************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut
Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports
or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is
to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an
opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and
subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut
Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the
State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced
or distributed without the express written permission of
the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial
Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction
JAMES HILTON v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION
(SC 21106)
Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria,
Ecker, Dannehy and Bright, Js.
Syllabus
The petitioner, who had been convicted of murder, among other crimes, in connection with the shooting death of the victim, filed a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel and first habeas counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate the opinion of K, the associate medical examiner who had performed the victim’s autopsy. At the petitioner’s criminal trial, a key issue was whether the fatal shot that caused the victim’s death had been discharged at close range or from a distance, and K opined during the criminal trial that the barrel of the gun that was used to shoot the victim had been touching the victim’s skin when the gun was fired. At the petitioner’s first habeas trial, his counsel presented the expert testimony of C, the chief medical examiner, and D, a forensic scientist, in support of the petitioner’s claim that trial counsel had failed to adequately cross-examine K and to present expert testimony on the petitioner’s behalf. The first habeas court rejected the petitioner’s claim and denied the first habeas petition. At his second habeas trial, the petitioner presented the testimony of W, an expert in forensic pathology, who disagreed with K’s conclusion that the victim’s fatal wound was a contact wound and testified that the victim had been shot from a distance. The second habeas court, after reviewing the prior testimony of K, C and D, and weighing W’s testimony, found that neither W nor his conclusion about the shot distance were credible and rendered judgment denying the second habeas petition. The petitioner, on the partial granting of certification, appealed to the Appellate Court, which dismissed in part the petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the second habeas court’s judgment. In so doing, the Appellate Court rejected the petitioner’s claim that the second habeas court had failed to apply the proper standard for evaluating the credibility of expert witnesses, purportedly set forth in Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction (316 Conn. 225). On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: The Appellate Court correctly determined that the second habeas court had applied the correct legal standard for evaluating the credibility of expert witnesses, this court having concluded that Lapointe did not vary the standard, set forth in Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668), that is applicable to ineffective assistance claims or alter how a habeas court is to assess the credibility of experts.
Lapointe did not prescribe a different legal standard for a habeas court’s assessment of the credibility of expert witnesses; rather, Lapointe involved an unusual circumstance in which the habeas court made clearly erroneous credibility findings that the record did not support, and the prejudicial effect of that error was evident in Lapointe because the evidence against the petitioner in that case was weak.
Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction
In the present case, the second habeas court was required make a predictive assessment about whether there was a reasonable probability that the petitioner would have prevailed if his first habeas counsel had called W to testify, and, in making that predictive assessment, the second habeas court properly weighed W’s expert opinion in light of W’s methodology and the court’s own firsthand observations of the persuasiveness of W’s testimony.
Accordingly, the second habeas court applied the proper legal standard when it concluded that the outcome of the petitioner’s criminal trial would not have been different if W had testified because W’s testimony would not have persuaded the criminal trial jury insofar as W failed to account for certain other features of the fatal wound about which C and D had testified, and W’s testimony would not have overcome the state’s overwhelming eyewitness and forensic testimony, as well as evidence of the petitioner’s motive.
Moreover, this court agreed with the Appellate Court that the evidence of the petitioner’s guilt in this case was not weak insofar as there were two eyewitnesses who gave statements identifying the petitioner as the shooter and no witnesses who corroborated the petitioner’s claim that other individuals were responsible for the shooting, and the Appellate Court had previously noted the overwhelming nature of the state’s case against the petitioner, both in the petitioner’s direct appeal and also in his appeal from the first habeas court’s judgment.
Argued March 6—officially released June 30, 2026
Procedural History
Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought
to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland
and tried to the court, Klatt, J.; judgment denying the
petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of
partial certification, appealed to the Appellate Court,
Alvord, Moll and Clark, Js., which dismissed the appeal
in part and affirmed the habeas court’s judgment, and
the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Alexander T. Taubes, for the appellant (petitioner).
