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Carrillo v. State

2025-05-06

Summary

Holding. The judgment is affirmed. Carrillo failed to demonstrate prejudice from counsel's failure to object to the text messages, and counsel did not perform deficiently by declining to renew objections to the search warrant, as the initial ruling already preserved the issue for appeal.

Jose Carlos Carrillo was convicted in 2021 of felony murder and aggravated assault stemming from a shooting that killed Shawn Rhinehart and wounded Robert Reeves. Carrillo challenged his convictions on the basis that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to certain text messages and by not renewing objections to a search warrant executed at his home. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected both ineffective assistance claims, finding that even if counsel's performance fell short, the evidence against Carrillo was overwhelming and the procedural requirements for preserving the search warrant issue were satisfied regardless of counsel's actions at trial.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Ineffective assistance of counsel—failure to object to hearsay text messages
  • Ineffective assistance of counsel—failure to renew objections to search warrant evidence
  • Prejudice analysis under Strickland v. Washington
  • Preservation of appellate issues without renewed trial objections

Procedural posture

Carrillo appealed his 2021 convictions after the trial court denied his motion for new trial, raising two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: May 6, 2025

S25A0275. CARRILLO v. THE STATE.

PETERSON, Chief Justice.

Jose Carlos Carrillo challenges his 2021 convictions for felony

murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of

Shawn Rhinehart and the non-fatal shooting of Robert Reeves.

Carrillo’s sole enumeration of error is that he was denied the

effective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the admission

of certain text messages and for failing to renew his objection to the

search warrant executed at his home and the evidence discovered

therein. Carrillo has failed to show that any deficiency in failing to

object to the admission of the text messages prejudiced him or that

counsel acted deficiently in failing to renew the objection to the

search warrant and discovered evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.1

1. The evidence at trial showed the following. 2 On October

8, 2017, Rhinehart and Reeves were at a park playing basketball

1 The shooting occurred on October 8, 2017. On May 16, 2018, a Chatham

County grand jury indicted Carrillo and Archie Marion Bryant for malice

murder (Count 1), two counts of felony murder, predicated on the aggravated

assault of Rhinehart and the possession of a firearm by a First-Offender

Probationer (Counts 2-3), and two counts of aggravated assault (Counts 4-5);

Carrillo was separately indicted for possession of a firearm by a First-Offender

Probationer (Count 6). Carrillo was tried separately at a trial from September

14 to 20, 2021, and the jury found him guilty of all counts except Count 1. The

trial court sentenced Carrillo to serve life in prison for Count 2 and a

consecutive term of twenty years for Count 5. The trial court purported to

merge Count 3, which was predicated on Count 6, into Count 2. On September

29, 2021, Carrillo filed a motion for new trial, which he amended with new

counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order denying

the motion on May 18, 2023. Carrillo filed a timely notice of appeal, and the

case was docketed to the term of this Court beginning in December 2024 and

submitted for a decision on the briefs. According to Carrillo’s trial counsel at

the hearing for the motion for new trial, Bryant negotiated a plea deal to a

reduced charge prior to his trial.

Under Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 371-374 (4), (5) (434 SE2d 479)

(1993), the State correctly argues that because the trial court failed to vacate

Count 3, it erroneously merged Count 6 into the vacated Count 3, and as a

result, the trial court failed to sentence Carrillo for Count 6, a crime for which he was found guilty and properly should have been convicted. But this merger

error benefits Carrillo, and the State failed to raise this merger issue by crossappeal and this case does not present an exceptional circumstance, so we

decline to exercise our discretion to correct the erroneous merger of Count 6.

See Marshall v. State, 309 Ga. 698, 700-701 (2) (808 SE2d 696) (2017).

2 Because this case involves questions of prejudice under Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), we set out the

evidence in detail, rather than recounting it in the light most favorable to the

jury’s verdicts. See Moore v. State, 315 Ga. 263, 264 n.2 (1) (882 SE2d 227)

(2022).

