NOTICE
2025 IL App (5th) 241010
NOTICE
Decision filed 10/02/25. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-24-1010 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of
IN THE limited circumstances allowed
the same. under Rule 23(e)(1).
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
DEBRA A. TIEDEMANN, as Trustee of ) Appeal from the
The Edward E. Tiedemann Declaration of ) Circuit Court of
Trust, Dated January 30, 2014, ) Piatt County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 24-CH-2
)
BRENT E. TIEDEMANN and KEVIN A. TIEDEMANN, ) Honorable
) Dana C. Rhoades,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Moore and Sholar concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Edward E. Tiedemann (Settlor) executed the “Edward E. Tiedemann Declaration of Trust”
(Trust) on January 30, 2014. He was the initial trustee of the Trust, and he named his wife, Debra
A. Tiedemann (Debra) as the successor trustee of his Trust. The beneficiaries of the Trust were
Debra, and his two sons, Brent E. Tidemann and Kevin A. Tiedemann (defendants). In 2022, the
Settlor and Debra obtained a loan for $862,400 to purchase land in St. Clair County. The purchase
was secured by a mortgage agreement dated June 30, 2022. Following the Settler’s death on
September 7, 2023, ownership of the Belleville property passed to Debra as a joint tenant with
right of survivorship. Following the Settlor’s death, no payments were made on the loan, and the
financial institution sent a notice of default, stating its intent to foreclose if the default was not
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remedied. Thereafter, Debra filed her petition with the trial court asking for “aid and direction”
pursuant to the Illinois Trust Code (Code) (760 ILCS 3/101 et seq. (West 2022)) and sought to use
trust assets to pay off the bank loan. The defendants responsively argued that Debra could not use
trust assets to pay off the loan, as doing so would be contrary to the Probate Act of 1975 (Act)
(755 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 2022)). The trial court entered its order finding in the defendants’
favor on August 26, 2024. Debra timely appealed from that order. For the following reasons, we
affirm.
¶2 I. Background
¶3 On January 30, 2014, the date that the Settlor executed his Trust, he also executed his final
will. The Trust included tracts of real estate described in an attached and incorporated schedule.
The two tracts of Trust real estate were in St. Clair County and were labeled as tract No. 1 and
tract No. 2. The Trust was also defined to include any other property later added by the Settlor,
together with the proceeds thereof. At an unspecified date, a third St. Clair County tract was
transferred into the Trust.
¶4 Article 10 of the Trust provides that upon the Settlor’s death:
“[Debra] shall pay from the Trust Estate, directly or through my personal representative,
without apportionment or reimbursement, all of my just debts, including the expenses of
my last illness and funeral, all expenses of administration of property wherever situated,
passing under my Will or this [Trust] or otherwise, and all estate inheritance, transfer and
succession taxes which become due by reason of my death ***.”
¶5 On June 30, 2022, the Settlor and First Federal Savings Bank of Mascoutah (Bank)
executed a promissory note and a mortgage for $862,400 to purchase the Rentchler Station Road
property in St. Clair County. The Settlor signed the promissory note and the Settlor and Debra
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both signed the mortgage. The promissory note was secured by a mortgage on four properties in
St. Clair County. Three of the properties were within the Trust. The fourth property, the Rentchler
Station Road property was not transferred into the Trust before the Settlor died. The Settlor also
signed an assignment of rents to the four St. Clair County properties to the Bank “TO SECURE
(1) PAYMENT OF THE INDETEDNESS AND (2) PERFORMANCE OF ANY AND ALL
OBLIGATIONS OF BORROWER AND GRANTOR UNDER THE NOTE, THIS
ASSIGNMENT, AND THE RELATED DOCUMENTS.” The Bank had the sole discretion as to
application of the rents, but any rents received by the Bank that were not applied to the costs and
expenses the Bank incurred in connection with the properties would be applied to the loan.
¶6 The Rentchler Station Road property was titled in the Settlor and Debra’s joint tenancy
with right of survivorship. Upon the Settlor’s death on September 7, 2023, ownership of the
Rentchler Station Road property passed by operation of law to Debra through her interest as the
property’s joint tenant with right of survivorship. Upon the Settlor’s death, Debra also became the
trustee of the Trust.
