Roy D. L., 339 Conn. 820, 831, 262 A.3d
712 (2021); and the second prong turns on the relevance
of each statement to the provision of medical care. See
State v. Cruz, supra, 260 Conn. 6.
This court and the Appellate Court have employed
this two-pronged test on many occasions to determine
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State v. Giovanni D.
the admissibility of statements made by a child declarant during a forensic interview under the medical treatment exception.3 We have not, however, always drawn a
clear distinction between the two prongs.4 We therefore
take this opportunity to clarify the application of the
test.
To satisfy the first prong (purpose prong), the declarant’s statement must be motivated, at least in part, by
the declarant’s desire to obtain medical diagnosis or
treatment.5 See, e.g., State v. Roy D. L., supra, 339 Conn.
3
In the present case, we focus on the application of the medical treatment
exception to forensic interviews of child sexual abuse victims. This context
is narrow. We acknowledge that the medical treatment exception will often
apply under other, potentially more straightforward, circumstances. See,
e.g., State v. Slater, 285 Conn. 162, 185–86, 939 A.2d 1105 (medical treatment
exception applied to statements made by victim to nurse and physician in
hospital emergency room), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1085, 128 S. Ct. 2885, 171
L. Ed. 2d 822 (2008); State v. Errol J., 199 Conn. App. 800, 811–15, 237 A.3d
747 (medical treatment exception applied to medical records and statements
made by victim to medical professionals who had treated him at health
center), cert. denied, 335 Conn. 962, 239 A.3d 1213 (2020); State v. Serrano,
123 Conn. App. 530, 538–40, 1 A.3d 1277 (2010) (medical treatment exception
applied to statements made by victim to surgeon who had treated him),
cert. denied, 300 Conn. 909, 12 A.3d 1005 (2011); State v. Williams, 65 Conn.
App. 449, 460–63, 783 A.2d 53 (medical treatment exception applied to
statements made by child victim to nurse practitioner during medical examination at clinic), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 927, 783 A.2d 1032 (2001).
4
See, e.g., State v. Roy D. L., supra, 339 Conn. 827–36; State v. Manuel
T., supra, 337 Conn. 436–48; State v. Arroyo, 284 Conn. 597, 635–36 n.23,
935 A.2d 975 (2007); State v. Dionne, 207 Conn. App. 106, 114–18, 262 A.3d
961, cert. denied, 340 Conn. 910, 264 A.3d 577 (2021); State v. Freddy T.,
200 Conn. App. 577, 589–98, 241 A.3d 173 (2020); State v. Ezequiel R. R.,
184 Conn. App. 55, 61–71, 194 A.3d 873, cert. granted, 330 Conn. 945, 196
A.3d 804 (2018) (appeal dismissed February 15, 2019); State v. Abraham,
181 Conn. App. 703, 710–16, 187 A.3d 445, cert. denied, 329 Conn. 908, 186
A.3d 12 (2018); State v. Griswold, supra, 160 Conn. App. 550–58; State v.
Telford, 108 Conn. App. 435, 441–45, 948 A.2d 350, cert. denied, 289 Conn.
905, 957 A.2d 875 (2008).
5
The analogous hearsay exceptions of some other states, such as Maryland
and North Carolina, require different degrees of purpose from the declarant
or the interviewer. See, e.g., Webster v. State, 151 Md. App. 527, 537, 827
A.2d 910 (2003) (‘‘[C]ourts must separately examine both the reason that a
medical provider asked the sexual assault victim to describe the assault,
and the victim’s subjective purpose in making the statement. . . . Only
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State v. Giovanni D.
831. This rule ensures the inherent reliability and trustworthiness of the hearsay statements because the law
presumes that ‘‘the patient has an incentive to tell the
truth in order to obtain . . . proper medical [care].’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Donald M.,
113 Conn. App. 63, 70, 966 A.2d 266, cert. denied, 291
Conn. 910, 969 A.2d 174 (2009). Importantly, obtaining
medical diagnosis or treatment does not have to be the
primary purpose of the declarant’s statement; State v.
Manuel T., supra, 337 Conn. 440–41 n.12; and, thus, the
presence of investigators or other nonmedical personnel during the forensic interview does not preclude
admission under the medical treatment exception. See
State v. Cruz, supra, 260 Conn. 12–14; State v. Miller,
121 Conn. App. 775, 783, 998 A.2d 170, cert. denied, 298
Conn. 902, 3 A.3d 72 (2010).
