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Page 3 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL December 9, 2025
2 DECEMBER, 2025 353 Conn. 667
Duso v. Groton
DONNA DUSO ET AL. v. TOWN OF GROTON
(SC 21082)
McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker, Dannehy and Elgo, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiffs, retired law enforcement officers formerly employed by the
defendant town, sought a judgment declaring that, pursuant to a pension
agreement between the town and the union that had represented them
during their employment, they were entitled to the same contributions to
their health savings accounts (HSAs) that the town makes to the HSAs of
police officers currently employed by the town (active police officers). The
provision of the pension agreement addressing the scope of health insurance
coverage for retirees provided that retirees are entitled to the ‘‘nature and
scope of coverages, including but not limited to deductibles . . . in effect
for active [p]olice [o]fficers . . . .’’ The pension agreement was incorporated into a collective bargaining agreement, executed after all of the plaintiffs retired, pursuant to which the town changed its group health insurance
plan to a high deductible plan with an annual deductible of $2000 for single
person coverage and $4000 for two or more person coverage. The collective
bargaining agreement also requires the town to contribute 50 percent of
the cost of an active police officer’s annual deductible to the active police
officer’s HSA. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and the Appellate
Court upheld the trial court’s decision, concluding that the pension agreement required the town to make the same HSA contributions to the plaintiffs’
HSAs that it makes to the HSAs of active police officers. On the granting
of certification, the defendant appealed to this court. Held:
The Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the pension agreement entitled the plaintiffs to the same HSA contributions as those made by the town
to the HSAs of active police officers, and, accordingly, this court reversed
the Appellate Court’s judgment, remanded the case, and directed that the
trial court render judgment for the town.
The plain and unambiguous meaning of the terms ‘‘coverages’’ and ‘‘deductibles,’’ as well as the general nature of HSAs, led this court to conclude that
HSA contributions did not qualify as insurance coverage or a deductible
under the pension agreement.
Whereas insurance coverage refers to the risk an insurer agrees to bear,
subject to the defined terms and limits set forth in an insurance policy, a
contribution to an HSA is not a term of the health insurance policy and
does not otherwise expand, limit, or define any insured risks.
Moreover, unlike a deductible, which is a fixed and structural part of an
insurance policy that defines the threshold point at which insurance coverage begins, an HSA is a separate funding mechanism outside of the insurance December 9, 2025 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 4
353 Conn. 667 DECEMBER, 2025 3
Duso v. Groton
policy, such that the existence of an HSA does not change the deductible
required by the terms of the insurance policy or satisfy the deductible by
virtue of HSA’s existence or availability, especially when HSA funds can be
used for purposes other than satisfying an insured’s deductible.
Even if this court assumed that the relevant language of the pension agreement was ambiguous, extrinsic evidence demonstrating that the town and
the union, as the contracting parties, did not intend for the HSA contribution
payments to constitute coverage or a deductible within the meaning of the
pension agreement further supported the conclusion that the plaintiffs were
not entitled to the HSA contributions that active police officers receive from
the town.
(One justice dissenting)
Argued September 15—officially released December 9, 2025
Procedural History
Action seeking, inter alia, a judgment declaring the
scope of the defendant’s obligations under a pension
agreement to make contributions to the plaintiffs’
health savings accounts, and for other relief, brought
to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New
London, where the court, Graff, J., adopted the parties’
joint stipulation of facts and rendered judgment for
the plaintiffs; thereafter, the court, Graff, J., awarded
compensatory damages to the plaintiffs, and the defendant appealed and the plaintiffs cross appealed to the
Appellate Court, Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Clark,
Js., which affirmed the trial court’s judgment, and the
defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to
this court. Reversed; judgment directed.
Kristi D. Kelly, with whom, on the brief, was Kyle
J. Zrenda, for the appellant (defendant).
Jacques J. Parenteau, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Opinion
DANNEHY, J. The question we must decide in the
present appeal is whether the plaintiffs, retired police
officers of the town of Groton, are entitled under a 2008
pension agreement to receive health savings account
Page 5 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL December 9, 2025
4 DECEMBER, 2025 353 Conn. 667
Duso v. Groton
(HSA) contributions from the town, like the town now
pays to its active police officers under a successive
collective bargaining agreement, which incorporates
the same 2008 pension agreement. The Appellate Court
concluded that the plaintiffs are, holding that the provision of the 2008 pension agreement entitling retirees
to the ‘‘nature and scope of coverages, including but not
limited to deductibles . . . in effect for active [p]olice
[o]fficers’’ extended to the HSA contributions that are
paid to active police officers. See Duso v. Groton, 228
Conn. App. 390, 423–24, 325 A.3d 295 (2024). We granted
the town’s petition for certification to appeal and now
reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.1
I
The underlying facts of this case are undisputed.2 The
plaintiffs, Donna Duso, David Menard, James Gauthier,
Kathleen Doyle, and Dexter Herron, were all employees
of the defendant, the town of Groton, and all retired
from the town at different times between 2012 and 2016.
