[Cite as Deitz v. Shelby Cty. Clerk of Court, 2026-Ohio-63.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
SHELBY COUNTY
PAUL DEITZ, CASE NO. 17-25-10
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
CLERK OF COURTS OF SHELBY
COUNTY, ET AL., OPINION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
Appeal from Shelby County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 24CV000296
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: January 12, 2026
APPEARANCES:
Paul Deitz, Appellant
Michael P. Doyle, Jr. for Appellees
Case No. 17-25-10
WILLAMOWSKI, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Paul Deitz (“Deitz”) filed a pro se appeal of the
judgment of the Shelby County Court of Common Pleas, arguing that the trial court
erred by failing to set aside a condemnation order issued by the Sidney-Shelby
County Board of Health (“SSCBH”). For the reasons set forth below, the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} In 2022, Deitz constructed a pole barn on his property and obtained the
Sidney-Shelby County Health Department’s (“SSCHD”) approval for this project.
On April 29, 2024, the builder of Deitz’s pole barn filed a nuisance complaint with
the SSCBH, reporting that Deitz appeared to be using the pole barn as a two-story
dwelling. The complaint stated that the pole barn had not gone through the
appropriate inspections for such use and was not built “to support load bearing walls
up [and] . . . downstairs.” (Doc. 115-10).
{¶3} In response to an inquiry from the SSCHD, Deitz reported that “[t]he
barn is being used as permitted.” (Doc. 115-18). The SSCBH then sent successive
communications to Deitz that directed him to schedule a property evaluation and to
appear at an administrative hearing in July. However, Deitz did not comply with
these directives.
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{¶4} After Deitz appeared at a board of health meeting in August, the
SSCBH voted to refer this matter to the Shelby County Prosecutor’s Office
(“Prosecutor’s Office”) over his failure to comply with the water system and sewage
treatment rules. Since Deitz had not scheduled a property evaluation, the SSCHD
approached Deitz’s neighbor and obtained permission to enter onto the neighbor’s
property.
{¶5} From a vantage point on this neighbor’s property, SSCHD personnel
observed that the pole barn had “upstairs patio doors, [an] air conditioner, children’s
toys, a shower nozzle, propane tanks, etc.” (Doc. 115-106). The Prosecutor’s
Office then contacted Deitz and sought his cooperation. After no evaluation was
scheduled, a search warrant was obtained.
{¶6} On September 19, 2024, SSCHD personnel went to Deitz’s property
with the search warrant and discovered a number of violations related to the pole
barn. On November 7, 2024, the Prosecutor’s Office sent Deitz a letter that
informed him of these violations and stated that, if these issues went unabated, the
pole barn would be condemned in sixty days.
{¶7} On November 22, 2024, Deitz filed a pro se complaint that named the
Clerk of Courts of Shelby County as a defendant. He later filed an amended
complaint that added employees of the SSCHD and the Prosecutor’s Office as
defendants. In these complaints, he alleged that his constitutional rights were
violated and sought a temporary restraining order.
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{¶8} On December 10, 2024, Deitz also filed a notice of appeal, challenging
the SSCHD’s decisions. In response, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss
Deitz’s complaint. The trial court later dismissed the claims in Deitz’s complaint
but found that his notice of appeal was sufficient “to constitute an administrative
appeal” of the decisions related to his pole barn. (Doc. 74).
{¶9} At a conference on March 10, 2025, the trial court asked about the
extent of the condemnation order that SSCBH had issued on January 13, 2025. The
text of this order prohibited “any occupancy of the building.” (Doc. 115-143). But
the Prosecutor’s Office indicated that the order was ultimately intended “to prevent
any permanent or temporary personal habitation.” (Doc. 83).
{¶10} On March 13, 2025, the trial court issued a judgment entry that
modified the condemnation order so that Deitz was “entitled to use of his building
for storage of personal property and for animal husbandry.” (Doc. 83). The trial
court also issued an order directing the parties to file briefs on the issues raised by
Deitz in his administrative appeal.
{¶11} On July 2, 2025, the trial court issued a judgment entry, concluding
that (1) Deitz was afforded appropriate procedural due process protections; (2) no
basis existed to exclude the evidence obtained by the administrative search warrant;
and (3) substantial evidence supported a condemnation order against the use of the
pole barn for residential or business purposes.
