[Cite as In re H.C., 2026-Ohio-12.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
HIGHLAND COUNTY
IN RE: H.C., : Case No.
25CA12
:
Adjudicated Dependent : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Child.
APPEARANCES:
Alana Van Gundy, Bellbrook Ohio, for appellant.1
Anneka P. Collins, Highland County Prosecuting Attorney, and Molly Bolek, Highland County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Hillsboro, Ohio, for appellee.
________________________________________________________________ CIVIL CASE FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT, JUVENILE DIVISION
DATE JOURNALIZED:
Abele, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Highland County Common Pleas
Court, Juvenile Division, judgment that granted Highland County
Department of Jobs and Family Services, Child Protection
Division, appellee herein, permanent custody of a four-year-old
child, H.C.
1 Different counsel represented appellant during the trial court proceedings.
HIGHLAND, 25CA12 2
{¶2} Appellant, J.C., the child’s biological father, raises
the following assignments of error for review:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PERMANENT
CUSTODY TO THE HIGHLAND COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES AS THEY FAILED TO
SHOW BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT
GROUNDS EXISTED FOR PERMANENT CUSTODY AND
SUCH DECISION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PERMANENT CUSTODY TO THE AGENCY WAS IN THE
BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD, WHEN THAT
FINDING WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE AND WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT
OF THE EVIDENCE.”
{¶3} In March 2023, as the child approached her second
birthday, appellee received a report that the child’s mother had
been using marijuana around the child. Appellee subsequently
filed a complaint that alleged the child to be an abused,
neglected, “and/or” dependent child and asked the trial court to
place the child in its temporary custody. Appellee additionally
requested emergency, temporary custody of the child, which the
trial court granted.
{¶4} The next month, the trial court adjudicated the child
a dependent child and dismissed the abuse and neglect
allegations. The court later entered a dispositional order that
placed the child in appellee’s temporary custody through March
2024. The court subsequently extended this temporary custody HIGHLAND, 25CA12 3
order through September 2024.
{¶5} In April 2024, appellee became concerned that the
child’s mother appeared to be in a relationship with an
individual, C.W., who had a violent criminal history. A
caseworker spoke with the child’s mother about appellee’s
concerns, but the child’s mother denied any relationship with
C.W.
{¶6} On August 8, 2024, appellee filed a permanent custody
motion. A few weeks later, a caseworker met with the child’s
mother in the home. At the time, C.W. was present. The
caseworker asked the child’s mother about a March 2024 incident,
when C.W. dragged the mother into the apartment. The mother
stated that she and C.W. are now sober and violence is no longer
a concern. The mother also asked the caseworker if appellee
would add C.W. to the case plan. Appellee did not, however, add
C.W. to the case plan.
{¶7} In November 2024, the mother advised her caseworker of
her pregnancy with C.W.’s child. On February 12, 2025, the
mother and C.W. married.
{¶8} On February 28, 2025, the trial court held a hearing
to consider appellee’s permanent custody motion. Appellant did
not appear.
{¶9} At the permanent custody hearing, appellee presented
evidence that, although the mother recently completed the tasks HIGHLAND, 25CA12 4
contained in her case plan, appellee remained concerned about
the mother’s ability to provide the child with a safe home.
Appellee’s witnesses explained that the mother’s involvement
with C.W. raised concerns that the mother may not adequately
protect the child from harm, whether due to C.W.’s violent past
or his drug use. One of the caseworkers explained that the
mother’s “involvement in unhealthy relationships . . . can
possibly be a safety threat to the child because of physical
violence that occurs in the home.”
{¶10} The child’s guardian ad litem (GAL) testified and
recommended that the court place the child in appellee’s
permanent custody. The GAL indicated that the child is thriving
in the foster home and believed that placing the child in
appellee’s permanent custody would be in the child’s best
interest. The GAL observed that the mother had nearly two years
to complete the case plan goals, but she did not complete drug
and alcohol treatment until two weeks before the permanent
custody hearing. The GAL suggested that the mother’s conduct
demonstrated that she did not prioritize her relationship with
her child. The GAL also found the mother’s relationship with
C.W. to be problematic. She reported that C.W. had been
involved in “21 traffic cases (including multiple OVI) and an
additional 21 criminal cases including multiple domestic
violence charges, violation of protection order charges and drug HIGHLAND, 25CA12 5
paraphernalia charges.” The GAL stated that she would have “a
very big concern” with the child in the same home as C.W.