To determine whether the purpose prong is satisfied
in cases involving forensic interviews of children, we
look to whether ‘‘the surrounding circumstances could
lead an objective observer to reasonably infer’’ that the
child, as declarant, understood the interview to have a
medical purpose. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Roy D. L., supra, 339 Conn. 834; see State v.
Freddy T., 200 Conn. App. 577, 597, 241 A.3d 173 (2020).
The objective ‘‘inquiry [under the purpose prong] must
be restricted to the circumstances that could be perceived by the declarant . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Freddy T., supra, 592. Accordingly, testimony establishing the medical purpose and
protocol of a forensic interview from the vantage point
statements that are both taken and given in contemplation of medical
treatment or medical diagnosis for treatment purposes fit within the . . .
hearsay exception.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.)); State v. Hinnant, 351 N.C. 277, 287, 523 S.E.2d 663 (2000) (‘‘the proponent of [the]
testimony must affirmatively establish that the declarant had the requisite
intent by demonstrating that the declarant made the statements understanding that they would lead to medical diagnosis or treatment’’ (emphasis
added)).
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State v. Giovanni D.
of the interviewer or by statute generally6 does not
satisfy the purpose prong in the absence of a showing
that an objective observer could reasonably infer that
the declarant understood that medical purpose at the
time he or she made the statements at issue. See, e.g.,
State v. Manuel T., supra, 337 Conn. 447 (‘‘[T]he medical
treatment exception focuses on the declarant’s purpose
in making individual statements. . . . [B]ecause the
focus of the . . . exception is the declarant’s understanding of the purpose of the interview, the inquiry
must be restricted to the circumstances that could be
perceived by the declarant, as opposed to the motivations and intentions of the interviewer that were not
apparent to the declarant.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.)); see also United States v.
Kootswatewa, 893 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2018) (‘‘[t]he
declarant herself must understand that she is providing
information for purposes of diagnosis or treatment
because that understanding is what provides assurance
that the statements are particularly likely to be
truthful’’).
A variety of factors may inform whether this inference can reasonably be drawn. These include but are
not limited to (1) the communications with the child
and circumstances leading up to the interview, (2) the
setting of the interview, (3) the substance of the declarant’s statements, (4) the substance of the interviewer’s
statements and questions, and (5) the temporal proximity of the interview to the alleged acts of sexual abuse,
6
We recognize that the statutory scheme governing the multidisciplinary
team approach expressly contemplates the medical purpose of forensic
interviews. See General Statutes § 17a-106a (e) (5) (describing one purpose
of multidisciplinary team as ‘‘providing specialized medical evaluation and
treatment, mental health services and support and advocacy services to
children . . . and referral to other appropriate providers of such services’’).
The state, however, cannot rely on the statutory purpose of the interview
to satisfy the purpose prong without evidence that the child understood
that purpose.
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the disclosure of the abuse, and the provision of medical
care. See, e.g., State v. Roy D. L., supra, 339 Conn.
834–35 (hospital location of interview, interviewer’s
questions regarding victim’s physical and mental health,
and victim’s complaints of pain supported inference
that child understood medical purpose of interview);
State v. Ezequiel R. R., 184 Conn. App. 55, 68, 194 A.3d
873 (purpose prong was satisfied when interview took
place in hospital and interviewers told victim that their
conversation would be recorded ‘‘in case . . . the doctor had any questions’’), cert. granted, 330 Conn. 945,
196 A.3d 804 (2018) (appeal dismissed February 15,
2019); State v. Abraham, 181 Conn. App. 703, 713–14,
187 A.3d 445 (purpose prong was satisfied when interview was conducted in hospital and ‘‘victim . . . was
asked whether she had any worries or any problems
with any part of [her] body’’ and ‘‘to identify, on an
anatomical diagram, the body parts with which the
defendant had had contact’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)), cert. denied, 329 Conn. 908, 186 A.3d 12
(2018); State v. Donald M., supra, 113 Conn. App. 71
(fact that referring party told child that ‘‘she would be
meeting with someone at the hospital who would help
her . . . and determine whether she needed therapy
or other medical treatment’’ supported inference that
child ‘‘was aware of the medical purpose of the
interview’’).
The Appellate Court’s decision in State v. Freddy T.,
supra, 200 Conn. App. 577, illustrates an apt application
of the purpose prong. In that case, the state argued that
the purpose prong was satisfied because the forensic
interviewer had asked the child questions about the
alleged sexual assault and collected information for a
medical referral. Id., 593. The Appellate Court disagreed
and concluded that the subsequent referrals did not
satisfy the purpose prong because ‘‘[t]he test . . . is
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State v. Giovanni D.
er’s motivation is.’’ Id., 594. The fact that a medical
referral is made after an interview does not—without
more—establish that the child understood during the
interview that his or her statements were made to
inform medical treatment.7 See id., 593–94. The Appellate Court reasoned that the record did not show that
the child’s statements were motivated by a desire to
obtain medical treatment because the child made no
physical or emotional complaints during the interview,
the medical content of the interview was ‘‘de minimis,’’
and, by the time of the interview, the child had already
received medical care addressing any health concerns.