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{¶12} Deitz filed his notice of appeal on July 17, 2025. On appeal, he raises
the following five assignments of error:
First Assignment of Error
The court erred by failing to reverse SSCBH’s decision as
unconstitutional under Ohio Const. Art. I, §§ 14, 16, ignoring the
September 4, 2024, trespass and invalid warrant (July2Amended
Decision.pdf, Pages 4-5; March 10, 2025, Transcript, Page 5).
Second Assignment of Error
The court erred by overlooking SSCBH’s bad faith and
retaliation, including Lloyd’s complaint, Zimmerman’s conflict,
Rindler-Woodruff’s actions, and access restrictions (July 2
Amended Decision, Page 6; Court of Claims, Pages 1-2, 4-5, 7).
Third Assignment of Error
The court erred by affirming the Notice without substantial
evidence, ignoring the disconnected septic line and unsigned
promissory agreement (March 10, 2025, Transcript, Page 4;
Exhibit A, Page 154).
Fourth Assignment of Error
The court misapplied deference, evading full review (July 2
Amended Decision, Pages 3-4).
Fifth Assignment of Error
The court failed to address access restrictions chilling petition
rights (December 6, 2024, Mumford memo; April 25, 2025,
emails/memo; August 7, 2025, affidavit).
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First Assignment of Error
{¶13} Deitz asserts that the trial court erred by failing to reverse the
SSCBH’s order on the grounds that the government engaged in unconstitutional
actions, including activities that rendered the search warrant invalid.
Legal Standard
{¶14} The protections of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution “extend to administrative searches.” Dawson v. City of Richmond
Heights, 2018-Ohio-1301, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). In this context,
[p]robable cause to issue an administrative warrant for entry into
premises is the subject of a flexible standard of reasonableness given
the agency’s particular demand for access and the public need for
effective enforcement of the regulation involved.
Bd. of Trs. Blanchard Twp. v. Simon, 2023-Ohio-1704, ¶ 32 (3d Dist.), quoting State
v. Finnell, 115 Ohio App.3d 583, 589 (1st Dist. 1996). Further,
the evidence of a specific violation required to establish
administrative probable cause must ‘show that the proposed
inspection is based upon a reasonable belief that a violation has been
or is being committed.’
Dawson at ¶ 17, quoting W. Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 958
(11th Cir. 1982). See R.C. 2933.21(F). In deciding whether to issue a search
warrant, a trial court is to examine “all the circumstances set forth in the [supporting]
affidavit, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying
hearsay information . . . .” State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 329 (1989), quoting
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-239 (1983).
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Legal Analysis
{¶15} Deitz raises three main arguments. First, he alleges that the warrant
application did not mention that he offered to cooperate with the SSCHD and that
this omission rendered the warrant invalid. However, the Prosecutor’s Office
denied receiving this cooperation. Further, the record contains no indication that
Deitz ever scheduled a property evaluation as requested by the SSCHD.
{¶16} The record establishes that the SSCHD personnel observed indications
that the pole barn was being used as a dwelling. The warrant application noted these
observations; identified the code sections at issue; and stated that neighboring
properties could be affected if the septic system, plumbing, or well were not
properly connected to the pole barn.
{¶17} In examining Deitz’s arguments, the trial court found “that the
affidavit in support of the issuance of the warrant provides an accurate summary of
the facts of the investigation and explanation of the need for an inspection.” (Doc.
158). Having reviewed the record, we conclude that Deitz’s first argument does not
provide a legal basis to find that the search warrant was invalid.
{¶18} Second, Deitz asserts that SSCHD inspectors trespassed on his
neighbor’s property to observe his pole barn. “A trespasser is one who, without
express or implied authorization, invitation or inducement, enters private premises
purely for his own purposes or convenience.” McKinney v. Hartz & Restle Realtors,
Inc., 31 Ohio St.3d 244, 246 (1987). However, the record establishes that the
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inspectors obtained the permission of Deitz’s neighbor to enter onto the land
adjacent to Deitz’s property.
{¶19} Deitz also asserts that the inspectors bypassed his “no trespass” signs
by entering onto his neighbor’s property. But once the inspectors were stationed at
a lawful vantage point on the adjacent property, they were “free to observe whatever
. . . [could] be seen from a place where they [were] . . . entitled to be.’” State v.