¶7 The record does not indicate if Debra made any mortgage payments on the Rentchler
Station Road property loan after the Settlor’s death. However, in January 2024, the Bank sent its
notification that both the promissory note and the mortgage were in default, stating that the Bank
intended to pursue foreclosure on the four properties if the default was not remedied. The amount
of outstanding debt was then $858,476.08.
¶8 Debra’s petition asked the trial court for aid and direction pursuant to section 201 of the
Code (760 ILCS 3/201 (West 2022)). She stated that the Trust contained a provision directing her,
as trustee, to “pay from the Trust Estate *** all of my just debts.” Debra indicated that the only
outstanding debts were the outstanding balance on the Rentchler Station Road property note of
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$858,476.08, and an outstanding balance on a tractor loan of $22,978.61. She stated that she could
avoid foreclosure by paying off the promissory note with assets held by the Trust. At the time she
filed her petition, the only assets in the Trust were the three properties, but she stated that based
upon the Settlor’s pour-over will, the Settlor’s other assets, excluding the Rentchler Station Road
property, would pour into the Trust after probate proceedings. She asked the trial court to provide
aid and direction on how she, as trustee, should proceed with the payment of the Settlor’s debts.
¶9 On July 3, 2024, the defendants filed their response to Debra’s petition. The defendants
agreed that Debra was a beneficiary of the Trust, particularly with respect to the marital domicile
shared as of Settlor’s death and that they were beneficiaries of the balance of the Trust, to be
distributed equally. They disputed Debra’s claim that the loan on the Rentchler Station Road
property should be satisfied by Trust assets. The defendants alleged that three of the four St. Clair
County properties were Trust assets, but the fourth property—the Rentchler Station Road property,
consisting of 61.6 acres—had been titled jointly with right of survivorship by the Settlor and Debra
alone. They argued that using Trust assets to pay the indebtedness on the property would be at the
defendants’ detriment and would unjustly enrich Debra. The defendants cited section 20-19 of the
Act (755 ILCS 5/20-19 (West 2022)) to support their argument.
¶ 10 The defendants asked the trial court to remove Debra as the trustee because (1) she was
suggesting that this personal debt should be paid from the Trust; (2) she was prioritizing her
personal interests over her Trust duties and the well-being of the Trust beneficiaries; (3) she had
received rental payments and income that were not placed into the Trust, and she had not reported
the use of such funds to the defendants; and (4) she had failed by commission and omission to
properly carry out the trustee’s duties of accounting. The defendants asked the court to remove her
as the acting trustee, and to replace her with the successor trustee, Brent E. Tiedemann.
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¶ 11 On July 31, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on Debra’s petition and the defendants’
response. The court entered its order on August 26, 2024. In its order, the court noted that the Trust
provided that Debra could reside in the marital home for her lifetime with conditions and that the
marital home at the time of the Settlor’s death was in Monticello, Illinois. The court also noted
that the Trust provided general provisions for the payment of the Settlor’s debts and expenses. The
court took judicial notice of the Settlor’s will and noted that it was a pour-over will with a few
specific tangible personal property bequests, with the remainder pouring into the Trust.
¶ 12 The trial court noted that the Settlor signed a promissory note to the Bank individually and
not in his capacity as trustee of the Trust on June 30, 2022, for $862,400. Those funds were used
to purchase a 61.6-acre parcel on Rentchler Station Road in St. Clair County. The mortgage dated
the same date was signed by both Settlor and Debra. Three additional parcels of land were included
with the Rentchler Station Road parcel as collateral to secure the promissory note.
¶ 13 The trial court found that section 20-19 of the Act was applicable to the transfer of the
Rentchler Station Road property and to the Trust document. The court noted that the property was
encumbered; that section 20-19 of the Act included all transfers of encumbered real estate
transferred by operation of law pursuant to joint tenancy; and the Act also applied to
nontestamentary instruments, like a trust. The court determined that the Trust language about
payment of “just debts” was a general direction to the trustee to pay the Settlor’s expenses of last
illness, administrative expenses, and all estate, inheritance, and transfer taxes. The clause did not
contain specific language “expressing the Settlor’s intent that the Trust Estate shall pay or assumes
the liability for encumbered real estate that passes upon his death through a right of survivorship
or another non-testamentary instrument.”