See id., 593–96.
Turning to the second prong (pertinence prong) of
the admissibility test, we note that the declarant’s statements must be ‘‘pertinent to the [medical] diagnosis or
treatment sought.’’ State v. Cruz, supra, 260 Conn. 6.
‘‘The term medical encompasses psychological as well
as somatic illnesses and conditions’’; (internal quotation
marks omitted) State v. Estrella J.C., 169 Conn. App.
56, 75, 148 A.3d 594 (2016); and, in sexual assault cases,
‘‘[statements] pertaining to the identity of the defendant
and the nature of the sexual assault [are] . . . pertinent
to proper diagnosis and treatment of the resulting physical and psychological injuries . . . .’’ State v. Kelly, 256
Conn. 23, 45, 770 A.2d 908 (2001). Similar to the purpose
prong, statements may be pertinent to medical treatment even if the primary relevance of the statements
was not strictly medical in nature. See State v. Griswold,
supra, 160 Conn. App. 552–53. Moreover, ‘‘[s]tatements
made by a sexual assault complainant to a social worker
may fall within the [medical treatment] exception if the
7
Age appropriate messaging at the outset of the interview advising the
declarant of its medical goals may aid in satisfying the purpose prong. But
cf. State v. Freddy T., supra, 200 Conn. App. 593 (‘‘ ‘brief safety messages’ ’’
conveyed to child at end of interview did not support inference that child
understood interview to have medical purpose).
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State v. Giovanni D.
social worker is found to have been acting within the
chain of medical care.’’ State v. Donald M., supra, 113
Conn. App. 71. An interviewer is within the chain of
medical care if he or she has ‘‘significant interaction
and cooperation with the medical care provider in the
victim’s case . . . .’’ State v. Arroyo, 284 Conn. 597,
635–36 n.23, 935 A.2d 975 (2007).
Whether a medical referral is made following a forensic interview is relevant to the pertinence prong. For
example, in Freddy T., the Appellate Court disagreed
with the state’s argument that the purpose prong was
satisfied because the interviewer made a medical referral. State v. Freddy T., supra, 200 Conn. App. 593–94.
Had the purpose prong been satisfied in that case, the
subsequent medical referral could have been used to
establish that the victim’s forensic interview statements
were pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment. Additionally, in determining whether the pertinence prong
is satisfied, courts may consider whether a medical
provider relied on the statements obtained during the
interview to inform the course of treatment.
Finally, the application of the medical treatment
exception need not involve an all-or-nothing approach
to admissibility. See State v. Manuel T., supra, 337 Conn.
448; see also State v. Roy D. L., supra, 339 Conn. 830
n.7 (‘‘the medical treatment exception . . . does not
preclude a party from objecting to portions of [forensic
interview] statements . . . that are . . . inadmissible
for the purpose they are offered’’). Although the purpose prong will often require a more holistic and contextual analysis as to whether the child understood the
interview’s purpose, the pertinence prong presents a
narrower inquiry for courts. See State v. Manuel T.,
supra, 448. We emphasize, however, that ‘‘the medical
treatment exception . . . does not preclude a party
from objecting to portions of statements made during
forensic interviews that are . . . otherwise unduly
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prejudicial. Under such circumstances, the court, particularly during a jury trial, may exercise its discretion
to redact portions of a forensic interview.’’ State v. Roy
D. L., supra, 830 n.7.
Applying these principles to the present case, we
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting Ayala’s testimony relaying J’s forensic interview statements under the medical treatment exception
because the state failed to demonstrate that the circumstances surrounding the forensic interview would allow
an objective observer to infer that J understood its
medical purpose.8 First, J was not interviewed in a setting that would, without more, alert a child to the medical nature of the interview. Unlike in other cases in
which the forensic interview took place at a hospital
or some other facility obviously dedicated to providing
medical services; see, e.g., State v. Roy D. L., supra,
339 Conn. 834–35; State v. Arroyo, supra, 284 Conn. 625;
J was interviewed in an observation room at Klingberg,
which is a children’s advocacy center. There is no evidence that the interview setting at Klingberg would
have suggested to J that it was a medical facility. Nor
was there any evidence that J was appraised of Klingberg’s role in providing specialized medical referrals.