Duso served as an animal control officer during most
of her tenure with the town, and Menard, Gauthier,
Doyle, and Herron served as police officers. At all relevant times during their employment, the plaintiffs were
represented by the Groton Police Union, Local 3428 of
Council 15, or Council 4 as successor in interest to
Council 15, of AFSCME, AFL-CIO (union), as their duly
elected bargaining representative.3
1
We granted the town’s petition limited to the following issues: (1) ‘‘Did
the Appellate Court correctly determine that the nature and scope of health
insurance coverage for the plaintiffs, who are retired employees of the
[town], included [HSA] contributions that are made to the accounts of
the [town’s] current employees under the applicable collective bargaining
agreement?’’ And (2) ‘‘[d]id the Appellate Court properly uphold the trial
court’s damages award?’’ Duso v. Groton, 350 Conn. 933, 327 A.3d 385 (2024).
2
In lieu of a court trial, the parties submitted a joint stipulation of facts
and various exhibits to the trial court. The trial court, in turn, adopted all
the stipulated facts as its findings of facts.
3
The union is not a party to this action. The town argued before the
trial court and the Appellate Court that the union was a necessary and
indispensable party to this action. Both courts disagreed. See Duso v. Groton, December 9, 2025 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 6
353 Conn. 667 DECEMBER, 2025 5
Duso v. Groton
During the course of the plaintiffs’ employment, the
town and the union collectively bargained the terms and
conditions of the plaintiffs’ employment in accordance
with the Municipal Employee Relations Act, General
Statutes § 7-467 et seq., resulting in a series of written
collective bargaining agreements every few years, each
typically covering a time period from two to four years,
depending on the agreement reached between the town
and the union. Under the pertinent agreements, the
plaintiffs were entitled to enroll in the town’s group
health insurance plan. All five plaintiffs participated in
the plan, which, during the time of their employment,
was a preferred provider option (PPO) plan as the primary option, with a high deductible health plan (HDHP)
as an alternative option. At all relevant times, the town
has provided self-insured health plans, with Anthem
Blue Cross/Blue Shield (Anthem) serving as the benefits
administrator under an administrative services contract
with the town.
At the time that each plaintiff retired from his or
her employment with the town, the operative collective
bargaining agreements incorporated by reference the
same collectively bargained pension agreement,4 ‘‘An
Agreement Between the Town of Groton and the Groton
Police Union, Local 3428 of Council 15 AFSCME Concerning Pensions August 1, 2008–June 30, 2012’’ (2008
supra, 228 Conn. App. 410–11. That issue is not before us in the present
appeal, and we express no view on the merits of that question. See, e.g.,
Rodriguez v. Kaiaffa, LLC, 337 Conn. 248, 275, 253 A.3d 13 (2020) (‘‘the
failure to give notice to or to join an indispensable party does not impact
the court’s subject matter jurisdiction’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
4
Because the plaintiffs retired from their employment with the town at
different times, different collective bargaining agreements were in effect at
the time of their respective retirements. The agreement between the town
and the Groton Police Union, Local 3428, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, for the period
July 1, 2011, through June 30, 2014, was in effect when Gauthier and Menard
retired, and the agreement between the town and the Groton Police Union,
Local 3428, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, for the period July 1, 2014, through June
30, 2016, was in effect when Duso, Doyle, and Herron retired.
Page 7 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL December 9, 2025
6 DECEMBER, 2025 353 Conn. 667
Duso v. Groton
pension agreement). The 2008 pension agreement sets
5
forth, among other things, the terms and conditions
under which retirees may elect to continue health insurance coverage into retirement under the town’s group
health insurance plan.
Section 16 of the 2008 pension agreement specifically
addresses the scope of health insurance coverage for
retirees under the age of sixty-five, which includes all
the plaintiffs. Section 16 (C) provides in relevant part:
‘‘The nature and scope of coverages, including but not
limited to deductibles, co-insurance, co-pays and/or limits, shall be those in effect for active Police Officers,
as those coverages, including but not limited to deductibles, co-insurance, co-pays and/or limits, may change
from time to time, except dental which, if provided
to active Police Officers, shall be limited for Retirees,
Spouses and/or Dependents, where applicable, to basic
coverage . . . as provided to active Police Officers.
Said coverages shall be available until such time as the
Retiree, Spouse and/or Dependents become eligible for
Medicare or reach age [sixty-five], whichever is earlier.’’
(Footnote omitted.) Upon retirement, the plaintiffs each
elected to continue coverage under the town’s PPO plan
that was offered to active employees.
Following the plaintiffs’ retirements, the town and the
union entered into a successive collective bargaining
agreement for the period July 1, 2016, through June 30,
2020 (2016 CBA), regarding the rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, and other conditions of employment for all active police officers. Like earlier collective
bargaining agreements between the town and the union,
the 2008 pension agreement was expressly incorporated
The parties stipulated that ‘‘[a]ll the plaintiffs are ‘police officers’ as
5
defined by § 1 of the [2008] pension agreement and are ‘regular employees’
to which the terms and conditions of the [2008] pension agreement apply,
as set forth in § 3 of the [2008] pension agreement.’’
December 9, 2025 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 8
353 Conn. 667 DECEMBER, 2025 7
Duso v. Groton
by reference into the 2016 CBA and made an attachment
to that agreement.
Pursuant to article 22.1 of the 2016 CBA, the town
and the union agreed that, in 2018, the town’s group
health insurance plan for active police officers would
be changed from a PPO plan to an HDHP. Active police
officers enrolled in the town’s health insurance were
moved from the PPO plan to the HDHP effective January 1, 2018, and retirees, including the plaintiffs, were
required to enroll in the HDHP no later than July 1,
2018. All of the plaintiffs enrolled in the HDHP effective
July 1, 2018.
