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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCAP-XX-XXXXXXX
30-DEC-2025
08:52 AM
Dkt. 39 OP
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
---o0o---CHRISTOPHER PIEZKO, AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE CP TRUST,
DATED FEBRUARY 28, 1992; and JANEL LEE PIEZKO,
AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE JP TRUST DATED FEBRUARY 28, 1992,
Class-Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
COUNTY OF MAUI,
Defendant-Appellee.
SCAP-XX-XXXXXXX
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
(CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 2CCV-XX-XXXXXXX)
DECEMBER 30, 2025
McKENNA, ACTING C.J., EDDINS, GINOZA, AND DEVENS, JJ., AND
CIRCUIT JUDGE KAWASHIMA, ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY
OPINION OF THE COURT BY EDDINS, J.
Class representative plaintiffs Christopher Piezko and
Janel Lee Piezko (Piezkos) own real property in Kīhei, Maui.
They use the property as a “vacation home for personal use.” *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
In 2021 the County of Maui (County) reclassified the
Piezkos’ property as a “short-term rental” based on zoning
rather than actual use. The Piezkos paid the resulting higher
real property taxes. But they did not appeal their tax
assessments through the administrative process established by
the County, that is to the Maui County Board of Review (BOR).
Instead, the Piezkos filed a class action suit in the
Circuit Court of the Second Circuit. As the class plaintiffs’
representatives, the Piezkos sought a refund of the additional
taxes they paid. Plaintiffs alleged that the County unjustly
enriched itself by retaining unconstitutionally-collected taxes
and violated their due process rights.
The County moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The County argued that Plaintiffs
should have “avail[ed] themselves” of Maui County’s
administrative appeals process by first appealing to the BOR,
and then, if necessary, to the Tax Appeal Court (TAC).
We hold that the circuit court correctly dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction. Under Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS)
chapter 232 and Maui County Code (MCC) chapter 3.48, the TAC has
exclusive jurisdiction over real property tax assessment
appeals, including those raising constitutional challenges.
Because Plaintiffs failed to follow the proper appeals
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procedure, and their potential appeal is now time-barred, we
affirm the circuit court dismissal.
I.
On December 4, 2020, the Maui County Council passed
Ordinance 5160. See Maui, Hawaiʻi, Ordinance No. 5160 (Dec. 5,
2020). The next day, the mayor signed the ordinance into law.
Ordinance 5160 amended MCC § 3.48.305.C.2 by expanding the
“short-term rental” condominium classification to include vacant
units and those “occupied by transient tenants for periods of
less than six consecutive months.” Those units would be
classified as short-term rentals if they were located in an area
permitting transient vacation rentals. Critically, the new law
included “units occupied by the owner for personal use” —
vacation homes like the Piezkos’.
The County Director of Finance projected that Ordinance
5160 would result in the reclassification of 1,428 properties
and increase tax revenue by $9,127,582. See Letter from Michael
P. Victorino, Maui Mayor, to Keani Rawlins-Fernandez, Economic
Development and Budget Committee Chair, Maui County Council
(Nov. 2, 2020),
https://mauicounty.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=8891167&GUID=A2
E983BD-3CC5-4180-91F5-1F442E715EB2 [https://perma.cc/GX69-MV48].
The new law was only applicable for one tax year. See Maui,
Hawaiʻi, Ordinance No. 5159 (Jan. 1, 2022). Effective January 1,
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2022, Ordinance 5159 repealed the short-term rental
classification. See id. Consequently, Ordinance 5160 applied
only to the 2021 tax assessment year (July 1, 2021 through June
30, 2022).
The Piezkos paid their 2021 real property tax bills at the
higher short-term rental rates. However, they did not appeal
their tax assessments to the BOR or TAC within the time periods
prescribed by law.
On October 18, 2023, the Piezkos filed a class action
complaint in circuit court against the County of Maui seeking
damages for the 2021 real property taxes collected under
Ordinance 5160. (Because the Piezkos are class representatives,
this opinion uses “Piezkos” and “Plaintiffs” interchangeably.)
Relying on the outcome of an unrelated tax appeal (filed by a
property’s trust, which, like the Piezkos, was taxed under the
ordinance), Plaintiffs claimed that Ordinance 5160 was
unconstitutional. Plaintiffs though did not directly challenge
the constitutionality of the ordinance.
Instead, Plaintiffs maintained that the constitutional
issue had already been decided in the other tax appeal.
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the County failed to provide
adequate pre-deprivation and post-deprivation remedies in
violation of their due process rights, and that the County
wrongfully collected and retained real property taxes, which
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constituted unjust enrichment. They sought compensatory
damages, prejudgment interest, and attorney fees.
