NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: February 6, 2024
S23Y0919, S24Y0084. IN THE MATTER OF TIMOTHY ORMAN
McCALEP.
PER CURIAM.
These disciplinary matters are before the Court on a notice of
discipline (S23Y0919) and the report and recommendation of Special
Master Daniel S. Reinhardt pursuant to a formal complaint
(S24Y0084). In both matters, the Bar seeks the disbarment of
Timothy Orman McCalep (State Bar No. 481089), a member of the
State Bar of Georgia since 2003, for his systemic abandonment of
multiple clients, for which he is charged with violating Rules 1.1,
1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15 (I) and (II), 1.16, 3.2, 3.5 (d), 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 8.4
(a) (1) and (4), and 9.3 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct
(“GRPC”), found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum penalty for a
single violation of Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.15 (I) and (II), 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, or
8.4 (a) (4) is disbarment, while the maximum penalty for a single
violation of Rules 1.4, 1.5, 1.16, 3.2, or 3.5 (d) is a public reprimand.
The maximum penalty for a single violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (1) is the
maximum penalty for the specific Rule violated; here, the maximum
penalty is disbarment because McCalep was charged with assisting
others to violate Rule 5.5. McCalep, who is currently under an
interim suspension, see Case No. S23Y0152 (Sept. 16, 2022), failed
to file an answer to the formal complaint or a notice of rejection to
the notice of discipline, and he has not requested review of the
Special Master’s report and recommendation by the State
Disciplinary Review Board or filed exceptions in this Court. Having
reviewed the record in both disciplinary matters, we agree that
McCalep’s multiple rule violations and history of abandonment of
clients warrant his disbarment.
S23Y0919
This notice of discipline is based on State Disciplinary Board
Docket (“SDBD”) No. 7712. McCalep acknowledged service on June
2
6, 2023.1 He has not filed a notice of rejection and is, therefore, in
default, has no right to an evidentiary hearing, and is subject to such
discipline as may be determined by this Court. See Bar Rule 4-208.1
(b). Additionally, by virtue of his default, the facts alleged in the
notice of discipline are deemed admitted. See, e.g., In the Matter of
Cleveland, ___ Ga. ___, at ___ n.14 (___ SE2d ___) (2023 Ga. LEXIS
213) (2023 WL 6611027) (Case No. S23Y0918, decided Oct. 11,
2023); In the Matter of Bonnell, 316 Ga. 460, 460 (888 SE2d 523)
(2023).
The admitted facts show that a client hired McCalep to
represent her in a criminal matter and a contested divorce matter
in January 2022. The client spoke to McCalep over the phone and
scheduled an in-person meeting, but when she arrived at his office,
she only met with his paralegal and paid her a $10,000 retainer. The
client did not meet with McCalep that day, but she heard him speak
1 In addition to McCalep’s acknowledgement of service, the Bar
attempted personal service in July 2023, and after that was unsuccessful but
before McCalep acknowledged service, the Bar effected service by publication
in August 2023.
3
to the paralegal over the telephone. On January 28, 2022, the client
received a retainer agreement from McCalep stating that all fees
were paid in full. The client never met McCalep in person. In March
2022, McCalep called the client and told her that he had
“transferred” her case and retainer fee to another licensed Georgia
attorney, who worked for “Georgia Law Firm” (“GLF”). However,
when the client checked the GLF website, there was no information
about the attorney, and although the website listed McCalep’s office
address as its physical location, the website did not identify any
attorneys associated with GLF.2
From March to July 2022, the client repeatedly asked for
updates on her divorce case, but she was only able to speak to the
paralegal and another individual, both of whom she believed worked
at GLF. The other individual represented himself as an attorney
working on the client’s case. However, that individual was not an
2 The Bar references Rule 7.2 (c) (1), which requires that any
advertisement for legal services in Georgia must include prominent
disclosures, including, inter alia, the attorney’s identity and physical location. McCalep is not charged with violating this Rule.
4
attorney, and actually was the paralegal’s husband. McCalep later
admitted to knowing that his paralegal often asked her husband to
help her at work, but the record does not indicate whether McCalep
knew that the individual held himself out as an attorney, nor does
the record indicate whether McCalep ever formally hired his
paralegal’s husband.3 Neither the paralegal nor her husband put the
client in touch with McCalep, and McCalep did not return her calls.
The client also emailed the attorney to whom McCalep had
transferred her divorce matter, asking to speak with her, but that
attorney ignored her requests. In June 2022, the client was finally
able to contact the licensed attorney, who told her that McCalep had
informed the licensed attorney that the divorce case was
uncontested; that she was only “hired” for an uncontested divorce
and was paid $2,000 from the retainer; and that she did not work for
GLF but that McCalep occasionally referred clients to her. The
licensed attorney also told the client that the non-attorney did not
3 The record in this disciplinary matter does not reflect whether the Bar
took any action in response to the suggestion that this individual may have
engaged in conduct constituting the unauthorized practice of law.