Andrews, 2025-Ohio-2803, ¶ 30 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Buzzard, 2007-Ohio373, ¶ 15. See Woody v. City of Granite City, 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 49459, *22
(S.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2019). Since the inspector’s entry onto the neighbor’s land was
authorized, Deitz’s second argument does not provide a legal basis to find that the
search warrant was invalid.
{¶20} Third, Deitz argues that, after a case management conference on
March 10, 2025, the trial court unconstitutionally issued two unannounced judgment
entries in the absence of an emergency. These orders set a briefing schedule and
decided a motion for a preliminary injunction that Deitz had filed.
Before [a] final judgment is issued, a trial court possesses jurisdiction
and is authorized to rule on the matters before it. . . . Thus, while a
case is pending, trial courts can, and routinely do, issue various
interlocutory orders that modify, dissolve, vacate, and otherwise
affect prior interlocutory orders—both final and non-final.
Palmer v. Bowers, 2017-Ohio-355, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.). Further, “a trial court has the
inherent authority to manage its own proceedings and control its own docket.”
Zimpfer v. Roach, 2017-Ohio-8437, ¶ 46 (3d Dist.).
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{¶21} In the two judgment entries issued after the March 10, 2025
conference, the trial court merely decided a pending motion and managed its docket
by setting a briefing schedule. Deitz has not identified any legal authority that
would suggest that the issuance of these judgment entries in the absence of an
emergency was unconstitutional. Thus, Deitz’s third argument is without merit.
Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.
Second Assignment of Error
{¶22} Deitz alleges that the trial court “erred by overlooking” evidence that
purportedly established that the SSCHD conducted an investigation in bad faith.
(Appellant’s Brief, 3).
Legal Standard
{¶23} R.C. 2506.01 provides for appeals of a final order or decision of a
board, department, “or other division of any political subdivision of the state . . . .”
See also Pelzl v. Greene County Combined Health Dist., 2008-Ohio-2068, ¶ 14 (2d
Dist.); Duffiled v. City of Barberton, 2005-Ohio-1817, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.); Adm. Code
3701-36-01(A), (G). R.C. 2506.04 sets forth the standards of review that are to
govern these appeals. In an appeal of an order subject to R.C. 2506.01(A), a
common pleas court considers the ‘whole record’ . . . and determines
whether the administrative order is unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary,
capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of
substantial, reliable, and probative evidence.
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T & R Props. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2025-Ohio-2947, ¶ 42 (5th Dist.), quoting
Henley v. Youngstown Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 90 Ohio St.3d 142, 147 (2000).
{¶24} In turn, the judgment rendered by the court of common pleas “may be
appealed by any party on questions of law . . . .” R.C. 2506.04. Thus, in an appeal
of an order subject to R.C. 2506.01(A), a court of appeals is to conduct a review that
is “more limited in scope.” Kisil v. Sandusky, 12 Ohio St.3d 30, 34 (1984).
The court of appeals reviews the common pleas court’s judgment only
on questions of law and does not have the same extensive authority to
weigh the evidence. . . . Within the ambit of questions of law for
appellate-court review is whether the common pleas court abused its
discretion. . . . The court of appeals must affirm unless it finds, as a
matter of law, that the trial court’s decision is not supported by a
preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.
(Citations omitted.) City of Independence v. Office of the Cuyahoga County Exec.,
2014-Ohio-4650, ¶ 14.
Legal Analysis
{¶25} Deitz alleges that he asked the builder of his pole barn to address an
issue with the roof and that the builder filed the nuisance complaint with the SSCBH
in retaliation. However, the trial court found that
the contractor who built the structure provided a detailed analysis of
the structural, plumbing, and electrical deficiencies in the structure if
it was used for residential purposes. No one would be better able to
alert regulatory authorities to these problems.
(Doc. 158). Deitz also argues that the fact that the Prosecutor’s Office was in
communication with the SSCBH about his use of the pole barn and the fact that the
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SSCHD’s findings were not disclosed expeditiously indicate that these entities
conducted a coordinated investigation in bad faith. However, the trial court found
commendable the conduct by SSCHD when providing notices and
giving Appellant [Deitz] opportunities to provide information and
input during the process. The . . . SSCHD provided over a dozen
formal and informal notices describing its investigation, subjects of
concern and intentions regarding administrative action. . . . Notably,
when Appellant sent any email and/or requested any documents,
appropriate responses were sent.
