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White v. District of Columbia

2026-06-24No. Civil Action No. 2024-0769

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court granted White's request for attorneys' fees and costs in full, including fees-on-fees, as itemized in her 2026 inflation-adjusted invoices.

Gwendolyn White sought to recover attorneys' fees and costs from the District of Columbia after prevailing in IDEA administrative proceedings. The court had previously awarded her a portion of the fees she requested for the underlying litigation by applying a reduced rate (75% of the Fitzpatrick matrix rather than the Laffey rates she sought). On remand, the District argued that White's request for fees incurred in pursuing the initial fee award (fees-on-fees) should be reduced because she had achieved only partial success in her underlying fee request, receiving roughly 60% of what she claimed. The District also contended the fees-on-fees award was excessive and that an earlier settlement offer should preclude a full award.

The court rejected the District's arguments. Although the District had waived its challenge by failing to substantively address fees-on-fees in its initial opposition, the court addressed the arguments on the merits given ambiguous language in an earlier order. Under D.C. Circuit precedent, IDEA litigants are entitled to compensation for hours spent pursuing fee awards at the same rates applied to the underlying action. The court declined to reduce the fees-on-fees award for limited success, finding that the reduction in White's underlying award stemmed primarily from the rate adjustment rather than from unreasonable hours, that the rate question remained genuinely disputed in the Circuit, and that the District's own conduct had prolonged and complicated the litigation. The court also found the District's settlement offer too ambiguous to qualify as a valid offer of judgment.

The court granted White's request and ordered the District to pay her full attorneys' fees and costs, including all fees-on-fees, as documented in her inflation-adjusted invoices.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Entitlement to fees-on-fees in IDEA cases
  • Appropriate hourly rates for fees-on-fees awards
  • Whether limited success in underlying fee award justifies reduction of fees-on-fees
  • Validity of settlement offer under Rule 68

Procedural posture

The plaintiff appealed the district court's partial award of attorneys' fees for underlying IDEA administrative proceedings and sought full recovery of fees incurred in pursuing that fee award, with the defendant opposing on grounds of limited success and excessiveness.

Authorities cited

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GWENDOLYN WHITE,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 24-cv-769 (DLF)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Gwendolyn White brought this action to recover attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in

successful administrative proceedings against the District of Columbia Public Schools under the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). On July 22, 2025, the Court granted in part

White’s motion for attorneys’ fees. See Order, Dkt 13. It ordered White to produce adjusted

invoices in accordance with the Court’s Memorandum Opinion, Dkt. 14, and it ordered the District

to file supplemental briefing on White’s request for fees-on-fees. See Order 1. Before the Court

are (1) the District’s supplemental brief, Dkt. 18; (2) White’s response thereto, Dkt. 20; and

(3) White’s 2026 inflation-adjusted invoices, see Dkts. 21-1; 21-2. For the following reasons, the

Court will accept White’s adjusted invoices in full and order the District to pay her attorneys’ fees

and costs.

The District argues that White’s fees-on-fees request is excessive and should be reduced

for limited success. To start, the District waived these arguments. In her motion for attorneys’

fees, White sought both attorneys’ fees incurred in “the underlying administrative litigation” and

“fees and costs incurred in this case,” all of which totaled almost $200,000. Dkt. 8, at 1. In its

opposition, the District did not substantively address White’s request for fees-on-fees. See generally Dkt. 9; see also Dkt. 20, at 6. The District may not now raise arguments about White’s

fees-on-fees request that it failed to raise in its opposition. See Wannall v. Honeywell, Inc., 775

F.3d 425, 428 (D.C. Cir. 2014). But because the Court’s language directing the District to file a

sur-reply as to “the plaintiff’s fees-on-fees request as invoiced in the reply brief” was ambiguous

and could be read broadly to include the entirety of White’s fees-on-fees request, Order 1, the

Court will address the District’s new arguments.

“IDEA litigants are entitled to receive compensation for the hours expended pursuing an

initial fee award in District Court.” Reed v. District of Columbia, 843 F.3d 517, 526 (D.C. Cir.

2016). And since the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Reed v. District of Columbia, 843 F.3d 517 (D.C.

Cir. 2016), “courts in this district have ordered fees-on-fees awards at the same rates as those

awarded to the attorneys for the underlying administrative action.” Merrick v. District of

Columbia, 316 F. Supp. 3d 498, 517 (D.D.C. 2018); see also McNeil v. District of Columbia, 233

F. Supp. 3d 150, 155 (D.D.C. 2017) (Applying different rate to fees-on-fees request “would be

illogical given that the initial fee proceeding and this proceeding are parts of the same action.”);

Lloyd ex rel. M.L. v. Ingenuity Prep Pub. Charter Sch., No. 18-cv-00801, 2020 WL 6822681, at

*6 n.8 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2020). Nonetheless, the Court must still determine that any fees-on-fees

award is “reasonable” and not excessive. Merrick, 316 F. Supp. 3d at 517. And the Court may