{¶11} C.W.’s probation officer also testified that C.W. had
previous criminal convictions for menacing, disorderly conduct,
and burglary. C.W.’s disorderly conduct conviction occurred in
July 2024, after he had engaged in violent acts directed toward
the mother.
{¶12} The mother testified, in relevant part, that in the
summer of 2024, she became intimately involved with C.W., and,
in August 2024, he moved in with her. The mother knew that
appellee had concerns about C.W. due to his criminal history,
but she believed that C.W. had “changed a lot.” The mother
agreed that, in March 2024, C.W. grabbed her as she tried to
exit his residence, but she did not believe that C.W. had been
physically aggressive with her. She further stated that, in
June 2024, she filed a criminal complaint against C.W., after he
damaged one of her candles and crushed methamphetamine on her
kitchen table. The mother again minimized his conduct. She
indicated that after this June 2024 incident, C.W. improved his
life and now is sober. The mother stated that C.W. wants to
help her reunify with her child and that she would trust C.W. to
be around her child.
{¶13} On March 5, 2025, the trial court awarded appellee
permanent custody of the child. The court found that the child HIGHLAND, 25CA12 6
had been in appellee’s temporary custody for 12 or more months
of a consecutive 22-month period and that placing the child in
appellee’s permanent custody is in the child’s best interest.
The court stated that the child is bonded with the foster family
and is thriving. The court additionally noted that the foster
parents are willing to adopt the child. The court further
observed that the child’s GAL recommended that the court place
the child in appellee’s permanent custody.
{¶14} With respect to appellant, the trial court stated that
he did not have any contact with the child between June 2023 and
August 2024. The court thus determined that he had abandoned
the child. The court also observed that appellant did not
appear for the permanent custody hearing, did not maintain
contact with appellee throughout the case, and did not complete
a case plan.
{¶15} The trial court found that the mother “has been unable
or unwilling to provide a safe, secure and suitable home for
[the child] during the pendency of this action.” The court
stated that the mother has a history of “associating with
abusive men” and remarked that her current husband “is certainly
no exception.” The court concluded that the mother “has elected
to live a drug addictive life without regard for the welfare or
benefit of [the child]” and that “[h]er choice of men
disqualifies her to be trusted as a responsible protective HIGHLAND, 25CA12 7
mother.” The court was not convinced that the mother would be
able or willing to protect the child “from violent adult
companions and environments where the safety of [the child] is
at risk.”
{¶16} The trial court further indicated that “[t]he past
history of a parent is one of the best predictors of their
future behavior” and that “some of the most reliable evidence
for a [c]ourt to consider is the past history of the parents.”
The court stated, “That finding certainly applies to this case.”
The court thus concluded that the child could not achieve a
legally secure placement without granting appellee permanent
custody and that placing her in appellee’s permanent custody
would be in her best interest. The court therefore granted
appellee permanent custody of the child. This appeal followed.
{¶17} In his two assignments of error, appellant argues that
the trial court’s permanent custody judgment is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. In his second assignment of
error, appellant additionally contends that the record does not
contain sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s best
interest determination. For ease of discussion, we have
combined our review of the two assignments of error.
A
{¶18} Generally, a reviewing court will not disturb a trial HIGHLAND, 25CA12 8
court’s permanent custody decision unless the decision is
against the manifest weight of the evidence. E.g., In re B.E.,
2014-Ohio-3178, ¶ 27 (4th Dist.); In re R.S., 2013-Ohio-5569, ¶
29 (4th Dist.); accord In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 1.
“Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the
greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial,
to support one side of the issue rather than the other.
It indicates clearly to the jury that the party having
the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict,
if, on weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall
find the greater amount of credible evidence sustains
the issue which is to be established before them. Weight
is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its
effect in inducing belief.’”
Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 12, quoting State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990).