(Doc. 158). On appeal, Deitz asserts that the trial court overlooked the facts that he
identifies as establishing that the SSCHD acted in bad faith. See Williams v. D&J
House Drs., LLC, 2025-Ohio-4716, ¶ 19-21 (The fact that a judgment entry does
not expressly reference every item in the record does not necessarily establish that
the trial court failed to review the unmentioned evidentiary materials.).
{¶26} In other words, Deitz is essentially asking this Court to interpret the
actions he identifies in a manner that differs from the trial court’s interpretation. He
is asserting that, properly considered, the purportedly overlooked evidence weighs
in favor of his claim that the investigation was conducted in bad faith and weighs
against the trial court’s conclusions. See Karnofel v. Nye, 2016-Ohio-3406, ¶ 15
(11th Dist.); Hays v. Young ex rel. Young, 2024-Ohio-3149, ¶ 33-34 (11th Dist.).
{¶27} However, in administrative appeals under R.C. 2506.04, appellate
courts review the decisions of trial courts “only on questions of law” and “do not
have the same power [as trial courts] to weigh the evidence.” Cleveland Clinic
Found. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2014-Ohio-4809, ¶ 25. For this reason, we decline
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Deitz’s invitation to reweigh the evidence and instead restrict our analysis to the
more limited scope of review provided for in R.C. 2506.04. See Minerva Dairy,
Inc. v. Vill. Of Minerva, 2025-Ohio-902, ¶ 47 (5th Dist.).
{¶28} Initially, we note that, on their face, the facts identified by Deitz do
not suggest that the SSCHD acted in bad faith. Further, the trial court did not
interpret the evidence in the record as suggesting that the SSCHD acted in bad faith.
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that Deitz’s arguments fail to establish
that the trial court’s decisions on these matters were, as a matter of law, unsupported
“by a preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.” Summit
County Bd. of Health v. Pearson, 2004-Ohio-2251, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.), quoting Kisil at
34. Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled.
Third Assignment of Error
{¶29} Deitz asserts that the trial court affirmed a decision from the SSCBH
that was not supported by the evidence.
Legal Standard
{¶30} We reincorporate the legal standard for appeals of administrative
decisions that was set forth under the second assignment of error.
Legal Analysis
{¶31} Deitz asserts that the SSCBH’s order was not supported by evidence.
However, the trial court found that
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the observation and inspection pursuant to the warrant further
substantiate the deficiencies [with the pole barn]. That there exist
pictures of the deficiencies and purported use of the premises for
habitation purposes enhances the conclusion by SSCHD. Indeed,
these pictures refute Appellant’s claim that the premises w[ere] only
being used for storage and husbandry purposes; they support the
conclusion that residential use was occurring.
Statements of fact and conclusions by staff and inspectors apparently
familiar with construction and regulatory requirements add additional
support for the decision by SSCHD. . . .
(Doc. 158). Against this conclusion, Deitz asserts that the trial court ignored several
evidentiary materials in the administrative record, including a picture that indicates
a septic line on his property was not connected.
{¶32} As an initial matter, we note that “[t]he trial court’s failure to list every
document . . . [a litigant] filed does not indicate the unmentioned documents were
ignored.” Ohio AG v. John Doe 26, 141 Ohio App.3d 242, 254 (10th Dist.). Further,
Deitz appears to again be asking this Court to reweigh the evidence and to assign
greater weight to the picture he identified. Once again, we decline to reweigh the
evidence and restrict our analysis to the more limited scope of review provided for
appellate courts in R.C. 2506.04. Cleveland Clinic Found., 2014-Ohio-4809, at ¶
25; Minerva Dairy, 2025-Ohio-902, at ¶ 47 (5th Dist.).
{¶33} Turning to the record, the SSCHD preserved a detailed administrative
record of this proceeding; submitted at least thirty-nine pictures of the issues with
the pole barn; identified roughly eleven regulations that were being violated; and
provided a detailed explanation of how these issues could be rectified. In its
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judgment entry, the trial court expressly relied on these materials in reaching its
decision to uphold the modified condemnation order. See Pearson, 2004-Ohio2251, at 19-21 (9th Dist.).