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¶ 14 Additionally, the trial court noted that the Settlor did not execute a codicil to his will
expressing his intent that section 20-19 of the Act should not apply and that the Trust shall pay the
outstanding encumbrance upon the Rentchler Station Road property. The court concluded that the
law presumed that the Settlor “understood that his spouse would receive the entire interest in the
Rentchler Station Road property subject to the encumbrance, at the time of his death.” In support,
the court noted that, although the Trust granted Debra a life estate in the marital residence subject
to specific conditions, the Trust made Debra personally liable for “all monthly mortgage payments,
costs and expenses incident to the use, debt service, maintenance, and protection thereof, and real
estate taxes and insurance.” The court stated: “This language seems to suggest that the Settlor’s
intent was for Section 20-19 to apply to any specific bequests or outright transfer of encumbered
real property.” Overall, the trial court concluded that the Settlor had no intent to shift the Rentchler
Station Road property debt owed to the Bank to the Trust. “The law presumes that Edward
Tiedemann knew the law when he executed these documents, that he understood the application
of Section 20-19 to the Rentchler property, and that he understood that his spouse would receive
the entire interest in the Rentchler property subject to the encumbrance, at the time of his death.”
¶ 15 The trial court found that section 20-19 of the Act did not apply to the tractor debt, as it
was personal property, and therefore, the Trust was responsible for paying that debt. The trial court
also denied the defendants’ request to remove Debra as the trustee because the official accounting
was not due until September 2024.
¶ 16 Debra appeals from the August 26, 2024, order.
¶ 17 II. Analysis
¶ 18 On appeal, Debra contends that the trial court erred both in finding that section 20-19 of
the Act applied to the payment of the Settlor’s debts from the Trust, and in finding that she, as
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trustee, could not pay off the promissory note with Trust assets. As the issues in this case involve
the trial court’s interpretation of statutory law, our review is de novo. Central Illinois Light Co. v.
Department of Revenue, 335 Ill. App. 3d 412, 415 (2002).
¶ 19 When we interpret statutory language, our main objective is to determine and give effect
to the legislature’s intent. Westberg v. Barcroft, 2022 IL App (2d) 210543, ¶ 23 (citing Rosenbach
v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 24). “The most reliable indicator of
legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. “Each word,
clause, and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable construction, and no term should be
rendered superfluous.” Id. (citing 1010 Lake Shore Ass’n v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.,
2015 IL 118372, ¶ 21). Moreover, a court cannot deviate from the statute’s plain and unambiguous
language by “reading into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed therein.”
Id. (citing Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 24).
¶ 20 There is no question that article 10 of the Trust directs Debra to pay all “just debts” of the
Settlor from the Trust estate. The defendants acknowledge that the promissory note is Settlor’s
debt. However, the defendants dispute that the promissory note qualifies as a “just debt” and note
that section 20-19 of the Act expressly ended the common law doctrine of exoneration. Debra
claims that the trial court misinterpreted section 20-19 of the Act.
¶ 21 The common law doctrine of exoneration provided that a devisee of encumbered real estate
was entitled to a discharge of the encumbrance from the decedent’s personal estate unless
otherwise directed. Griffin v. Gould, 72 Ill. App. 3d 747, 749 (1979). This rule was followed in
Illinois “as a corollary of the common law principle that a decedent’s personalty is the primary
fund for payment of his debts.” Id. (citing Watts v. Killian, 300 Ill. 242 (1921); Martin v. Martin,
310 Ill. App. 622 (1941)).
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¶ 22 Historically, the exoneration question was debated in legal circles. Noting that exoneration
had been statutorily disposed of in New York in 1850 and in England in 1854, the question of
whether Illinois should follow suit was deemed problematic, and thus, “[i]f the testator wants his
will to reflect his wishes, what he thinks the law to be, then he must explicitly burden the devised
realty with its mortgage” and “[i]t seems probable that a testator would believe that an
encumbrance followed his devise. It would be more normal to expect him to comment if he wished
it to be otherwise.” Lloyd J. Tyler Jr., Should the Widow Pay?, 47 Ill. B.J. 850, 852-53 (1959).