5
work for her; that she did not know how to contact McCalep; and
that she did not know where the rest of the retainer went. On June
27, 2022, the client called McCalep’s office and was told that
McCalep was out of the country, that a non-attorney was handling
her case, and that he would close out the case based on her
dissatisfaction but would not give her a refund.
The client filed a grievance on August 2, 2022. McCalep did not
respond, so on September 15, 2022, the Bar filed a petition for
interim suspension based on this case and several of the cases at
issue in S24Y0084. This Court ordered McCalep’s interim
suspension on September 16. Subsequently, he failed to
acknowledge service of the notice of investigation, but in an unsworn
response, McCalep stated that he never represented the client;
denied ever meeting or speaking to her or receiving her money;
stated he had never heard of GLF; acknowledged that he hired the
licensed attorney on multiple occasions to help with court
appearances while he dealt with health issues; stated that he did
not recall any conversations with that attorney about the client’s
6
divorce case because he does not handle divorce matters; and denied
“transferring” the client’s case to her. McCalep stated that he fired
the paralegal in 2021 while he was out of the office on sick leave. He
stated that he knew his paralegal’s husband helped her while she
worked for McCalep, but he denied knowledge of any work those two
individuals did on this particular client’s case.
The State Disciplinary Board (“Board”) found probable cause
to believe that McCalep violated Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5,
and 8.4 (a) (4). In determining the appropriate level of discipline, the
Board appropriately considered the American Bar Association
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”),
including the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. See In
the Matter of Morse, 265 Ga. 353, 354 (456 SE2d 52) (1995),
superseded by Rule on other grounds as stated in In the Matter of
Cook, 311 Ga. 206, 214-215 (857 SE2d 212) (2021). The Board
determined that McCalep knowingly and intentionally violated the
GRPC and that the client in SDBD No. 7712, as well as the grievants
in S24Y0084, were seriously harmed by McCalep’s disregard and
7
abandonment of their matters, lack of communication,
misrepresentation, and the loss of significant funds they paid for
him to represent them. The Board found the following aggravating
factors: McCalep had two serious prior disciplinary offenses4 in the
form of a three-year suspension for his violation of Rule 1.7 related
to sexual misconduct with a 17-year-old client, see In the Matter of
McCalep, 283 Ga. 586 (662 SE2d 120) (2008), and a confidential
reprimand5 in 2020 for violating Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 3.2; acted
with a dishonest and selfish motive; showed a pattern of misconduct;
had been charged with multiple offenses; displayed bad faith
obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to
comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency because he
failed to timely respond to the notice of discipline; refused to
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct; had substantial
4 The Board determined that the instant matter was McCalep’s third
disciplinary infraction, which is “discretionary grounds for suspension or
disbarment.” Bar Rule 4-103.
5 Although the issuance of a confidential reprimand is a form of
confidential discipline, see Bar Rule 4-102 (b) (5), in the event of a later
disciplinary proceeding, the confidentiality of the imposition of the prior
confidential discipline is waived. See Bar Rule 4-208.
8
experience in the practice of law; and showed indifference to making
restitution. See ABA Standard 9.22 (a)-(e), (g), (i)-(j).6
The Board observed that McCalep had shown a marked
unwillingness to participate in the disciplinary process and it
appeared that he had abandoned the practice of law. The Board
determined that the Court has typically disbarred lawyers in similar
cases. See, e.g., In the Matter of Noriega-Allen, 308 Ga. 398 (841
SE2d 1) (2020) (disbarring lawyer on notice of discipline who
abandoned client matter and moved to Maine without providing
contact information); In the Matter of Jennings, 305 Ga. 133 (823
SE2d 811) (2019); In the Matter of Barton, 303 Ga. 818 (813 SE2d
590) (2018).
S24Y0084
6 Although the Board considered in mitigation that McCalep “appears to
be suffering from some undefined personal problems,” there is no indication in
the record about what led the Board to this supposition. While a lawyer’s
personal problems may be a factor in mitigation, see ABA Standard 9.32 (c),
we decline to consider it as a mitigating factor in the absence of any evidence
supporting such a claim.