{¶19} When an appellate court reviews whether a trial
court’s permanent custody decision is against the manifest
weight of the evidence, the court “‘“weighs the evidence and all
reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses
and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence,
the [fact-finder] clearly lost its way and created such a
manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.”’” Eastley, 2012-Ohio-2179,
at ¶ 20, quoting Tewarson v. Simon, 141 Ohio App.3d 103, 115
(9th Dist. 2001), quoting Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387,
quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.
1983); accord In re Pittman, 2002-Ohio-2208, ¶ 23-24 (9th HIGHLAND, 25CA12 9
Dist.). We further observe, however, that issues that relate to
the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given the
evidence are primarily for the trier of fact. As the court
explained in Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80
(1984):
The underlying rationale of giving deference to the
findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge
that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses
and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice
inflections, and use these observations in weighing the
credibility of the proffered testimony.
{¶20} Moreover, deferring to the trial court on matters of
credibility is “crucial in a child custody case, where there may
be much evident in the parties’ demeanor and attitude that does
not translate to the record well.” Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio
St.3d 415, 419 (1997); accord In re Christian, 2004-Ohio-3146, ¶
7 (4th Dist.).
{¶21} The question that an appellate court must resolve when
reviewing a permanent custody decision under the manifest weight
of the evidence standard is “whether the juvenile court’s
findings . . . were supported by clear and convincing evidence.”
In re K.H., 2008-Ohio-4825, ¶ 43. “Clear and convincing
evidence” is
the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the
mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as
to the allegations sought to be established. It is
intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but
not to the extent of such certainty as required beyond
a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. It does not
HIGHLAND, 25CA12 10
mean clear and unequivocal.
In re Estate of Haynes, 25 Ohio St.3d 101, 103-04 (1986). In
determining whether a trial court based its decision upon clear
and convincing evidence, “a reviewing court will examine the
record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient
evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.”
State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1990); accord In re
Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368 (1985), citing Cross v. Ledford,
161 Ohio St. 469 (1954) (“Once the clear and convincing standard
has been met to the satisfaction of the [trial] court, the
reviewing court must examine the record and determine if the
trier of fact had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy this
burden of proof.”); In re Adoption of Lay, 25 Ohio St.3d 41, 42-43 (1986); compare In re Adoption of Masa, 23 Ohio St.3d 163,
165 (1986) (whether a fact has been “proven by clear and
convincing evidence in a particular case is a determination for
the [trial] court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless
such determination is against the manifest weight of the
evidence”).
{¶22} Thus, if a children services agency presented
competent and credible evidence upon which the trier of fact
reasonably could have formed a firm belief that permanent
custody is warranted, the court’s decision is not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. In re R.M., 2013-Ohio-3588, ¶ HIGHLAND, 25CA12 11
62 (4th Dist.); see also In re R.L., 2012-Ohio-6049, ¶ 17 (2d
Dist.), quoting In re A.U., 2008-Ohio-187, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.) (“A
reviewing court will not overturn a court’s grant of permanent
custody to the state as being contrary to the manifest weight of
the evidence ‘if the record contains competent, credible
evidence by which the court could have formed a firm belief or
conviction that the essential statutory elements . . . have been
established.’”).
{¶23} Once a reviewing court finishes its examination, the
judgment may be reversed only if it appears that the factfinder, when resolving the conflicts in evidence, “‘clearly lost
its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that
the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’”
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d
at 175. A reviewing court should find a trial court’s permanent
custody judgment against the manifest weight of the evidence
only in the “‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs
heavily against the [decision].’” Id., quoting Martin, 20 Ohio
App.3d at 175; see Black’s (12th ed. 2024) (the phrase “manifest
weight of the evidence” “denotes a deferential standard of
review under which a verdict will be reversed or disregarded
only if another outcome is obviously correct and the verdict is
clearly unsupported by the evidence”).
{¶24} A reviewing court also may reverse a trial court’s HIGHLAND, 25CA12 12
permanent custody judgment if the record does not contain
sufficient evidence to support it. See Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, at
¶ 1. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, our
inquiry focuses primarily upon the adequacy of the evidence;
that is, whether “the evidence is legally sufficient to support
the [judgment] as a matter of law.” See Thompkins, 78 Ohio
St.3d at 386.