Second, the record is silent with respect to any representations Ayala made to J regarding the nature of the
interview and is limited with respect to the specific
questions Ayala asked J during the interview. See, e.g.,
State v. Freddy T., supra, 200 Conn. App. 593. In Roy D.
8
We note that the trial court’s focus, echoed by the state in its appellate
brief, on whether the interview itself had a medical purpose, particularly
when the court requested further foundation that ‘‘[the interview] was in
the course of . . . medical and diagnostic treatment,’’ was certainly relevant
to the pertinence prong but did not address the purpose prong as we have
clarified it. In determining whether the purpose prong is satisfied, the focus
is on the purpose of the interview as understood by the declarant. See, e.g.,
State v. Freddy T., supra, 200 Conn. App. 594.
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L., this court upheld the admission of forensic interview
statements under the medical treatment exception
when the interviewer introduced herself to the victim
as someone who ‘‘work[ed] for the hospital’’ and then
explained that ‘‘people who[m] [she] work[s] with were
observing the interview because they want to make
sure that [children’s] bodies are okay and that [the
children are] okay . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Roy D. L., supra, 339 Conn. 835; see id.
(‘‘[d]uring the course of the interview, [the interviewer]
asked [the victim] about her physical and mental wellbeing’’). Unlike in Roy D. L., the record in the present
case does not reveal how Ayala introduced herself to
J, whether she explained to J that part of the purpose
of the interview was to get information so J could
receive the appropriate medical treatment, whether she
asked J any questions about her physical or mental
health, or whether she otherwise made statements or
inquiries that would support a reasonable inference that
J understood the medical purpose of the interview.9
Third, the record is silent as to whether J discussed
any physical or mental health concerns during the interview. Cf., e.g., State v. Roy D. L., supra, 339 Conn. 828
(victim told forensic interviewer that abuse caused her
physical pain and made her uncomfortable); State v.
Dollinger, 20 Conn. App. 530, 536, 568 A.2d 1058 (‘‘[child’s]
complaints of pain, coupled with the physical manifestations of injury could have led the doctor . . . to conclude that the child was aware of her discomfort and
her need for medical attention’’), cert. denied, 215 Conn.
805, 574 A.2d 220 (1990). Although J testified at trial
9
Ayala testified that ‘‘forensic interviewers typically ask the child if they
have any worries or concerns about their body.’’ (Emphasis added.) The
state contends that this testimony supports an inference that J understood
the interview’s medical purpose. Our inquiry under the purpose prong is
limited to the circumstances perceived by the declarant, and we decline to
presume that an interviewer’s ‘‘typical’’ practice was carried out in the
present case for purposes of establishing that understanding on the part of J. Page 16 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
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State v. Giovanni D.
that the abuse ‘‘hurt’’ and made her feel ‘‘[s]cared,’’ this
testimony was almost two years after the forensic interview. This testimony may reflect on J’s physical and
mental condition while the abuse was occurring, but it
does not indicate whether she understood that there
was a medical purpose for her interview. There is no
evidence that J articulated these same complaints to
Ayala during the interview, which precludes us from
inferring that J’s statements were made for the purpose
of obtaining medical treatment.10
In addition, the timing of the forensic interview
weighs against an inference that J understood the interview’s purpose to be medical. See State v. Freddy T.,
supra, 200 Conn. App. 594–95. J first disclosed the sexual abuse to D at least five months after her final contact
with the defendant.11 Approximately four months later,
D reported the abuse to the police. Ayala did not interview J until thirteen days following the police report.
Given that at least ten months had passed since the
last instance of abuse and five months since her initial
disclosure, we cannot infer from timing alone that J
would have understood that her interview statements
were made for a medical purpose. See State v. Estrella
J.C., supra, 169 Conn. App. 77 (‘‘the timing and context
of the forensic interview in relation to the victim’s other
visits to medical professionals supported the conclu10
In State v. Telford, 108 Conn. App. 435, 948 A.2d 350, cert. denied, 289
Conn. 905, 957 A.2d 875 (2008), the Appellate Court used the child’s trial
testimony that she felt ‘‘ ‘upset,’ ‘mad,’ and ‘scared’ ’’ to support the inference
that she understood that her forensic interview had a medical purpose. Id.,
443. The court’s decision does not indicate whether these same complaints
were expressed during the child’s interview. We disagree with Telford to
the extent that it stands for the proposition that a child’s trial testimony
concerning his or her physical and mental health, without evidence that
those complaints were made during the interview, supports a finding of
medical purpose.
