NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: May 6, 2025
S25A0355. COLEMAN v. THE STATE.
MCMILLIAN, Justice.
Amanda Coleman appeals her malice murder conviction for the
death of two-year-old Brooklyn Aldridge.1 Coleman argues that (1)
the trial court erred in admitting evidence of her methamphetamine
use; (2) the trial court erred in excluding her expert’s testimony
about alternative causes of death; and (3) trial counsel rendered
constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to the
1 Brooklyn died on March 6, 2018. In August 2018, a Coffee County grand
jury indicted Coleman for malice murder and felony murder. At a jury trial
held in October 2019, Coleman was found guilty of both counts. The trial court
sentenced Coleman to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for
malice murder; although the trial court purported to merge the felony murder
count for sentencing purposes, it was actually vacated by operation of law. See
Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 371-72 (434 SE2d 479) (1993). Coleman timely
filed a motion for new trial, which was amended through new counsel on April
25, 2024. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for new trial,
as amended, on July 26, 2024. Coleman timely appealed, and her case was
docketed to the term of this Court beginning in December 2024 and submitted
for a decision on the briefs.
prosecutor’s allegedly improper characterization of reasonable doubt
during closing argument. Because we conclude that evidence of
Coleman’s methamphetamine use was admissible; that the trial
court did not plainly err in limiting the defense expert’s testimony;
and that Coleman cannot show prejudice from trial counsel’s failure
to object during closing argument, we affirm.
The evidence at trial showed that Brooklyn was born in
January 2016 and lived almost exclusively with her biological
mother, Rachel Aldridge, until a March 1, 2018 court order required
that Brooklyn alternate weeks living with Aldridge and Brooklyn’s
biological father, Ron Lott. At that time, Lott lived with Coleman,
along with their one-year-old son, and Coleman’s three children
from a prior relationship. Lott worked outside of the home, and
Coleman stayed home with the children.
Aldridge testified that in the days leading up to Brooklyn’s
death, Brooklyn was walking, talking, and eating as usual. Neither
Aldridge nor Aldridge’s sister, who is a registered nurse, saw
anything unusual happen to Brooklyn while she was with them over
2
the weekend. The preschool director at Brooklyn’s church testified
that Brooklyn was “happy, healthy, smiling, playing and enjoying
her friends” in the nursery that Sunday morning and did not show
any signs of sickness. When Aldridge dropped Brooklyn off at Lott’s
home around 6:00 p.m. on Sunday, March 4, 2018, Aldridge
mentioned that Brooklyn had thrown up a few days ago after eating
too much pizza.
The next morning, while Lott was making breakfast, Brooklyn
came in and told him that she was hungry. Brooklyn ate breakfast
and then played with her siblings. On Tuesday, March 6, Lott took
Coleman’s two older sons, A. C. and J. C., to the bus stop and then
went to work. A. C., who was nine years old at the time, testified
that he checked on Brooklyn and his younger siblings before going
to school that morning. He noticed that Brooklyn seemed “sad” but
thought it “was just because she had to leave her mom’s house.”
Coleman stayed home with Brooklyn and her two younger children
the rest of the day. When Lott came home for lunch, Coleman told
him that Brooklyn was not feeling well and that he should be quiet
3
so Brooklyn could sleep. After Lott returned to work, he and
Coleman texted several times, and Coleman reported that Brooklyn
was still not feeling well.
When the boys came home from school, Coleman told them to
be quiet because Brooklyn was sleeping. Around 5:30 p.m. that
evening, Lott’s mother, Glendora, and Glendora’s sister stopped by
the house unannounced to visit the children. Coleman was lying
down on the couch and said that Brooklyn had been sick. Coleman
then went to check on Brooklyn and “hollered” for help. Glendora
rushed into the room and immediately called 911 before beginning
CPR. Brooklyn had thrown up and had vomit in her mouth and hair.
Her eyes were open, and her body was cold. Paramedics arrived at
6:02 p.m. and found Brooklyn lifeless; she was pale with fixed eyes,
was not breathing, and had no pulse.