B
{¶25} Courts must recognize that “parents’ interest in the
care, custody, and control of their children ‘is perhaps the
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e
United States Supreme] Court.’” In re B.C., 2014-Ohio-4558, ¶
19, quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
Indeed, “the right to raise one’s children is an ‘essential’ and
‘basic’ civil right.” In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157
(1990), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972);
accord In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48 (1997); see Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (“natural parents have a
fundamental right to the care and custody of their children”).
Thus, “parents who are ‘suitable’ have a ‘paramount’ right to
the custody of their children.” B.C. at ¶ 19, quoting In re
Perales, 52 Ohio St.2d 89, 97 (1977), citing Clark v. Bayer, 32
Ohio St. 299, 310 (1877); Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d at 157.
{¶26} A parent’s rights, however, are not absolute. In re HIGHLAND, 25CA12 13
D.A., 2007-Ohio-1105, ¶ 11. Rather, “‘it is plain that the
natural rights of a parent . . . are always subject to the
ultimate welfare of the child, which is the polestar or
controlling principle to be observed.’” In re Cunningham, 59
Ohio St.2d 100, 106 (1979), quoting In re R.J.C., 300 So.2d 54,
58 (Fla. App. 1974). Thus, the State may terminate parental
rights when a child’s best interest demands such termination.
D.A. at ¶ 11.
{¶27} Before a court may award a children services agency
permanent custody of a child, R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) requires the
court to hold a hearing. The primary purpose of the hearing is
to allow the court to determine whether the child’s best
interests would be served by permanently terminating the
parental relationship and by awarding permanent custody to the
agency. Id. Additionally, when considering whether to grant a
children services agency permanent custody, a trial court should
consider the underlying purposes of R.C. Chapter 2151: “to care
for and protect children, ‘whenever possible, in a family
environment, separating the child from the child’s parents only
when necessary for the child's welfare or in the interests of
public safety.’” In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 29, quoting R.C.
2151.01(A).
C
{¶28} A children services agency may obtain permanent
HIGHLAND, 25CA12 14
custody of a child by (1) requesting it in the abuse, neglect,
or dependency complaint under R.C. 2151.353, or (2) filing a
motion under R.C. 2151.413 after obtaining temporary custody.
In this case, appellee sought permanent custody by filing a
motion under R.C. 2151.413. When an agency files a permanent
custody motion under R.C. 2151.413, R.C. 2151.414 applies. R.C.
2151.414(A).
{¶29} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) permits a trial court to grant
permanent custody of a child to a children services agency if
the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
child’s best interest would be served by the award of permanent
custody and that any of the factors listed in R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(a) to (e) apply. As relevant in the case sub
judice, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b) and (d) provide that the court
may grant an agency permanent custody of a child if “[t]he child
is abandoned” or “has been in the temporary custody of one or
more public children services agencies . . . for twelve or more
months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period. . .”
R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b) and (d)
{¶30} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues
that the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding
that he abandoned the child. Appellant agrees, however, that
the evidence supports the court’s finding that the child had
been in appellee’s temporary custody for more than 12 months of HIGHLAND, 25CA12 15
a consecutive 22-month period.
{¶31} We observe that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) requires the trial
court to find the existence of only one of the factors listed in
R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) to (e). See In re W.W., 2011-Ohio-4912,
¶ 54 (1st Dist.) (if one of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) factors exists,
court need not find that other (B)(1) factors apply). If the
court finds that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) applies, then it need
not also find that the child is abandoned. See In re A.P.,
2022-Ohio-1577, ¶ 36 (4th Dist.). Thus, when considering a R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(d) permanent custody motion, the only other
consideration becomes the child’s best interest. In re N.S.N.,
2015-Ohio-2486, ¶ 52 (4th Dist.); In re R.S., 2012-Ohio-2016, ¶
31 (4th Dist.).
{¶32} In the case at bar, the trial court found that (1)
R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b) applied because appellant had abandoned
the child, and (2) 2151.414(B)(1)(d) applied because the child
had been in appellee’s temporary custody for more than 12 months
of a consecutive 22-month period. The statute required the
court to find only one of the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) to (e)
factors. Thus, assuming, arguendo, that the evidence fails to
support the trial court’s abandonment finding, the court’s
alternative finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) satisfies the
requirement that the court find the existence of any of the R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(a) to (e) factors. Consequently, any error that HIGHLAND, 25CA12 16
the trial court made by determining that the child was abandoned
was harmless. See In re P.G., 2025-Ohio-1521, ¶ 42 (4th Dist.).
