3/19/2026 3:10:13 PM
In the Iowa Supreme Court
No. 25–1787
Submitted February 19, 2026—Filed March 20, 2026
Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board,
Complainant,
vs.
Stephen K. Allison,
Respondent.
On review of the report of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance Commission.
The grievance commission recommends a public reprimand for violation
of ethical rules. Attorney Reprimanded.
May, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.
McDonald, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Tara van Brederode, Sarah C. Tupper, and Robert A. Howard III, Des
Moines, for complainant.
Jesse Macro, Jr. of Macro Law, LLP, Des Moines, for respondent.
2
May, Justice.
The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board (Board) charged
Stephen Allison with violating three Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. The
charges all arise from Allison’s repeated refusals to comply with this court’s
orders to file a jurisdictional statement during a criminal appeal. Ultimately,
these refusals led to the dismissal of the appeal. As will be explained, though,
Allison did not abandon his client. Instead, Allison helped his client resolve the
underlying criminal charge through a separate plea deal.
After a hearing, the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance Commission
(commission) found that Allison had committed the charged violations. As a
sanction, the commission recommends a public reprimand.
Following our de novo review, we agree that the Board proved the charged
violations. We also agree that the proper sanction is a public reprimand.
I. Background.
Allison has held a license to practice law in Iowa since 2017. This matter
arises from Allison’s representation of Mark Derrick Easton in a criminal appeal
in 2023.
Before Allison was involved, Easton pleaded guilty to one count of indecent
exposure in violation of Iowa Code section 709.9(2)(a) (2022). The district court
sentenced Easton on December 9, 2022. Later, the district court was advised
that the sentence should have included a ten-year special sentence as required
by Iowa Code section 903B.2. On February 1, 2023, the court set aside the
judgment and set dates for a pretrial conference and jury trial. The same day,
Easton’s prior counsel (not Allison) filed a motion to withdraw.
Meanwhile, during January and February, Easton made various pro se
filings in our court. In an order dated February 27, we noted that one of Easton’s
3
pro se filings “could be read as” a notice of appeal from the district court’s
February 1 order. We remanded the matter “for a period of 14 days for the district
court to rule on [Easton’s prior counsel’s] . . . motion to withdraw, and to appoint
new counsel as necessary.”
The next day, the district court removed Easton’s prior counsel and
appointed Allison to represent Easton. As the commission describes, “This
appointment led to Allison being listed as counsel for the appellate case, despite
the fact that Allison was not on the court-appointed list for appellate matters
and did not practice appellate law.”
On April 14, our court issued an order acknowledging Allison’s
appointment as counsel for Easton’s attempted appeal. We also noted possible
jurisdictional problems with that attempted appeal. So we directed Allison to “file
a statement regarding whether the court may exercise jurisdiction over
appellant’s February 1, 2023 filing” within twenty days. This meant that Allison
had until May 4 to file a jurisdictional statement.
But Allison did not file a jurisdictional statement by May 4. Nor did Allison
file a motion to withdraw from the appeal.
On May 12, we issued another order. We noted that on May 9, the district
court had allowed Allison to withdraw from the case underlying the appeal. We
also noted, however, that the district court’s order “did not remove Mr. Allison
as counsel for [Easton] in th[e] appeal.” We also directed Allison to file a
jurisdictional statement “[w]ithin 20 days of the date of th[e] order.” This gave
Allison until June 1 to file a jurisdictional statement.
But Allison did not file a jurisdictional statement by June 1. Nor did Allison
file a motion to withdraw from the appeal.
4
On June 22, we issued yet another order. We noted Allison’s failure to file
a jurisdictional statement as instructed in the April 14 and May 12 orders.
Because of those failures, we assessed a $150 penalty against Allison. And we
again ordered Allison to file a jurisdictional statement within twenty days, i.e.,
by July 12. We also warned Allison that failure “to comply with this order may
result in dismissal of this appeal.”
On July 7, Allison paid the $150 penalty. Yet Allison did not file a
jurisdictional statement. Nor did Allison move to withdraw from the appeal.
Meanwhile, though, Allison was assisting Easton in a separate criminal
case in the district court. With Allison’s help, Easton entered a plea deal in that
case. That deal led to the dismissal of the indecent exposure charge underlying
Easton’s attempted appeal. The dismissal was entered on July 12. But even then,
neither Easton nor Allison dismissed the appeal. Nor did Allison file a
jurisdictional statement or motion to withdraw in our court.
