[Cite as State v. Greer, 2025-Ohio-5775.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
SANDUSKY COUNTY
City of Bellevue Court of Appeals No. {72}S-25-009
{72}S-25-010
v. {72}S-25-011
Milly J. Greer Trial Court No. TRD2300104A
TRD2400806A
Appellant TRD2400689
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Decided: December 26, 2025
*****
Henry Schaefer, for appellant.
*****
ZMUDA, J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} This is a consolidated appeal from three traffic cases in the Bellevue
Municipal Court. In one case, appellant, Milly Greer, admitted to a charge of contempt
for failing to report to serve a 20-day jail sentence previously imposed for her conviction
for driving under a 12-point suspension. In the second case, she pled guilty to one count
of driving under a financial responsibility law suspension, a misdemeanor of the fourth
degree. In the third case, she pled no contest to one count of driving under a financial responsibility law suspension, a misdemeanor of the first degree. Greer argues on appeal
that her pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given because the trial
court failed to notify her of the effect of her guilty plea, no contest plea, and admission to
the charge of contempt. For the reasons that follow, the trial court’s judgments are
affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings.
II. Background and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In case No. TRD2300104A, on December 5, 2023, Greer pled no contest to
driving under a 12-point suspension in violation of R.C. 4510.037(J), a misdemeanor of
the first degree.1 The trial court found her guilty and sentenced her to 90 days in jail with
70 days suspended. It ordered her to serve the 20 days that were not suspended by June
1, 2024, in two sets of ten days. Greer did not appear to serve her jail sentence, and on
June 11, 2024, the State filed a motion to hold her in contempt.
{¶ 3} In case No. TRD2400689, on July 15, 2024, Greer was charged with one
count of driving under a financial responsibility law suspension in violation of R.C.
4510.16, a misdemeanor of the fourth degree.
1
Greer also pled no contest to and was found guilty of one count of tinted windows in violation of R.C. 4513.241, a minor misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced her to pay a $40 fine and court costs.
2.
{¶ 4} In case No. TRD2400806A, on August 20, 2024, Greer was charged with
one count of driving under a financial responsibility law suspension in violation of R.C.
4510.16, a misdemeanor of the first degree.2
{¶ 5} The three cases came before the court on March 3, 2025.
{¶ 6} In case No. TRD2300104A, the following occurred:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, at this time [Greer] would
change to an admittance of the contempt motion.
COURT: Ma’am, you’re represented by counsel; is that correct?
Would you like to admit to the contempt at this time?
MS. GREER: Yes, sir.
COURT: Have you been explained the consequences of you
admitting to being in contempt of Court?
MS. GREER: Yes, sir.
COURT: Are you satisfied with the representation that you’ve had
here today?
MS. GREER: Yes, sir.
COURT: I’m going to find that you are in contempt. I’m going to
order that you serve the remaining 70 days of jail that you’ve had
suspended on that case.
{¶ 7} Next, in case No. TRD2400689, the following exchange took place:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, at this time we’d ask the
Court to accept a change to a guilty plea on that count, um, in exchange for
sentencing within the guidelines discussed previously off the record.
2
Greer was also charged with one count of loud exhaust in violation of R.C. 4513.22, a minor misdemeanor. This count was dismissed by the State pursuant to a plea agreement.
3.
COURT: Again, ma’am, do you understand your (recording
skipped) consequences of changing your plea from not guilty to no contest
(sic)?
MS. GREER: Yes, sir.
COURT: And is that how you would like to proceed to the -- with
this charge?
MS. GREER: Yes Sir.
COURT: Are you doing -- doing so knowingly and voluntarily?
MS. GREER: Yes, sir.
COURT: Are you under the influence of anything today that would
cloud your judgment.
MS. GREER: No, sir.
COURT: You are thinking clearly?
MS. GREER: Yes, sir.
COURT: Okay. And you’re satisfied with the representation that
you’ve had in this matter?
MS. GREER: Yes, sir.
COURT: I’m going to accept your guilty plea and find you guilty.
{¶ 8} Finally, in case No. TRC2400806A, defense counsel indicated that Greer
would change her plea to no contest. The court then requested a recitation of the facts,
which was provided by the State. After hearing the facts, the trial court accepted Greer’s
no contest plea and found her guilty without conducting any inquiry of her.