Coleman told responding officers that Brooklyn had not “been
acting herself all day,” that “she was acting like she was sleepy,” and
that she “had been throwing up.” Coleman claimed that she laid
Brooklyn down at 4:00 p.m. and that when she went to check on her
4
a little before 6:00 p.m., she noticed Brooklyn “was not breathing,
she was cold, and she was blue.” Later that evening, Coleman told a
GBI investigator that she fed Brooklyn a light meal before she laid
her down around lunch time; she stayed with Brooklyn until she fell
asleep and then Coleman went to sleep in another room until her
sons came home from school around 3:00 p.m. At that point, she
checked on Brooklyn, who was snoring.
The following day, investigators from Georgia’s Division of
Family & Children Services (“DFCS”) came to the home. Lott took a
urine test at their request, and his urine tested negative for the
presence of drugs. DFCS investigators also asked Coleman to take a
urine test, and she initially refused. After the lead DFCS
investigator explained the importance of taking the test, Coleman
agreed, and the test was positive for the presence of
methamphetamines. Coleman and Lott then spoke privately, and
Coleman told Lott that she had “slipped up a few times” with drugs
since November but that she had not used drugs in the week or two
before Brooklyn’s death. Lott testified that he was not aware that
5
Coleman had starting using drugs again, but he knew that Coleman
would sometimes leave in the middle of the night while he and the
children were sleeping, claiming that she was going to run errands.
The lead DFCS investigator testified that Coleman asked to
speak with her privately and then told her that she had “f**ked up”
and “had been using meth” but only “at night when [the children]
were asleep.” Coleman claimed that her last use “was about a month
prior.” Coleman later told another DFCS employee that she had
relapsed with methamphetamine because she was “stressed out and
overwhelmed” as the children’s primary caretaker.
The medical examiner who performed the autopsy on Brooklyn
identified a large subdural hemorrhage that caused Brooklyn’s brain
to swell and herniate through the base of her skull, damaging her
brain stem and causing her death. The subdural hemorrhage was
still liquid, meaning that Brooklyn had not lived long enough after
the injury for her body to try to heal itself. The medical examiner
attributed Brooklyn’s cause of death to blunt force impact and
opined that the significant force required to cause the injury could
6
not have been inflicted by Brooklyn or another toddler or a fall off a
bed. Rather, it would have been caused by a hard, immovable object
striking her head. The medical examiner explained that Brooklyn
would have displayed a noticeable decrease in her level of
consciousness very soon after the injury and would not have been
able to walk or talk normally.
As part of her defense, Coleman presented the expert
testimony of Dr. Adel Shaker, a medical examiner, who testified that
Brooklyn’s injury would be consistent with several hypothetical
accidents, including her having fallen off the family’s trampoline,
jumping on and falling off a bed, or slipping in a bathtub within the
72 hours leading up to her death.
1. Coleman asserts that the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of her methamphetamine use for several reasons. We are
not persuaded.
Before trial, Coleman moved in limine to exclude evidence of
her drug use, arguing first that it was inadmissible under OCGA §
7
24-4-403 2 (“Rule 403”) and OCGA § 24-4-404 (b)3 (“Rule 404 (b)”) and
also that the result of the urine test was inadmissible because it
lacked scientific reliability. The trial court denied the motion after
concluding that evidence of Coleman’s drug use was intrinsic
evidence and therefore not subject to the limitations set forth in Rule
404 (b) and also satisfied Rule 403’s balancing test. The trial court
then addressed Coleman’s challenge to the admissibility of the urine
test based on the test’s alleged lack of scientific reliability and ruled
that the State would be permitted to introduce evidence showing
2 This statute provides that “[r]elevant evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
3 This statute provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident. The prosecution in a criminal
proceeding shall provide reasonable notice to the defense in
advance of trial, unless pretrial notice is excused by the court upon
good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it
intends to introduce at trial. Notice shall not be required when the
evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts is offered to prove the
circumstances immediately surrounding the charged crime,
motive, or prior difficulties between the accused and the alleged
victim.
8
Coleman took a test that was indicative of the presence of
methamphetamines. 4 Coleman made a continuing objection to the
results of the urine test pursuant to Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519
(292 SE2d 389) (1982) (setting out standard for admission of expert
testimony in criminal cases tried before July 1, 2022, when it was
superseded by statute).5
(a) Rule 404 (b)
Although Rule 404 (b) limits the admission of evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts, those limitations do not apply to intrinsic
evidence. See Roberts v. State, 315 Ga. 229, 235-36 (2) (a) (880 SE2d
501) (2022). Evidence of other crimes is considered intrinsic if it is
“(1) an uncharged offense arising from the same transaction or
series of transactions as the charged offense; (2) necessary to
4 The parties agreed that evidence of a subsequent hair follicle test was
inadmissible.