In conjunction with changing from a PPO plan to an
HDHP, the 2016 CBA required active police officers to
open and maintain HSAs.6 The 2016 CBA also provided
that active police officers would receive from the town
a contribution to their HSAs in the amount equal to 50
percent of each active police officer’s annual in-network
deductible. The 2016 CBA delineated that the in-network deductibles are $2000 for single person coverage
and $4000 for two person or family coverage. Thus,
active police officers electing single person coverage
would receive from the town a $1000 contribution to
their HSA each year on a nontax basis and active police
officers purchasing two person or family coverage
would receive a $2000 contribution to their HSA on a
nontax basis. For those active police officers legally
ineligible to open an HSA, the town agreed, in the 2016
CBA, to provide them with a taxable payment in the
same amount. The 2016 CBA did not contain any limita6
As explained in greater detail in this opinion, an HSA is a creature of
federal law originating under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act of 2003. See Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1201, 117 Stat.
2066, 2469 (2003). HSAs are tax advantaged savings accounts created to
help eligible individuals pay for qualified medical expenses. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 223 (d) (1) and (f) (2018). The parties stipulated that retirees were not
required to open and maintain an HSA but had the option to do so.
Page 9 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL December 9, 2025
8 DECEMBER, 2025 353 Conn. 667
Duso v. Groton
tion on how active police officers were permitted to
use the town’s contributions to their HSAs or payments
made by the town in lieu of such contributions. Commencing July 1, 2018, and each year since, active police
officers enrolled in the HDHP have received those payments. It is undisputed that the plaintiffs have not
received them.
In November, 2018, the plaintiffs commenced a
declaratory judgment action in the Superior Court asking that the court declare that, under the terms of the
2008 pension agreement, the plaintiffs are not receiving
the ‘‘nature and scope of coverages . . . in effect for
active Police Officers’’ and that the town is required
to ‘‘contribute 50% of the deductible amount to [the
plaintiffs’] HSA accounts on a pretax or taxable basis
based on [the plaintiffs’] eligibility to maintain a HSA
account.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In lieu
of a court trial, the parties submitted a joint stipulation
of facts and various exhibits to the trial court. The trial
court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the
payment equal to 50 percent of the deductible was part
of the ‘‘essence of the deductible’’ and that the plaintiffs,
therefore, were entitled under the 2008 pension agreement to the same HSA payments as active police officers. Following briefing by the parties, the court
ordered the town to pay damages to the plaintiffs totaling $36,000.7 The court declined to award any attorney’s fees.
The town appealed to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court agreed with the trial court that the 2008
pension agreement precluded the town from contributing an amount equal to 50 percent of the deductible to
active police officers’ HSAs without making the same
7
The trial court concluded that the town was liable to Duso in the amount
of $5000, Gauthier in the amount of $10,000, Menard in the amount of $6000,
Doyle in the amount of $5000, and Herron in the amount of $10,000.
December 9, 2025 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 10
353 Conn. 667 DECEMBER, 2025 9
Duso v. Groton
contribution to the plaintiffs’ HSAs. Duso v. Groton,
supra, 228 Conn. App. 414. It reasoned that, because
active police officers, in effect, are ‘‘obligated to pay
only $1000 for individuals or $2000 for families before
the [town] . . . begins paying their claims,’’ the active
police officers’ deductibles ‘‘are less than those of the
plaintiffs.’’ Id. The court rejected the town’s claim that
the term ‘‘deductible’’ under the 2008 pension agreement ‘‘does not include the source from which the
deductible is paid.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 414, 416. The court also rejected the town’s claim
that the trial court erred in calculating the damages
owed to the plaintiffs. Id., 424.
The town subsequently filed a petition for certification to appeal. We granted its petition, and this appeal
followed.
II
The town claims that the Appellate Court erred in
concluding that the 2008 pension agreement entitled
the plaintiffs to the same HSA contributions as active
police officers. It argues that the court incorrectly determined that HSA contributions qualify as insurance ‘‘coverages,’’ and, more specifically, that they qualify as
‘‘deductibles’’ under the 2008 pension agreement. We
agree.
A
This court interprets collective bargaining agreements according to ordinary principles of contract law.
See, e.g., Gallagher v. Fairfield, 339 Conn. 801, 807,
262 A.3d 742 (2021); Poole v. Waterbury, 266 Conn. 68,
87–88, 831 A.2d 211 (2003). Under these well established
principles, ‘‘[a] contract must be construed to effectuate
the intent of the parties, which is determined from the
language used interpreted in the light of the situation
of the parties and the circumstances connected with
Page 11 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL December 9, 2025
10 DECEMBER, 2025 353 Conn. 667
Duso v. Groton
the transaction. . . . [When] the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be
given effect according to its terms. A court will not
torture words to import ambiguity [when] the ordinary
meaning leaves no room for ambiguity . . . . Similarly,
any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the
language used in the contract rather than from one
party’s subjective perception of the terms.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Poole v. Waterbury, supra,
87–88. ‘‘[T]he mere fact that the parties advance different interpretations of the language in question does not
necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Honulik v.
Greenwich, 293 Conn. 698, 710–11, 980 A.2d 880 (2009).