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when Carrillo arrived and, without articulating a reason why, said

that he wanted to fight Rhinehart and pointed at Rhinehart “[a]s if

[Carrillo] had a gun” in his hand. Rhinehart appeared “shocked[]

[and] scared” when he saw Carrillo. Rhinehart and Reeves left the

park immediately in Reeves’s silver sedan; Rhinehart was in the

back seat of the car while Reeves drove. Around the time Rhinehart

and Reeves left the park, video surveillance footage from a nearby

gas station showed an orange sports car pulling alongside a car that

investigators believed to be Reeves’s silver sedan at an intersection.

As Reeves drove, he saw the orange sports car in his rearview

mirror, speeding closely behind him. Rhinehart urged Reeves to

speed up, and when Reeves did, shots were fired. Reeves could not

see anyone in the orange sports car, could not say how many people

were in the car, and could not see who was shooting. Reeves testified,

however, that he and Rhinehart had been shot and that he heard

seven or more gunshots fired from behind his car. Reeves also

asserted that neither he nor Rhinehart possessed a weapon and that

neither of them fired shots out of the window while driving away

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from the orange sports car.

One witness testified that he was at home around 6:30 p.m. on

October 8 when he heard between seven and nine gunshots. His

back was to the window when he heard the shots, so he did not see

who was shooting, but he stated that when he turned around, he saw

two cars speeding by his home. The car in front was a “white,

compact car,” and an orange sports car was following behind it. The

witness further testified that the gunshots stopped when the cars

reached his property line and that he believed only one gun was

being fired.

After being shot, Reeves drove to his grandmother’s house

nearby. When he got there, he immediately got out of the car,

believing Rhinehart had also gotten out at the same time, and told

his grandmother that he had been shot. His grandmother took him

to the hospital in her car.

After receiving 911 calls from Reeves’s mother, police arrived

at his grandmother’s house. Police found Rhinehart’s dead body in

the backseat of Reeves’s car; Reeves’s car was riddled with bullet

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holes. Rhinehart’s death was ruled a homicide caused by gunshot

wounds to the chest and back of his right arm. One bullet was

recovered from Rhinehart’s right arm, and another bullet was

removed from Reeves’s lower back at the hospital and three bullets

from his car. At the crime scene, investigators found nine 9mm

Aguila brand shell casings that appeared to have been recently

fired.3

Based on statements from Reeves and others, investigators

identified Carrillo as a person of interest. During an interview with

investigators, Carrillo denied, among other things, being at the park

the day the shooting took place, being involved in the shooting, being

around any of his friends the weekend of the shooting, being in

possession of a firearm, and knowing anyone who drove an orange

sports car. 4 Carrillo also stated during the interview that “[he] had

3 There was an additional .45-caliber shell casing found in the area. The

shell casing appeared to be rusted, suggesting to investigators that the shell

casing had been in the area prior to the shooting involving Reeves and

Rhinehart taking place.

4 After investigators showed Carrillo a photo of him standing next to an

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a feelin[g] . . . that [investigators] were [going to] come get [him].”

Carrillo appeared to be referencing that in 2015, Javon Wilson,

whom Carrillo described as his “little brother,” was killed.

Investigators initially suspected that Rhinehart might have been

involved in Wilson’s death, but eventually cleared him as a person

of interest.5 Accordingly, Carrillo explained that “[b]ecause it’s just

you know, the boy got killed . . . and I mean, the only people they

gonna come after is . . . any close friends of Javon, Javon family . . .

‘cause they think . . . we lash out to do it . . . .” There was also

evidence of several Facebook posts made by Carrillo memorializing

Wilson, stating, among other things, “d**n I miss you lil bruh . . . .

You always h[e]ld it down when I was gone, so that’s what I’m gonna

do” and “it been two years since a p**sy boy took my brother from

orange sports car from Carrillo’s public Facebook account, Carrillo contended

that he had never been in that car and did not know who it belonged to. Based

on a partial tag seen in the Facebook photo, investigators determined that the

car belonged to Carrillo’s co-indictee, Archie Bryant, who was also in the

Facebook photo, standing next to Carrillo.

5 Investigators handling Wilson’s case initially believed that Rhinehart

was involved in Wilson’s killing, as Rhinehart was the victim of an armed

robbery in which his phone was taken, and Wilson’s death was believed to have

occurred in an effort to recover that phone.

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me.”

