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Richardson v. Semple
LYNNETTE RICHARDSON, ADMINISTRATRIX
(ESTATE OF J’ALLEN JONES), ET AL. v.
SCOTT SEMPLE ET AL.
(AC 48427)
Cradle, C. J., and Alvord and Seeley, Js.
Syllabus
The proposed intervenor, A Co., appealed from the trial court’s judgment
denying its motion to intervene in the underlying action for the limited
purpose of litigating the issue of whether a certain video recording filed as
an exhibit to the defendants’ memorandum of law in support of their motion
for summary judgment should be sealed pursuant to our rule of practice
(§ 11-20A) governing the disclosure of court filings to the public. A Co.
claimed that it had a specific, personal and legal interest in the issue of
whether the video recording may be lawfully sealed. Held:
The trial court’s denial of A Co.’s motion to intervene was not a final judgment
for purposes of this appeal, as A Co. failed to make a colorable claim of
intervention as of right; accordingly, this court dismissed the appeal.
Argued October 6—officially released December 9, 2025
Procedural History
Action to recover damages for, inter alia, alleged violations of the civil rights of the plaintiffs’ decedent, and
for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Hartford, where the court, Noble, J.,
granted the motion to dismiss all claims as to the named
defendant et al.; thereafter, the court, Baio, J., denied
the motion to intervene filed by the American Civil
Liberties Union Foundation of Connecticut, and the
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Connecticut appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.
Jaclyn Blickley, with whom were Dan Barrett and,
on the brief, Elana Bildner, for the appellant (proposed
intervenor).
Terrence M. O’Neill, assistant attorney general, with
whom were James Belforti, assistant attorney general,
and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney general, for
the appellees (defendant Anthony Kacpryzski et al.).
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Richardson v. Semple
Opinion
CRADLE, C. J. The American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of Connecticut (ACLU) appeals from the
judgment of the trial court denying its motion to intervene in this action for the limited purpose of litigating
the issue of whether a certain video recording filed as
an exhibit to a memorandum of law in support of a
motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants,
various employees of the Department of Correction
(DOC),1 should be sealed pursuant to Practice Book
§ 11-20A.2 We conclude that the ACLU does not have a
colorable claim of intervention as of right and, therefore, is not appealing from a final judgment. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
The following procedural history is relevant to this
appeal. In August, 2018, the plaintiffs, Lynnette Richardson, the administratrix of the estate of J’Allen Jones
(decedent), and Jessica Jones, the mother of the decedent, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983,
1
This action initially was brought against Scott Semple, the former Commissioner of Correction, as well as Anthony Corcella, Warden of Garner
Correctional Institution, and various correctional officers and medical unit
employees of Garner Correctional Institution. Dr. Susannah Tung, a psychiatrist, and Warden Denise Dilworth later were cited in as party defendants.
On March 18, 2021, the court, Noble, J., dismissed the claims against Semple
and Dilworth. The plaintiffs later withdrew their action as to Corcella, Tung
and a correctional officer identified only as ‘‘Ryan.’’
2
Practice Book § 11-20A provides in relevant part that, ‘‘(a) [e]xcept as
otherwise provided by law, there shall be a presumption that documents
filed with the court shall be available to the public,’’ that ‘‘(b) . . . the
judicial authority shall not order that any files, affidavits, documents, or
other materials on file with the court or filed in connection with a court
proceeding be sealed or their disclosure limited,’’ and that ‘‘(c) . . . [a]n
agreement of the parties to seal or limit the disclosure of documents on
file with the court or filed in connection with a court proceeding shall not
constitute a sufficient basis for the issuance of such an order. . . .’’ The
rule further provides that a motion to seal ‘‘shall be calendared so that
notice to the public is given of the time and place of the hearing on the
motion and to afford the public an opportunity to be heard on the motion
under consideration.’’ Practice Book § 11-20A (e).