“The inequitable case, the hard case ***, is more likely to occur where the devise is exonerated.”
Id. Another author suggested that the doctrine of exoneration “thwarts intention more often than it
fulfills it” and that “many, if not most testators, if they thought about the problem, would have said
the *** devisee, should take the property with whatever encumbrance there might be on it, and
assume the debt.” Austin Fleming, Will Drafting Problems Posed by Mortgage Indebtedness, 48
Ill. B.J. 846, 848 (1960).
¶ 23 The predecessor to section 20-19 of the Act took effect in 1967 (1967 Ill. Laws 2012
(§ 219b)) and eliminated the doctrine of exoneration, “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided
by decedent’s will.” 755 ILCS 5/20-19 (West 2022). After the predecessor to section 20-19 took
effect, legal scholars discussed application of the statutory language:
“A question suggested by the statutory words [of what is now section 20-19] is
whether a general direction to the legal representative to pay the debts of the decedent
constitutes an ‘express provision’ to the contrary. The majority rule appears to be that a
general direction to pay debts is merely declaratory of the law and does not of itself indicate
an affirmative or express intent to pay debts secured by a lien or encumbrance.” 4 William
M. James, Illinois Probate Law and Practice § 219b.4, at 242 (Austin Fleming Supp. 1975).
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Another author stated: “The new statute requires an express provision in the decedent’s will to
overcome the effect of the statute and a mere statement to pay the testator’s debts will not be
sufficient to overcome it.” Spencer H. Raymond, 1967 Legislative Changes Affecting Probate and
Trust Law, 56 Ill. B.J. 208, 215 (1967).
¶ 24 We review section 20-19 of the Act to determine if it applies to the outstanding
indebtedness on the Rentchler Station Road property. Section 20-19(a) expressly provides: “When
any real estate *** subject to an encumbrance *** passes by joint tenancy with right of
survivorship *** the *** surviving tenant *** to whom the real estate *** passes, takes it subject
to the encumbrance ***.” 755 ILCS 5/20-19(a) (West 2022). The Act defines an encumbrance to
include a mortgage. Id. § 1-2.07. Thus, section 20-19 unquestionably applies to the transfer of the
Rentchler Station Road property under the statute’s express terms.
¶ 25 The question that remains is whether Debra, as the undisputed owner of this property with
its monetary encumbrance, can use Trust assets to pay off the encumbrance. Debra argues that the
answer to this question lies within section 20-19 of the Act and contends that a decedent’s “real or
personal estate” is different from a decedent’s “trust estate,” and because she was seeking payment
of the promissory note with “trust” assets versus “real or personal estate” assets, the trial court’s
order was erroneous. She cites no legal authority for this proposition, other than to state that there
is no comparable statutory language in the Code (760 ILCS 3/101 et seq. (West 2022)).
¶ 26 We start with legal definitions of the terms at issue. The terms “real or personal estate,”
“real and personal estate,” and “trust estate” are not defined in the Act or the Code. The term “real
or personal estate” was used in the Act 9 times, 1 and the term, “real and personal estate” was used
1
The term “real or personal estate” can be found in sections 2-5, 4-6, 11-6, 11a-7, 13-4, 14-1, 20-19, 22-4, and 24-3 of the Act. See 755 ILCS 5/2-5, 4-6, 11-6, 11a-7, 13-4, 14-1, 20-19, 22-4, 24-3 (West 2022).
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16 times in the Act. 2 The term “personal estate” is defined as “personal property” as follows: “Any
movable or intangible thing that is subject to ownership and not classified as real property.”
Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (directed to “personal property (1) under PROPERTY”).
The term “real estate” is defined as “real property” as follows: “Land and anything growing on,
attached to, or erected on it, excluding anything that may be severed without injury to the land.”
Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (directed to “real property under PROPERTY”). The term
“trust estate” is defined as “corpus” as follows: “[t]he property for which a trustee is responsible;
the trust principal.—Also termed res; trust estate; trust fund; trust property; trust res; trust.”
Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (directed to “corpus (1)”).
¶ 27 Using rules of statutory construction by giving the words their plain and ordinary meaning
(Westberg, 2022 IL App (2d) 210543, ¶ 23 (citing Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 24)), we find
that the terms real and/or personal estate as used in the Act simply mean real property and/or
personal property. Reasonably interpreting this clause, we conclude that use of these terms, as they
have been legally defined, simply denotes the distinction between realty and personal assets.
Moreover, the term “trust estate” simply means the trust property. See id. (citing 1010 Lake Shore
Ass’n, 2015 IL 118372, ¶ 21).
¶ 28 We acknowledge that cases interpreting section 20-19’s prohibition of paying off
encumbrances have only involved real estate taxes and not a survivor’s attempt to pay off a
mortgage or promissory note. Nonetheless, we find that the analysis in these real estate taxes cases
is helpful.
2
The term “real and personal estate” can be found in sections 2-1, 2-2, 4-4, 4-13, 4-14, 6-2, 9-4, 9-8, 10-2, 10-4, 14-1, 18-14, 24-1, 24-3, 24-7, and 28-6 of the Act See 755 ILCS 5/2-1, 2-2, 4-4, 4-13, 4-14, 6-2, 9-4, 9-8, 10-2, 10-4, 14-1, 18-14, 24-1, 24-3, 24-7, 28-6 (West 2022).
10
¶ 29 In Gould, 72 Ill. App. 3d at 750, Gould claimed that the will’s provision that “ ‘all
indebtedness’ ” is to be paid, necessarily included real estate taxes. Gould argued that the word,
“ ‘all’ ” must “be regarded as including the real estate taxes in order to avoid a construction
rendering the word meaningless or mere surplusage.” Id. at 752. The appellate court stated: “The
will must be considered in its entirety to determine testator’s intent and, to the extent possible, that
construction should be adopted which will give effect to all the language employed.” Id. (citing
Kiesling v. White, 411 Ill. 493, 499 (1952); Glaser v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 393 Ill. 447, 457
(1946)). The appellate court declined to reach a conclusion that “ ‘all indebtedness’ ” included real
estate taxes, noting that given the history of exoneration, and section 20-19 of the Act, that phrase
did not authorize the payment of real estate taxes from the estate as that would be in “contravention
of the rule embodied in section 20-19.” Id. at 753. “To hold otherwise would have the effect of
introducing exoneration into a statute enacted for the very purpose of avoiding its general
application.” Id.; see In re Estate of Matthews, 409 Ill. App. 3d 780, 785-86 (2011) (holding that
the decedent’s direction to the executor “ ‘[t]o pay all governmental charges, taxes or liens imposed
upon my estate or upon the interest of any and all beneficiaries hereunder by any law of any state,
foreign state or federal government, relating to the transfer of property by descent or devise’ ” did
not constitute a specific direction for the estate to assume responsibility for the real estate taxes on
the decedent’s realty, and instead concerned the payment of estate and inheritance taxes);
Merchants National Bank of Aurora v. Olson, 27 Ill. App. 3d 432, 433-34 (1975) (applying section
20-19 of the Act and stating that the statute abrogates a surviving joint tenant’s rights “to have
liens on the real estate paid in whole or in part out of the decedent’s probate estate,” but concluding
that the bank—who only had a lien against the husband, and not the spouse—lost its lien upon the
husband’s death); In re Estate of Light, 385 Ill. App. 3d 196, 197, 201 (2008) (where the decedent’s
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will directed the executor to pay “ ‘all taxes assessed or imposed against [her] estate or against any
beneficiary of [her] estate,’ ” the court found that real estate taxes were not included because the
taxes were assessed and imposed against the real estate, not the decedent’s estate).
¶ 30 The promissory note and mortgage represent the Bank’s encumbrance against the property.