While Carrillo was being interviewed, his home was searched

pursuant to a search warrant. At his home, investigators discovered

a Glock 17 9mm handgun in a tool bag with the name “Jose C”

written on it and one 9mm Aguila brand round. Investigators also

conducted a search of Reeves’s grandmother’s home pursuant to a

search warrant. During that search they found a 9mm pistol, seven

9mm rounds, 26 5.6mm rounds, six .38 special rounds, and 20

Winchester 30/30 rounds. No firearm was found matching the

Winchester rounds, and investigators did not find any Aguila brand

rounds. Reeves claimed that none of the firearms and ammunition

found at his grandmother’s home belonged to him. Carrillo was

eventually arrested and tried for malice murder, two counts of felony

murder (predicated on the aggravated assault of Rhinehart and the

possession of a firearm by a First-Offender Probationer), two counts

of aggravated assault for the non-fatal wounding of Reeves, and

possession of a firearm by a First-Offender Probationer.

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At trial, a ballistics expert6 testified that she concluded within

a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the Glock 17 9mm

handgun found in Carrillo’s home fired the nine Aguila brand shell

casings recovered from the scene of Rhinehart’s murder, the bullets

found in Reeves’s car, the bullet recovered from Reeves’s back, and

the bullets found in Rhinehart’s body. Moreover, a DNA analyst

from the GBI testified that the DNA found on the Glock 17 9mm

handgun matched Carrillo’s DNA and the match to Carrillo was

“approximately thirty billion times more probable than a

coincidental match to an unrelated person in the population.” 7

There was also evidence admitted at trial showing text

messages on the day of the shooting between Carrillo and his child’s

6 The ballistics expert who testified was asked to resign from the GBI

prior to trial because she had a high peer review rejection rate, involving “typos in her work.” She confirmed that her resignation was not due to the quality of

her work or the scientific certainty of her conclusions, but only the quality of

the actual reports she produced. Notwithstanding this, the State also called a

former GBI ballistics expert who, after completing similar tests, reached the

same conclusions.

7 The firearm had a mixture of detectable DNA from at least two

individuals. The DNA analyst testified that mixed DNA was common and that

results obtained from examinations of subjects involving mixed DNA for later

comparison were not less reliable than if there were only a single source of

detected DNA.

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mother, Danequa Loadholt, who also went by “Neka.” At 6:50 p.m.

on the day of the shooting, Carrillo’s phone messaged Loadholt’s

phone asking, “Can I spend da night at ur house[?]”Loadholt’s phone

responded, “[W]hat’s wrong,” and “[W]hat u did Jose[?]”Carrillo’s

phone responded, “Neka just chill I just want to spend da time with

u I miss u.” Later that night at 10:25 p.m., Loadholt’s phone sent the

following message to Carrillo’s phone:

I guess you wasn’t gonna text me idk, whatever. But

you just keep doing dumb s**t . . . you ain’t even had

to do all that then gone lie to me and say “you going

to hoop” . . . . I BEEEEEEEEN told you about doing

dumb s**t with ur friends, . . . I’m frustrated cuz u

never gets it[.]

Carrillo, from his sister’s phone,8 responded to Loadholt’s phone:

I really needed u tonight man u is always there for

me I am just scared cuz I really don’t want to lose u

or [my child] I know I f**ked up neka I know bt how

could I do anything neka dats my lil brudda man u

know he was like my blood man I couldn’t let it ride

I’m sorry I won’t do anything else man bt I really did

8 Loadholt’s phone consistently referred to the person the messages were

being sent to as “Jose,” and a message sent from Carrillo’s sister’s phone to

Loadholt’s phone to “call my phone really quick I’m finna give [Carrillo’s sister] her phone” suggested that Carrillo was the person using his sister’s phone to

send messages to Loadholt’s phone.

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need u tonight bt I’m sorry[.]

2. Carrillo raises two claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel. We conclude that, as to the first claim, Carrillo has not

shown prejudice and, as to the second claim, Carrillo has not shown

that counsel performed in a constitutionally deficient manner.

To prove his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Carrillo

must prove both that his attorney’s performance was professionally

deficient and that the deficiency resulted in prejudice to Carrillo’s

case. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt

2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). If Carrillo fails to meet the burden of

proving either prong of the Strickland test, “we need not examine

the other prong.” Moore v. State, 307 Ga. 290, 298 (6) (835 SE2d 610)

(2019) (citation omitted).