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Richardson v. Semple
alleging in the operative complaint that the decedent’s
death, which occurred while in the custody of the DOC,
was caused by the excessive force to which he was
subjected by, and the deliberate indifference of, certain
correctional officers and nurses. On October 21, 2019,
the parties filed a joint motion for a protective order
with regard to the use of any DOC video recordings
during the litigation, which they averred was necessary
for the preservation of safety and security. In the
motion, the parties requested an order limiting disclosure of such videos to counsel of record for the parties,
as well as their staff, experts and investigators, the
court, court reporters, and witnesses at deposition or
trial. They also requested that the order provide that,
before submitting to the court any video recordings
subject to the protective order, the parties must jointly
request that they be filed under seal. On November 13,
2019, the court, Noble, J., granted the motion for a
protective order.
On March 5, 2024, the defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment, along with a supporting memorandum, to which they attached as an exhibit a video
recording of the events culminating in the decedent’s
death. The defendants did not request that the video
recording be filed under seal. On September 27, 2024,
the ACLU requested a copy of the video recording, but
the court, Morgan, J., denied the request on the ground
that it was subject to the protective order.
On October 4, 2024, the plaintiffs filed a motion seeking ‘‘an order declaring that the video showing the death
of [the decedent] is now accessible to the public and
press because the defendants submitted that video as
[an exhibit] in [support of] their motion for summary
judgment.’’ It does not appear that the court acted on
the plaintiffs’ motion. The plaintiffs later filed another
motion seeking the same relief, but that motion also
was not adjudicated.
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Richardson v. Semple
On October 7, 2024, the ACLU filed with this court
a petition for expedited review of the trial court’s denial
of its request for a copy of the video recording. This
court granted the petition for review, in part, and
vacated the trial court’s denial of the ACLU’s request
for a copy of the video recording and remanded the
matter to the trial court with direction to promptly
conduct a properly noticed public hearing in compliance with Practice Book § 11-20A on the issue of
whether the video recording should be sealed or its
disclosure limited in whole or in part. This court further
ordered that the video recording remain inaccessible
to the public pending the trial court’s resolution of the
proceeding on the sealing question.
On October 31, 2024, the ACLU filed a motion to
intervene for the limited purpose of contesting any limitation on the disclosure of the video recording in order
to advocate for ‘‘its—and the public’s—right of access
to the video.’’ The ACLU asserted in its motion that it
met the standards for both permissive and as of right
intervention. The ACLU argued, inter alia, that it ‘‘has
a direct and substantial interest in being added as a
party for the limited purpose of litigating public access
to [the video recording], which interest would be extinguished by an unfavorable ruling.’’ It argued that,
‘‘absent [its] participation, there very well may be no
advocate for public access to [the video recording].’’
The court indicated that it would consider the ACLU’s
motion to intervene, if necessary, after the Practice
Book § 11-20A sealing hearing.
On December 20, 2024, the court commenced the
Practice Book § 11-20A sealing hearing. Counsel for
the defendants argued in support of sealing the video
recording and counsel for the plaintiffs opposed sealing
the recording. Counsel for the ACLU asked the court
to grant its motion to intervene, stating that he sought
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Richardson v. Semple
the right to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. The court reiterated that it would not rule on
the motion to intervene at that time. At the hearing,
issues regarding certain motions to quash subpoenas
were raised by the parties, making it clear that the
hearing could not conclude on that date. Counsel for
the ACLU therefore asked to be heard when the court
reconvened on the next hearing date. At the hearing,
three other members of the public were heard in opposition to the sealing of the video recording at issue.
On January 13, 2025, the court, Baio, J., denied the
ACLU’s motion to intervene, finding that the ACLU
failed to meet the legal requirements necessary for intervention and stating further that the ACLU already has
the opportunity to be heard by way of the sealing proceeding being held before it pursuant to Practice Book
§ 11-20A.3 The ACLU thereafter filed this appeal challenging the court’s denial of its motion to intervene.4
‘‘Unless a specific right to appeal otherwise has been
provided by statute, we must always determine the
3
The ACLU filed a motion for articulation of the court’s denial of its
motion to intervene, which the court denied.
4
While this appeal was pending, the sealing hearing resumed on August
22, 2025. At that hearing, counsel for the ACLU presented oral argument in
opposition to sealing the video recording. Attorney Alexander Taubes also
presented oral argument, on behalf of the CT Examiner, LLC, in opposition
to sealing the video recording. In addition, the court heard from several
other members of the public, including the plaintiffs.