Laurie N. Feldman, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle, Jr., state’s
attorney, and Craig P. Nowak, supervisory assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
Robert J. Meredith, Desmond Ryan and M. Chris
Fabricant, pro hac vice, filed a brief for the Innocence
Project, Inc., et al., as amici curiae.
Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction
Opinion
D’AURIA, J. In this certified appeal, we consider
whether the Appellate Court correctly determined that
the habeas court had applied the correct legal standard
in denying the second petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by the petitioner, James Hilton. The petitioner
claims that the habeas court failed to apply the standard
for evaluating the credibility of expert witnesses that this court articulated in Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction, 316 Conn. 225, 112 A.3d 1 (2015). We disagree
and affirm the Appellate Court’s judgment.
The Appellate Court’s opinion aptly recites the facts
and procedural history required to resolve this appeal;
see Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction, 225 Conn.
App. 309, 312–23, 315 A.3d 1135 (2024); which we summarize along with other undisputed facts in the record.
In July, 2000, the victim, William Rodriguez, was shot
and killed on Truman Street in New Haven. The police
found the victim’s body on the sidewalk, surrounded
by a crowd of people. An autopsy later revealed that the
victim died from a single gunshot at close range to the
left side of his head.
A drug turf war in the Truman Street area between the
petitioner and the victim’s associates had been ongoing,
including two altercations in the days leading up to the
shooting. The victim had recently moved into an apartment on Truman Street. One eyewitness to the shooting,
Sherice Mills, saw the petitioner approach the victim as
the victim was making a drug sale to someone in a car.
Mills testified that she had heard the petitioner state
that he was “about to kill [the victim]” and observed
the petitioner shoot the victim in the head. (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 313. According to Mills,
the petitioner fell to the ground with the victim, and the petitioner “kept holding [the victim’s] head, saying he
didn’t mean to do it and [telling] somebody to call the
police.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Mills
later identified the petitioner as the shooter from an array of photographs. A second eyewitness, Simone Williams,
Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction
corroborated Mills’ account and added that the petitioner
had approached the victim from behind and stated: “You
ain’t from around here, son,” and, “[y]ou need to move
from around here, son,” and then took a gun from behind
his back and shot the victim. (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 314. Williams positively identified the
petitioner in a photographic array and did so again at
trial. A third eyewitness, Toisann Henderson, saw the
petitioner shoot the victim and ran into the victim’s
apartment to tell the victim’s girlfriend, Cora Moore.
The petitioner voluntarily went to the police station
and informed detectives that he had been sitting on his
porch when he heard a commotion and went to see what
was happening. He said that a third man had drawn a
gun, that the petitioner had grappled for the gun, and
“it went bashing across [the victim’s] head.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 315. At trial, the petitioner described how several seconds after he had fought
with the third man, a fourth man shot the victim and ran
away. The petitioner testified that, immediately after
the gunshot, he applied pressure to the victim’s wound
to stop the bleeding and then left to make sure someone
had called an ambulance. He explained that he left the
scene after people in the crowd began to tell the police
that he was the shooter. Although the petitioner had
his bloodied clothes washed, the state discovered a drop
of blood on his boxer shorts that matched the victim’s
blood type and DNA.
The state charged the petitioner with murder, criminal
possession of a pistol or revolver and carrying a pistol
or revolver without a permit. One of the key issues at
the petitioner’s criminal trial was the distance the fatal gunshot had traveled. The state contended that the petitioner had shot the victim at close range; the petitioner
maintained that someone else had fired the gunshot from
a distance. The state presented the testimony of Arkady
Katsnelson, an associate medical examiner in the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, who performed the victim’s
autopsy. Katsnelson testified that, because “there was
Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction
no evidence of soot or gunpowder,” the victim’s gunshot
wound case resembled either a “long distance” wound
resulting from a gun generally being “more than three
feet” away, or a contact wound caused by “the barrel of
the gun . . . touching the skin, touching the body . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 316 and n.2.