{¶ 9} Ultimately, the trial court sentenced Greer to serve the suspended 70 days in
jail for the charge of contempt in case No. TRD2300104A. It also ordered her to serve
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30 days in jail with 20 days suspended in case No. TRD2400689, and 180 days in jail
with 170 days suspended in case No. TRD2400806A. The trial court further ordered the
non-suspended days to be served consecutively for a total of 90 days in jail.
{¶ 10} This appeal followed.
III. Assignments of Error
{¶ 11} Greer raises the following assignments of error in her appeal:
1. The trial court erred by accepting Ms. Greer’s guilty plea in Case
No. TRD2400689 and no contest plea in case No. TRD2400806 without
conducting a proper plea colloquy as required by Ohio Traffic Rule 10(D),
thereby rendering the pleas involuntary, unknowing, and unintelligent in
violation of her due process rights under the Ohio and U.S. Constitutions.
2. The trial court erred in its handling of the contempt hearing in
Case No. TRD2300104 by failing to provide adequate notice of the
consequences of admitting to contempt and by imposing the suspended
sentence as a contempt sanction without a separate penalty, violating Ms.
Greer’s due process rights under R.C. 2705.03 and the Ohio and U.S.
Constitutions.
3. The sentence imposed in TRD2300104 is contrary to law.
The State has not filed a brief in response.
IV. Analysis
A. Trial Court’s Obligation under Traf.R. 10(D) when Accepting Pleas of Guilty
and No Contest
{¶ 12} In her first assignment of error, Greer argues that the trial court failed to
properly advise her as required by Traf.R. 10(D), and therefore her pleas of guilty and no
contest in case Nos. TRD2400689 and TRD2400806(A), respectively, were not
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.
5.
{¶ 13} Traf.R. 10(D) provides, in relevant part, “[T]he court may refuse to accept
a plea of guilty or no contest and shall not accept such pleas without first informing the
defendant of the effect of the plea of guilty, no contest, and not guilty. This information
may be presented by general orientation or pronouncement.” Notably, Traf.R. 10(D) is
“identical in all relevant respects” to Crim.R. 11(E), which applies to misdemeanor cases
involving petty offenses. State v. Watkins, 2003-Ohio-2419, ¶ 15; State v. Everson,
2018-Ohio-323, ¶ 8 (6th Dist.). “Accordingly, cases analyzing a court’s duties under
Crim.R. 11(E) can also be applied to cases analyzing Traf.R. 10(D).” Everson at ¶ 8,
citing Watkins at ¶ 15; see State v. Sting, 2012-Ohio-3113 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 14} To comply with Traf.R. 10(D), the trial court must “inform[] the defendant
of the information contained in Traf.R. 10(B).” Watkins at ¶ 28; see also State v. Jones,
2007-Ohio-6093, paragraph two of the syllabus (“To satisfy the requirement of informing
a defendant of the effect of a plea, a trial court must inform the defendant of the
appropriate language under Crim.R. 11(B).”). Traf.R. 10(B) describes the effect of the
pleas: a “plea of guilty is a complete admission of the defendant’s guilt;” a “plea of no
contest is not an admission of defendant’s guilt, but is an admission of the truth of the
facts alleged in the complaint and such plea or admission shall not be used against the
defendant in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding.”
{¶ 15} In addition to arguing that the trial court failed to inform her of the effect of
her pleas, Greer also argues that the trial court failed to inform her of the consequences of
entering her pleas, namely the range of penalties she could face. Traf.R. 10(D), however,
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does not require the trial court to inform the defendant of the potential penalties. See
Jones at ¶ 22 (distinguishing “effect of a plea” in Crim.R. 11(E) [and Traf.R. 10(D)] from
statements relating to a maximum penalty and the right to jury trial under Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(a) through (c)). Instead, “[w]hen a defendant charged with a petty misdemeanor
traffic offense pleads guilty or no contest, the trial court complies with Traf.R. 10(D) by
informing the defendant of the information contained in Traf.R. 10(B).” Watkins at
syllabus. We will, therefore, focus our analysis only on the effect of the pleas of guilty
and no contest as described in Traf.R. 10(B).
1. Guilty Plea in case No. TRD2400689
{¶ 16} In case No. TRD2400689, Greer pled guilty to the count of driving under a
financial responsibility law suspension. Thus, the trial court was required to “inform the
defendant that ‘[t]he plea of guilty is a complete admission of the defendant’s guilt.’”