On August 3, the appellate clerk entered a notice of default to Allison
based on his failure to file a jurisdictional statement. The notice warned that if
Allison did not remedy this default within an additional fifteen days, the appeal
would be dismissed. The notice also assessed an additional $150 penalty against
Allison and warned that it must be paid “within fifteen days.” The notice closed
with this warning:
You are advised that if the appeal is dismissed as a result of
counsel’s failure to comply with this default notice, a copy of the
dismissal order will be forwarded to the Iowa Supreme Court
Attorney Disciplinary Board and to the State Public Defender’s
Office, where applicable. The dismissal may serve as grounds for an
investigation of neglect of a client’s legal matter.
(Emphasis omitted.)
5
Even then, Allison did not comply. The fifteen-day deadline came and
went. Allison still did not file a jurisdictional statement. Nor did Allison file a
motion to withdraw from the appeal.
On September 6, about two weeks after that deadline passed, we entered
an order dismissing the appeal for want of prosecution. We noted that Allison
had still not filed the jurisdictional statement or paid the second $150 penalty.
We also directed the clerk to certify copies of the appellate docket to the Board.
A week later, on September 11, Allison paid the second $150 penalty.
On September 25—more than two weeks after the appeal was dismissed—
Allison filed a document entitled “Statement From Attorney Ordered to File
Statement.” Allison noted that he did not have a contract with the state public
defender to handle appellate criminal matters. As for the jurisdictional question,
Allison said that he declined to “speculate as to whether this Court has
jurisdiction on this appeal.”
We took no action on this statement. Procedendo issued on October 9.
II. Disciplinary Proceedings.
The Board investigated the matters just described. Following that
investigation, the Board filed a complaint charging Allison with violating Iowa
Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.3, 32:3.2, and 32:8.4(d). The Board
recommended public reprimand as the appropriate sanction.
Allison’s answer admitted most of the Board’s factual allegations. But he
denied that the court “ordered [him] to represent Mr. Easton on [appellate]
matters as a court appointed attorney.” Allison also denied that he violated any
rules.
The commission conducted a hearing in July 2025. Allison was the only
witness.
6
Following the hearing and the filing of posthearing briefs, the commission
issued its written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended
sanction. The commission concluded that Allison violated rules 32:1.3, 32:3.2,
and 32:8.4(d) by “deliberately ma[king] the decision” not to file the jurisdictional
statement “even though he was on notice of the three orders directing him to do
so.” As a sanction, the commission recommended a public reprimand.
Allison did not appeal. However, both Allison and the Board filed
statements with our court regarding the appropriate sanction.
III. Standard of Review.
Although Allison did not appeal, it is our practice to review the record de
novo and verify that the Board proved the violations charged. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Leitner, 998 N.W.2d 627, 633 (Iowa 2023). If we conclude the
Board has proven violations, we then consider the appropriate sanction. In all of
this, we give respectful consideration to the commission’s findings and
recommendations, but we are not bound by them. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Anderson, 21 N.W.3d 145, 148 (Iowa 2025).
IV. Violations.
As explained, the Board alleged—and the commission found—that Allison
violated three of our ethical rules: rules 32:1.3, which requires lawyers to “act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client”; 32:3.2,
which requires lawyers to “make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation
consistent with the interests of the client”; and 32:8.4(d), which prohibits lawyers
from “engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”
Iowa Rs. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.3, 32:3.2, 32:8.4(d). These alleged violations arise
from Allison’s deliberate failure to comply with our court’s orders to make certain
filings by certain deadlines, all leading to the administrative dismissal of a
7
client’s criminal appeal. Following our de novo review, we agree with the
commission that this conduct by Allison violated rules 32:1.3, 32:3.2, and
32:8.4(d). See Anderson, 21 N.W.3d at 148 (finding a violation of rules 32:1.3,
32:3.2, and 32:8.4(d) through the failure to meet appellate filing deadlines
resulting in default notices); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lipski, 14
N.W.3d 751, 757 (Iowa 2024) (finding a violation of rule 32:1.3 based on the
failure to comply with appellate deadlines); Leitner, 998 N.W.2d at 639 (“We have
consistently held an attorney violates rule 32:8.4(d) when the
‘misconduct . . . causes court proceedings to be . . . dismissed.’ ” (quoting Iowa
Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnson, 988 N.W.2d 399, 413 (Iowa 2023)));
Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Bergmann, 938 N.W.2d 16, 20, 22 (Iowa
2020) (observing that the “[f]ailure to meet appellate deadlines and the triggering
of default notices can violate rule 32:3.2” even if the attorney “erroneously
believed that his court-appointed duties had ended”). Thus we proceed to
consider the proper sanction.