9
The eight grievances7 at issue were filed between 2021 and
2022. McCalep responded to the notices of investigation in
documents entitled “Bar Grievance Response,” which were all dated
March 11, 2022, but which the Bar did not receive until October
2022. The Bar filed a formal complaint addressing SDBD Nos. 7635
through 7642. On February 10 and March 8, 2023, the Bar’s staff
investigator attempted to personally serve McCalep at his official
address on file with the Membership Department, see Bar Rule 4-203.1 (b) (3) (i), but he was informed by McCalep’s landlord that
McCalep had been evicted and that he had not been in the office
since 2020.8 McCalep was served by publication on March 17 and 24,
2023. See Bar Rule 4-203.1 (b) (3) (ii). On March 20, 2023, another
attorney emailed Bar counsel on McCalep’s behalf, stating that he
could acknowledge service. Bar counsel informed that attorney that
McCalep was being served by publication and that an answer would
7 The grievances only pertain to five separate underlying cases.
8 We note that, pursuant to Rule 1-207, “all members of the State Bar of
Georgia shall keep the membership department of the State Bar of Georgia
informed of their current name, official address and telephone number.”
10
be due by April 24, and sent the attorney the formal complaint and
an acknowledgment of service. Neither the attorney nor McCalep
ever acknowledged service or responded to the formal complaint.
The Bar filed a motion for default, which the Special Master granted.
The formal complaint charged McCalep with violating Rules
1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15 (I) and (II), 1.16, 3.2, 3.5 (d), 5.3, 5.5, 8.4
(a) (1) and (4), and 9.3. The Special Master observed that he had
granted the Bar’s motion for default; that neither party had
requested a hearing as to aggravation and mitigation; and that he
had directed the parties to submit proposed reports and
recommendations pursuant to Bar Rule 4-214, but only the Bar had
submitted any such filing. The Special Master found that McCalep
had admitted, by virtue of his default, the following facts.
In SDBD Nos. 7635 and 7636, a mother hired McCalep in
November 2020 to represent her son in a criminal matter, for which
she agreed to pay $5,000. She paid a down payment of $500 and
made regular monthly payments until she had paid the $5,000 in
full. McCalep filed an entry of appearance in December 2020, but
11
failed to file discovery requests and never made any further contact
with the son. He also did not respond to inquiries from the son’s legal
team in New York about a case pending against the son there,
resulting in a bench warrant being issued against the son in New
York. The clients asked for a refund, and McCalep responded that
they needed to pay him more money because the district attorney
had filed an indictment that included additional charges. The clients
filed separate grievances in June 2021. In his response, McCalep
admitted he represented the son, but stated that he had done
everything the mother requested; he otherwise denied violating
ethical rules. While McCalep admitted that the total charge for the
case was $5,000, he contended that he was informed by the court
that the son had serious pending and unindicted charges; he
admitted that he did not explain to the clients that he would not be
handling the case for $5,000 and that he did not ask them to sign a
new contract for a different amount. McCalep further admitted that
he did not want to continue the representation, so he stopped
communicating with the clients and the New York legal team; he
12
continued accepting payments until he was paid in full; and he did
not intend to provide the clients a refund. The Bar issued a notice of
investigation on both grievances on February 24, 2022. In his “Bar
Grievance Response,” McCalep stated that due to severe health
issues, he hired people to help him manage his office, but later
learned that they were stealing from and mismanaging the office
during the COVID-19 pandemic. McCalep stated that he fired those
people, and he could not say what they had done to the clients, but
he denied the mother and son’s allegations and denied ever speaking
to them. In the formal complaint, the Bar alleged that McCalep
violated Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4 (a) and (b), 1.5 (a) and (b), 1.16 (d),
and 8.4 (a) (4).
In SDBD No. 7637, in March 2020, the client’s family retained
McCalep to represent the client in a murder case, but McCalep did
not visit the client in jail; did not give the client information about
his case; and failed to file any pre-trial motions or respond to the
State’s discovery. McCalep did not attend court dates for the client’s
bond hearing (which was denied), indictment, and the first plea and
13
arraignment hearing; instead, a person identified as a paralegal
appeared. When McCalep informed the client and his family that he
would not come see them until three days before the client’s next
court date, the family requested a refund so they could hire a new
lawyer. McCalep failed to provide the refund and failed to formally
withdraw from the case as required by Uniform Superior Court Rule
(“USCR”) 4.3 and GRPC Rule 1.16 (a). The client’s family hired other
attorneys in June 2021. The client filed a grievance, to which
McCalep did not respond. In his “Bar Grievance Response” to the
notice of investigation, McCalep denied meeting or speaking with
the client, reiterated his problems with the personnel he hired to
manage his law office, and stated as to the client’s allegations of
rudeness that “[w]hen I was healthy, I did my best to speak and see
all my clients as much as possible if they were incarcerated. Her [sic]
allegations are not me.” The Bar alleged that McCalep violated
Rules 1.1, 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4 (a) and (b), 1.5 (a), 1.16 (c) and (d), 3.2, and
8.4 (a) (4).