Everson at ¶ 9, quoting Traf.R. 10(B)(1). The colloquy between the trial court and Greer
contains no such instruction. Furthermore, although Traf.R. 10(D) expressly permits the
trial court to inform defendants of the effect of pleas through general orientation or
pronouncement, the record contains no indication that such a general orientation or
pronouncement was made in this case. The trial court, therefore, failed to comply with
Traf.R. 10(D).
{¶ 17} “When a criminal defendant seeks to have [her] conviction reversed on
appeal, the traditional rule is that [she] must establish that an error occurred in the trialcourt proceedings and that [she] was prejudiced by that error.” State v. Dangler, 2020-7.
Ohio-2765, ¶ 13, citing State v. Perry, 2004-Ohio-297, ¶ 14-15. “The test for prejudice is
‘whether the plea would have otherwise been made.’” Id. at ¶ 16, quoting State v. Nero,
56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990). Exceptions exist to this traditional rule, however.
{¶ 18} One exception to the prejudice requirement is the trial court’s complete
failure to comply with the notification requirements. Dangler at ¶ 15; State v. Sarkozy,
2008-Ohio-509, ¶ 22; see also State v. McGlinch, 2019-Ohio-1380, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.)
(defendant not required to demonstrate prejudice where the trial court completely failed
to comply with Traf.R. 10(D)). But this exception is subject to its own exception “in
instances where the trial court failed to inform the defendant of the effect of a guilty
plea.” State v. Willis, 2019-Ohio-1182, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.)
{¶ 19} In Willis, the trial court failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(E) because it “did
not tell Willis (either orally or in writing) that his guilty plea was a complete admission of
his guilt.” Id. at ¶ 15. This court nonetheless assumed “that the trial court partially
complied (rather than failed to comply) with Crim.R. 11(E)” because Willis did not assert
his actual innocence at the plea hearing and thus “subjectively understood that he was
completely admitting his guilt by pleading guilty.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 17. This
court reasoned,
In [State v.] Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d 51, at
¶ 14, the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that a trial court’s failure to
inform the defendant of the effect of a guilty plea, specifically, is subject to
a unique analysis because “[a] plea of guilty is a complete admission of
guilt.” (Emphasis sic.) That is, when a defendant affirmatively indicates
that he or she is “guilty” of the charge, it is—necessarily and patently—a
complete admission of guilt. In other words, “a complete admission of
guilt” is more than just the effect of a guilty plea; it is the very nature of a
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guilty plea. For that reason, “a defendant who has entered a guilty plea
without asserting actual innocence is presumed to understand that he has
completely admitted his guilt. In such circumstances, a court’s failure to
inform the defendant of the effect of his guilty plea as required by Crim.R.
11 is presumed not to be prejudicial.” Id. at ¶ 19.
(Emphasis sic.) Willis at ¶ 16; accord State v. Lucas, 2025-Ohio-5303, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.);
State v. Vasquez, 2024-Ohio-2496, ¶ 20 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 20} Willis is applicable to the facts here. Greer entered a guilty plea and did
not assert actual innocence. To the contrary, she admitted she had been driving without a
valid license, and she stated the best thing that happened to her was that her car was taken
away, which removed the temptation. Consistent with Willis, because it is presumed that
Greer subjectively understood that she was completely admitting her guilt when she
entered the guilty plea, the trial court at least partially complied with Traf.R. 10(D).
Greer, therefore, is required to demonstrate prejudice by showing that she would not have
entered the guilty plea if the trial court had informed her of its effect. Greer makes no
attempt to do so.
{¶ 21} Accordingly, because Greer has not demonstrated that she has been
prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to comply with Traf.R. 10(D), she is not entitled to
have her guilty plea in case No. TRD2400689 vacated.
2. No Contest Plea in case No. TRD2400806A
{¶ 22} In contrast, in case No. TRD2400806A, Greer pled no contest to the count
of driving under a financial responsibility law suspension. “[F]or a no contest plea, a
defendant must be informed that the plea of no contest is not an admission of guilt but is
9.
an admission of the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, and that the plea or
admission shall not be used against the defendant in any subsequent civil or criminal
proceeding.” Jones at ¶ 23, citing Traf.R. 10(B)(2).