{¶34} Having examined the record, we conclude that Deitz’s arguments fail
to establish that the trial court’s decision was, as a matter of law, unsupported “by a
preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.” Pearson at ¶ 9,
quoting Kisil, 12 Ohio St.3d 30, at 34. Accordingly, the third assignment of error
is overruled.
Fourth Assignment of Error
{¶35} Deitz argues that, in examining the SSCBH’s decision, the trial court
did not follow TWISM Ents., L.L.C. v. State Bd. of Registration for Professional
Engineers & Surveyors, 2022-Ohio-4677, ¶ 3.
Legal Standard
{¶36} The judicial branch has “the ultimate authority to render definitive
interpretations of the law. . . .” TWISM at ¶ 33. For this reason,
the judicial branch is never required to defer to an agency’s
interpretation of the law. As we explain, an agency interpretation is
simply one consideration a court may sometimes take into account in
rendering the court’s own independent judgment as to what the law is.
Id. at ¶ 3. If ambiguity exists in a provision, “a court may consider an administrative
agency’s construction of a legal text . . . .” Id. at ¶ 44. However,
[t]he weight, if any, the court assigns to the administrative
interpretation should depend on the persuasive power of the agency’s
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interpretation and not on the mere fact that it is being offered by an
administrative agency.
Id. at ¶ 45. Thus, “Ohio courts are not compelled to adopt th[e] agency’s preferred
reading of the law—unless, of course, its reading is the best one.” Id. at ¶ 63.
Legal Analysis
{¶37} Deitz argues that the trial court failed to follow TWISM in the process
of reviewing the SSCBH’s decision. However, in this case, Deitz ultimately
challenged the condemnation order as being unsupported by the evidence. Deitz
does not identify an instance in which the trial court interpreted an ambiguous legal
provision in this case or inappropriately deferred to an administrative agency’s
interpretation of any legal provision. TWISM at ¶ 29.
{¶38} In summary, the TWISM decision addressed “judicial deference to
administrative agencies’ legal interpretations.” State ex rel. Berry v. Indus.
Comm’n, 2025-Ohio-4720, ¶ 15, 26, citing TWISM at ¶ 3. Since this case did not
involve an administrative agency’s interpretation of a legal provision, Deitz has
failed to demonstrate how the trial court ran afoul of TWISM at ¶ 3, 63. Accordingly,
the fourth assignment of error is overruled.
Fifth Assignment of Error
{¶39} Deitz asserts that the various state actions in this case chilled his right
to petition the government.
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Legal Standard
{¶40} “[A] bedrock principle of appellate practice in Ohio is that an appeals
court is limited to the record of the proceedings at trial.” Morgan v. Eads, 2004-Ohio-6110, ¶ 13. Further, “[m]atters outside the record cannot be used to
demonstrate error . . . .” Herron v. Herron, 2021-Ohio-2223, (9th Dist.), quoting In
re J.C., 2010-Ohio-637, ¶ 15 (9th Dist.). For these reasons, appellate courts are to
review the “evidence set forth in the record of appeal and cannot consider facts
outside that record.” Nunn v. Mitchell, 2024-Ohio-4586, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.).
Legal Analysis
{¶41} As the State notes in its brief, the arguments raised by Deitz herein are
based upon materials that are not a part of the record.1 Appellate review is limited
to the matters in the record from the trial court. Bigler v. Haynes, 2025-Ohio-5105,
¶ 21 (3d Dist.). Thus, we are unable to decide the merits of arguments that can only
be evaluated on the basis of information that we do not have in the record and are
not able to review in this appeal. For this reason, we do not reach the substance of
these arguments. Accordingly, the fifth assignment of error is overruled.
1
After the trial court issued its judgment entry on July 2, 2025, Deitz filed a motion to supplement the record for appeal. The trial court then denied this motion. The contents of Deitz’s brief suggest that the body of this assignment of error is referring to the materials that he sought to introduce into the record through his motion to supplement.
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Conclusion
{¶42} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars
assigned and argued, the judgment of the Shelby County Court of Common Pleas is
affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
WALDICK and MILLER, J.J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby
rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the
judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
John R. Willamowski, Judge
Mark C. Miller, Judge
Juergen A. Waldick, Judge
DATED:
/hls
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