Katsnelson’s expert opinion was that “[t]his gunshot
wound, it is not typical [of] a gunshot wound which was
created from a long distance because a gunshot wound
from a distance will be a round shape, and the round shape . . . and . . . size of the wound will be slightly bigger than the size of the bullet.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 316. Katsnelson noted that a contact wound is
larger and does not have gunpowder residue around the
wound because the gun’s muzzle directs gases and residue
through the skin. Katsnelson’s conclusion was that the
victim’s wound was consistent with a contact gunshot
wound of entrance, meaning the barrel of the gun was
touching the skin when the gun was discharged. The
petitioner’s defense counsel cross-examined Katsnelson
but did not present his own expert on the nature of the
victim’s wound to counter Katsnelson’s opinion.
A jury found the petitioner guilty of murder, criminal
possession of a pistol or revolver and carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of sixty-five years of imprisonment.
The Appellate Court rejected the petitioner’s prosecutorial impropriety claim and affirmed the petitioner’s
conviction on direct appeal. See State v. Hilton, 79 Conn. App. 155, 170, 829 A.2d 890 (2003).
The petitioner commenced his first habeas action,
in which he alleged that his criminal trial counsel had
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately
cross-examine Katsnelson regarding the nature of the
victim’s fatal wound and failing to present his own expert testimony regarding the wound. At the first habeas trial,
the petitioner’s counsel sought to undercut Katsnelson’s
autopsy report and conclusions by presenting the expert
testimony of Harold Wayne Carver II, the state’s chief
Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction
medical examiner, and Peter DeForest, who held a doctorate degree in forensic science.
Carver testified that there was a sufficient basis from
the autopsy photographs and report to conclude that the
wound had resulted from a contact shot based on the large
size and abnormal shape of the wound. He noted that one
phenomenon that is a “very, very strong criteri[on]” of a
contact wound is a blowback laceration that occurs when
the force is great enough to make the skin explode toward
the muzzle. He explained that blowback lacerations can
have serrated edges, also referred to as “stellate” because they are starlike, which can extend symmetrically in all
directions around the wound. Carver also opined that,
in addition to the large size and irregular shape of the
wound, there was one stellate arm present at the irregular perforation, indicating a blowback laceration caused by
a contact wound.
DeForest testified that the wound was “ambiguous,”
and he could not conclude with certainty whether the
wound resulted from a contact shot or from a shot from
a distance. DeForest noted that the oval shape of the
wound could have been caused by a destabilized bullet
that struck the skin sideways. “Nevertheless, [DeForest]
acknowledged that a bullet striking the skin at an angle
can cause an oval wound. . . . In [DeForest’s] assessment, this was either a contact wound or a distance wound
where the bullet had become destabilized.” (Citation
omitted.)
The habeas court denied the petitioner’s first habeas
petition. The court determined that defense counsel had
not rendered deficient performance because the scope
of the cross-examination of Katsnelson reflected a reasonable trial strategy. The habeas court also concluded
that the petitioner had failed to prove prejudice because
DeForest’s opinion that the wound was ambiguous did not
contradict Katsnelson’s testimony that it was a contact
wound. The Appellate Court affirmed the habeas court’s
judgment; Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction, 161
Conn. App. 58, 85, 127 A.3d 1011 (2015); and we denied
Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction
the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal. Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction, 320 Conn. 921, 132
A.3d 1095 (2016).