The County moved to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. The
County argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because
(1) HRS § 632-1 precluded the circuit court’s jurisdiction, and
(2) the case belonged in the TAC per HRS chapter 232 and MCC
chapter 3.48. The circuit court granted the County’s motion and
dismissed Plaintiffs’ case with prejudice.
Plaintiffs appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals.
The County applied for transfer to this court. We accepted
transfer.
II.
Plaintiffs present two questions: (1) whether the circuit
court erred in ruling that it lacked jurisdiction, and (2)
whether, under the issue preclusion doctrine, the TAC’s prior
decision in the unrelated tax appeal binds Maui County.
A. HRS § 632-1 does not apply because Plaintiffs did not seek
declaratory relief
We start with jurisdiction.
Both parties invoke HRS § 632-1 (2016). That statute
governs declaratory judgments. It reads:
In cases of actual controversy, courts of record,
within the scope of their respective jurisdictions, shall
have power to make binding adjudications of right, whether
or not consequential relief is, or at the time could be,
claimed, and no action or proceeding shall be open to
objection on the ground that a judgment or order merely
declaratory of right is prayed for; provided that
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declaratory relief may not be obtained in any district
court, or in any controversy with respect to taxes, or in
any case where a divorce or annulment of marriage is
sought.
HRS § 632-1(a) (emphases added).
HRS § 632-1 expressly prohibits declaratory relief in tax
controversies. Per the statute, plaintiffs may not obtain
declaratory relief “in any controversy with respect to taxes.”
Id.
Plaintiffs maintain that HRS § 632-1 doesn’t bar circuit
court jurisdiction because they didn’t seek declaratory relief.
Plaintiffs rely on Tax Foundation of Hawaiʻi v. State, 144
Hawaiʻi 175, 439 P.3d 127 (2019). There, this court held that
declaratory relief may be obtained in tax matters under HRS
§ 632-1 when such relief does not interfere with tax assessment
or collection. Id. at 188, 439 P.3d at 140. Because their
complaint does not seek preemptive declaratory relief against
tax assessment or collection, Plaintiffs claim that HRS § 632-1
does not bar jurisdiction. And even if they had sought
declaratory relief, the circuit court would still have
jurisdiction, they insist, because the relief they seek now does
not interfere with the assessment or collection of taxes.
The County counters that this case involves a tax
controversy that blocks the circuit court’s jurisdiction under
HRS § 632-1. The County points to Ocean Resort Villas Vacation
Owners Ass’n v. Cnty. of Maui, 147 Hawaiʻi 544, 465 P.3d 991
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(2020). The Ocean Resort plaintiffs sought declaratory relief
to void Maui’s real property timeshare tax. Id. at 556, 465
P.3d at 1003. Because that action would “interfere with the
assessment or collection of taxes,” this court determined there
was a tax controversy. Id. And because the case involved both
a tax controversy and a declaratory judgment action, we held
that HRS § 632-1 divested the circuit court of jurisdiction,
leaving the TAC with exclusive jurisdiction. Id. Per HRS
§ 632-1, declaratory judgment action plus tax controversy equals
no circuit court jurisdiction.
Significantly, both Ocean Resort and Tax Foundation
involved declaratory judgment actions. See Ocean Resort, 147
Hawaiʻi 544, 465 P.3d 991; Tax Foundation, 144 Hawaiʻi 175, 439
P.3d 127. So did another similar case, Hawaii Insurers Council
v. Lingle, 120 Hawaiʻi 51, 201 P.3d 564 (2008). Assessing
jurisdiction under HRS § 632-1 made sense in those cases because
the plaintiffs expressly sought declaratory relief.
But here, Plaintiffs did not file a declaratory judgment
action. And Plaintiffs consistently stress that they do not
seek declaratory relief. Without a request for declaratory
judgment, Plaintiffs believe, HRS § 632-1 is not dispositive of
the jurisdictional question.
The County protests that Plaintiffs’ choice not to seek a
declaratory judgment is just strategy – a stab to avoid the
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proper appeals process. The County suggests that Plaintiffs’
claims inherently require declaratory relief, even though they
did not request it.
We acknowledge that under Hawaiʻi Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 54(c), every final judgment shall grant the relief to which
the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the
party has not demanded such relief in the party pleadings. See
10 Mary Kay Kane & Adam N. Steinman, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ.
§ 2664 (4th ed. Sep. 2025 update); 10B Mary Kay Kane & Adam N.
Steinman, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2768 (4th ed. Sep. 2025
update); Chambrella v. Rutledge, 69 Haw. 271, 285, 740 P.2d
1008, 1016 (1987). However, this rule says nothing about
whether a court should grant relief that plaintiffs explicitly
disavow. In any event, this question does not ultimately affect
our jurisdictional analysis. If a court has jurisdiction, it
may grant equitable relief, including declaratory judgments.