5 Under Harper, a trial court in a criminal case was tasked with
“decid[ing] whether the procedure or technique in question [had] reached a
scientific stage of verifiable certainty, or . . . whether the procedure rest[ed]
upon the laws of nature.” 246 Ga. at 525 (1) (cleaned up). This case was tried
in 2019, before the amendment of OCGA § 24-7-702, which extended the
federal standard of admissibility of expert testimony articulated in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (113 SCt 2786, 125 LE2d 469)
(1993), to criminal cases.
9
complete the story of the crime; or (3) inextricably intertwined with
the evidence regarding the charged offense.” Id. at 236 (2) (a)
(citation and punctuation omitted). We have also defined evidence
as intrinsic “if it pertains to the chain of events explaining the
context, motive, and set-up of the crime and is linked in time and
circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral and
natural part of an account of the crime.” Jackson v. State, 317 Ga.
95, 101 (2) (a) (891 SE2d 866) (2023) (citation and punctuation
omitted). “We review a trial court’s ruling regarding the
admissibility of evidence as intrinsic for an abuse of discretion.”
State v. Harris, 316 Ga. 272, 277 (3) (888 SE2d 50) (2023).
Applying this standard here, we conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting as intrinsic evidence that
Coleman had used methamphetamine in the weeks leading up to
Brooklyn’s death. Coleman, who was the only adult present on the
day that Brooklyn died, admitted that she had been using
methamphetamine because she was “stressed out and
overwhelmed” as the children’s primary caregiver. And in her
10
various pretrial statements, Coleman admitted that she had been
using methamphetamine in the middle of the night, which would
also help explain why Coleman was found sleeping in the afternoon
when Glendora arrived and Brooklyn was found deceased. Thus,
Coleman’s methamphetamine use was linked in time and
circumstance to the charged crimes and helped to explain the
context for the crimes. See, e.g., McNabb v. State, 313 Ga. 701, 713
(2) (a) (872 SE2d 251) (2020) (explaining, in the context of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, that evidence of defendant’s
drug use and physical abuse would have been admissible as intrinsic
evidence in circumstantial case involving death of infant); Smith v.
State, 302 Ga. 717, 725-26 (4) (808 SE2d 661) (2017) (portions of
defendant’s statement that referred to his drug use were properly
admitted as intrinsic evidence because they “formed an integral and
natural part of his account of the circumstances surrounding the
offenses for which he was indicted”).
(b) Rule 403
Although intrinsic evidence must still satisfy Rule 403’s
11
balancing test, see Jackson, 317 Ga. at 102 (2) (a), “[t]he exclusion
of relevant evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy that
trial courts should grant only sparingly.” Smith v. State, 307 Ga.
263, 273 (2) (c) (834 SE2d 1) (2019) (“The major function of Rule 403
is to exclude matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged
in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.” (citation and
punctuation omitted)). As we have explained, “[i]nculpatory
evidence is inherently prejudicial,” and such prejudicial effect does
not automatically render evidence inadmissible as unfairly
prejudicial. Jackson, 317 Ga. at 102 (2) (a) (citation and punctuation
omitted). Rather, “[t]he prejudicial effect of evidence is unfair if the
evidence has the capacity to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt
on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged, or
an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” Id. (citation
and punctuation omitted). “[I]n reviewing issues under Rule 403, we
look at the evidence in a light most favorable to its admission,
maximizing its probative value and minimizing its undue
12
prejudicial impact.” Mills v. State, 320 Ga. 457, 464-65 (3) (b) (910
SE2d 143) (2024) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Here, given Coleman’s own admissions, the probative value of
evidence that Coleman was using methamphetamine because she
was “stressed out and overwhelmed” by her caregiver role was
relatively high in explaining Brooklyn’s sudden death while in
Coleman’s sole care, and it is not likely that the jury improperly
convicted Coleman based solely on evidence of her previous
methamphetamine use. Because any unfair prejudice from this
evidence did not substantially outweigh its probative value, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence under
Rule 403. See Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728, 740 (8) (a) (883 SE2d
802) (2023) (although evidence may have cast defendant “in an
unflattering light, it did not do so unfairly” (emphasis in original));
Whited v. State, 315 Ga. 598, 605 (3) (883 SE2d 342) (2023) (evidence
of defendant’s perceived disregard for his daughter’s well-being was
relevant to the question of his intent toward her on the day she
sustained her fatal injuries and not unfairly prejudicial).