The petitioner then filed his second habeas petition,
which is at issue in this appeal. He alleged that his first habeas counsel and criminal trial counsel had rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate Katsnelson’s opinion. He further alleged that,
although his first habeas counsel had presented two
experts (DeForest and Carver), both counsel failed to
present expert testimony from a forensic pathologist to
undercut Katsnelson’s opinion. Hilton v. Commissioner
of Correction, supra, 225 Conn. App. 320–21. In support
of this claim, the petitioner presented the testimony
and report of his new forensic pathology expert, Cyril
H. Wecht.
Wecht testified that he had reviewed, among other
things, Katsnelson’s autopsy report and photographs,
Katsnelson’s testimony from the criminal trial, a police
report, the petitioner’s posttrial brief from his first
habeas trial, and a field report from a private investigation service. Wecht acknowledged that he had not
reviewed the transcripts from the first habeas trial,
including the testimony of Carver that the wound had
blowback stellate. Wecht disagreed with Katsnelson’s
opinion and offered his own opinion that the victim’s
gunshot wound was not a contact wound but, instead,
resulted from a bullet fired from a gun held at least
twenty-four inches from the victim. He explained that he
arrived at his conclusion because there was no gunpowder
residue or stippling, which is the term used to describe
skin abrasions resulting from burning gunpowder particles. Wecht agreed that the wound was oval and not
round, indicated that he did not see any stellate tears on the wound, and could rule out a “loose” contact gunshot
wound in which gunpowder residue goes into the wound
or onto bone, but also onto skin.
The habeas court denied the petitioner’s second habeas
petition. The court reviewed in detail the prior testimony
Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction
of Katsnelson, DeForest, and Carver with respect to the
distance a gun would have had to be from the victim to
create the type of wound that the victim sustained. The
court observed that “[t]hree of the four experts found
that there were indicia of a contact wound. Only . . .
Wecht completely ruled out the possibility of a contact
wound.” The court went on to state that it did “not find . . . Wecht’s assessment to be credible, especially because
he did not review . . . Carver’s testimony from the first
habeas trial. . . . Carver observed a stellate tear and evidence of a blowback laceration. Additionally . . . Wecht
did not provide any explanation for the causes of the
oval wound. Nor did . . . Wecht’s evaluation address
the potential effects of the victim being kept alive for a day or more so that organs could be harvested from his
cleaned and disinfected body, the blood from the wound
washing away gunshot residue, or the beginnings of the
healing process making residue in the wound difficult to
detect. The more credible evidence establishes that the
shot that killed the victim was a contact shot. Because
the court does not find . . . Wecht’s conclusion that the
shot could not have been fired from less than twenty-four
inches to be credible, [the petitioner’s] claims premised
thereon must fail.”
The habeas court concluded that the petitioner’s
trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to
adequately cross-examine Katsnelson and that first
habeas counsel did not perform deficiently by calling
Carver, a forensic pathologist, “whose experience and
credentials are on par with, if not superior, to [Wecht].” The habeas court further found that the petitioner had
failed to establish prejudice because the court was not
persuaded that Wecht’s testimony would have made a
difference to the outcome of the petitioner’s criminal
trial because Wecht was not credible, and the state had
abundant and overwhelming evidence of identification
and motive, which supported the forensic testimony at
the petitioner’s criminal trial.
The petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal with the habeas court. Two of the grounds he advanced
Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction
challenged whether the habeas court had failed to apply
the correct legal standard under Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 316 Conn. 272–73, to determine that [Wecht’s conclusion] was not credible. The
habeas court denied the petition to appeal as to this issue, holding that, “[c]ontrary to the petitioner’s argument
in the petition for certification to appeal, Lapointe . . . does not preclude a habeas court from determining that
an expert witness and their conclusion are not credible.