See Ching v. Case, 145 Hawaiʻi 148, 165, 449 P.3d 1146, 1163
(2019). But the court must first have jurisdiction.
We decline to construe Plaintiffs’ suit as a declaratory
judgment action. Because Plaintiffs do not seek declaratory
relief, HRS § 632-1 does not apply.
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B. The TAC has jurisdiction over real property tax assessment
appeals and related constitutional challenges
We hold that the TAC has exclusive jurisdiction over this
real property tax assessment appeal. The circuit court
correctly ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
“[A]s a general matter, subject matter jurisdiction rests
in the tax appeal court to hear taxpayer ‘appeals’ from
assessments [under HRS chapter 232]; challenges to taxes paid
under protest [under HRS § 40-35]; and adverse rulings by the
[Director].” Grace Bus. Dev. Corp. v. Kamikawa, 92 Hawaiʻi 608,
612, 994 P.2d 540, 544 (2000) (citations omitted). HRS § 232-11
(2017) provides that the TAC “shall . . . have jurisdiction
throughout the State with respect to matters within its
jurisdiction.” Matters within the TAC’s jurisdiction include
appeals of real property tax assessments on grounds of (1)
certain over-valuations of property, (2) lack of uniformity or
inequality, (3) denial of exemptions a taxpayer is entitled to
or qualified for, and (4) illegality, including
unconstitutionality. HRS § 232-3 (2017).
To effectuate this appeals process, taxpayers “may appeal
directly to the tax appeal court,” but only if the taxpayers
“first obtain a decision from an administrative body established
by county ordinance[] . . . if [the] county ordinance requires a
taxpayer to do so.” See HRS § 232-16 (2017 & Supp. 2021). The
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MCC requires this intermediate step: “In the case of a real
property tax appeal, a taxpayer shall first appeal to the County
board of review, pursuant to section 232-16, Hawaiʻi Revised
Statutes.” MCC § 3.48.595 (emphasis added). Thus, both the MCC
and HRS § 232-16 require taxpayers to appeal to the County BOR
first. Later, if the taxpayer disagrees with the BOR’s
decision, they may appeal to the TAC. HRS § 232-17 (Supp.
2021).
Similar to appeals to the TAC, real property taxes may be
appealed to the BOR for (1) certain over-valuations of property,
(2) lack of uniformity or inequality, (3) denial of exemptions
or certain tax credits a taxpayer is entitled to or qualified
for, and (4) illegality, including unconstitutionality. See MCC
§ 3.48.605. The BOR may decide all questions of fact and law,
except those involving the Constitution or laws of the United
States. MCC § 3.48.625. The taxpayer must raise any
constitutional objections in their appeal to the BOR to preserve
them for argument on any subsequent appeal to the TAC. MCC
§ 3.48.655; HRS § 232-15 (Supp. 2021) (“If any objection
involving the Constitution or laws of the United States is
included by the taxpayer in the notice of appeal, the objection
may be heard and determined by the tax appeal court on appeal
from a decision of the taxation board of review[.]”).
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The TAC’s jurisdiction is “limited to the amount of
valuation or taxes[.]” HRS § 232-13 (Supp. 2021). Still, the
TAC “shall have the power and authority . . . to decide all
questions of fact and all questions of law, including
constitutional questions, involved [in the appeal].” HRS § 232-11.
The circuit court is “without authority to exercise general
jurisdiction . . . where doing so [is] precluded by HRS chapter
232 and MCC chapter 3.48.” Ocean Resort, 147 Hawaiʻi at 559, 465
P.3d at 1006.
Ocean Resort specifically addressed challenges to real
property tax assessments premised on illegality and
unconstitutionality. Because “HRS chapter 232 and MCC chapter
3.48 provided the process by which Taxpayers could bring their
challenges to the legality and constitutionality of the real
property . . . tax classification and rates,” the circuit court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to real
property tax assessments brought on these grounds. Id.
Here, HRS chapter 232 and MCC chapter 3.48 both preclude
the circuit court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
claims.
Plaintiffs try to dodge the exclusive jurisdiction of the
TAC by arguing that they do not plead illegality or
unconstitutionality of the underlying tax ordinance, and do not
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seek a declaratory action subject to HRS § 632-1. Yet in their
own words, Plaintiffs seek a “refund or adjustment” of real
estate property taxes they paid due to the “unconstitutional
Ordinance 5160.” This is, definitionally, an appeal of a real
property tax assessment premised on grounds that the underlying
ordinance is unconstitutional, and therefore illegal. See HRS
§ 232-3. Such appeals fall within the TAC’s jurisdiction.
Thus, we hold that the TAC has exclusive jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ claims. To hold otherwise would elevate form over
substance, a disfavored approach. See Rodriguez v. Mauna Kea
Resort LLC, 156 Hawaiʻi 289, 295, 574 P.3d 309, 315 (2025).