On October 16, 2025, the court issued a memorandum of decision wherein
it determined that ‘‘the majority of the [video] recording cannot be sealed.’’
The court ordered the defendants to prepare a revised video recording with
specific limited redactions, furnish a copy of that revised video recording
to counsel for the plaintiffs for review and, provided there are no objections,
to file it with the court.
The ACLU subsequently sought leave to brief the issue of whether the
trial court’s decision rendered this appeal moot. Because we dismiss this
appeal for lack of a final judgment, we need not address the additional
jurisdictional query of what practical relief, if any, may be afforded to the
ACLU now that the court has ordered that a majority of the video recording
will not be sealed.
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Richardson v. Semple
threshold question of whether the appeal is taken from
a final judgment before considering the merits of the
claim. . . . The lack of a final judgment implicates the
subject matter jurisdiction of an appellate court to hear
an appeal. A determination regarding . . . subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law [over which we
exercise plenary review]. . . . Specifically, with regard
to motions to intervene, an unsuccessful applicant for
intervention in the trial court does not have a final
judgment from which to appeal unless [it] can make a
colorable claim to intervention as a matter of right. If
[it] does make such a colorable claim, on appeal the
court has jurisdiction to adjudicate both [its] claim to
intervention as a matter of right and to permissive intervention. . . . When prospective intervenors have not
made a colorable claim to intervene as a matter of right,
there is no right to interlocutory review of the order
denying their motion to intervene.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.). In re Santiago G.,
325 Conn. 221, 228, 157 A.3d 60 (2017).
There is a ‘‘two part framework by which we consider
interlocutory appeals from a trial court’s decision to
deny a motion to intervene. The first part of the inquiry
focuses on whether the court’s judgment as to the
motion to intervene was a final judgment for purposes
of appeal. The right of appeal is purely statutory. It is
accorded only if the conditions fixed by statute and the
rules of court for taking and prosecuting the appeal are
met. . . . The statutory right to appeal is limited to
appeals by aggrieved parties from final judgments. . . .
Because our jurisdiction over appeals, both criminal
and civil, is prescribed by statute, we must always determine the threshold question of whether the appeal is
taken from a final judgment before considering the merits of the claim. . . . An otherwise interlocutory order
is appealable in two circumstances: (1) [when] the order
or action terminates a separate and distinct proceeding,
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Richardson v. Semple
or (2) [when] the order or action so concludes the rights
of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect
them. . . . Unless an order can satisfy one of these
two prongs, the lack of a final judgment is a jurisdictional defect that [necessitates] . . . dismissal of the
appeal. . . . For purposes of the appeal from a court’s
interlocutory ruling on a motion to intervene, only the
second prong of the . . . test is implicated.’’ (Citations
omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 228–30.
‘‘[A]n unsuccessful applicant for intervention in the
trial court does not have a final judgment from which
to appeal unless [it] can make a colorable claim to
intervention as a matter of right. If [it] does make such
a colorable claim, on appeal the court has jurisdiction
to adjudicate both [its] claim to intervention as a matter
of right and to permissive intervention. . . . Accordingly, the dispositive inquiry into whether the denial of
a motion to intervene is an appealable, final judgment
is whether the intervenor can make a colorable claim
to intervention as a matter of right.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 230–31.
‘‘A colorable claim is one that is superficially well
founded but that may ultimately be deemed invalid
. . . . For a claim to be colorable, the [proposed intervenor] need not convince the trial court that [it] necessarily will prevail; [it] must demonstrate simply that [it]
might prevail. . . . In order for a proposed intervenor
to establish that it is entitled to intervene as a matter
of right, the proposed intervenor must satisfy a well
established four element conjunctive test: [t]he motion
to intervene must be timely, the movant must have a
direct and substantial interest in the subject matter of
the litigation, the movant’s interest must be impaired
by disposition of the litigation without the movant’s
involvement and the movant’s interest must not be represented adequately by any party to the litigation. . . .