To establish deficient performance, Carrillo must show that his

attorney’s acts or omissions were objectively unreasonable,

considering all the circumstances at the time and in the light of

prevailing professional norms. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-690.

To establish the required prejudice, Carrillo must show that but for

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his attorney’s unprofessional errors, there is a “reasonable

probability” that the result of the proceeding would have been

different. Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “In reviewing

a ruling on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we defer to

the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous,

but we apply the law to the facts de novo.” Payne v. State, 314 Ga.

322, 329 (3) (877 SE2d 202) (2022) (citation omitted).

(a) Carrillo argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to object to the text messages Loadholt’s phone

sent to Carrillo’s phone. Specifically, Carrillo contends that the

message sent from Loadholt’s phone at 10:25 p.m. on the night of the

shooting, regarding her frustration with Carrillo for “doing dumb

s**t with [Carrillo’s] friends . . . [,]” was admitted in support of

Carrillo’s guilt and that trial counsel should have objected on the

ground that the text messages were inadmissible hearsay.

Without deciding whether Carrillo’s trial counsel was deficient

for failing to object on hearsay grounds to incoming text messages

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from Loadholt’s phone, Carrillo cannot show prejudice on this claim

because there was other overwhelming evidence supporting

Carrillo’s guilt. Particularly, the gun used in Rhinehart’s shooting

was found in Carrillo’s home in a tool bag that was labeled “Jose C.”

Moreover, DNA found on that gun was “approximately thirty billion

times more probable [to be a match to Carrillo] than a coincidental

match to an unrelated person in the population.” There was also

evidence showing that the shell casings found at the scene and

bullets found in Reeves’s car, Reeves’s back, and Rhinehart’s body

were fired from the weapon found in Carrillo’s tool bag. Finally,

Carrillo’s message to Loadholt’s phone on the day of the shooting,

which was admissible as an admission by a party opponent, see

OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (A) (“Admissions shall not be excluded by

the hearsay rule. An admission is a statement offered against a

party which is: . . . [t]he party’s own statement . . . .”), implies his

guilt. That message stated, in part, “I know I f**ked up.” And

Carillo’s other remark to Loadholt’s phone that “dats my lil brudda

man u know he was like my blood man I couldn’t let it ride”

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suggested that Carrillo understood the significance of shooting

Rhinehart and Reeves but believed it was necessary to avenge

Wilson’s death. See Turner v. State, 308 Ga. 537, 540-541 (2) (a) (842

SE2d 40) (2020) (concluding that the defendant could not show the

required prejudice for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim

because of other properly admitted evidence of his guilt). This claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel therefore fails.

(b) Carrillo next argues that his trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance by failing to renew his objections to the search

warrant permitting investigators to search Carrillo’s home and the

evidence obtained from that search. Prior to trial, Carrillo’s trial

counsel filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a

search warrant of Carrillo’s home and argued that the search

warrant was not supported by probable cause. The trial court denied

Carrillo’s motion to suppress. When the challenged evidence was

admitted at trial, trial counsel did not object.

On appeal, Carrillo does not contend that the search warrant

was not supported by probable cause or that the trial court erred in

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denying his motion to suppress. Instead, he argues only that trial

counsel waived these issues for appellate review by failing to renew

his objection to the evidence obtained under the warrant. But trial

counsel did not need to renew his objection in order to preserve the

issues. “Once the court makes a definitive ruling on the record

admitting or excluding any evidence, either at or before trial, a party

need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve such claim

of error for appeal.” OCGA § 24-1-103 (a). Therefore, trial counsel’s

failure to make a renewed objection did not constitute deficient

performance, and the issues are preserved. See Rashad v. State, 318

Ga. 199, 209 (3) (a) (897 SE2d 760) (2024). We do not reach the

merits of these issues, however, because Carillo does not

independently raise them on appeal. Thus, Carrillo’s ineffective

assistance claim fails.

Judgment affirmed. Warren, PJ, and Bethel, Ellington,

McMillian, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ, concur.

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