13
(c) Reliability Challenge
Coleman also argues that the result of the urine test was
inadmissible without expert testimony establishing the scientific
reliability of the specific testing method.6 See Harper, 249 Ga. 519.
However, pretermitting whether the trial court abused its discretion
in admitting evidence of the positive urine test result, it was clearly
cumulative of Coleman’s multiple statements to other witnesses
that she had been using methamphetamine in the weeks before
Brooklyn’s death. Accordingly, any error was harmless. See Lyons v.
State, 309 Ga. 15, 22 (4) (843 SE2d 825) (2020) (“The test for
determining nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly
probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict. Generally,
the erroneous admission of hearsay is harmless where substantial,
cumulative, legally admissible evidence of the same fact is
6 At trial, a DFCS contractor, who was trained by Quest Diagnostics
certified staff and who conducted Coleman’s urine test, explained that she
provides an “instant cup” for an individual to urinate in, after which she rips
a label off, and lines come back showing the results of the screen. On crossexamination, the defense highlighted that the urine test results were not sent
for confirmation testing.
14
introduced.” (cleaned up)).
(d) Constitutional Challenge
Coleman argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting evidence of her initial refusal to
submit to drug testing under Awad v. State, 313 Ga. 99, 103 (3) (868
SE2d 219) (2022) (holding that the right against compelled selfincrimination protected by Article I, Section I, Paragraph XVI of the
Georgia Constitution prohibits the State from admitting into
evidence a defendant’s refusal to submit to a urine test that would
have required the defendant to urinate into a collection container).
Because she did not raise this specific ground in the trial court, we
review this claim only for plain error. See Dunbar v. State, 309 Ga.
252, 256 (3) (845 SE2d 607) (2020) (“Because she did not object to
the trial court on the constitutional grounds she now raises, we
review this evidentiary claim only for plain error.”). To establish
plain error, Coleman must show “(1) the alleged error was not
affirmatively waived, (2) it was obvious beyond reasonable dispute,
and (3) it affected [her] substantial rights, which ordinarily means
15
showing that it affected the outcome of the trial.” Rana v. State, 320
Ga. 66, 74 (4) (907 SE2d 674) (2024) (citation and punctuation
omitted). If an appellant meets all three prongs of this test, this
Court “has the discretion to remedy the error only if the error
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).
As an initial matter, we question whether it is clear and
obvious beyond reasonable dispute that evidence of Coleman’s initial
refusal to submit to the urine test is inadmissible under Awad,
which did not involve a situation where the defendant voluntarily
submitted to the urine test later that same day, and Coleman points
to no precedent holding that an initial refusal to submit to a urine
test is inadmissible under these circumstances. However, even
assuming that it was clear and obvious error to admit evidence
about Coleman’s initial refusal, Coleman subsequently submitted to
the test, and the positive result from that test was cumulative of her
own voluntary admissions of methamphetamine use to both Lott
and DFCS investigators. Thus, even if Coleman could satisfy the
16
second prong of the plain-error test, she cannot show that any error
in the admission of her initial refusal affected the outcome of her
trial. See Rogers v. State, 311 Ga. 634, 639 (2) (859 SE2d 92) (2021)
(plain error claim failed where challenged evidence was cumulative
of other properly admitted evidence).
2. Coleman also argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in limiting her expert witness’s testimony about alternative causes
of Brooklyn’s death, which allegedly undermined her “constitutional
right” to present a complete defense. We disagree.
Prior to the start of trial, the State moved in limine to exclude
portions of Dr. Shaker’s testimony. Coleman argued that Dr. Shaker
would testify that Brooklyn had pneumonia that could have led to
disseminated intravascular coagulopathy (DIC), and, therefore, it
could have taken less blunt force to cause harm to her, such that an
accidental fall could have caused Brooklyn’s death.7 After the trial
7 In his report, Dr. Shaker noted that despite documentation of her lung
tissue showing consistencies with pneumonia, he had not seen further testing
that would exclude or preclude bacteremia or septicemia that could have led to
DIC, which could have led to easy bruising and bleeding in the head.