{¶ 23} As with her guilty plea, the record does not demonstrate that the trial court
informed her of the effect of a no contest plea. Unlike her guilty plea, however, the plea
of no contest does not come with a presumption that the defendant subjectively
understands its effect. The trial court’s failure to inform her of the effect of the plea,
therefore, was a complete failure under Traf.R. 10(D). Because the trial court completely
failed to comply with Traf.R. 10(D), Greer is not required to demonstrate that the error
was prejudicial. Dangler at ¶ 15; State v. Hudson, 2025-Ohio-5258, ¶ 16-17 (6th Dist.);
State v. Schuster, 2023-Ohio-3038, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.); State v. McGlinch, 2019-Ohio-1380,
¶ 31 (2d Dist.); State v. Williams, 2018-Ohio-1000, ¶ 4-6 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 24} Accordingly, Greer’s no contest plea in case No. TRD2400806A is
vacated.
3. Summary
{¶ 25} In sum, Greer’s first assignment of error is well-taken, in part, and not
well-taken, in part. In case No. TRD2400689, Greer has not demonstrated any prejudice
from the trial court’s failure to inform her of the effect of her guilty plea, and that
conviction is affirmed. In case No. TRD2400806A, Greer is not required to demonstrate
any prejudice from the trial court’s complete failure to inform her of the effect of her no
contest plea, and that conviction is reversed and her plea is vacated.
10.
B. Trial Court’s Obligation to Defendant Before Accepting Admission to Charge of
Contempt
{¶ 26} In her second assignment of error, Greer argues that her due process rights
were violated when the trial court accepted her admission to the charge of contempt
without informing her of the potential consequences.
{¶ 27} As an initial matter, we note that the trial court pursued contempt
proceedings rather than a hearing on the probation violation. In her brief, Greer notes the
overlapping remedies of contempt and probation violation for her failure to comply with
the trial court’s order to serve her 20-day jail sentence by June 1, 2024, recognizing that
since “violations of probation generally constitute violations of a court order, it is not
unreasonable to see how both contempt and a probation violation apply.” While she does
not assign it as an error or otherwise argue that the trial court was not permitted to
proceed with contempt, she does cite In re Burt, 2007-Ohio-4034, ¶ 40 (5th Dist.), in
which the Fifth District commented that
courts should not use the inherent contempt power to punish a violation of a
condition of probation that would not otherwise constitute an offense. We
do not believe that when the Legislature expressly provided that the
sanction for a violation of probation (other than for the inherent criminality
of the act) would be a revocation of probation, it intended that a defendant
would be subject to a new indictment for contempt in addition to the
punishment for the original offense.
{¶ 28} In State v. Patton, 2007-Ohio-1296, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.), the Tenth District
observed that appellate courts appear divided on this issue. “Some courts have assumed
that probation revocation proceedings are the sole remedy.” Id., citing State v. Smith,
2002-Ohio-6710, ¶ 8 (7th Dist.) (“The municipal court treated Smith’s alleged failure to
11.
attend the counseling sessions as an act of contempt rather than a violation of probation.
This was an error by the trial court.”); see also Cleveland v. Serrano, 2021-Ohio-1586, ¶
30 (8th Dist.) (“Based upon the plain language of R.C. 2929.25(D)(2), courts cannot
charge offenders who violate the conditions of their community control sanctions with
criminal contempt.”); State v. Jacobs, 2000 WL 924822, *1 (3d Dist. June 29, 2000)
(municipal court “erroneously” treated violation of community control condition of no
contact with the victim “as an indirect contempt proceeding rather than a probation
revocation hearing.”). “Other courts have assumed that contempt proceedings could be
used in such cases.” Patton at ¶ 11, citing State v. Daugherty, 2006-Ohio-240, ¶ 7 (2d
Dist.) (“While Daugherty claims that the appropriate course of action for the court was to
consider revocation of probation under Crim.R. 32.2, we do not understand him to argue
that this was the only course open to the court. In other words, indirect contempt
proceedings, if conducted properly, might have been appropriate.”).
{¶ 29} Considering the issue, Patton reasoned,
Unquestionably, the preferred method for dealing with actions such
as those taken by appellant would be the institution of revocation
proceedings. However, courts have traditionally been viewed as having
very broad authority to use contempt proceedings to vindicate the authority
of the court. Denovchek v. Board of Trumbull Cty. Commrs. (1988), 36
Ohio St.3d 14, 520 N.E.2d 1362. In the absence of any statutory provision
limiting the use of contempt proceedings in cases where the court order or
judgment being disobeyed is a sentencing entry, we are reluctant to impose
such a limitation on the court’s inherent authority.