11
The last time J saw the defendant was in July, 2020, and her forensic
interview statements indicated that the last instance of abuse was before
that date.
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sion that the interview was . . . reasonably pertinent
to obtaining medical treatment’’). Indeed, Livingston
testified at trial that child sexual abuse victims often
heal quickly from physical injuries and that this may
have been the case for J. Furthermore, D brought J to
the police because she was concerned that the defendant, who had recently been released from prison, might
pose a threat to J, rather than for the purpose of
obtaining medical treatment.
The state argues that Ayala’s use of anatomical drawings as a clarification aid during the forensic interview
supports a finding of medical purpose. Although the
use of anatomical drawings and diagrams may signal
a medical purpose to a child in some contexts, that
circumstance alone cannot carry the inference. See,
e.g., State v. Estrella J.C., supra, 169 Conn. App. 62
(noting that victim had explained abuse using anatomical diagrams and dolls in assessing forensic interview
statements under medical treatment exception); State v.
Telford, 108 Conn. App. 435, 443, 948 A.2d 350 (forensic
interviewer’s use of exhibit of female body diagram,
among other things, established that child’s statements
were admissible under medical treatment exception),
cert. denied, 289 Conn. 905, 957 A.2d 875 (2008). Ayala
testified that she used an anatomical drawing of a male
body during the interview to help J articulate which
body parts were involved in the defendant’s abuse of
her. Ayala could not recall, however, whether she had
used an anatomical drawing of a female body to help
J explain how that abuse physically affected her health.
Because the purpose prong was not satisfied, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence J’s statements during the forensic
interview under the medical treatment exception.12
12
Although the purpose prong was not satisfied, we conclude that the
pertinence prong would have been satisfied, at least as to some of J’s
statements. Ayala was acting within the chain of medical care because she
worked collaboratively with other members of the multidisciplinary team,
which included medical professionals, and her interview was used to make
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C
The remaining question is whether the error was
harmful. See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 329 Conn. 272, 287–
88, 186 A.3d 1 (2018). ‘‘[W]hether [an improper ruling]
is harmless in a particular case depends [on] a number
of factors, such as the importance of the [evidence]
in the [defendant’s] case, whether the [evidence] was
cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the [evidence] on material
points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case. . . . Most importantly, we must examine
the impact of the . . . evidence on the trier of fact and
the result of the trial. . . . [T]he proper standard for
determining whether an erroneous evidentiary ruling
is harmless should be whether the jury’s verdict was
substantially swayed by the error. . . . Accordingly, a
nonconstitutional error is harmless when an appellate
court has a fair assurance that the error did not substantially affect the verdict.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Myers, 352 Conn. 770, 784, 338 A.3d 1088
(2025).
Given the lack of physical evidence or eyewitnesses
to the alleged abuse, the state’s case was not an exceedingly strong one. See State v. Fernando V., 331 Conn.
201, 215–216, 202 A.3d 350 (2019). It is therefore undisputed that this case turned on the credibility of J.
Indeed, during closing argument, the prosecutor stated:
‘‘If you don’t believe [J], then you should acquit [the
J’s medical and psychological referrals for treatment. On many occasions,
this court has held that social workers and forensic interviewers were within
the chain of medical care, so long as the statements made to them were
for a medical purpose and pertinent to that end. See, e.g., State v. Arroyo,
supra, 284 Conn. 633 (social worker and forensic interviewer at sexual abuse
clinic); State v. Cruz, supra, 260 Conn. 6 (social worker at hospital). Further,
Livingston relied on Ayala’s forensic interview report to obtain J’s medical
history and to inform her examination.
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defendant]. . . . If you do believe her, it’s your duty
to convict him.’’ In light of this, the defendant argues
that Ayala’s testimony was harmful to the extent that
it bolstered J’s credibility by repeating her allegations
of sexual abuse. Although this case presents a close call,
we conclude that the trial court’s error was harmless.
At trial, and before the jury heard any testimony from
Ayala, J testified regarding her allegations of sexual
abuse, telling the jury that the defendant ‘‘had [her]
move [her] hand up and down on [his penis],’’ that he
had put his penis in her ‘‘butt’’ and ‘‘mouth,’’ and that
the abuse happened ‘‘more than [she could] count.’’ J
further testified about instances of physical and emotional abuse, including that the defendant had slapped
her, threatened to kill her, choked her, and pulled her
hair, which she explained ‘‘hurt’’ and made her feel
‘‘[s]cared.’’ Ayala testified after J; the majority of her
testimony discussed the process of disclosure for victims of sexual abuse, the composition and purpose of
multidisciplinary teams, and the goals of forensic interviews. Ayala also testified, but only briefly, about the
statements that J had made during the forensic interview. It is this limited testimony that the defendant
challenges on appeal. Although this portion of Ayala’s
testimony reiterated some of J’s previous testimony,
we nevertheless have a fair assurance under the circumstances of this case that it did not substantially affect
the jury’s verdict.