17
court expressed concern over Dr. Shaker’s speculation as to the exact
source of the blunt force injury without any evidence to support it,
the parties agreed that Dr. Shaker could simply say that the injury
could have resulted accidentally.8 The trial court then preliminarily
ruled that it would exclude Dr. Shaker’s speculative opinions
regarding pneumonia and DIC as potential alternative explanations
for Brooklyn’s injuries but agreed to revisit the issue.
After the State rested its case at trial, a proffer was made in
which Dr. Shaker explained that he found “fingerprints” of
pneumonia based on the autopsy report. Dr. Shaker conceded,
however, that he could not exclude or prove bacteremia or
septicemia that could have led to DIC. The trial court concluded
that, because Dr. Shaker did not have enough information to say
that pneumonia caused Brooklyn to develop DIC, it was not
appropriate for Dr. Shaker to speculate and upheld its prior ruling
excluding this line of testimony regarding pneumonia and DIC.
8 The trial court announced, “But he can . . . say . . . this could have
happened accidentally.” Coleman’s lead counsel responded, “That’s what we
want.”
18
After the trial court reiterated that Dr. Shaker would be permitted
to testify that there could have been an accidental trauma to
Brooklyn, defense counsel stated, “Good enough.” And as the trial
court allowed counsel to explore the parameters of its ruling during
the bench conference, defense counsel three more times responded,
“Good enough.” Dr. Shaker then testified before the jury that
Brooklyn’s injury would be consistent with several hypothetical
accidents, including her having fallen off the family’s trampoline,
jumping on and falling off a bed, or slipping in a bathtub within the
72 hours leading up to her death.
Because Coleman did not raise any constitutional challenge to
the trial court’s ruling limiting Dr. Shaker’s testimony, this claim is
reviewed for plain error only. See Dunbar, 309 Ga. at 256 (3).
Assuming without deciding that Coleman has not affirmatively
waived this claim of error, Coleman cannot show that the outcome
would have been different had Dr. Shaker been permitted to testify
that Brooklyn may have had pneumonia that may have caused DIC,
which may have exacerbated the blunt force trauma injury while
19
Brooklyn was in Coleman’s sole care. Evidence was presented that
Brooklyn had thrown up a few days before she was dropped off at
her father’s house, suggesting that she was unwell. And Dr. Shaker
was allowed to testify that Brooklyn’s death may have been caused
by some accidental blunt force trauma the weekend before she was
dropped off at her father’s house. Yet the jury rejected this theory in
finding Coleman guilty of malice murder. Thus, it is unlikely that
additional testimony about how Brooklyn may have bled more easily
due to DIC would have made any material difference to the jury’s
apparent rejection of the theory that Brooklyn’s injury was caused
accidentally, particularly given the State’s evidence that Brooklyn’s
blunt force injury was caused by “significant violent force,” rather
than an accidental fall off a bed, that her injuries would have been
noticeable “very quickly,” and that Coleman admitted to
methamphetamine use in the weeks leading up to Brooklyn’s death.
Accordingly, this enumeration of error fails. See Merritt v. State, 311
Ga. 875, 886 (4) (860 SE2d 455) (2021) (appellant unable to show
that the trial court committed plain error because he could not
20
demonstrate that the outcome of his trial probably would have been
different had his expert witness been allowed to testify at trial).
3. Coleman also asserts that trial counsel provided
constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to the
prosecutor’s improper characterization of the reasonable doubt
standard during closing argument. We disagree.
To prevail on this claim, Coleman must show both that her
counsel performed deficiently and that she suffered prejudice as a
result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104
SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). To establish deficient performance,
Coleman must show that her attorney’s acts or omissions were
“objectively unreasonable . . . considering all the circumstances and
in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Davis v. State, 299 Ga.