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Richardson v. Semple
‘‘For purposes of judging the satisfaction of [the]
conditions [for intervention] we look to the pleadings,
that is, to the motion for leave to intervene and to the
proposed complaint or defense in intervention, and
. . . we accept the allegations in those pleadings as
true. . . . [N]either testimony nor other evidence is
required to justify intervention, and [a] proposed intervenor must allege sufficient facts, through the submitted motion and pleadings, if any, in order to make a
showing of [its] right to intervene. The inquiry is
whether the claims contained in the motion, if true,
establish that the proposed intervenor has a direct and
immediate interest that will be affected by the judgment. . . .
‘‘[T]he four factors of the intervention as of right test
are viewed in a slightly different lens when determining
the jurisdictional issue of whether the proposed intervenor has made a colorable claim to intervene as of right.
. . . Consistent with the well established rule that
every presumption is to be indulged in favor of jurisdiction, and the judicial policy preference to bring about
a trial on the merits of a dispute whenever possible
and to secure for the litigant his day in court . . . our
examination of whether a colorable claim exists focuses
on the plausibility of the appellant’s challenge to the
denial of the motion to intervene when the pleadings
and motion are viewed in light of the relevant legal
principles.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 231–33. ‘‘Failure to
meet any one of the four elements, however, will preclude intervention as of right.’’ BNY Western Trust v.
Roman, 295 Conn. 194, 206, 990 A.2d 853 (2010).
In the present case, the ACLU failed to identify in its
motion to intervene a direct and substantial interest in
the disclosure of the video recording that is different
from the interest of any member of the general public.
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Richardson v. Semple
Indeed, in support of its motion to intervene, it represented that its intervention was necessary to advocate
for public access to the video recording. On appeal, the
ACLU further contends that its ‘‘interests in intervening
here . . . go beyond the general public’s interest in
open courts because they have ripened into justiciable
legal injuries on which it seeks a ruling.’’ The ACLU
argues that it ‘‘has a specific, personal and legal interest
in the issue of whether the [video recording] may be
lawfully sealed, as opposed to a general interest that
all members of the community share, because it has
asked for a copy of the record and been denied.’’ This
argument is misplaced in that the ACLU did not attain
a direct and substantial interest in the subject matter
of this case simply because it sought and was denied
access to the video recording.5 By that logic, anyone
who sought and was denied access to the video
recording would share that same purported interest and
therefore meet the direct and substantial interest prong
of the intervention as of right requirements. We decline
to adopt that circular argument. In its motion to intervene, the ACLU argued that its intervention was necessary to ‘‘vindicate its presumptive right to access’’ to
the video recording. That right is shared by every member of the public.
Although we are mindful that in order to invoke this
court’s jurisdiction a proposed intervenor is required
5
The ACLU relies heavily on this court’s decision in Rosado v. Bridgeport
Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 60 Conn. App. 134, 758 A.2d 916 (2000).
In Rosado, this court considered an appeal from the denial of the motion
of seven priests to intervene in an action brought by the plaintiffs against
the Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation (Diocese) and others
for damages for alleged sexual abuse by a priest when he was assigned to
various churches within the Diocese. Id., 135. This court held that the priests
were entitled to intervene as of right for the purpose of contesting the
disclosure of their private and confidential personnel files on the ground,
inter alia, that those priests had a direct and personal interest in arguing
to protect the release of those files. Id., 148. By contrast, the ACLU in this
case has not identified any direct and substantial interest that differs from
the interest of a member of the public.
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Richardson v. Semple
only to establish a colorable claim that it is entitled to
intervention as of right and not prove that it is so entitled, the ACLU has failed to identify an entitlement to
intervention as of right that is superficially well
founded, let alone such a claim upon which it might
prevail.6 Because the ACLU has failed to make a colorable claim of intervention as of right, the trial court’s
denial of its motion to intervene is not a final judgment
for purposes of this appeal.
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
6
Moreover, as the court aptly noted, Practice Book § 11-20A affords all
members of the public the opportunity to be heard when the sealing of a
filing is considered by the court. Indeed, several members of the public,
including counsel for the ACLU, presented their positions to the court at
the sealing hearing.