Nor does Lapointe establish a standard that a petitioner
is entitled to a new trial by presenting an expert who
is of ‘sufficient import and credibility.’ Such a vague
standard could necessitate a new criminal trial in nearly
all postconviction habeas proceedings involving expert
witnesses. A habeas court’s credibility assessments and
how they impact the prejudice prong of the ineffective
assistance of counsel standard would be rendered meaningless if a habeas court had to grant a new trial upon the presentation of expert testimony that was ‘of sufficient
import and credibility.’ ” The habeas court further elaborated on its finding about Wecht’s credibility, stating
that it found “Wecht’s conclusion that the shot could not
have been fired from less than twenty-four inches to be
not credible. The court did not find . . . Wecht credible
based on the totality of all evidence from the criminal,
prior habeas, and current habeas trials. . . . Wecht did
not review all relevant evidence, and his opinion was
contradicted by the factual findings regarding the shape
of the wound, stellate tearing, and evidence of a blowback laceration. It is this lack of foundation supporting . . . Wecht’s conclusion about the shot distance that caused
the court to find him not credible as an expert witness.”
(Emphasis omitted.)
The Appellate Court affirmed the habeas court’s
judgment. See Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction,
supra, 225 Conn. App. 341. In particular, it rejected the
petitioner’s claim that the habeas court had applied an
incorrect legal standard in assessing witness credibility
by failing to follow the prescriptions of Lapointe. See
id., 333. It held that the habeas court had applied the
Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction
correct, well established standard because Lapointe was
factually and legally distinguishable. See id., 337–38.
Factually, the court held that the evidence of the petitioner’s guilt was overwhelming in the present case,
whereas the evidence against the petitioner in Lapointe
was weak and founded on “highly questionable admissions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 337. The
Appellate Court further held that Lapointe involved a
Brady1 claim, whereas the petitioner in the present case
founded his claim on Strickland.2 See id., 331, 337–40.
We granted certification to decide whether “the Appellate Court correctly conclude[d] that the habeas court
had properly declined to apply the standard in Lapointe
. . . for evaluating an expert witness’ credibility . . . .” (Citation omitted.) Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction, 351 Conn. 916, 332 A.3d 293 (2025).
“A defendant seeking habeas relief for ineffective
representation must prove two elements. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.
This requires [a] showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel
guaranteed the defendant by the [s]ixth [a]mendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Maia v. Commissioner of Correction,
347 Conn. 449, 460, 298 A.3d 588 (2023). To prevail on
a second habeas petition, a petitioner is faced with the
task of establishing that (1) his first habeas counsel was ineffective, and (2) his trial counsel was ineffective. See, e.g., Kaddah v. Commissioner of Correction, 324 Conn.
548, 562, 153 A.3d 1233 (2017).
In determining whether a petitioner has met his burden
of establishing prejudice, “[t]he principal question . . . is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent
the errors, the [fact finder] would have had a reasonable
doubt respecting guilt. . . . A reasonable probability
1
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).
2
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome. . . . In making a prejudice determination,
habeas courts must consider the totality of the evidence
before the judge or jury. . . . Some factual findings will be unaffected by the errors, and factual findings that were
affected will have been affected in different ways. . . .
Indeed, [s]ome errors will have had a pervasive effect on
the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering
the entire evidentiary picture, whereas some will have
had an isolated, trivial effect. . . . [A] verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming
record support.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Grant v. Commissioner of Correction,
354 Conn. 30, 41–42, 348 A.3d 463 (2026).
In assessing whether a petitioner has met his burden,
a habeas court, as the finder of fact, must assess whether to believe all, none, or some of the testimony presented.
See, e.g., Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, 343
Conn. 347, 367, 273 A.3d 680 (2022). The habeas court
“is free to juxtapose conflicting versions of events and
determine which is more credible.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Echeverria v. Commissioner of Correction, 193 Conn. App. 1, 15 n.6, 218 A.3d 1116, cert.
denied, 333 Conn. 947, 219 A.3d 376 (2019); see also
Bowens v. Commissioner of Correction, 333 Conn. 502,
523, 217 A.3d 609 (2019).