We consider it important that the challenged testimony did not present any new material to the jury
regarding the specific instances of abuse.13 See, e.g.,
13
Ayala testified that, during the forensic interview, J ‘‘described being
threatened . . . having her hair pulled and being choked . . . and that she
couldn’t breathe.’’ (Emphasis added.) J similarly testified at trial about these
instances. J’s trial testimony differed from Ayala’s because J did not mention
that she ‘‘couldn’t breathe.’’ Instead, J testified: ‘‘[The defendant] had choked
[me] until I [removed my clothes]. . . . [He choked me] [a]round my neck.’’
During closing argument, the prosecutor did not mention the choking
allegation or the fact that J could not breathe. Her focus, instead, was on Page 20 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
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State v. Giovanni D.
State v. Gonzalez, 272 Conn. 515, 528–29, 864 A.2d 847
(2005) (harmless error when improper testimony was
cumulative of victim’s earlier graphic and detailed testimony about defendant’s sexual abuse). But cf. State v.
Fernando V., supra, 331 Conn. 219 (concluding that
exclusion of testimony was harmful because, inter alia,
it would have presented jury with new information).
Rather, Ayala’s discussion of J’s forensic interview
statements reiterated, in less detail, J’s earlier testimony.14 Although repetitious testimony in cases that
turn on the complainant’s credibility may be considered
harmful bolstering; see, e.g., State v. Grenier, 257 Conn.
797, 808, 778 A.2d 159 (2001) (concluding that improper
testimony that had effect of vouching for victim ‘‘struck
at the heart of the central—indeed, the only—issue in
the case, namely, the relative credibility of [the victim]’’); we conclude that Ayala’s testimony, which was
both brief and underinclusive of J’s testimony, did not
rise to that level.
Importantly, even without Ayala’s testimony, the jury
would have learned of J’s forensic interview statements
through the unchallenged testimony of Livingston, who
was also asked at trial to identify the specific instances
of abuse that J had reported. Without objection, Livingston testified: ‘‘[J] reported . . . penile-oral penetration . . . penile-anal penetration . . . and making her
the ‘‘three different acts that [J] . . . identified in the course of her testimony,’’ namely, penile to anal penetration, penile to oral penetration, and
masturbation. (Emphasis added.) The prosecutor then emphasized to whom
J identified the acts: ‘‘She identified it to [the jury]. She identified it to . . .
Livingston. She identified it to . . . Ayala in terms of what happened and
what she described to have occurred when she was living with [the defendant] in New Britain over the course of 2015 through . . . 2020.’’ Because
the prosecutor did not mention it during closing argument, we do not consider the isolated reference in Ayala’s testimony to the fact that J could not
breathe to be significant to the state’s overall case.
14
Unlike Ayala, J testified that the abuse ‘‘hurt’’ and made her feel
‘‘[s]cared,’’ that the defendant made her remove her clothes, and that the
abuse would stop ‘‘[w]hen the weird liquid happened.’’
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touch his penis with her hand and move it up and down
until he ejaculated.’’ In addition to this testimony, the
relevant portion of Livingston’s medical report was
admitted into evidence without objection following a
redaction.15 This report contained a history from the
forensic interview, which included the following: ‘‘[J]
identified [the defendant] and reported sexual abuse
including multiple incidents with contact including
penile-oral penetration, penile-anal penetration, and
[the defendant] making [J] touch his penis with her
hand and [move] it up and down until he ejaculated.’’
Additionally, in evaluating harm, we consider how
the state used the improperly admitted evidence during
closing argument. See, e.g., State v. Ayala, 333 Conn.
225, 235, 215 A.3d 116 (2019). ‘‘[W]e find it telling [when]
the state [does] not specifically mention, and certainly
[does] not emphasize, the challenged statement during
its closing argument, thus diminishing the importance
of the statement to the state’s case.’’ Id.; see, e.g., State
v. Thompson, 266 Conn. 440, 456, 832 A.2d 626 (2003).