‘‘Although ordinarily the question of contract interpretation, being a question of the parties’ intent, is a
question of fact . . . [when] there is definitive contract
language, the determination of what the parties intended
by their contractual commitments is a question of law.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Garcia v. Hartford,
292 Conn. 334, 341, 972 A.2d 706 (2009). ‘‘When only
one interpretation of a contract is possible, the court
need not look outside the four corners of the contract.’’
Poole v. Waterbury, supra, 266 Conn. 89.
At the time that each plaintiff retired, he or she was
covered by a collective bargaining agreement that incorporated the 2008 pension agreement by reference.8 The
parties do not dispute that the plaintiffs are third-party
beneficiaries of the 2008 pension agreement. Section
16 (C) of the 2008 pension agreement, which delineates
the nature and scope of the health insurance coverage
to which the plaintiffs are entitled, provides in relevant
part that ‘‘[t]he nature and scope of coverages, including
but not limited to deductibles, co-insurance, co-pays
and/or limits, shall be those in effect for active Police
8
See footnote 4 of this opinion.
December 9, 2025 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 12
353 Conn. 667 DECEMBER, 2025 11
Duso v. Groton
Officers, as those coverages, including but not limited
to deductibles, co-insurance, co-pays and/or limits, may
change from time to time . . . .’’
To determine the ‘‘[t]he nature and scope of coverages’’ to which the plaintiffs are entitled, we must necessarily examine the coverages ‘‘in effect for active Police
Officers . . . .’’ At the time the plaintiffs brought the
underlying declaratory judgment action, article 22.1 (A)
(2) of the 2016 CBA described the health coverages to
which active police officers at that time were entitled,
as well as other terms and conditions. It provides in
relevant part: ‘‘[T]he Town shall provide current full
time employees and dependents with the following
health coverage (inclusive of vision coverage) . . .
‘‘A High Deductible Health Plan (HDHP), or substantially similar plan, with shared in network ($2000/$4000)
and out of network ($5000/$6850) deductibles; medical
cost of care edits and utilization management; prescription rider with mandatory generic substitution, cost of
care edits and utilization management.
‘‘After the deductible, 0% co-insurance for in network,
80%/20% co-insurance for out of network, medical cost
of care edits and utilization management, and the following, or substantially similar, prescription drug rider
with mandatory generic substitution, cost of care edits
and utilization management, no annual limit and the
following co-pays:
Retail (30 day supply):
$10/generic
$25/brand
$40/non listed brand
Mail Order (90 day supply):
$10/generic
$50/brand
$80/non-preferred brand
Page 13 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL December 9, 2025
12 DECEMBER, 2025 353 Conn. 667
Duso v. Groton
‘‘Employees are required to open and maintain a
Health Savings Account . . . in conjunction with the
HDHP.
‘‘The Town will fund fifty percent (50%) of the annual
in-network deductible on a non-tax basis in each of the
plan years 2017–2018, 2018–2019 and 2019–2020. The
Town will make its contribution in one installment on
or about July 1.
‘‘Employees who are legally ineligible to open a HSA,
but who enroll in the HDHP, will receive fifty percent
(50%) of the annual in-network deductible on a taxable basis.’’
Article 22.1 (A) (2) of the 2016 CBA concludes with
the following italicized proviso: ‘‘NOTE: The Town’s
fifty percent (50%) contribution toward the funding
of the HDHP plan is not an element of the underlying
insurance plan, but rather relates to the manner in
which the deductible shall be funded for active employees. The Town shall have no obligation to fund any
portion of the HDHP deductible for retirees or other
individuals upon their separation from employment.
Under 65 retirees must enroll in the HDHP as of July
1, 2017, or as soon as legally possible following the
ratification of this 2016–2020 agreement, but in no
case later than July 1, 2018.’’9 (Emphasis in original.)
The plaintiffs maintain that the town failed to provide
them with the same deductible as active police officers
because the town agreed in the 2016 CBA to contribute
to active police officers’ HSAs in the amount of 50
percent of the deductible but did not do so for the
plaintiffs. They contend that this contribution has, in
effect, lowered active police officers’ deductibles to
9
The parties also submitted into evidence a ‘‘Summary of Benefits and
Coverage’’ document prepared by Anthem. It describes, in more detail,
the coverage, deductibles, co-pays, co-insurance, and limits for the health
insurance benefits offered by the town.
December 9, 2025 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 14
353 Conn. 667 DECEMBER, 2025 13
Duso v. Groton
$1000 for individual plans and $2000 for two person
and family plans, whereas retirees are paying $2000 for
individual plans and $4000 for two person and family
plans.
The town contends that HSA contributions do not
constitute insurance ‘‘coverages’’ or ‘‘deductibles’’ within
the meaning of the 2008 pension agreement, reasoning
that a deductible is a set dollar amount in an insurance
policy, exclusive of the source or manner in which the
amount is paid. It argues that the trial court improperly
conflated the insurance plan’s deductible with how the
deductible is paid.10
10
The town also argues that the term ‘‘deductible’’ cannot be interpreted
to include HSA contributions because (1) the 2016 CBA and the 2008 pension
agreement are not separate accords but, rather, a single contract that must
be read as a whole and that, when one reads the note in article 22.1 of the
2016 CBA together with the 2008 pension agreement, the unambiguous
meaning of the contract as a whole is that retirees are not entitled to the
HSA contributions, and (2) the parties stipulated that the 2016 CBA was
the subject of this declaratory judgment action and that the 2016 CBA not
only incorporated the 2008 pension agreement but also modified it, consistent with the terms of § 19 of the 2008 pension agreement.