180, 182-83 (2) (787 SE2d 221) (2016). To carry her burden of
overcoming the “strong presumption that counsel performed
reasonably,” Coleman must show that “no reasonable lawyer would
have done what [her] lawyer did, or would have failed to do what
[her] lawyer did not.” Washington v. State, 313 Ga. 771, 773 (3) (873
21
SE2d 132) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). To prove
prejudice, Coleman must demonstrate that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for her counsel’s deficient performance, the
result of the trial would have been different. See Davis, 299 Ga. at
183 (2). When an appellant fails to make a sufficient showing on one
part of this test, we need not address the other part. See
Washington, 313 Ga. at 773 (3).
During closing arguments, the prosecutor reiterated that the
State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
Coleman committed the charged offenses. The prosecutor then
argued:
The Judge is going to tell you, we don’t have to prove it to
a mathematical certainty, to a scientific fact, beyond all
doubt. It’s to a reasonable doubt. That is a reason you can
assign to the doubt. If you can’t assign that reason, then
you know she’s guilty. The other thing that from time to
time I hear jurors say is they go back to the room and
they’re thinking about it and they come out and they say,
we think she was guilty but. If you go back there and you
say – your mind says we think she was guilty, then you
have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. The “but”
part is you wanting certainty. You want something that’s
not required. The law does not require certainty, but a
doubt that you can assign a reason to. If that doubt does
22
not exist, then you should convict her.
(Emphasis supplied.)
When asked about it, counsel did not recall the challenged
portion at the motion for new trial hearing, but he did not believe it
was objectionable and agreed that the trial court would have
explained to the jurors that they had to find Coleman guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt and would have explained that opening
statements and closing arguments are not evidence.9
We first note that prosecutors are generally afforded “wide
latitude during closing arguments.” Burke v. State, 320 Ga. 706, 711
(2) (d) (911 SE2d 575) (2025). And here, the record shows that, when
viewed in context, the prosecutor was discussing the difference
between certainty and reasonable doubt without attempting to
reduce or shift the burden to Coleman or to reduce the concept of
reasonable doubt to a percentage. See id. at 711 (2) (d) (“Considered
in their full context, the remarks here fell within the wide latitude
9 The trial court did give the pattern charges on Coleman’s presumption
of innocence, the State’s burden of proof, reasonable doubt, and that opening
or closing remarks by the attorneys did not constitute evidence.
23
given to prosecutors during closing argument and did not shift the
burden of proving any fact to [appellant].” (citation and punctuation
omitted)); Jackson v. State, 319 Ga. 51, 55 (2) (901 SE2d 552) (2024)
(in addition to making the challenged statement, the prosecutor
correctly characterized reasonable doubt as not requiring a
mathematical certainty); Debelbot v. State, 308 Ga. 165, 167 (839
SE2d 513) (2020) (“[T]he argument that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt requires something less than proof that leaves a jury with 51
percent certainty is obviously wrong.” (cleaned up)).
However, pretermitting whether counsel was deficient in
failing to object, Coleman has not established prejudice because the
trial court properly charged the jury on presumption of innocence,
burden of proof, and the correct standard for reasonable doubt, and
the challenged statements from the prosecutor were fleeting and
were only made one time in the course of the argument. Accordingly,
this ineffective assistance claim fails. See Jackson, 319 Ga. at 55 (2)
(ineffective assistance claim failed where appellant did not show
reasonable probability that counsel’s failure to object to the
24
prosecutor’s statements affected the outcome of his trial); Troutman
v. State, 320 Ga. 489, 500 (3) (d) (910 SE2d 173) (2024) (where trial
court instructed jury on burden of proof, presumption of innocence,
and reasonable doubt and also told jury that closing arguments were
not evidence, appellant failed to show how counsel objecting to
prosecutor’s comments would have created a reasonable probability
of a different outcome).
4. Lastly, we note that, although Coleman has not made a
cumulative-error argument, we determine that the combined
prejudicial effect from any error presumed in the admission of
Coleman’s initial refusal to take the urine test and in trial counsel’s
failure to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument would not
demand a new trial. See Haufler v. State, 315 Ga. 712, 722 (2) n.14
(884 SE2d 310) (2023) (conducting cumulative-error review even
though appellant did not argue cumulative error and concluding
that appellant failed to establish that the combined prejudicial effect
of the errors required a new trial).
Judgment affirmed. Peterson, CJ, Warren, PJ, and Bethel,
25
Ellington, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ, concur.
26