In the present case, the prosecutor did not emphasize
Ayala’s testimony concerning J’s forensic interview
statements during closing argument but, instead, relied
on a limited portion of it that is not challenged on
appeal: ‘‘You also heard from . . . Ayala about the process of disclosure, how kids disclose, when they disclose, what can affect it.’’ The prosecutor then explained
the specific utility of this testimony to the jury, which
was not to bolster J’s claims but, rather, to offer context
to her process of disclosure: ‘‘[T]hat testimony was for
15
When the state sought to introduce Livingston’s medical report, defense
counsel objected, arguing that the ‘‘history’’ section of the report contained
hearsay statements. Specifically, defense counsel, outside of the presence
of the jury, contended that the report improperly included statements made
by D, who only obtained information about the abuse from J’s department
social worker. The trial court then redacted a portion of the report’s history
section and statements made by third parties.
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the purpose of trying to give you some information to
properly assess what’s before you.’’ (Emphasis added.)
Finally, while deliberating, the jury requested a playback of the portion of Ayala’s testimony ‘‘about [multidisciplinary teams’] responsibilities and . . . who is on
the team.’’ The defendant argues that this request highlights the centrality of Ayala’s testimony to the state’s
case. We disagree. Although a jury’s request to hear
evidence again indicates the significance of an issue or
related evidence to the verdict; see, e.g., State v. Carter,
232 Conn. 537, 549, 656 A.2d 657 (1995); the jury’s question focused on Ayala’s testimony regarding the responsibilities and structure of multidisciplinary teams, which
did not implicate the erroneously admitted hearsay statements. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that
Ayala’stestimony did not substantially sway the jury’s
verdict.
II
The defendant’s next claim is that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his request to provide
the jury with a special child credibility instruction16
16
The defendant requested the following special credibility instruction:
‘‘In weighing the testimony of a child, you should also take into consideration
her youth. In certain respects, a child is more apt to err than an older person;
she is apt to be more amenable to any influence or suggestion which may
be made to her by an older person and particularly persons closely related
to her, and may try to avoid causing such persons to be angry with her.
[Their] imaginations often also mislead them; its product may take on all
the semblance of actual fact, and they will relate them as such. The sanctity
of the oath and the solemnity of legal proceedings may appeal to them less
than to an adult. On the other hand, motives of interest and ultimate design
or purpose often sway her less than they do an adult. Perhaps these suggestions by me are sufficient to indicate to you that, in weighing the testimony
of a child, her youth is a factor you should not overlook, and to make clear
that you should apply your own experience and knowledge of childhood.
‘‘The capacity and intelligence of a child, her understanding of the difference between truth and falsehood, and her appreciation of the duty to tell
the truth and, in a general way, belief that failure to perform that obligation
will result in punishment, are ingredients which you should consider in
assessing the testimony of a child.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 23
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State v. Giovanni D.
concerning J’s testimony. Alternatively, the defendant
asks this court to exercise its supervisory authority
over the administration of justice to modify its approach
to special child credibility instructions, as stated in
State v. James, 211 Conn. 555, 570–71, 560 A.2d 426
(1989), overruled in part on other grounds by State v.
Douglas C., 345 Conn. 421, 285 A.3d 1067 (2022). We
are not persuaded by the defendant’s claim and decline
to exercise our supervisory authority as requested.
‘‘The general rule is that a [criminal] defendant is not
entitled to an instruction singling out any of the state’s
witnesses and highlighting his or her possible motive for
testifying falsely.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Jones, 337 Conn. 486, 495, 254 A.3d 239 (2020).
‘‘Such a cautionary comment [on] the evidence . . . is
now clearly within the discretion of the trial court.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Hayes, 20 Conn. App. 737, 748, 570 A.2d 716,
cert. denied, 215 Conn. 802, 574 A.2d 218 (1990). This
rule applies with equal force to jury instructions concerning the credibility of child witnesses; see id.; and
‘‘court[s] considering whether to give a special child
credibility instruction [may consider] factors [including], the child’s age, corroboration of the accusations,
the child’s ability to recall and discuss events in the
past, and the child’s understanding of the concept of
truthfulness.’’ State v. Ceballos, 266 Conn. 364, 423, 832
A.2d 14 (2003), overruled in part on other grounds by
State v. Douglas C., 345 Conn. 421, 285 A.3d 1067 (2022).
‘‘[T]he lack of corroboration, beyond constancy of accusation evidence, is not dispositive.’’ State v. Ceballos,
supra, 424.