We do not find either of these two related arguments persuasive. In its
brief and at oral argument, counsel for the town acknowledged that the
plaintiffs were not third-party beneficiaries of any portion of the 2016 CBA
other than the 2008 pension agreement that was attached to it. Indeed,
the parties expressly stipulated that all of the plaintiffs retired from their
employment with the town prior to the effective date of the 2016 CBA and
under other collective bargaining agreements that had also incorporated
the 2008 pension agreement. Although the 2016 CBA is important for the
purpose of determining what health insurance coverages and deductibles
active police officers are receiving in order to determine what coverages
and deductibles the plaintiffs are entitled to under the 2008 pension agreement, the 2016 CBA is extrinsic evidence with respect to the meaning of
the terms in the 2008 pension agreement; see part II B of this opinion; and,
more specifically, does not inform the meaning of the terms ‘‘coverages’’
and ‘‘deductibles’’ in the 2008 pension agreement because, as we explain in
this opinion, those terms, as they appear in the 2008 pension agreement, are
plain and unambiguous. Second, the stipulated facts and evidence provide
no support for the town’s argument that the 2016 CBA, and, specifically,
the note in article 22.1 of the 2016 CBA, modified the 2008 pension agreement
pursuant to the contract reopening requirements in § 19 of that agreement. Page 15 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL December 9, 2025
14 DECEMBER, 2025 353 Conn. 667
Duso v. Groton
Turning to the 2008 pension agreement, we observe
that the term ‘‘coverages’’ in § 16 (C) is not defined,
though the agreement makes clear that it includes but
is not limited to ‘‘deductibles, co-insurance, co-pays
and/or limits . . . .’’ The term ‘‘deductibles’’ is also not
defined. To determine what the town and the union
intended by the use of these terms in the 2008 pension
agreement, we must look to their ‘‘common, natural,
and ordinary meaning[s] and usage . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Poole v. Waterbury, supra,
266 Conn. 88. To do so, this court often consults dictionaries. See, e.g., Garcia v. Hartford, supra, 292 Conn. 345.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘‘coverage’’ as the
‘‘[i]nclusion of a risk under an insurance policy; the
risks within the scope of an insurance policy.’’ Black’s
Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009) p. 422. Another dictionary
defines ‘‘coverage’’ in relevant part as ‘‘[i]nclusion in
an insurance policy or protective plan’’; ‘‘[t]he extent
of protection afforded by an insurance policy.’’ The
American Heritage College Dictionary (4th Ed. 2007)
p. 329. Distilled, the term ‘‘coverage’’ in the context of
insurance describes what risks or losses the insurer
agrees to bear, subject to the defined terms and limits
set forth in the applicable insurance policy.
As to the term ‘‘deductible,’’ Black’s Law Dictionary
defines it as (1) ‘‘[u]nder an insurance policy, the portion of the loss to be borne by the insured before the
insurer becomes liable for payment,’’ and (2) ‘‘[t]he
insurance-policy clause specifying the amount of this
portion.’’ Black’s Law Dictionary, supra, p. 475; see also
NEMS, PLLC v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care of Connecticut, Inc., 350 Conn. 525, 554, 325 A.3d 196 (2024)
(setting forth definitions of ‘‘deductible’’ as provided in
Black’s Law Dictionary and General Statutes § 17b-290
(7)); 12A S. Plitt et al., Couch on Insurance (3d Ed. Rev.
2018) § 180:21, p. 180-38 (‘‘[c]omprehensive policies,
which are policies in which basic and major medical
December 9, 2025 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 16
353 Conn. 667 DECEMBER, 2025 15
Duso v. Groton
benefits are provided in a single contract, usually provide a deductible amount [that] must be paid by the
insured before any benefits are payable under the policy’’). The American Heritage College Dictionary similarly defines ‘‘deductible’’ as ‘‘[a] clause in an insurance
policy that exempts the insurer from paying a specified
amount in the event of a claim.’’ The American Heritage
College Dictionary, supra, p. 369.
We must next examine what an HSA is to determine
whether contributions to an HSA qualify as ‘‘coverages’’
or ‘‘deductibles’’ under the 2008 pension agreement.11
An HSA is a creature of federal law. See 26 U.S.C. § 223
(2018). Born out of the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003; see Pub.
L. No. 108-173, § 1201, 117 Stat. 2066, 2469 (2003); HSAs
are tax advantaged savings accounts created to help
eligible individuals12 pay for qualified medical expenses.
See 26 U.S.C. § 223 (d) (1) and (f) (2018). Indeed, they
are personally established and owned private bank
11
We note that, before the Appellate Court, the town argued that the trial
court’s interpretation of the 2008 pension agreement ‘‘contravene[d] the
manner in which the federal government regulates HSAs . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Duso v. Groton, supra, 228 Conn. App. 419. The
plaintiffs argued that the town’s argument was not raised before the trial
court and was based on information that was not in the record. Id. The
Appellate Court agreed with the plaintiffs and declined to consider the
town’s argument or the nature of HSAs in its analysis. Id., 419–20. The
plaintiffs make the same argument to this court. We conclude that the
Appellate Court should have considered the nature of HSAs in its analysis.