{¶33} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we
overrule appellant’s first assignment of error.
R.C. 2151.414(D)
{¶34} In his second assignment of error, appellant contends
that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support
the trial court’s best interest finding and that its finding is
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶35} R.C. 2151.414(D) lists the factors that a trial court
considers when determining whether permanent custody will serve
a child’s best interest. The statute directs a trial court to
consider “all relevant factors,” as well as specific factors, to
determine whether a child’s best interest will be served by
granting a children services agency permanent custody. The
listed factors include: (1) the child’s interaction and
interrelationship with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives,
foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person
who may significantly affect the child; (2) the child’s wishes,
as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s
guardian ad litem, with due regard for the child’s maturity; (3)
the child’s custodial history; (4) the child’s need for a
legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of
placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody HIGHLAND, 25CA12 17
to the agency; and (5) whether any factors listed under R.C.
2151.414(E)(7) to (11) apply.
{¶36} Courts that must determine whether a grant of
permanent custody to a children services agency will promote a
child’s best interest must consider “all relevant [best
interest] factors,” as well as the “five enumerated statutory
factors.” C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, at ¶ 57, citing In re Schaefer,
2006-Ohio-5513, ¶ 56; accord In re C.G., 2008-Ohio-3773, ¶ 28
(9th Dist.); In re N.W., 2008-Ohio-297, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.).
However, none of the best interest factors is entitled to
“greater weight or heightened significance.” C.F. at ¶ 57.
Instead, the trial court considers the totality of the
circumstances when making its best interest determination. In
re K.M.S., 2017-Ohio-142, ¶ 24 (3d Dist.); In re A.C., 2014-Ohio-4918, ¶ 46 (9th Dist.). In general, “[a] child’s best
interest is served by placing the child in a permanent situation
that fosters growth, stability, and security.” In re C.B.C.,
2016-Ohio-916, ¶ 66 (4th Dist.), citing In re Adoption of
Ridenour, 61 Ohio St.3d 319, 324 (1991).
{¶37} In the case at bar, appellant argues that appellee did
not present clear and convincing evidence that placing the child
in its permanent custody is in the child’s best interest.
Appellant claims that R.C. 2151.414 requires a trial court to
“find by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best HIGHLAND, 25CA12 18
interests of the child to be place[d] in the permanent custody
of the Agency and that the child cannot be placed with either
parent or kin within a reasonable period of time.” Appellant
contends that a relative remained available to provide the child
with a legally secure permanent placement and that placing the
child in appellee’s permanent custody, therefore, was
unnecessary. Appellant further contends that the court did not
discuss the child’s wishes.
{¶38} We do not agree with appellant that R.C. 2151.414
requires a trial court to “find by clear and convincing evidence
that it is in the best interests of the child to be place[d] in
the permanent custody of the Agency and that the child cannot be
placed with either parent or kin within a reasonable period of
time.” R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) states that one of the
circumstances that may support placing a child in an agency’s
permanent custody is that “the child cannot be placed with
either of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should
not be placed with the child’s parents.” This provision does
not mention “kin” or relatives, as appellant suggests.
{¶39} Moreover, as we noted above, the trial court
determined that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) applied. Thus, R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(a), by its terms, was inapplicable. See In re
N.S.N., 2015-Ohio-2486, ¶ 52 (4th Dist.) (“under the plain
language of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), when a child has been in a HIGHLAND, 25CA12 19
children services agency’s temporary custody for twelve or more
months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, a trial court
need not find that the child cannot or should not be placed with
either parent within a reasonable time”); accord In re C.W.,
2004-Ohio-6411, ¶ 21 (under “the ‘12 of 22’ provision to R.C.
2151.414, an agency need no longer prove that a child cannot be
returned to the parents within a reasonable time or should not
be returned to the parents, so long as the child has been in the
temporary custody of an agency for at least 12 months”).