Id. at ¶ 12.
12.
{¶ 30} Here, because Greer does not assign this issue as an error, we do not decide
whether the trial court erred in proceeding with contempt. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(b) (court
of appeals shall “[d]etermine the appeal on its merits on the assignments of error set forth
in the briefs under App.R. 16); Bonn v. Bonn, 2013-Ohio-2313, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.) (“[T]his
court rules on assignments of error only, and will not address mere arguments.”); Jensen
v. AdChoice, Inc., 2014-Ohio-5590, ¶ 23, fn.4 (6th Dist.). We note, however, that
regardless of the label, Greer was afforded a fair and impartial hearing to determine
whether she had violated the specific terms and conditions of her probation, and was
sentenced to a penalty appropriate for her violation of the terms of her probation as set
forth in the trial court’s December 5, 2023 order. See Jacobs, 2000 WL 924822, at *1
(Error in treating probation violation as contempt was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt because defendant was afforded a fair and impartial hearing and there was “no
actual prejudice to the appellant arising from the manner in which the proceedings were
conducted.”).
{¶ 31} While noting the contempt proceedings mirrored a revocation hearing, we
nevertheless address Greer’s second assignment of error as articulated, and limit our
review to the claimed lack of due process within the contempt proceedings.
{¶ 32} Contempt can be criminal or civil. “[I]n determining whether a contempt is
civil or criminal, the pertinent test is ‘what does the court primarily seek to accomplish by
imposing sentence.’” State ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 90 Ohio St.3d 551, 554-555 (2001),
quoting Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966). “Civil contempt sanctions
13.
are designed for remedial or coercive purposes and are often employed to compel
obedience to a court order.” Id. at 555; In re Disqualification of Ruehlman, 2024-Ohio1306, ¶ 36. “Criminal contempt sanctions, however, are punitive in nature and are
designed to vindicate the authority of the court.” Id.; Ruehlman at ¶ 36. “Thus, civil
contempts are characterized as violations against the party for whose benefit the order
was made, whereas criminal contempts are most often described as offenses against the
dignity or process of the court.” Id., citing State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohio St.2d 201, 204-205
(1980).
{¶ 33} Greer argues that her contempt was criminal. Here, she was charged with
contempt for failing to obey the trial court’s order to complete her jail term by June 1,
2024, which is an offense against the process of the court. Further, because the 70-day
sanction imposed by the trial court was punitive in nature and was designed to vindicate
the trial court’s authority, we agree that Greer was charged with criminal contempt.
{¶ 34} Contempt can also be direct or indirect. “‘Direct contempt occurs “in the
presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration of justice.”’”
Ruehlman at ¶ 35, quoting Burt v. Dodge, 65 Ohio St.3d 34, 35, fn. 1 (1992), quoting
R.C. 2705.01. “Indirect contempt occurs outside the court’s presence, and the alleged
contemnor is entitled to a hearing before [she] may be convicted and punished.” Id.,
quoting Burt at 35, fn. 1. In this case, Greer’s conduct occurred outside of the presence
of the court and was therefore indirect contempt.
14.
{¶ 35} “A party subject to indirect criminal contempt is afforded many of the same
constitutional safeguards and due process rights as a defendant in a criminal trial.” In re
Guardianship of Finan, 2014-Ohio-3572, ¶ 21 (5th Dist.), citing U.S. v. Dixon, 509 U.S.
688, 696 (1993); Lillo v. Lillo, 2004-Ohio-4848, ¶ 32 (6th Dist.). “Specifically, a person
charged with indirect criminal contempt is entitled to all the procedural due process
protections afforded in criminal proceedings, including the right to notice of the charges,
the right to defend oneself and be heard, the right to counsel, and the right that there be
proof beyond a reasonable doubt to support a conviction.” Id., citing Intl. Union, United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826 (1994).
{¶ 36} Here, the charge of contempt related to Greer’s failure to serve the sentence
from a traffic offense in municipal court. She received notice of the contempt charge,
was present with counsel at a hearing on the contempt charge, and the contempt was
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Notably, Greer does not dispute on appeal that she
did not, in fact, serve her jail term by June 1, 2024.