Debra’s request to use Trust assets to pay off the loan on the property at issue is clearly contrary
to the express wording of section 20-19 of the Act. See 755 ILCS 5/20-19(a) (West 2022). As
Illinois law prohibits exoneration of the debt on encumbered assets, Debra, as the sole owner, is
solely responsible for the outstanding debt. We note that the Settlor could have expressly
authorized use of the Trust assets to pay off this encumbrance, but he did not. There is no catchall provision allowing exoneration of debts on encumbered assets in his Trust. Moreover, he could
have included this type of provision in his will or in a codicil to his will. He did not. As the first
sentence of section 20-19 of the Act states: “Except as otherwise provided by decedent’s will,”
there is no exoneration of encumbered assets in real estate. Id. § 20-19.
¶ 31 The provisions of the Trust provide additional support for the conclusion that Settlor never
intended his trust assets to be used to pay off the encumbrance on the Rentchler Station Road
property. “This court’s primary concern in construing a trust is to discover the settlor’s intent,
which the court will effectuate if it is not contrary to law or public policy.” Estate of Mendelson v.
Mendelson, 2016 IL App (2d) 150084, ¶ 25 (citing First National Bank of Chicago v. Canton
Council of Campfire Girls, Inc., 85 Ill. 2d 507, 513 (1981)). “The settlor’s intent is determined as
of the time the instrument is executed.” Id. To ascertain the settlor’s intent, we must consider the
plain and ordinary meaning of the words used by the settlor and must also consider the entire
document. Id. (citing First National Bank of Chicago, 85 Ill. 2d at 514).
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¶ 32 In the Settlor’s trust, he made provisions to allow Debra to have the marital home in
Monticello “as her sole property” if they were living in that home when he died. He makes no
provisions about payment of real estate taxes, insurance, maintenance, or any other costs
associated with home ownership. Notably, Debra did not seek guidance from the court on who was
responsible for said expenses.
¶ 33 As Debra was living in the Monticello home when the Settlor died, alternative Trust
provisions for Debra’s housing after his death are inapplicable. However, we find that the
alternative provisions provide insight into the Settlor’s intentions. If they had been living anywhere
but the Monticello home, the Settlor provided that while Debra could live there for her lifetime—
so long as she did not remarry or cohabitate with another person on a conjugal basis—she was
expressly responsible for “costs and expenses incident to the use, debt service, maintenance and
protection thereof, including the cost of monthly mortgage payments, if any, insurance and the
taxes thereon.” Additionally, upon either Debra’s “death, remarriage, cohabitation, abandonment
of said property, or failure to pay the aforesaid costs and expenses incident to the use thereof, or
at my death, if my wife predeceases me, said property shall be distributed per stirpes to my
descendants then surviving.”
¶ 34 Article four of the Trust also capped the amount Debra could receive for the “property.” It
is not clear what “the property” is as it was not defined, but it is not characterized as a marital
domicile as used in other paragraphs in article four. The provision states:
“If the property which my wife and I own jointly *** does not have a *** fair market value,
less mortgage or security interest debt *** of at least $250,000.00 at the date of my death,
my successor Trustee shall distribute next from the Trust Estate to my wife an amount
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equal to the difference between the *** [fair] market value of said jointly owned property
and the sum of $250,000.00 ***.”
¶ 35 We conclude that the Settlor’s intent was to provide housing for Debra so long as she did
not remarry or cohabitate with a partner, that she was solely responsible for all costs and expenses
associated with this housing, and that she was entitled to a certain amount of money for “the
property.” The balance of the trust was to be distributed to the Settlor’s two sons, the defendants.
Outside of the trust, Debra received the Rentchler Station Road property as the surviving joint
tenant subject to the amount owed to the Bank. We find no basis in law or in the express terms of
the Settlor’s Trust and/or his will that Debra was entitled to pay off the encumbrance on the
Rentchler Station Road property with Trust assets.
¶ 36 III. Conclusion
¶ 37 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Piatt County circuit court.
¶ 38 Affirmed.
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Tiedemann v. Tiedemann, 2025 IL App (5th) 241010
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Piatt County, No. 24-CH-2; the
Hon. Dana C. Rhoades, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Michael J. Brusatte, David C. Thies, and Mia O. Hernandez, of for Webber & Thies, P.C., of Champaign, for appellant.
Appellant:
Attorneys David A. Rolf and Andrew T. Jarmer, of Sorling Northrup, of for Springfield, for appellees.
Appellee:
15