In the Iowa Supreme Court
No. 24–0169
Submitted February 18, 2026—Filed March 20, 2026
State of Iowa,
Appellee,
vs.
Dillon Michael Heiller,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Allamakee County, John
Bauercamper, senior judge.
The defendant appeals two theft convictions, arguing that the evidence
was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Decision of Court of Appeals
Vacated; District Court Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and
Case Remanded.
McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices
joined.
Shea M. Chapin (argued), The Chapin Center, PLC, Dubuque, for
appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout (argued) and David
Banta, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
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McDonald, Justice.
Dillon Heiller was convicted of theft in the second degree and theft in the
first degree, in violation of Iowa Code sections 714.1(1), 714.2(1), and 714.2(2)
(2023), arising out of the theft of two motor vehicles. One of the convictions arises
out of the theft of an automobile in Wisconsin, and Heiller challenges the state’s
ability to prosecute him for that offense under Iowa’s criminal jurisdiction
statute. See Iowa Code § 803.1. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting both theft convictions. We do not have to resolve Heiller’s challenge
under the criminal jurisdiction statute because there is insufficient evidence
supporting the conviction for the theft of the car in Wisconsin. We conclude there
is sufficient evidence to sustain the second theft conviction, which undisputedly
occurred in Iowa.
I.
The trial record established the following. On the evening of June 18,
2023, Dillon Heiller went for drinks at the Waterville Bar in Waterville, Iowa.
Dave Christianson, a local resident, observed Heiller enter the bar wearing a hat
and a bandana, with one gloved hand and the other wrapped in some type of
material. Christianson was familiar with the patrons, and their respective
vehicles, that frequented the bar, and he noticed an unfamiliar white or silver
SUV with Wisconsin license plates parked outside. He assumed the SUV was
associated with Heiller.
Bartender Kaylee Sorum was working that evening. She saw Heiller pull
into the parking lot in the white or silver SUV. According to Sorum, the SUV had
a broken-out passenger window covered in plastic. She believed it had Wisconsin
plates. Sorum’s description of Heiller was similar to Christianson’s: Heiller was
wearing a black shirt, an Iowa Hawkeyes cap, a bandana, and a fingerless glove
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on one hand, with the other hand wrapped with a black wrap. Sorum
remembered Heiller from that night because he repeatedly asked other patrons
for a ride. She informed him that no one would be driving him anywhere and
that he would need to leave the bar in whatever way he had arrived. Sorum
testified that Heiller left the bar between 11 and 11:30 p.m.
Near midnight, Allamakee County Sheriff’s Deputy Ross Kolsrud was on
patrol traveling westbound on Highway 76, near Waukon, when he encountered
a silver SUV traveling eastbound at above the posted speed limit. As the two
vehicles approached one another, Kolsrud flashed his patrol lights as a “friendly
reminder to slow down.” Instead of slowing, the SUV accelerated. When Kolsrud
checked the speed on his front radar, it clocked the SUV in the upper 60s. The
rear radar recorded the vehicle’s speed as increasing to 75 miles per hour.
Kolsrud turned around to pursue the vehicle. Despite accelerating to as high as
96 miles per hour, he lost sight of the SUV. Deputy Kolsrud searched Buckskin
Road, Sugar Road, and the surrounding areas, but the SUV never reappeared.
Between 4:15 and 4:30 a.m. on June 19 Kenneth Koozer woke up and
checked his game camera mounted near his driveway. Koozer lived on Buckskin
Road. Around midnight, Koozer’s game camera recorded a small SUV speeding
through his property. Koozer went outside to investigate and discovered tire
tracks running through his property. The tracks continued down a steep
embankment, across the narrow strip before a pond, and into some timber,
where Koozer found a silver Chevy Captiva crashed into a tree. Koozer testified
that the vehicle’s passenger-side window was broken and taped over with plastic.
The vehicle had Wisconsin plates. He identified a gas can, a cellphone, a
bandana, a hat, and a small purse-like item inside the vehicle.