V. Sanctions.
Sanctions for attorney misconduct should advance “our goals of protecting
‘society from those unfit to practice law, . . . uphold[ing] public confidence in the
justice system,’ deterring future misconduct, and ‘maintain[ing] . . . the
reputation of the bar as a whole.’ ” Leitner, 998 N.W.2d at 646 (alterations and
omissions in original) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ireland, 748
N.W.2d 498, 502 (Iowa 2008) (per curiam)). “There is no standard sanction for a
particular type of misconduct”; rather, we “determine an appropriate sanction
based on the particular circumstances of each case.” Anderson, 21 N.W.3d at
148 (first quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Neff, 5 N.W.3d 296, 314
(Iowa 2024); and then quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Earley, 729
8
N.W.2d 437, 443 (Iowa 2007)). Even so, we “seek a degree of consistency in our
disciplinary cases with respect to sanctions.” Id. (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Taylor, 814 N.W.2d 259, 268 (Iowa 2012)). So our analysis
typically centers on three issues: (1) “our history of sanctioning similar
misconduct,” (2) “any special mitigating factors that apply to the particular case,”
and (3) “any special aggravating factors.” Leitner, 998 N.W.2d at 646.
A. History of Sanctioning Similar Misconduct. As explained, Allison
violated rules 32:1.3, 32:3.2, and 32:8.4(d) when he deliberately declined to
comply with our orders requiring him to file a jurisdictional statement and
thereby allowed Easton’s appeal to be administratively dismissed. “Sanctions for
conduct of this nature range from a public reprimand when the attorney’s
misconduct is relatively isolated, to suspensions of several months when the
conduct is egregious or accompanied by related misrepresentations, additional
violations, or other aggravating circumstances.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Weiland, 862 N.W.2d 627, 639–40 (Iowa 2015) (collecting cases). Allison’s
violations line up most closely with those in Iowa Supreme Court Attorney
Disciplinary Board v. Wright, 758 N.W.2d 227, 228 (Iowa 2008), and Iowa
Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Weiland, 862 N.W.2d at 641. In
each of those cases, an attorney “failed to comply with appellate deadlines in a
single client matter and failed to dismiss his client’s appeal, instead allowing it
to be administratively dismissed.” Weiland, 862 N.W.2d at 641 (discussing
Wright). Based on this conduct, we publicly reprimanded the attorneys in each
case. Weiland, 862 N.W.2d at 643; Wright, 758 N.W.2d at 232.
B. Potential Mitigating Factors. We next consider whether there are
mitigating factors. We believe there are several. Allison’s acceptance of court
appointments for indigent criminal defendants is mitigating. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y
9
Disciplinary Bd. v. Hier, 937 N.W.2d 309, 318 (Iowa 2020). Allison’s acceptance
of appointments for an underserved population is especially mitigating. Iowa
Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Said, 869 N.W.2d 185, 194 (Iowa 2015). Allison’s
regular engagement in other community service is mitigating. Lipski, 14 N.W.3d
at 760. Allison’s lack of prior discipline is mitigating. Leitner, 998 N.W.2d at 647.
Allison’s limited experience with appellate practice is mitigating. Iowa Sup. Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Turner, 918 N.W.2d 130, 155 (Iowa 2018) (“Even before
we adopted the rules of professional conduct, we considered inexperience to be
a mitigating factor.”).
We also adopt the commission’s finding that although Allison failed to
pursue Easton’s interests in the appeal, he did not abandon Easton and, indeed,
he helped Easton obtain a positive outcome in the underlying criminal matter.
This lack of client harm is mitigating. Weiland, 862 N.W.2d at 642.
But we look somewhat less favorably on some of Allison’s other proposed
mitigating factors. In his statement regarding sanctions, Allison claims that he
has made “the ultimate acceptance of responsibility” by making changes to the
way he monitors the court’s electronic document management system (EDMS),
thereby “acknowledging the way he was doing things was problematic” and also
“show[ing] a new pattern of conduct to help prevent the errors from happening
in the future.” And so, Allison suggests, the commission and the Board were
wrong to suggest that he failed to take responsibility.
We see things differently. For one thing, the record doesn’t support
Allison’s suggestion that “contrary to the panel and Board’s positions,” he has
consistently taken responsibility for his misconduct. Both in his correspondence
with the Board and in his testimony before the commission, Allison made it clear
10
that he did not view his actions as misconduct at all. He also focused blame on
others, including the district court and the appellate clerk.
To be clear, we do not suggest that it was wrong for Allison to defend
himself in disciplinary proceedings. He was certainly free to do so. See Iowa Sup.
Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Tindal, 949 N.W.2d 637, 645 (Iowa 2020). Rather, our
point is simply that—contrary to his current claims—Allison has not always
taken responsibility for his misconduct.
Nor do we think Allison is taking responsibility for his misconduct now.
Although Allison says he has changed how he monitors EDMS, that doesn’t really
address his actual violations. Allison’s violations here are not like those of an
attorney who accidentally overlooked some deadlines because he didn’t spend
enough time on EDMS. Rather, Allison’s violations arise from deliberate choices.
