Adonel Concrete Corp. v. Randy Furshman

2026-06-24No. 3D2025-0132

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court reversed the trial court's denial of Adonel Concrete's motion to enforce the settlement and reversed the final summary judgment against Adonel, remanding for further proceedings consistent with the finding that a valid and enforceable settlement agreement existed between the parties.

Adonel Concrete, a subcontractor, recorded a lien against the Furshmans' property after they disputed the quality of concrete work and refused payment. The parties engaged in a two-week negotiation via phone and email that culminated in Adonel sending a confirmation email outlining the settlement terms: payment of $16,937.26 plus $4,500 in attorney fees, along with preparation of a lien release and mutual general release. The Furshmans did not object to this email, sent a check for the full amount, and responded positively when Adonel later sent a draft settlement agreement. However, the Furshmans later refused to sign the mutual release and claimed only the lien had been satisfied, not the attorney fees obligation.

The trial court ruled against Adonel Concrete, but the appellate court reversed. The court held that the parties' conduct demonstrated an objective meeting of the minds on all essential settlement terms, despite the mutual release remaining unsigned. The Furshmans manifested their assent through their silence after the confirmation email, their payment of the agreed-upon sum, and their acknowledgment that they would review and comment on the proposed release documents. Under Florida law, execution of a formal release document is not a condition precedent to forming a binding settlement agreement when the parties have agreed on the material terms and demonstrated their intent to be bound.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a binding settlement agreement exists when the parties objectively manifest assent to essential terms without executing all formal documentation
Whether the unsigned mutual general release defeats contract formation when parties agreed on payment amount and lien release
Whether objective external signs of assent override a party's subjective intent regarding settlement terms

Procedural posture

Adonel Concrete appealed the trial court's denial of its motion to enforce a settlement agreement and entry of final summary judgment in favor of the Furshmans.

Authorities cited

3 So. 3d 415

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed June 24, 2026.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

No. 3D25-0132

Lower Tribunal No. 22-CA-118-P

Adonel Concrete Corp.,

Appellant,

vs.

Randy Furshman and Sindee Furshman,

Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Luis Garcia, Judge.

Law Offices of Mara Shlackman, P.L., and Mara Shlackman (Fort Lauderdale); Law Office of Buckley Correa and Richard Allen Buckley (Weston), for appellant.

Philip D. Parrish, P.A., and Philip D. Parrish, for appellees.

Before LINDSEY, LOBREE and GOODEN, JJ.

GOODEN, J.

In this construction dispute, Appellant Adonel Concrete Corp.

challenges the trial court’s denial of its motion to enforce settlement and entry

of the final summary judgment against it. Because we find that a settlement

agreement exists, we reverse.

Appellees Randy and Sindee Furshman hired a general contractor to

perform construction on their property in Key Largo. The general contractor

then hired Adonel Concrete as a subcontractor. The Furshmans were not

satisfied with Adonel Concrete’s work and did not pay. In response, Adonel

Concrete recorded a lien for $16,937.26.

In a series of telephone calls and emails spanning a two-week period,

Adonel Concrete and the Furshmans negotiated. In the final email, Adonel

Concrete confirmed a phone call in which the Furshmans agreed to pay

$16,937.26, plus $4,500.00 for attorneys’ fees. Adonel Concrete advised

that it “will prepare and record the . . . lien release” and “prepare a mutual

general release.” At the end of this email, it requested: “If this email does

not correctly outline our conversation, please immediately contact me by

email explaining your understanding of those portions of our conversation

discussed in this email.”

The Furshmans did not object or contest the content of the email.

Rather, they sent a check for that amount and wrote: “For Driveway Final

Payment.” The next day, they provided the tracking number and wrote:

Please send me the proposed lien release, general release, and

any other paperwork for my review. After I have time to review, I

will let you know if they are agreeable, and if I have any edits,

comments, or concerns.

Upon receipt, Adonel Concrete deposited the check. It then emailed the

Furshmans a “draft proposed settlement agreement and mutual release” and

requested them to “provide us any changes that need to be made.” Mr.

Furshman responded: “ok, thanks, will have to you tomorrow.”

Adonel Concrete signed the mutual general release. But the

Furshmans never did. Instead, the Furshmans claimed the lien was paid in

full and they were no longer obligated to pay attorneys’ fees. So, Adonel

Concrete filed suit. And, the Furshmans counterclaimed.

The law of contracts governs settlements. Robbie v. City of Miami, 469

So. 2d 1384, 1385 (Fla. 1985). “To form a binding contract there must be an

offer and acceptance.” Mercury Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Fonseca, 3 So. 3d 415,

417 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). “[A]n acceptance must contain an assent—or

meeting of the minds—to the essential terms contained in the offer.” Nichols

v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 834 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

“The making of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in

one intention, but on the agreement of two sets of external signs—not on the

parties having meant the same thing but on their having said the same thing.”

Gendzier v. Bielecki, 97 So. 2d 604, 608 (FIa. 1957) (quoting Oliver Wendell

Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 464 (1897)). “There

must therefore be an objective manifestation by both parties of assent to the

same terms.” Suarez Trucking FL Corp. v. Souders, 350 So. 3d 38, 42 (Fla.

2022).

We find that a valid and enforceable settlement exists between the

parties because there was “an objective manifestation by both parties of

assent to the same terms.” Id. The parties “said the same thing” and agreed

to all essential elements—which includes use of a mutual general release.

Gendzier, 97 So. 2d at 608. The Furshmans objectively demonstrated their

assent in several ways: not objecting to the settlement confirmation email,

sending the check in the negotiated amount, and replying “ok, thanks, will

have to you tomorrow” to the email with the proposed release. Randy

Furshman’s testimony on his subjective intent and state of mind does not

overcome these objective, external signs. See 1 Williston on Contracts § 4:1

(4th ed.).

The Furshmans point to the unsigned mutual general release as proof

that no settlement agreement was reached. They claim it shows a lack of

assent. But the fact that one was not executed or finalized does not prevent

formation of a contract or destroy the agreement of the parties. See

Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., Inc. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 302 So.

2d 404, 408 (Fla. 1974) (“Even though all the details are not definitely fixed,

an agreement may be binding if the parties agree on the essential terms and

seriously understand and intend the agreement to be binding on them.”).

The release simply memorialized the parties’ agreement. See Boyko v.

Ilardi, 613 So. 2d 103, 104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (“We affirm based on . . .

execution of the settlement documents was not a condition precedent to the

settlement agreement, but rather a mere procedural formality which both

parties to the settlement agreement were obliged to perform.”). See also

Portner v. Koppel, 382 So. 3d 742, 748 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024); Erhardt v. Duff,

729 So. 2d 529, 530 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v.

Sykes, 495 So. 2d 859, 861 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). “[A]ll the details of a

release do not need to be absolutely decided as long as the parties agree on

the essential terms. . . .” Nichols, 834 So. 2d at 219. And, that was the case

here.

Accordingly, we reverse the order denying Adonel Concrete’s motion

to enforce settlement and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion. Because we find that a valid settlement agreement exists, we also

reverse the final summary judgment for the Furshmans on Adonel

Concrete’s claim for lien foreclosure.

Reversed and remanded.