“exercise[] its discretion” to reduce fees-on-fees awards in IDEA cases to account for plaintiffs’

limited success in their initial fee awards. McAllister v. District of Columbia, 160 F. Supp. 3d 273,

280 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983)), aff’d, 689 F. App’x

646 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

Although the District does not dispute that the same hourly rate should apply to White’s

fees-on-fees as to the fees awarded for the underlying IDEA litigation (in this case, 75% of the

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Fitzpatrick matrix per the Court’s Memorandum Opinion), it contends that because White

“originally sought $143,337.60” in attorneys’ fees “connected to the administrative litigation” and

was awarded only $85,198.88—“or about 60% of her requested fees”—the Court should apply a

corresponding 40% reduction to White’s fees-on-fees request. 1 Dkt. 18, at 3. The District also

argues that because White’s fees-on-fees award would be “over 45% of the claimed total cost of

this litigation” and because her counsel was unsuccessful in obtaining their “sought-after rates,”

White’s fees-on-fees award is excessive and should be reduced by 50%. Id. at 4–5. The District

does not identify any specific time entries that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unnecessary,” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, except for flagging a few entries where “multiple

attorneys perform[ed] the same work,” Dkt. 18, at 4 n.1. But these entries were occasions when

“two lawyers read[] the same document,” Dkt. 20, at 10 n.4, and they are not excessive.

The Court concludes that White’s fees-on-fees request is reasonable and will not exercise

its discretion to reduce the award for limited success. The District’s primary argument is that

White’s attorneys sought $143,337.60 in fees for the underlying IDEA litigation but will receive

only $85,198.88. See Dkt. 18, at 3. According to the District, White achieved limited success and

her fees-on-fees award should be reduced to reflect that limited success. First, the Court notes that

it found the number of hours White expended litigating the merits of her IDEA case reasonable.

See Mem. Op. 2–3. In fact, out of over 150 hours, see Dkt. 18, at 4, the Court deducted only 1.9

hours from White’s invoices and White herself removed 11.6 hours, see Mem. Op. 4–5. Almost

all of the difference between White’s requested fee amount and the ultimate award stemmed from

the Court’s decision to apply 75% of the Fitzpatrick matrix as a reasonable rate as opposed to the

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The Court refers to the amounts that appear in the parties’ briefs, which were not yet adjusted for 2026 inflation. See Dkt. 21.

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Laffey rates requested by White. See id. at 6–10. The Court will not penalize White’s counsel for

pursuing Laffey rates, albeit unsuccessfully, because the question whether Laffey or Fitzpatrick

rates apply in IDEA cases is not fully resolved in this Circuit, and White cited decisions applying

her desired Laffey rates. See Dkt. 20, at 8–9 (citing cases). Moreover, White’s counsel, an

experienced IDEA practitioner, spent “relatively little time” on the reasonable rate argument given

he could reuse prior briefs. Id. at 11. And even though the fees-on-fees award of $71,580.90

(approximately 109 hours) is high when compared to the award for the underlying IDEA litigation

of $85,198.88 (approximately 151 hours), see Dkt. 18, at 4, it would not “constitute an

unsupportable windfall” in this case, Urb. Air Initiative, Inc. v. EPA, 442 F. Supp. 3d 301, 327

(D.D.C. 2020). The Court agrees with White that “the District controlled the scope of this

litigation.” Dkt. 20, at 10. The litigation was prolonged and complicated and required significant

work. The District made an ambiguous offer of judgment, failed to answer clarifying questions

about that offer from White in a timely manner, and ignored White’s offer of judgment weeks

later. See id. at 1–5, 10. The Court will not exercise its discretion to reduce the fees-on-fees award

and finds that it is not excessive given the facts of this case.

Finally, the Court need not address the District’s separate argument concerning its

purported offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. See Dkt. 18, at 1–3. The

District contends that on January 24, 2025, it “conveyed an offer of judgment to Plaintiff in which

the District agreed to pay Plaintiff $115,000.00 in full satisfaction of all claims in this matter.” Id.

at 2. Because the Court rejects the District’s proposed limited-success reduction to White’s feeson-fees request, the purported offer of judgment was not more favorable than White’s final award.

Contra id. at 1–3. Regardless, the Court would likely find that the District’s offer was too

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ambiguous to be a valid offer of judgment under Rule 68 for the reasons offered by White. See

Dkt. 20, at 1–5.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will award in full White’s attorneys’ fees and costs,

including the fees-on-fees incurred in litigating this case, as itemized in White’s 2026 InflationAdjusted Itemizations. See Dkts. 21; 21-1; 22-2. 2 A separate order consistent with this decision

accompanies this memorandum opinion.

DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH

United States District Judge

June 24, 2026

2

The award will include time spent by White’s counsel litigating this matter “since the Court issued its Order and Opinion,” including approximately “10 hours of work” responding to the defendant’s sur-reply. Dkt. 20, at 11. The Court understands that White’s latest 2026 inflationadjusted itemizations have been updated to include all of this additional time. See Dkt. 21, at 1; Dkt. 21-2, at 3.

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