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That same morning, approximately half a mile from Koozer’s residence,
Robert Lloyd woke up, looked outside, and immediately noticed that his shed
door, which was always closed at night, was fully open. His 2023 John Deere
Gator was missing. Lloyd reported the theft to the police department. He learned
from the department that the Gator had been found totaled on Brady Drive,
approximately a mile and a half from his property. The Gator, valued at over
$30,000, had evidence of blood on the interior passenger seat and vent area, as
well as a bloodied bandana hanging from the glove compartment area. Heiller’s
DNA matched the blood on the bandana.
Not far from the location where the Gator was found on Brady Drive,
Bryton Meyer began his morning. As he stepped outside to leave for work, he
realized that his silver 2013 Chevrolet Impala, which he typically left in the
driveway, was missing. He conducted a brief search of the immediate area and
discovered a single set of footprints in the dew walking up the driveway from the
area where the car had been parked. He then reported the theft to the police.
Meyer informed officers that his Smith & Wesson nine-millimeter handgun was
in the missing car.
Deputy Steven Wilkes responded to Koozer’s call regarding the wrecked
Captiva. He ran the vehicle identification number on the Captiva. The vehicle
came back as stolen out of Campbell, Wisconsin. It was first reported stolen by
its owner on April 6, 2023. Deputy Wilkes then went and saw the wrecked Gator,
and he began to suspect that whoever crashed the Captiva went and stole the
Gator, crashed the Gator, and then went and stole Meyer’s Impala next.
Around 6:30 on the morning of the 19th Heiller arrived at a Casey’s
General Store in Monona, driving a white 2005 GMC Envoy with Minnesota
license plates. Anissa Rohde was employed by Casey’s at the time, and she
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helped Heiller at the register. She noticed blood on Heiller’s face and arm.
Another witness saw Heiller at the Casey’s and found his appearance troubling
enough to comment on it to Rohde. Rohde and her coworker contacted law
enforcement. Heiller left before law enforcement arrived.
More than three months later, on October 1, Heiller was arrested after
being found in possession of a different stolen vehicle. His theft of that vehicle
was charged in a separate case, and that case is the subject of a different appeal.
In this case, Heiller was charged with second-degree theft relating to the Captiva,
first-degree theft relating to the Gator, and second-degree theft relating to the
Impala. Each theft was charged under Iowa Code section 714.1(1) on a theory of
theft by taking. The State also charged Heiller with being a felon in possession,
which arose out of the possession of the firearm Meyer kept in the stolen Impala.
An Allamakee County jury found Heiller guilty of theft of the Captiva as
charged in count 1 and theft of the Gator as charged in count 2, but the jury
acquitted him of theft of the Impala, count 3, and being a felon in possession of
a firearm, count 4.
Heiller timely filed his notice of appeal, and we transferred the case to the
court of appeals. On appeal, he argued that the State lacked territorial
jurisdiction to prosecute him for the theft of the Captiva. He also challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. The court of appeals,
en banc, held that error was not preserved with respect to Heiller’s territorial
jurisdiction challenge and held that the evidence was sufficient to support both
convictions. One judge dissented. We granted Heiller’s application for further
review.
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II.
We start with Heiller’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting each of the convictions because that challenge could provide him
greater relief due to double jeopardy protections. See Burks v. United States,
437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) (holding that the “Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a
second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient”
and that the required remedy “is the direction of a judgment of acquittal”); Iowa
Code § 816.1 (“A conviction or acquittal by a judgment upon a verdict shall bar
another prosecution for the same offense, notwithstanding a defect in form or
substance in the indictment on which the conviction or acquittal took place.”);
State v. Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d 247, 255 (Iowa 2022) (looking at “sufficiency of the
evidence first, as it could provide [the defendant] greater relief”); State v. Kern,
831 N.W.2d 149, 158 (Iowa 2013) (“We first address whether the State introduced
sufficient evidence for a fact finder to find [the defendant] guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. We address this issue first because the Double Jeopardy
Clause would not permit a retrial of the charges if there was insufficient evidence
of guilt presented at trial.”); see also United States v. Robinson, 87 F.4th 658,
667 n.1 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[S]ufficiency challenges should be disposed of
first . . . for double-jeopardy purposes.”); United States v. Gonzalez-Sanchez,
825 F.2d 572, 588 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that an appellate court “must consider
the defendant’s challenge to [the] sufficiency of the evidence to ensure that the
prohibition against double jeopardy is upheld” regardless of any other errors).