The defendant has failed to establish that the trial
court’s denial of his request for a special child credibility
instruction was an abuse of discretion under the circumstances. J was twelve years old at the time of trial,
which is an age that, in itself, does not generally warrant
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a special credibility instruction. See, e.g., id., 423–24
(denial of special child credibility instruction was not
abuse of discretion when child was eight years old at
time of trial); State v. James, supra, 211 Conn. 570–71
(denial of special child credibility instruction was not
abuse of discretion when child was twelve years old at
time of trial). Additionally, the defendant concedes that
J was a competent witness and that she understood the
concept of truthfulness.17 We can identify no reason,
particular to this case, that would have required the
trial court to give the jury the requested special child
credibility instruction. We therefore decline to disturb
the trial court’s decision.
Alternatively, the defendant asks this court to exercise its supervisory authority to modify its approach to
special child credibility instructions, as stated in James,
and to hold that a defendant is entitled to such an
instruction when the evidence establishes a particularized credibility concern for a child complainant. The
defendant offers three limiting factors to his proposed
rule, namely, that the case (1) is charged as a continuing
course of conduct, (2) involves a delayed disclosure,
and (3) has particularized trial evidence underlying a
theory of suggestion.
‘‘It is well settled that [a]ppellate courts possess an
inherent supervisory authority over the administration
of justice. . . . Supervisory powers are exercised to
direct trial courts to adopt judicial procedures that will
address matters that are of utmost seriousness, not only
for the integrity of a particular trial but also for the
perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole.
. . . Under our supervisory authority, we have adopted
17
The defendant also argues that the special child credibility instruction
was necessary to evaluate J’s credibility because of the lack of corroborative
evidence and her difficulty recalling the abuse at trial. We disagree and
conclude that these concerns were sufficiently addressed by the general
credibility instruction provided to the jury by the trial court.
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rules intended to guide the lower courts in the administration of justice in all aspects of the criminal process.
. . . We ordinarily invoke our supervisory powers to
enunciate a rule that is not constitutionally required
but that we think is preferable as a matter of policy.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Medrano, 308 Conn. 604, 630, 65 A.3d 503 (2013).
In James, this court overruled its earlier decision in
State v. Anderson, 152 Conn. 196, 205 A.2d 488 (1964),
and held that a trial court retains broad discretion over
whether to grant requests for special child credibility
instructions. State v. James, supra, 211 Conn. 570–71.
‘‘In so doing, [this court] noted the difficulty in fixing
an age when such an instruction would be necessary,
and expressed concern that singling out the testimony
of the child witness for special scrutiny may infringe
[on] the jury’s exclusive role as arbiter of credibility.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Angell, 237
Conn. 321, 330, 677 A.2d 912 (1996); see State v. James,
supra, 568. The court in James additionally reasoned
that ‘‘[a]uthorities, more qualified than judges in regard
to child behavior, question the conventional wisdom
that children are less likely to be truthful on the witness
stand than adults . . . .’’ State v. James, supra, 568.
Because trial courts retain discretion to consider, at
the defendant’s request and on the basis of the particular facts of the case, whether to give a special credibility
instruction, there is no need to exercise our supervisory
authority and to disrupt our holding in James. ‘‘[I]n a
case involving the sexual abuse of a very young child,
that child’s capacity to recall specifics, and the state’s
concomitant ability to provide exactitude in an information, are very limited.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stephen J. R., 309 Conn. 586, 596, 72 A.3d
379 (2013). Thus, ‘‘[t]his court will not impose a degree
of certitude . . . that will render prosecutions of those
who sexually abuse children impossible.’’ State v. SaraPage 26 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
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State v. Giovanni D.
ceno, 15 Conn. App. 222, 237, 545 A.2d 1116, cert. denied,
209 Conn. 823, 552 A.2d 431 (1988), and cert. denied,
209 Conn. 824, 552 A.2d 432 (1988).
The defendant also argues that child witnesses should
be treated like the narrow classes of witnesses that we
have concluded warrant a special credibility instruction, namely, jailhouse informants, accomplices, and
complaining witnesses. See, e.g., State v. Bruny, 342
Conn. 169, 202, 269 A.3d 38 (2022). Children as a class
do not present the same inherent unreliability as these
witnesses, who have ‘‘a powerful incentive, fueled by
self-interest, to implicate falsely the accused.’’ State v.
Diaz, 302 Conn. 93, 102, 25 A.3d 594 (2011); see also
State v. Ceballos, supra, 266 Conn. 422–23 (noting that
research does not suggest children are less likely to be
truthful). In cases of child sexual abuse, we are confident that ‘‘cross-examination and argument by counsel
are . . . likely to be adequate tools for exposing the
truth . . . .’’ State v. Diaz, supra, 110. Accordingly, we
decline to exercise our supervisory authority to hold
that a defendant is entitled to a special child credibility instruction.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.