The record supports, and we adopt, the commission’s unchallenged finding that
Allsion “deliberately made the decision to eschew filing the jurisdictional
statement” in Easton’s appeal “even though he was on notice of the three orders”
from our court “directing him to do so.” This deliberate defiance is not mitigated
by changes to Allison’s EDMS monitoring process.
Similarly, although we acknowledge that Allison encountered other
suboptimal circumstances during his representation of Easton—such as the fact
that Easton was a difficult client and the fact that Allison was appointed even
though he had not been contracted to do appellate work—we do not view those
circumstances as especially mitigating. None of those circumstances gave Allsion
license to ignore our orders. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Eichmann,
18 N.W.3d 460, 475 (Iowa 2025) (“A difficult client does not excuse an attorney
from complying with our rules of professional conduct.”). Rather, it was Allison’s
11
duty to comply with those orders or—at the very least—to ask leave to withdraw
as counsel. Allison did neither.
C. Potential Aggravating Factors. We next consider whether the record
shows any aggravating factors. The Board points to two candidates: Allison’s
prior private admonition and his lack of remorse in this matter.
“Although a private admonition is not discipline, we can consider it an
aggravating factor because it puts the attorney on notice of his or her ethical
requirements.” Bergmann, 938 N.W.2d at 23. Allison’s prior private admonition
was issued in November 2022—just months before the misconduct at issue here.
And just as in this case, the admonition arose from Allison’s mishandling of an
appeal. There are differences, though. The prior matter arose in the very different
context of a termination of parental rights proceeding. And in that prior matter,
Allison’s misconduct involved the miscalculation of a filing date. That was more
like negligence, not the deliberate defiance at issue here. In any event, given the
timing of the prior admonition and the fact that it was based on mishandling of
another appeal, we consider it to be aggravating.
We turn next to Allison’s remorse or lack thereof. “An attorney’s lack of
remorse is an aggravating factor.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Ranniger, 981 N.W.2d 9, 19 (Iowa 2022).
As explained, Allison’s sanctions statement does not include a genuine
acceptance of responsibility for his actual violations. Indeed, by directing our
attention toward EDMS, Allison seems to be steering us away from the real
problem here: his deliberate refusal to comply with our orders.
In any event, we agree with the commission that Allison has not shown
remorse for his actual violations. Before the Board and the commission, Allison
maintained that because he thought his client’s appeal should be dismissed, he
12
also thought it was appropriate to ignore our orders and thereby allow the appeal
to be administratively dismissed. Even now, he has not retreated from that
erroneous view. This is aggravating. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Tompkins, 733 N.W.2d 661, 669 (Iowa 2007) (“Our case law makes it clear that
an attorney cannot use a default notice to dismiss an appeal in lieu of the
attorney’s obligation to comply with our appellate rules.”).
D. The Proper Sanction Here. As mentioned, the commission concluded
that a public reprimand was the proper sanction. Likewise, in its statement on
sanctions, the Board recommends a public reprimand. Meanwhile, Allison
requests another private admonition.
After considering the nature of Allison’s misconduct, our history of
sanctions for similar misconduct, the relevant mitigating factors, and the
relevant aggravating factors, we do not believe that a private admonition would
adequately address Allison’s deliberate defiance of our orders. Instead, we agree
with the Board and the commission that a public reprimand is appropriate.
VI. Conclusion.
We hereby impose a public reprimand on Allison as recommended by the
commission. We tax the costs of this action to Allison under Iowa Court
Rule 36.24(1).
Attorney Reprimanded.
All justices concur. McDonald, J., files a concurring opinion.
13
#25–1787, Bd. v. Allison
McDonald, Justice (concurring).
I write separately to emphasize that Iowa Court Rules 36.21 and 36.22 are
distinct rules with distinct meanings, and we should treat them accordingly. See
Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y. Disciplinary Bd. v. Lipski, 14 N.W.3d 751, 762 (Iowa 2024)
(McDonald, J., concurring in the judgment); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Yang, 6 N.W.3d 312, 325–26 (Iowa 2024) (McDonald, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Tindal, 949
N.W.2d 637, 646–48 (Iowa 2020) (McDonald, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
In this case, the grievance commission issued findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and recommended sanctions. See Iowa Ct. R. 36.19(1). Allison then filed
a statement opposing the recommended sanction, and the Board filed a
statement in support of the recommended sanction. Neither party appealed the
merits. Thus, we review the record de novo to “impose a lesser or greater sanction
than the discipline the grievance commission recommends,” id. r. 36.21(1), but
the commission’s uncontested findings and conclusions are not within the scope
of our review when the attorney does not appeal those findings and conclusions
pursuant to rule 36.22. Although, as the majority notes, it has been “our
practice” to review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the underlying
violations, that practice is inconsistent with the text of the rules. We should
either follow the rules we have adopted or amend them. I respectfully concur.