Plaintiffs aspire to reframe a straightforward tax assessment
appeal as a general civil action by styling their claims as
challenging due process violations and unjust enrichment rather
than as a direct challenge to the tax assessment. However, the
substance of their claims — contesting and seeking remedies for
the collection of higher taxes paid under an allegedly
unconstitutional ordinance — places them squarely within the
TAC’s jurisdiction.
As Ocean Resort instructs, Plaintiffs should have followed
the tax appeal procedures clearly described in HRS chapter 232
and MCC chapter 3.48. 147 Hawaiʻi at 555, 465 P.3d at 1002.
This process “require[s] an appeal of assessments to the County
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BOR and TAC, even for questions involving the constitutionality
or illegality of an assessment.” Id.
We hold that the TAC has exclusive jurisdiction under HRS
chapter 232 and MCC chapter 3.48.
C. Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred
Even if Plaintiffs had filed their appeal in the proper
place, their claims are untimely. The tax appeal procedures
under HRS chapter 232 and MCC chapter 3.48 control. “HRS
chapter 232 . . . reinforces the primacy of the tax appeal
procedures set forth in [c]ounty codes like MCC chapter 3.48,
titled ‘Real Property Tax.’” Ocean Resort, 147 Hawaiʻi at 557,
465 P.3d at 1004.
Per MCC § 3.48.595, “[a]ppeals to the County board of
review shall be filed on or before April 9 preceding the tax
year.” Here, Ordinance 5160 only applied to the 2021 real
property tax assessment year (July 1, 2021 - June 30, 2022).
Thus, Plaintiffs’ real property tax assessment appeals deadline
was April 9, 2021. See MCC § 3.48.595.
The County issued the real property tax assessment for the
Piezkos’ property in January 2021. Plaintiffs sued in circuit
court in October 2023 – more than two and a half years after the
deadline. So even if they had appealed to the right place (the
BOR), their appeal would have been late.
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A remedy existed to give Plaintiffs the relief they wanted.
But they failed to pursue it within the prescribed time. The
appeal window has closed.
Plaintiffs suggest that the window for filing an appeal was
unreasonably short. Their position lacks merit. Plaintiffs’
briefing frequently cited to an unrelated TAC case, where a
taxpayer trust successfully challenged Ordinance 5160 on
constitutional grounds. Unlike Plaintiffs, that taxpayer
complied with the statutory deadlines by timely filing with the
BOR and subsequently appealing to the TAC, establishing that
others subjected to the same timeframes navigated the procedural
requirements.
Further, the Maui County Council passed Ordinance 5160 in
December 2020. It even created a “frequently asked questions”
web page explaining the implications of the new ordinance. See
Maui County, Frequently Asked Questions: Real Property Tax –
Short-Term Rental Classification,
https://www.mauicounty.gov/FAQ.aspx?TID=140
[https://perma.cc/H2ST-KWG8]. Under these circumstances,
Plaintiffs had adequate time to file an appeal with the BOR.
The taxpayer trust in the unrelated case received a refund
because it followed the proper procedures for appeal. We
decline to override the clearly delineated procedures
established by Maui County for tax appeals. These procedures
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have been tested and proven effective in other cases, including
one premised on the same ordinance, with the same timeline for
appeal, that Plaintiffs challenge here.
Because Plaintiffs failed to follow the established
administrative procedures and their claims are now time-barred,
we need not address their second question regarding issue
preclusion.
We also hold that because Plaintiffs failed to follow the
procedural process governing real property tax appeals,
Plaintiffs’ contention that they were deprived of pre- and postdeprivation relief in violation of their due process rights
lacks merit. Appellants under our real property tax appeals
procedures are entitled to refunds if the BOR or TAC lower overassessments on appeal, on grounds including illegality or
constitutionality. See HRS §§ 232-3, 232-11; MCC §§ 3.48.605,
3.48.625, 3.48.655. Given Plaintiffs’ access to postdeprivation relief, Plaintiffs’ argument that alleged
unconstitutionality requires pre-deprivation and postdeprivation relief untethered to the existing framework for tax
appeals lacks merit. See Matter of Hawaiian Flour Mills, Inc.,
76 Hawaiʻi 1, 5, 868 P.2d 419, 423 (1994) (evaluating due process
remedies following valid appeal to the TAC).
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III.
We hold that the TAC has exclusive jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ tax refund claims and related constitutional
challenges, and therefore the circuit court correctly dismissed
their case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The judgment of the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit is
affirmed.
Nathaniel A. Higa and /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna P. Kyle Smith (on the briefs)
for appellants /s/ Todd W. Eddins
Brian A. Bilberry /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza (on the briefs)
for appellee /s/ Vladimir P. Devens
/s/ James S. Kawashima
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