A.
In Iowa, appellate courts measure the sufficiency of the evidence against
the marshaling instructions if the defendant does not object to them. See State v.
Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Iowa 2022). In determining whether the evidence
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is sufficient to support a jury’s verdict, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the state. See State v. Hawkins, 27 N.W.3d 562, 568 (Iowa 2025).
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the state, must be substantial
and must raise more than mere “suspicion, speculation, or conjecture.” State v.
Miller, 4 N.W.3d 29, 34 (Iowa 2024) (quoting State v. Huser, 894 N.W.2d 472, 490
(Iowa 2017)).
B.
1.
The defendant did not challenge the marshaling instruction with respect
to count 1, relating to the theft of the Captiva. The unobjected-to marshaling
instruction required the State to prove:
1. On or about the 19th day of June, 2023, the defendant took
possession or control of 2012 silver Chevrolet Captiva. . . .
2. The defendant did so with the intent to deprive the owner
of the 2012 silver Chevrolet Captiva. . . .
3. The property, at the time of the taking, belonged to or was
in the possession of its owner.
As set out in the jury instruction, the criminal conduct proscribed here is
theft by taking. The theory of theft charged matters because the Code provides
alternative means of committing the crime of theft. See Iowa Code § 714.1. For
example, Iowa Code section 714.1(4) criminalizes theft by exercising control over
stolen property, but that theory of theft was not charged in this case. Instead,
the State charged Heiller with theft by taking. See State v. Hanneman, No. 17–1147,
2018 WL 3650311, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2018) (“The theft-by-taking
statute is construed narrowly to apply to a person’s acquisition of
property . . . .”); State v. Hershberger, 534 N.W.2d 464, 466 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995)
(“A person cannot commit theft by taking without also being in possession of
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stolen property. But they represent different points of time within one crime.”
(citation omitted)). In State v. Nall, 894 N.W.2d 514, 524 (Iowa 2017), we
explained that “[i]n order to ‘[take] possession or control’ under [Iowa Code
section 714.1(1)], a person must acquire property without the consent or
authority of another.” (Second alteration in original.) We emphasized that “[t]his
conclusion affirms the importance of the method of obtaining property” so as not
to “transform[] our theft-by-taking statute into a catch-all provision.” Id.
Theft by taking is not a continuing offense. See State v. Hippler,
545 N.W.2d 568, 571 (Iowa 1996) (en banc); State v. Schmitz, 610 N.W.2d 514,
517 (Iowa 2000) (en banc). Instead, theft by taking occurs at a single moment in
time and is complete the instant a person takes possession or control of the
property of another with the requisite intent. See Schmitz, 610 N.W.2d at 517;
State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Iowa 1999) (en banc) (holding that the
state must “pro[ve] that the defendant acted with the specific purpose of
depriving the owner of his property,” which “requires a determination of what
the defendant was thinking when an act was done”); see also State v. Donaldson,
663 N.W.2d 882, 886 (Iowa 2003) (stating that “ ‘possession or control’ begins
and a theft is completed when the actor secures dominion over the object or uses
it in a manner beyond his authority”); State v. Gray, 505 S.W.3d 160, 166
(Ark. 2016) (“ ‘[O]btain’ connotes a singular, discrete taking of possession that
occurs at a given time.”); State v. Taylor, 349 P.3d 696, 703 (Utah 2015) (“The
key actus reus elements of the offense—‘obtain[ing] or exercis[ing]’—are discrete
acts that are satisfied instantaneously. And the commission of the crime is
complete when a person obtains or exercises that control with the requisite
intent.” (alterations in original) (footnote omitted)).