In order to determine whether an HSA contribution falls within the meaning
of ‘‘coverages’’ or ‘‘deductibles’’ under the 2008 pension agreement, the court
necessarily needed to consider what an HSA is. HSAs, as we explain in this
opinion, are creatures of federal law, rendering their nature a question of
law rather than a question of fact. The parties specifically flagged for the
trial court the federal law governing HSAs in their stipulated facts. See 26
U.S.C. § 223 (2018). We therefore consider the nature of HSAs in addressing
the question before us.
12
An individual can contribute to an HSA only if he or she is covered by
an HDHP and meets the other requirements of the statute. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 223 (c) (1) (A) through (2) (A) (2018).
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16 DECEMBER, 2025 353 Conn. 667
Duso v. Groton
accounts that participants open and maintain at banks
of their choosing. See 26 U.S.C. § 223 (d) (1) (B) (2018).
The funds contributed to an individual’s HSA are property of that individual whether he or she changes
employers or leaves the workforce altogether. See 26
U.S.C. § 223 (d) (1) (E) (2018); see also Health Savings
Accounts and Other Tax-Favored Health Plans, I.R.S.
Publication 969 (January 13, 2025) p. 3 (‘‘An HSA is
‘portable.’ It stays with you if you change employers or
leave the work force.’’).
A touchstone of an HSA is the tax advantages it provides. Contributions to a qualified HSA, within the prescribed contribution limits, are tax deductible; see 26
U.S.C. § 223 (a) and (b) (2018); and employer contributions are excluded from the employee’s gross income.
26 U.S.C. § 106 (a) and (d) (2018). Additionally, distributions from an HSA used to pay qualified medical
expenses are excluded from gross income and, thus,
are tax-free for the account beneficiary. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 223 (f) (1) (2018).
Although HSAs are intended to help individuals pay
for qualified medical expenses, distributions from an
HSA can be used for any purpose. See I.R.S. Notice
2004-50, 2004-33 I.R.B. 207 (August 16, 2004) (‘‘[T]he
account beneficiary is entitled to distributions for any
purpose and distributions may be used to pay or reimburse qualified medical expenses or for other nonmedical expenditures. Only the account beneficiary may
determine how the HSA distributions will be used.’’).
The caveat to the unlimited use of funds in an HSA is
that an account beneficiary who chooses to use distributed funds for anything other than qualified medical
expenses will generally have those distributions taxed
as gross income, and such distributions are subject to
an additional 20 percent tax. See 26 U.S.C. § 223 (f)
(4) (A) (2018). The penalty for using distributions for
nonqualifying expenditures terminates once the benefiDecember 9, 2025 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 18
353 Conn. 667 DECEMBER, 2025 17
Duso v. Groton
ciary becomes Medicare-eligible at age sixty-five. See
26 U.S.C. § 223 (f) (4) (C) (2018).
With the nature of HSAs in mind, as well as the plain
and unambiguous meaning of the terms ‘‘coverages’’
and ‘‘deductibles,’’ we conclude that contributions to
an HSA do not constitute ‘‘coverages’’ or ‘‘deductibles’’
under the 2008 pension agreement and, therefore, do
not implicate the ‘‘nature and scope’’ of insurance coverages, including deductibles, under the town’s group
health plan. Unlike insurance ‘‘coverage,’’ which is generally understood as the risks the insurer agrees to bear,
subject to the defined terms and limits set forth in the
applicable insurance policy, a contribution to an HSA
is not a term of the insurance policy and does not
otherwise expand, limit, or define any insured risks.
Indeed, a review of the ‘‘Summary of Benefits and Coverage’’ document from Anthem that the parties entered
into evidence confirms that there is no discussion of
the town’s HSA contributions.
Nor can it be said that a contribution to an HSA is
a ‘‘deductible.’’ A deductible, as that term is commonly
understood in the insurance context, is a fixed and
structural part of an insurance policy that defines the
threshold point at which insurance coverage begins.
See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary, supra, p. 475 (defining
‘‘deductible’’). In this way, the deductible is a term of
coverage—it sets the boundary line between the
insured’s initial financial responsibility and the insurer’s
obligation to pay once the deductible has been satisfied.
An HSA, by contrast, is a separate funding mechanism
outside of the insurance policy. See 26 U.S.C. § 223
(2018). The existence of an HSA—even if funded by an
employer—does not change the deductible required by
the terms of the insurance policy; nor does it satisfy
the deductible by virtue of its existence or availability to
the insured member of the health plan. As we explained,
account beneficiaries of an HSA can use their HSA
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Duso v. Groton
funds for whatever purpose they choose; there is no
requirement that they use those funds toward satisfying
their deductibles.
In concluding that an HSA contribution is a deductible, both the trial court and the Appellate Court substantially relied on the ‘‘nature and scope’’ language in
the 2008 pension agreement that precedes the phrase
‘‘coverages, including but not limited to deductibles,’’
not simply to broaden but, rather, to change the otherwise plain and unambiguous meaning of those terms.
See Duso v. Groton, supra, 228 Conn. App. 414–16. Like
the terms ‘‘coverages’’ and ‘‘deductibles,’’ the phrase
‘‘nature and scope’’ is not defined in the 2008 pension
agreement. Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘‘nature’’ as
‘‘[a] fundamental quality that distinguishes one thing
from another; the essence of something.’’ Black’s Law
Dictionary, supra, p. 1127. With respect to the term
‘‘scope,’’ one dictionary defines it as the ‘‘extent of treatment, activity, or influence’’; Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed. 2003) p. 1113; and another
defines it as ‘‘[t]he area covered by a given activity or
subject.’’ The American Heritage College Dictionary,
supra, p. 1244.