An appellate court “does not retry the case or evaluate
the credibility of the witnesses. . . . Rather, [the reviewing court] must defer to the [habeas court’s] assessment
of the credibility of the witnesses based on its firsthand observation of their conduct, demeanor and attitude.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Taylor v. Commissioner of Correction, 324 Conn. 631, 643, 153 A.3d 1264
(2017); accord Sanchez v. Commissioner of Correction,
314 Conn. 585, 604, 103 A.3d 954 (2014). A habeas
court’s pure credibility determination is unassailable,
and we will not disturb it on appeal. See Breton v. Commissioner of Correction, 325 Conn. 640, 694, 159 A.3d
Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction
1112 (2017); Orcutt v. Commissioner of Correction, 284
Conn. 724, 741, 937 A.2d 656 (2007). “Because it is the
[habeas] court’s function to weigh the evidence and determine credibility, we give great deference to its findings. . . . In reviewing factual findings, [w]e do not examine
the record to determine whether the [court] could have
reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . .
Instead, we make every reasonable presumption . . . in
favor of the [habeas] court’s ruling.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 343 Conn. 357–58. Thus, the habeas judge’s
credibility determinations and findings are entitled to
deference from this court and cannot be disregarded
unless they are clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Small v.
Commissioner of Correction, 286 Conn. 707, 716, 946
A.2d 1203, cert. denied sub nom. Small v. Lantz, 555
U.S. 975, 129 S. Ct. 481, 172 L. Ed. 2d 336 (2008).
In Lapointe, this court recognized an “exceptional
factual and procedural scenario” in which we held that
the habeas court’s credibility assessment of expert witnesses was clearly erroneous. Lapointe v. Commissioner
of Correction, supra, 316 Conn. 272–73.3 In that case,
the petitioner was convicted of capital felony and other
offenses for the rape and murder of an elderly woman
and the arson of her apartment to destroy the evidence.
Id., 229. After an unsuccessful direct appeal and first
3
In the decade since Lapointe, this court has not encountered another factual and procedural scenario in which it was appropriate to review with elevated scrutiny a habeas court’s credibility assessment of an expert. Instead, we have twice rejected the application of Lapointe review. See, e.g., In re Jewelyette M., 351 Conn. 511, 562 n.32, 332 A.3d 207 (2025) (trial court’s finding of “ ‘no credible evidence’ ” was not limited circumstance in which Lapointe applies (emphasis in original)); State v. Campbell, 328 Conn. 444, 486–88 and n.13, 180 A.3d 882 (2018) (trial court’s discrediting of defendant’s experts was not subject to Lapointe review). And we have relied on Lapointe for the established rule that this court must defer to a habeas court’s credibility assessments. See, e.g., Horn v. Commissioner of Correction, 321 Conn. 767, 783 n.12, 138 A.3d 908 (2016) (quoting Lapointe for proposition that “ ‘we ordinarily accord deference to credibility determinations that are made on the basis of [the] firsthand observation of [a witness’] conduct, demeanor and attitude’ ”).
Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction
habeas petition, the petitioner filed a second habeas petition alleging that his first habeas counsel had rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to pursue a claim that the state violated Brady by withholding a police note regarding the amount of time that the fire had burned inside
the apartment before it was discovered. Id., 230–31. The
petitioner claimed that the note would have established
a complete alibi defense because it purported to identify
the time frame within which the fire was set, for which
the petitioner had witnesses testify that he was home.
Id., 231. At the second habeas trial, the petitioner and
the respondent presented conflicting expert testimony
as to the length of time that the fire had burned in the
victim’s apartment. Id., 232–33. The habeas court denied
the petitioner’s claim because it found that the testimony of the respondent’s expert was far more persuasive than the testimony of the petitioner’s experts and
that it was not reasonably probable that, if the jury at
the petitioner’s criminal trial had heard the testimony
of the petitioner’s experts, it would have credited that
testimony and reached a different result. See id., 233.