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Because theft by taking is complete at the moment of acquisition, evidence
of later possession is sufficient to establish theft by taking only to the extent the
later possession supports a reasonable inference that the defendant committed
the earlier act of taking. This does not mean that direct evidence of the defendant
physically removing property from its rightful owner is required to support a
conviction for theft by taking. As always, “[d]irect and circumstantial evidence
are equally probative” of the defendant’s guilt. State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336,
342 (Iowa 2021). However, the strength, and thus reasonableness, of the
inference of taking to be drawn from the fact of later possession is dependent
upon the temporal proximity between the taking and the possession.
When the defendant is found in possession of the stolen property close in
time to the taking, the inference that the defendant in possession of the stolen
property was also the person who took the stolen property is stronger and more
concrete. For example, in State v. Hershberger, 534 N.W.2d 464, the defendant
was convicted pursuant to section 714.1(1) for the taking of a motorcycle found
in his possession on the same day it was reported stolen. Id. at 465. On appeal,
the defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction
because the state proved only post-theft possession, not participation in the
taking. Id. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the defendant’s
possession of the stolen motorcycle soon after the theft was reported was
sufficient to support the inference that he took it. Id. at 465–66; see also
Hanneman, 2018 WL 3650311, at *3 (affirming a theft by taking conviction
because the state presented substantial circumstantial evidence that the
defendant took the motorcycle, including the fact that he was found in
possession of the motorcycle when stopped by police for driving without a license
plate on the same day the motorcycle was reported stolen); State v. Eppers,
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3 P.2d 989, 992–93 (Or. 1931) (holding that the defendant’s possession of a
stolen cow only two weeks after the taking was sufficiently recent for a jury to
infer that he was the thief).
Conversely, when the defendant is found in possession of the stolen
property remote in time from the taking, the inference that the defendant in
possession of the stolen property was also the person who took the stolen
property is weaker and more speculative. For example, in Warren v. State, this
court reversed a defendant’s conviction for stealing goods that were found in his
possession eighteen or nineteen months after they were stolen. 1 Greene 106,
107 (Iowa 1848). We explained that mere possession of stolen goods may in some
cases support an inference that the possessor committed the taking, but the
strength and reasonableness of the inference depended on the passage of time
and the presence of additional evidence. See id. at 109–10. “[W]hen the goods
are found in the possession of a person[] within a short period after” a theft, the
inference of guilt is strong, even in the absence of other evidence, because there
has been no meaningful opportunity for the property to pass to another. Id. at
109. Mere possession of stolen property eighteen or nineteen months after it was
taken was not sufficiently recent to support an inference of initial taking,
particularly when the property was easily transferable. See id. at 109–10.
This case falls somewhere between Hershberger and Warren. The record
established that the Captiva was reported stolen in Wisconsin on April 6, 2023.
There was no evidence regarding the circumstances of the taking. The jury found
that Heiller was in possession of that same vehicle approximately two and
one-half months later, on June 18, 2023. The question is whether the mere
possession of a stolen vehicle more than two months after it was taken, standing
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alone, is sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant was in fact the person
who took the vehicle.
Courts that have considered possession of stolen property months after a
theft as sufficient evidence of an initial taking have done so only when that
possession was combined with additional evidence to support an inference of
taking. For example, the defendant in Robertson v. State was caught driving a
stolen vehicle three months after it was reported stolen, and he was convicted of
auto theft. No. 24A-CR-2932, 2025 WL 3677617, at *1–3 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 18,
2025). On appeal, he argued that evidence of his possession was insufficient to
support his theft conviction. Id. at *2–3. The Indiana Court of Appeals agreed
with the defendant, stating:
[M]ere unexplained possession of recently stolen property standing
alone does not automatically support a conviction for theft. Rather,
such possession is to be considered along with the other evidence in
a case, such as how recent or distant in time was the possession
from the moment the item was stolen, and . . . the circumstances of
the possession[.]
Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Fortson v. State, 919 N.E.2d 1136,
1143 (Ind. 2010)). However, the court held that the state produced enough
circumstantial evidence beyond mere possession to support a conviction under
Indiana’s auto theft statute. Id. at *3–4. This evidence included the defendant’s
false stories and explanations to the police, evidence that he had possessed the
car at earlier points in time prior to his arrest and closer to the taking, and
testimony from the owner of the vehicle. Id.; see also Muse v. State, 419 N.E.2d
1302, 1304 (Ind. 1981) (possession of a stolen van three weeks after the theft
plus additional evidence of exclusive possession in the interim was sufficient to
support the defendant’s conviction); State v. Aragon, 788 P.2d 932, 937 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1990) (“Possession of stolen property, standing alone, is not enough to
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justify a conviction . . . . Where other circumstances are present linking
defendant with the theft, however, possession of the stolen property combined
with the other circumstances can justify such a conviction.” (citations omitted)).
No such additional evidence was presented here. The only evidence presented in
support of Heiller’s conviction for the taking of the Captiva was his possession of
the vehicle more than two months after it was reported stolen. The State offered
no evidence that Heiller possessed the car prior to June 19, that he was present
near the location of the theft around the time it was reported stolen in Wisconsin,
or that anything occurred during the intervening two-month period linking him
to the original taking. We conclude that Heiller’s mere possession of the Captiva
over two months after it was reported stolen cannot, without more, support his
conviction for theft by taking of the Captiva. Without more, the passage of time
rendered the inference mere suspicion, speculation, and conjecture, which is
insufficient to sustain the conviction. See Miller, 4 N.W.3d at 34; see also
Turner v. State, 39 S.E. 863, 863–64 (Ga. 1901) (reversing a larceny conviction
because it was based solely on the defendant’s possession of stolen property
approximately fifteen months after it was taken); Shelby v. State, 875 N.E.2d
381, 386 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that evidence insufficient where a “Buick
was stolen a full fifteen days before [the defendant] was found exercising control
over it”); Jones v. State, 26 Miss. 247, 249–50 (Miss. 1853) (reversing a conviction
after the defendant was found in possession of a stolen saddle five or six months
after it was taken because the passage of time weakened the probability that the
later possessor was also the original thief); State v. Matheay, 82 S.E.2d 408, 409
(N.C. 1954) (holding that evidence insufficient to prove automobile theft where
the defendant was found in possession of car eighty-two days after it was
reported stolen and stating that “the time that elapsed . . . between the theft and
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the arrest of the defendant was too long under the circumstances . . . to infer
guilt on the part of the defendant”); Sutherlin v. State, 682 S.W.2d 546, 548–49
(Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc) (holding that evidence insufficient and stating
that “the inference of guilt that might be drawn from mere possession of stolen
property necessarily greatly diminishes as time elapses”); Menchaca v. State,
125 S.W. 20, 21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1910) (holding that possession of stolen
property three and a half months after the burglary occurred was “too remote”
to support a jury inference that the defendant possessor was “the party who
entered the house and secured the property”).
2.
The State requests that, if the court finds the evidence insufficient to
sustain the conviction for theft of the Captiva, we remand the case for an entry
of judgment on the lesser included offense of operating a motor vehicle without
the owner’s consent. The unobjected-to marshaling instruction for that offense
provided that the State would have to prove:
1. On or about the 19th day of June, 2023, the defendant
intentionally took possession or control of an automobile belonging
to the respective owner. . . .
2. The possession or control was without consent of the
respective owner.
Like Iowa Code section 714.1(1), section 714.7 proscribes the act of taking
possession or control of someone’s property. Unlike theft, however, the crime of
operating a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner does not require proof
of the specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property but
instead requires proof that the taking was done without the owner’s consent. See
Iowa Code § 714.7; State v. McCormack, 293 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Iowa 1980). The
primary difference between the two offenses lies in the mens rea requirement,
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not the actus reus requirement. As the jury instruction demonstrates, the State
is still required to prove that the defendant is the person who initially took the
vehicle. See State v. Jackson, 4 N.W.3d 298, 313 (Iowa 2024) (“Jackson’s
blackout while driving, even if true, had no bearing on whether he initially took
possession and control of the vehicle without the owner’s consent.” (emphasis
added)). As discussed above, however, there is insufficient evidence that Heiller
took the vehicle without the owner’s consent. We thus cannot remand for entry
of judgment on the lesser included offense.