The Appellate Court agreed with the trial court that
the terms in § 16 (C) of the 2008 pension agreement
were plain and unambiguous; Duso v. Groton, supra,
228 Conn. App. 414; and, in applying the dictionary
definitions of ‘‘nature’’ and ‘‘scope,’’ reasoned that the
‘‘essence and extent’’ of the deductibles applicable to
retirees were effectively higher than those of active
police officers because the latter received HSA contributions from the town. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 412, 416.
Although recognizing that how a deductible is funded
is different from what a deductible is, the Appellate
Court nevertheless applied the phrase ‘‘nature and scope’’
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353 Conn. 667 DECEMBER, 2025 19
Duso v. Groton
to shift the focus away from the nature and scope of
the deductible itself and onto a collateral issue—how
much financial assistance active police officers, as compared to retirees, had available to pay their deductibles.
The nature and scope of a deductible do not vary based
on the source of the payment that funds the deductible
or how the insured otherwise satisfies it. A deductible,
by its very nature, is a fixed dollar amount set forth in
the insurance policy, independent of the resources an
insured may use to satisfy it. Whether an individual pays
the deductible with wages, savings, borrowed funds, or
an employer funded HSA, a deductible remains the
same fixed amount defined by the policy. Similarly,
although the ‘‘scope’’ or ‘‘extent’’ of a deductible can
vary in certain ways—for example, by the dollar amount
($500, $1000, $2000, etc.) or by exempting certain benefits (such as preventive services) from its application—
it too does not vary based on the manner in which the
deductible itself is funded.
The HSA contributions at issue are nothing more than
an additional, optional source of funds that active police
officers may use to satisfy their preexisting deductible
obligations. To be sure, the 2016 CBA references the
deductible in relation to the town’s agreement to make
HSA contributions to active police officers, and the
town apparently intended its contribution to mitigate
the financial impact felt by its employees as a result of
the higher deductible associated with the HDHP. But
the town’s intention in providing the additional compensation to its employees does not change the nature or
scope of the insurance deductible. The point is demonstrated by hypothesizing that the town instead had simply agreed, as part of the 2016 CBA, to pay a flat $1000
annual stipend to active police officers in recognition
of rising health care costs. In that scenario, the plaintiffs
would have no plausible claim to that payment under
the 2008 pension agreement. The fact that the town
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Duso v. Groton
tied the HSA contribution to the deductible amount or
described it as funding the deductible does not change
this analysis, particularly because the active police officers are not required to use the HSA contributions to
meet their deductibles. The plaintiffs’ contractual rights
are limited to maintaining the same health insurance
coverages and deductible levels as active police officers
but do not extend to supplemental employer payments
to active police officers—whether labeled stipends,
allowances, or HSA contributions—merely because
such payments are motivated by rising costs under the
health insurance plan.
We conclude that the town acted in accordance with
the terms of the 2008 pension agreement. HSA contributions to active police officers as described in the 2016
CBA do not constitute ‘‘coverages’’ or ‘‘deductibles’’
within the plain and unambiguous meaning of the 2008
pension agreement; nor does the phrase ‘‘nature and
scope’’ otherwise change the meaning of those terms.
The record indicates that the deductibles for all participants of the town’s group health insurance plan,
whether the participant was an active employee receiving HSA contributions or a retiree not receiving such
contributions, were the same—$2000 for those insured
with single person coverage and $4000 for those insured
with two person or family coverage.
B
Even if we were to assume arguendo that the operative language of the 2008 pension agreement is ambiguous because the plaintiffs’ interpretation is also one
reasonable way to interpret it, we would nevertheless
resolve that ambiguity in favor of the town in light of the
extrinsic evidence contained in the stipulated record.
To resolve an ambiguity in a collective bargaining
agreement, a trial court typically will consider extrinsic
evidence of the contracting parties’ intent. See, e.g.,
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353 Conn. 667 DECEMBER, 2025 21
Duso v. Groton
Poole v. Waterbury, supra, 266 Conn. 97; see also
Stiegler v. Meriden, 348 Conn. 452, 471, 307 A.3d 894
(2024). Courts will look to various evidence in an attempt
to discern that intent, including but not limited to the
‘‘conduct of the parties,’’ the agreement’s ‘‘drafting history,’’ and the ‘‘contracting parties’ past practices and
negotiations.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stiegler
v. Meriden, supra, 471. When contractual language is
ambiguous, the parties’ intent is ordinarily a question
of fact for the trial court, which this court would then
review for clear error. See, e.g., Murtha v. Hartford,
303 Conn. 1, 12, 35 A.3d 177 (2011).
In the present case, however, the plaintiffs and the
town, although advancing different interpretations,
agreed that the relevant terms of the 2008 pension agreement are plain and unambiguous and could be construed as a matter of law. The parties proceeded based
on a joint stipulation of facts and exhibits. Under these
circumstances, in which the record before the trial
court was identical to the record before this court and
there was no need for the trial court to evaluate the
credibility of witnesses, the legal inferences properly
to be drawn from the parties’ definitive stipulation of
facts and exhibits raise questions of law rather than of
fact. See, e.g., Stiegler v. Meriden, supra, 348 Conn.