{¶ 37} Greer contends that she nonetheless did not receive due process because
she was not informed of the potential penalties she was facing by admitting to the
contempt. Because this matter involved a charge of contempt from a traffic offense in
municipal court, the protections afforded for misdemeanor cases involving petty offenses
under Crim.R. 11(E) apply. Crim.R. 11(E)—unlike Crim.R. 11(C), which applies to
felony cases—“does not require a court to inform the defendant of ‘the maximum
penalty, the right to a jury trial, or other rights.’” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Scott, 2025-15.
Ohio-1244, ¶ 21 (4th Dist.), quoting Cleveland v. Greene, 2024-Ohio-4899, ¶ 6 (8th
Dist.), citing Jones, 2007-Ohio-6093, at ¶ 22.
{¶ 38} Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not violate Greer’s due process
rights when it accepted her admission to the charge of contempt of court. Greer’s second
assignment of error is not well-taken.
C. Trial Court’s Imposed Penalty Following Finding of Contempt
{¶ 39} Finally, in her third assignment of error, Greer argues that the trial court’s
imposition of a 70-day jail term for contempt was contrary to law. She cites R.C.
2705.05, which provides,
(A) In all contempt proceedings, the court shall conduct a hearing.
At the hearing, the court shall investigate the charge and hear any answer or
testimony that the accused makes or offers and shall determine whether the
accused is guilty of the contempt charge. If the accused is found guilty, the
court may impose any of the following penalties:
(1) For a first offense, a fine of not more than two hundred fifty
dollars, a definite term of imprisonment of not more than thirty days in jail,
or both.
She argues that because her 70-day jail sentence exceeded the maximum penalty for a
first offense, it was contrary to law.
{¶ 40} The Ohio Supreme Court has held, however, that “[t]he inherent power of a
court to punish for contempt of court may not be limited by legislative authority, nor does
such power depend upon express constitutional grant.” State v. Local Union 5760,
United Steelworkers of Am., 172 Ohio St. 75 (1961), paragraph one of the syllabus. This
is because “[a] court created by the constitution has inherent power to define and punish
contempts, such power being necessary to the exercise of judicial functions.” State ex
16.
rel. Johnson v. Cty. Court of Perry Cty., 25 Ohio St.3d 53, 54 (1986), quoting State ex
rel. Turner v. Albin, 118 Ohio St. 527 (1928), paragraph one of the syllabus. Thus,
“controlling precedent unequivocally establishes the full discretion of the trial court to
craft a sanction without regard to [R.C. 2705.05’s] statutory penalties.” City of Toledo v.
Ross, 2007-Ohio-451, ¶ 24 (6th Dist.) (involving appeal from conviction for contempt of
court in municipal court); see also Cleveland v. Bright, 2020-Ohio-5180, ¶ 45 (8th Dist.)
(in review of contempt from municipal court, recognizing that “it is well established that
trial courts are not bound by the sanction limits set forth in R.C. 2705.05 when imposing
a penalty for contempt.”); Johnson v. Johnson, 2020-Ohio-1644, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.)
(“Although R.C. 2705.05(A) does prescribe sanctions for indirect contempt violations
such as the one at issue here, common pleas courts are not required to follow it.”).
{¶ 41} Accordingly, because the trial court’s imposition of the 70-day jail sentence
is within its inherent authority to punish Greer’s contempt, it is not contrary to law.
Greer’s third assignment of error is not well-taken.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 42} For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the Bellevue Municipal Court
are affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part. In case No. TRD2400689, Greer has not
demonstrated any prejudice from the trial court’s failure to inform her of the effect of her
guilty plea, and her conviction is affirmed. In case No. TRD2400806A, Greer is not
required to demonstrate any prejudice from the trial court’s complete failure to inform
her of the effect of her no contest plea, and her conviction is reversed and her plea is
17.
vacated. In case No. TRD2300104A, the trial court was not required to inform her of the
potential penalties for contempt of court, and its 70-day jail sentence was within its
inherent authority to punish Greer’s contempt, and her conviction is affirmed. Case No.
TRD2400806A is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
{¶ 43} Costs of this appeal are to be shared evenly by the parties pursuant to
App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed, in part,
reversed, in part, and remanded.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
Charles E. Sulek, P.J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
18.