This court in Lapointe did not substitute its own credibility determination for that of the habeas court but,
instead, concluded that the underlying factual findings
on which the habeas court relied to discredit the petitioner’s experts were clearly erroneous because they were
unsupported by the record. See id., 273. This court held
that it was “not bound” by the habeas court’s “appraisal
of the scientific underpinnings of the parties’ expert
testimony”; id., 261; because the habeas court’s “critique” of the petitioner’s experts was “comprised of
factually unfounded assertions.” Id., 277. For instance,
we reasoned that the habeas court had erroneously (1)
characterized the testimony of the petitioner’s experts as a “high energy fire” when they in fact did not state that
and had opined that it was a “low energy fire”; id., 278;
(2) stated that the respondent’s expert provided a lower
peak temperature when his testimony was the opposite;
id.; (3) considered the petitioner’s experts’ maximum
fire temperature as “ ‘wildly exaggerated’ ” when the
Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction
respondent’s expert never disputed that testimony; id.,
279; and (4) determined that the petitioner’s experts’ fire burn time was contradicted by the historical and physical
evidence marshaled by the respondent’s expert when a
review of the criminal trial record showed the converse.
Id., 287–88. In light of these clearly erroneous findings
and taking “due account of the fact that the state’s case
against the petitioner was relatively weak, founded as it
was on highly questionable admissions” by the petitioner;
id., 261; whose cognitive and motor skills were impaired
as a result of Dandy-Walker syndrome, causing him to
be “slow-witted, easily confused, childlike and gullible”; id., 240; this court determined that the petitioner was
entitled to a new criminal trial. Id., 349.
In the present case, the question the petitioner raised
in his petitions for certification to the habeas court and this court, and the question as to which we granted certification, is whether the habeas court had erred by failing to apply Lapointe in assessing Wecht’s credibility. The
parties do not dispute that the habeas court did not cite, apply, or use a standard articulated by Lapointe. We
conclude, however, that the habeas court did not err in
not applying Lapointe because our decision in that case
did not alter a habeas court’s analysis of a claim brought pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), or how it
is to make credibility assessments of experts. Lapointe
represented an unusual circumstance in which this court
concluded that the habeas court made erroneous credibility findings that the record did not support in a case in which the prejudicial effect of that error was evident
because the evidence against the petitioner was weak.
What made Lapointe “extraordinary” was the searching nature of the appellate review we found necessary to
review for clear error a habeas court’s credibility determination of an expert witness; our analysis did not change
the legal standard the trial court must apply in making
credibility determinations in the first instance. Because
Lapointe in fact did not prescribe a different legal standard to be applied by the habeas court, the habeas court
Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction
in the present case did not err when it applied the usual
standard set forth in Strickland.
Our well established standard—both before and after
Lapointe—required the habeas court to make the predictive judgment as to whether there is a reasonable
probability that the petitioner would have prevailed if
the petitioner’s first habeas counsel had called Wecht to
testify. See, e.g., Grant v. Commissioner of Correction,
supra, 354 Conn. 50. In making that predictive assessment, the habeas court was required to assess Wecht’s
expert opinion based on his methodology and its firsthand
observation of the persuasiveness of his testimony. See,
e.g., Bowens v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 333
Conn. 523; Taylor v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,
324 Conn. 643–44. The habeas court properly applied this
legal standard as it quoted the apt legal principles and
expressly concluded that the outcome of the petitioner’s
criminal trial would not have been different if Wecht had
testified for two principal reasons. First, the court found that Wecht’s testimony would not have persuaded the
jury because he failed to account for the shape and stellate tear around the wound, as well as the time that had
elapsed between the shooting and autopsy. Second, the
habeas court determined that Wecht’s testimony would
not have overcome the state’s overwhelming eyewitness
and forensic testimony, as well as evidence of the petitioner’s motive, that bolstered its case.
The petitioner further asks this court to apply Lapointe
on appeal to reverse the habeas court’s determination
that Wecht was not credible. This argument is outside
the question on which the petitioner requested and we
granted certification, and would necessitate our application of Lapointe instead of the habeas court’s standard.