3.
Because we have concluded that there is insufficient evidence in support
of Heiller’s conviction for theft in the first degree with respect to the Captiva, we
need not address Heiller’s territorial jurisdiction challenge to the conviction.
C.
Heiller next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
conviction for first-degree theft of the Gator. The marshaling instructions were
not objected to, and they serve as the law of the case for the purpose of
determining the sufficiency of the evidence. The marshaling instruction provided
that the State was required to prove:
1. On or about the 19th day of June, 2023, the defendant took
possession or control of the John Deere Gator. . . .
2. The defendant did so with the intent to deprive Robert Lloyd
of the John Deere Gator. . . .
3. The property, at the time of the taking, belonged to or was
in the possession of Robert Lloyd.
Heiller argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for
theft by taking of the Gator because there is insufficient evidence that he took
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the Gator, and there is insufficient evidence that he intended to permanently
deprive the owner of the Gator.
There is substantial evidence that Heiller took the Gator. Two witnesses
saw Heiller at the Waterville Bar on the night in question. He was associated
with the distinctive Captiva because of the broken-out passenger window. Later
that night, Koozer’s game camera captured the same car driving through his
property, and the same car was found on the property, crashed into a tree. The
Gator was stolen from Lloyd’s residence, within walking distance of the Koozer
residence. The Gator was found wrecked not far from Lloyd’s residence with
blood inside it and a bloodied bandana in it. Witnesses observed Heiller with that
bandana earlier in the evening, and the blood on the bandana was a positive
DNA match to Heiller. And Heiller appeared a few hours later at a Casey’s with
visible injuries and blood on his face and arm. From this evidence, a reasonable
jury could conclude that Heiller took the Gator.
On the second element, Heiller argues that the evidence was insufficient
to prove his intent to permanently deprive Lloyd of the Gator. Heiller is correct
that theft requires proof of the specific intent to permanently deprive the owner
of the property at issue. See Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d at 791; State v. Morris,
677 N.W.2d 787, 788 (Iowa 2004) (per curiam). We have recognized that when a
vehicle is wrecked shortly after it is taken, the evidentiary basis for inferring an
intent to permanently deprive is limited because there has been insufficient time
to show the defendant intended more than a brief joyride. See Schminkey,
597 N.W.2d at 791; Morris, 677 N.W.2d at 788. Here, however, the marshaling
instruction did not require proof of permanent deprivation. Because the
instruction was not challenged, it became the law of the case for the purpose of
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. We therefore consider only whether the
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evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find Heiller possessed the intent
to deprive Lloyd of his Gator.
The evidence is sufficient to support the conviction as instructed. The jury
could reasonably infer intent from the sequence of events and Heiller’s conduct
that night. Heiller sped away from law enforcement in a stolen vehicle, wrecked
the vehicle, and fled the scene of the accident. See State v. Miller, No. 16–2110,
2018 WL 1099580, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2018) (finding sufficient
evidence of intent where “[t]he jury could have deduced that [the defendant]
wanted to take someone else’s vehicle to avoid detection”). He drove the Gator
recklessly and without regard for the owner’s interest. See Shoemaker v. State,
No. 22–2107, 2024 WL 2317501, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. May 22, 2024) (“The
reckless operation of a get-away vehicle can satisfy the intent element of theft.”).
Taken together, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that
Heiller intended to deprive Lloyd of the Gator.
III.
We vacate Heiller’s conviction and sentence on count 1, theft in the second
degree, arising out of the alleged theft of the Chevy Captiva, and we affirm
Heiller’s conviction on count 2, theft in the first degree, arising out of the theft of
the John Deere Gator. We remand this matter for entry of judgment of acquittal
on count 1. A new sentencing hearing with the defendant present is not required.
See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.27(3) (providing that the “defendant’s presence is not
required for a reduction of sentence”).
Decision of Court of Appeals Vacated; District Court Judgment
Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Case Remanded.