616 June 17, 2026 No. 551
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
Beth ORCUTT,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
Robert FRIES,
Respondent-Appellant.
Jackson County Circuit Court
21DR03068; A188204
David J. Orr, Judge.
Submitted April 8, 2026.
Andy Simrin and Andy Simrin PC filed the brief for
appellant.
No appearance for respondent.
Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
O’Connor, Judge.
SHORR, P. J.
Supplemental judgment vacated and remanded.
Cite as 350 Or App 616 (2026) 617
SHORR, P. J.
Respondent Fries (father) appeals from a supplemental judgment that modified a previous domestic relations
judgment. The supplemental judgment modified custody from
joint custody with both parents to sole custody with petitioner Orcutt (mother). It also temporarily changed the parenting
time relating to the children’s time with father’s wife, stepmother. Mother does not appear before us. Father raises three
assignments of error that challenge the court’s ruling that
modified custody and parenting time. Because we agree with
father’s first assignment of error and it results in our vacating the supplemental judgment, we need not reach the other
assignments of error. As a result, we vacate the supplemental
judgment and remand this matter to the trial court.
The facts necessary for our opinion are largely procedural. Father and mother initially agreed to joint custody
of their two children, which was reflected in a general judgment. The parties also agreed that if father, who served in
the military, was on an overseas deployment, father’s weekend parenting schedule would be assumed by stepmother.
At a later point in time, father was deployed with the military overseas to Egypt for an extended period. Suffice it to
say that there was conflict between mother and stepmother,
particularly over an incident during the time that the children were with stepmother during her assumed parenting
time. Mother moved to change custody and parenting time.
Father alerted the trial court by letter that he was
serving overseas. Pursuant to 50 USC section 3932, which
is part of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, he asked
the court to stay all proceedings until he returned or, if
not stayed until that point, for at least 90 days. Father participated in some hearings through the internet from his
foreign military base, but the connection was not always
reliable. After the 90 days passed, father again asked the
court to stay the proceeding until he returned from overseas military service. In his written request, he specifically contended that federal law required that, if the court were
to deny his request, it must appoint him an attorney to represent his interests and could not enter a judgment without
doing so.
618 Orcutt v. Fries
The court denied father’s second motion to stay and
did not appoint him an attorney. The court observed that it
was required to grant the initial request for a 90-day stay
but concluded that it had discretion to deny a second request. The court noted that father had been able to file his own
motions from overseas, reasoned that he was able to litigate
matters, remarked that father had been able to successfully
articulate his positions and mother had more difficulty, and
further stated that father was using the law to his strategic
advantage. Father again objected—taking the position that
he was actually disadvantaged by being overseas because
mother had access to court staff while he did not have an
attorney to help him in Oregon. Although the court denied
father’s second motion to stay, it initially did not decide on mother’s motion to change custody for other reasons.1 At the
subsequent hearing on the merits of mother’s motion, the
court modified custody in favor of mother and temporarily
changed parenting time—again over father’s objection and
request for a stay while he was deployed overseas.
Father assigns error to that decision. Under 50 USC
section 3932(b), a person in military service, such as father, may request a stay of a civil proceeding, including a child
custody proceeding, and the court “shall” grant the stay for
90 days if certain conditions relating to the person’s active
military service and their notice of the proceedings are met.
Those conditions were met in this case, and the trial court
appropriately granted the initial 90-day stay. However, a
service member may seek an additional stay under 50 USC
section 3932(d)(1) “based on continuing material affect of
military duty on the servicemember’s ability to appear.” We
need not resolve whether the court erred in applying that
section or whether that section provided the court with a
wide range of discretion to deny the stay in these circumstances. Significantly, if a court denies the request for an
additional stay, “the court shall appoint counsel to represent the servicemember in the action or proceeding.” 50 USC
§ 3932(d)(2). That did not occur here despite father’s request
1
During this time, the court noted some procedural deficiencies in mother’s motion and attempted, pending resolution of the custody issues, to get the children their own counsel, which ultimately proved unsuccessful.
Cite as 350 Or App 616 (2026) 619
for an attorney. As a result, the trial court erred.2 We also
cannot say that there was little likelihood that father was
not harmed by the court’s failure to appoint an attorney
when father then immediately lost on mother’s pending
motion to change custody. Indeed, there was a substantive
dispute about whether mother proved a change in circumstances justifying a change in custody. See ORS 107.169(5)
(stating standard for change from joint custody). We cannot
say that the error, the failure to appoint the attorney, had
little likelihood of affecting the resulting change in custody. See State v. Cole, 323 Or 30, 36, 912 P2d 907 (1996) (court’s
error in accepting the defendant’s uninformed waiver of the
right to counsel was not harmless when the court could not
determine whether competent counsel may have assisted
the defendant). As a result, we vacate the supplemental
judgment modifying custody and temporarily changing
parenting time and remand to the trial court for further
proceedings.3
Supplemental judgment vacated and remanded.
2
We note that this proceeding arose at a time when courts throughout Oregon were having difficulty securing appointed counsel even for criminal defendants who have a constitutional right to counsel. See State v. Roberts, 374 Or 821, 826-27, 584 P3d 1217 (2026) (describing the “systemic, statewide public defense crisis” in Oregon in recent years that has resulted in an inability to promptly appoint counsel for all indigent defendants). Indeed, the trial court wanted to appoint counsel for the children here but could not secure an attorney for them. Still, under section 3932, the court could have extended the stay and, if it did not, that statute required appointment of counsel. The trial court could not both deny a stay and not appoint counsel.
3
Father also argues that the trial court plainly erred in not applying ORS 107.145(3), which provides, subject to limited exception, that a court “may not set aside, alter or modify any portion of a judgment * * * that provides for the custody, parenting time, visitation, support and welfare of a minor child of a deployed parent until 90 days after the completion of the deployed parent’s deployment” unless the matter was decided by the court before the parent’s deployment. It appears that that section might have application to these facts, but we need not decide the issue on a plain-error basis. We therefore decide this appeal based on the preserved federal statutory argument.