{¶40} We also observe that a trial court that is evaluating
a child’s best interest need not determine that no suitable
person is available for placement. See Schaefer, 2006-Ohio5513, at ¶ 64. Moreover, courts are not required to favor
relative placement if, after considering all the factors, it is
in the child’s best interest for the agency to be granted
permanent custody. Id.; accord In re T.G., 2015–Ohio–5330, ¶ 24
(4th Dist.); see In re V.C., 2015–Ohio–4991, ¶ 61 (8th Dist.)
(stating that relative’s positive relationship with child and
willingness to provide an appropriate home did not trump child’s
best interest). Additionally, “[r]elatives seeking the
placement of the child are not afforded the same presumptive
rights that a natural parent receives as a matter of law, and
the willingness of a relative to care for the child does not
alter the statutory factors to be considered in granting HIGHLAND, 25CA12 20
permanent custody.” In re Keaton, 2004-Ohio-6210, ¶ 61 (4th
Dist.). We observe that “[i]f permanent custody is in the
child’s best interest, legal custody or placement with [a parent
or other relative] necessarily is not.” K.M., 2014-Ohio-4268,
at ¶ 9 (9th Dist.).
{¶41} Furthermore, we recognize that, “[a]lthough family
unity and ‘blood relationship’” may be vital factors to
consider, “neither is controlling.” In re J.B., 2013–Ohio–1703,
¶ 31 (8th Dist.). Indeed, “neglected and dependent children are
entitled to stable, secure, nurturing and permanent homes in the
near term . . . and their best interest is the pivotal factor in
permanency case.” In re T.S., 2009–Ohio–5496, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.).
Thus, while biological relationships may constitute important
considerations, they do not control when ascertaining a child’s
best interest. In re J.B., 2013–Ohio–1706, ¶ 111 (8th Dist.).
Consequently, “courts are not required to favor a relative if,
after considering all the factors, it is in the child’s best
interest for the agency to be granted permanent custody.”
Keaton, 2004-Ohio-6210, at ¶ 61 (4th Dist.). We therefore do
not agree with appellant that the trial court should have placed
the child with a relative rather than placing the child in
appellee’s permanent custody.
{¶42} We also disagree with appellant that the trial court
failed to consider the child’s wishes. The court recognized HIGHLAND, 25CA12 21
that the GAL recommended that the court place the child in
appellee’s permanent custody. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) allows the
court to consider “[t]he wishes of the child, as expressed
directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem,
with due regard for the maturity of the child.” This provision
“unambiguously gives the trial court the choice of considering
the child’s wishes directly from the child or through the
guardian ad litem.” C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, at ¶ 55; accord In re
S.M., 2014-Ohio-2961, ¶ 32 (4th Dist.) (recognizing that R.C.
2151.414 permits juvenile courts to consider a child’s wishes as
the child directly expresses or through the GAL). Additionally,
the record indicates that, at the time of the permanent custody
hearing, the child was less than four years of age. Thus, the
trial court may have appropriately considered that the child
lacked sufficient maturity to directly express her wishes.
{¶43} Moreover, the record otherwise contains ample,
competent and credible evidence that placing the child in
appellee’s permanent custody is in the child’s best interest.
Consequently, appellant has not shown that the trial court’s
judgment placing the child in appellee’s permanent custody is
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶44} Our conclusion that the trial court’s judgment is not
against the manifest weight of the evidence also disposes of
appellant’s assertion that the record does not contain HIGHLAND, 25CA12 22
sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s judgment. See
In re C.N., 2015-Ohio-2546, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.) (“though
sufficiency and manifest weight are different legal concepts, a
finding that a judgment is supported by the manifest weight of
the evidence necessarily includes a finding that sufficient
evidence supports the judgment”); see also State v. McKinney,
2024-Ohio-4642, ¶ 63 (4th Dist.) (“a determination that the
weight of the evidence supports a conviction also is dispositive
of an insufficient-evidence claim”). We therefore disagree with
appellant’s argument that the record fails to contain sufficient
evidence to support the trial court’s best interest
determination.
{¶45} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we
overrule appellant’s two assignments of error and affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
HIGHLAND, 25CA12 23
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and that
appellee recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this
appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this
Court directing the Highland County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile
Division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that
mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
For the Court
BY:__________________________
Peter B. Abele, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.