See State v. Armadore, 338 Conn. 407, 438 n.15, 258
A.3d 601 (2021). We will not undertake the task at this
point. Doing so would not benefit the petitioner in any
event, because it is evident from the foregoing analysis
that the petitioner in the present case, unlike in Lapointe, cannot demonstrate that the reasons the habeas court
Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction
discredited Wecht were factually unsupported. The
record supports each of the habeas court’s reasons for
declining to credit Wecht’s opinion, so this case does not present the same type of “limited” circumstance this
court encountered in Lapointe that led us to reverse the
habeas court’s credibility finding in that case. Lapointe
v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 316 Conn. 306.
Under these circumstances, we must defer to the habeas
court’s credibility determination.
We also agree with the Appellate Court that, unlike
in Lapointe, the state’s evidence of guilt in the present
case was not weak. The habeas court aptly found that the
state’s case against the petitioner was “overwhelming”
because “[t]here were multiple witnesses to the argument and ongoing feud between him and the victim.
Identification was not an issue as all parties knew each
other. There were two eyewitnesses who remained on
the scene and gave statements to [the] police identifying
[the petitioner] as the shooter and placing him standing
right next to the victim when he was shot. There were no
witnesses to [the petitioner’s claimed] third and fourth
individuals. . . . [T]he sole witness who testified in support of [the petitioner’s] claim that someone else shot
the victim was wrong about the time and location of
the shooting and did not observe a fourth witness.” The
Appellate Court has twice taken note of the strong and
overwhelming nature of the state’s case against the petitioner, once in his direct appeal and second in his appeal following his first habeas trial, and we have no reason
to disagree with those assessments of the evidence. See
Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 161 Conn.
App. 76; State v. Hilton, supra, 79 Conn. App. 168.4
Although Lapointe did not alter a habeas court’s function as the arbiter of credibility, it provides an important
4
Although we reach the same result as the Appellate Court, our analysis differs in one important respect. We do not agree with the Appellate Court’s holding that Lapointe is legally inapposite because it involved a claimed violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), whereas the petitioner in the present case asserted a Strickland claim. See Hilton v. Commissioner of
Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction
lesson to habeas courts, namely, that a habeas court must
carefully scrutinize expert opinions and forensic science
and ensure that the factual record supports its ultimate
credibility determination. We encourage habeas courts
to articulate in detail, as the habeas court did in the
present case, the way it assesses and finds an expert to
be credible or not credible so that a reviewing court, if
asked to apply Lapointe, can decide whether the record
factually supports that credibility determination. The
habeas court’s assessment as to which expert, neither,
or both, to credit often is determinative of a petitioner’s claims. See, e.g., Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction,
supra, 343 Conn. 367–68; Skakel v. Commissioner of Correction, 329 Conn. 1, 62, 188 A.3d 1 (2018), cert. denied, 586 U.S. 1068, 139 S. Ct. 788, 202 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2019).
It is therefore important that habeas courts thoughtfully
consider and deliberate on this type of evidence, as the
habeas court did in the present case.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
Correction, supra, 225 Conn. App. 331, 337–40. The habeas claim at issue in Lapointe implicated both Strickland and Brady because the petitioner there asserted that habeas counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in violation of Strickland by failing to demonstrate that the state had improperly withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady. See Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 316 Conn. 251. Moreover, a habeas court’s predictive assessment is the same under both Strickland and Brady because “it is undisputed that the test for prejudice under Strickland is identical to the test for materiality under Brady.” Skakel v. Commissioner of Correction, 329 Conn. 1, 40 n.16, 188 A.3d 1 (2018), cert. denied, 586 U.S. 1068, 139 S. Ct. 788, 202 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2019); see also Jones v. State, 328 Conn. 84, 102, 177 A.3d 534 (2018) (noting that appellate review of Brady claims and Strickland claims is same). Thus, although we agree that Lapointe does not impact the outcome of this case, it is not because of a distinction between Strickland and Brady in this context.