472; Sharper Image Corp. v. Miller, 240 Conn. 531, 535,
692 A.2d 774 (1997); Morton Buildings, Inc. v. Bannon,
222 Conn. 49, 53–54, 607 A.2d 424 (1992); see also 11
Williston on Contracts (4th Ed. May, 2025 Update) § 30:7
(‘‘if a contract is ambiguous, its interpretation is a question of law for the court as long as the extrinsic evidence
bearing on the interpretation is undisputed’’).
In proceeding under the assumption that the 2008
pension agreement language is ambiguous as to whether
the plaintiffs are entitled to HSA contributions from the
town, we must, on this stipulated record, seek to discern
what the contracting parties—the town and the union—
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Duso v. Groton
intended by the language in § 16 (C) of the 2008 pension
agreement. Two documents are particularly relevant to
this inquiry: the 2016 CBA and the collective bargaining
agreement between the town and the union for the
period July 1, 2020, through June 30, 2023 (2020 CBA).
Like the collective bargaining agreements under which
the plaintiffs retired, both of these agreements incorporate the 2008 pension agreement. Accordingly, the 2016
and 2020 CBAs—each negotiated between the town
and the union—are probative of the contracting parties’
shared understanding of the operative language in the
2008 pension agreement, which was itself a product of
their collective bargaining and which the parties to this
action stipulated remained in effect as of October 19,
2022, the date on which they submitted the joint stipulation of facts to the trial court. See Paper, Allied-Industrial Chemical & Energy Workers International Union,
Local 8-192, AFL-CIO v. TXI Riverside Cement Co., 244
Fed. Appx. 116, 118 (9th Cir.) (in interpreting ambiguous
language, trier of fact may ‘‘consider the parties’ conduct subsequent to contract formation’’ and ‘‘the scope
of other related collective bargaining agreements, as
well as the practice, usage and custom pertaining to all
such agreements’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)),
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1023, 128 S. Ct. 628, 169 L. Ed.
2d 395 (2007); see also F. Elkouri & E. Elkouri, How
Arbitration Works (6th Ed. 2003) c. 9.3.A.ii, pp. 453–54
(evidence of ‘‘subsequent negotiations’’ may aid in interpretation of ambiguous provisions).
Each of those agreements contains a ‘‘note’’ in article
22.1 (the employee group insurance provision), which
expressly addresses the town’s HSA contributions to
active police officers. Each note provides in relevant
part: ‘‘The Town’s fifty percent (50%) contribution toward
the funding of the HDHP plan is not an element of
the underlying insurance plan, but rather relates to the
manner in which the deductible shall be funded for
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353 Conn. 667 DECEMBER, 2025 23
Duso v. Groton
active employees. The Town shall have no obligation
to fund any portion of the HDHP deductible for retirees
or other individuals upon their separation from employment.’’ (Emphasis omitted.)
The language in each note unmistakably reflects the
contracting parties’ intent that the HSA contribution is
not ‘‘an element of the underlying insurance plan’’ and
that the town ‘‘shall have no obligation to fund any
portion of the HDHP deductible for retirees . . . .’’
(Emphasis omitted.) The note, therefore, resolves any
ambiguity about whether the town and the union
intended for an HSA contribution to constitute either
a coverage or a deductible within the meaning of § 16
(C) of the 2008 pension agreement. The 2016 and 2020
CBAs confirm that the contracting parties understood
the town’s HSA contributions solely as a mechanism
through which active employees could fund their
deductibles, not the nature or scope of ‘‘coverages’’
or ‘‘deductibles’’ available to retirees under the 2008
pension agreement. Importantly, nothing in the stipulated record suggests that the note in the 2016 or 2020
CBAs modified the 2008 pension agreement in any way.
Rather, the stipulated record reflects that the 2008 pension agreement was incorporated into the 2016 and 2020
CBA without modification and, therefore, remained the
same agreement that was incorporated into the CBAs
under which each plaintiff retired. The plaintiffs acknowledge that there is no support in the joint stipulation of
facts that the note in article 22.1 of the 2016 or 2020
CBA modified the 2008 pension agreement.
Accordingly, we conclude that the most reasonable
reading of the phrase ‘‘nature and scope of coverages,
including . . . deductibles’’ in § 16 (C) of the 2008 pension agreement is that it does not encompass the source
from which a deductible is funded and, therefore, that
the plaintiffs are not entitled under that provision to
the HSA contributions that active police officers receive
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from the town. To conclude otherwise would lead to
the irrational result that the same pension agreement
would be interpreted differently depending on the collective bargaining agreement into which it was incorporated. Indeed, under the plaintiffs’ interpretation,
retirees like the plaintiffs who left employment under
earlier CBAs would receive an additional benefit—
town-funded HSA contributions—that was expressly
denied to all later retirees, even though all are covered
by the same exact pension agreement that remained in
effect when the parties submitted their joint stipulation
of facts to the trial court. Thus, even if we assume that
the operative language of the 2008 pension agreement
is ambiguous, the town’s interpretation of the relevant
phrase is the more reasonable one.13
The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and
the case is remanded to that court with direction to
reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case
to the trial court with direction to render judgment for
the town.
In this opinion McDONALD, ECKER, and ELGO,
Js., concurred.
13
In light of our disposition on the first certified question and determination that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the HSA contributions, we need
not decide the second certified question regarding the propriety of the trial
court’s damages award.