14
In SDBD No. 7638, the client hired McCalep to handle a
personal injury matter for herself and her minor son. The client filed
a grievance in September 2021, to which she attached a letter that
she had sent to McCalep. The letter indicated that the client had
fired McCalep; demanded that McCalep turn over the case files;
requested that he provide a list of work he had performed, including
the breakdown of financial activity; requested an accounting of any
recovery and a disbursement of funds; and asked when she could
pick up the records. The letter stated that the last communication
the client had received from McCalep was an email asking her to
sign for a settlement check, even though he had not contacted her to
ensure that she wanted to settle the case; that when the client went
to the office to sign the check, McCalep was not present and the
client was told to sign, but she declined the settlement offer; that the
client had spoken to McCalep’s paralegal, who had not been helpful
and had not sent over the files; and that the client had no further
communication with McCalep. Moreover, the letter stated that
although McCalep claimed he paid her medical bills, her doctors
15
informed her that they did not know she had an attorney. McCalep
settled the case on behalf of the client and her son without
permission; did not disburse any money to the client; and failed to
pay the medical bills, provide an accounting, and refund the client’s
money. In his “Bar Grievance Response” to the notice of
investigation, McCalep stated that he did not know what his office
staff did on the client’s case because he had no information about
her, but it appeared that she had communicated with the paralegal,
became upset, and tried to terminate the representation. He stated
that he did not have the client’s file and received no money from her.
The Bar alleged that McCalep violated Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4 (a) and
(b), 1.5 (a), 1.15 (I) and (II), and 8.4 (a) (4).
In SDBD Nos. 7639 and 7640, the chief judge of a superior court
notified the Bar that McCalep had requested that his client be
produced from the Department of Corrections to enter a negotiated
plea, but McCalep failed to appear for that hearing. The chief judge
spoke to the client and determined that McCalep had not discussed
the potential plea with him prior to scheduling the plea hearing.
16
When McCalep subsequently failed to appear for calendar call, the
chief judge scheduled a contempt hearing, which McCalep also failed
to attend. Before the contempt hearing, the chief judge learned that
McCalep had filed a leave of absence but had failed to send it to the
court or opposing counsel as required by USCR 16.1. The chief judge
rescheduled the contempt hearing, but McCalep never contacted the
court to attempt to resolve the matter. During the time McCalep
represented the client, he never personally spoke to the client or
visited him in jail; failed to provide the client or his family members
with a copy of the attorney-client agreement or to explain the terms;
and failed to file discovery motions, investigate the case, or give the
client an opportunity to assist in his own defense. McCalep falsely
told the chief judge that he had not been paid, but in fact, the client’s
family had paid in full. Emails between McCalep and the client’s
mother indicated that he was trying to use his non-appearance at
court to force the mother to pay an additional $5,000 to “fund a trial,”
which was not permitted by the attorney-client agreement. In
September 2021, the Board issued a grievance based on the chief
17
judge’s report, and the client filed his own grievance in January
2022. McCalep did not respond to either grievance. In his “Bar
Grievance Response” to the notice of investigation, McCalep denied
the Board’s allegations and noted that several attorneys entered an
appearance for the client; that a leave of absence had been filed on
his behalf due to sickness, but he was unsure whether the proper
filing protocol was followed; and that he was not held in contempt of
court. In response to the client’s allegations, McCalep stated that he
had personally appeared for the client on Zoom while he was sick,
and he also hired two attorneys to help him with representing the
client. McCalep asserted that the client had verbally received a
global plea offer and told a family member that he thought the offer
was good, but later told the chief judge that he had never received
an offer. McCalep believed that the client used this as a tactic to
delay his sentencing, but the chief judge thought the client might be
telling the truth and admonished McCalep and his office. However,
the client’s recorded jail calls proved that the client was being
dishonest about not receiving the plea offer. The Bar alleged that
18
McCalep violated Rules 1.1, 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4 (a) and (b), 1.5 (a) and
(b), 1.16 (d), 3.2, 3.5 (d), and 8.4 (a) (4).9
In SDBD Nos. 7641 and 7642, a mother hired McCalep in
November 2021 to represent her son in a criminal matter. By March
2022, the grievants had paid McCalep over $18,000, including
$5,000 for a bond hearing. McCalep purported to waive the son’s
9 Rule 1.1 requires lawyers to “provide competent representation to a
client.” Rule 1.2 (a) requires lawyers to “abide by a client’s decisions concerning the scope and objectives of representation” and “consult with the client as to
the means by which they are to be pursued.” Rule 1.3 requires lawyers “to act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” Rule 1.4
(a) requires lawyers to “promptly inform the client of any decision or
circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent” is required,
among other things. Rule 1.4 (b) requires lawyers to “explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.” Rule 1.5 (a) prohibits lawyers from “mak[ing]
an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable
amount for expenses.” Rule 1.5 (b) requires lawyers to communicate “the basis
or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible,”
“preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing
the representation.” Further, this Rule requires lawyers to communicate “[a]ny
changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses.” Rule 1.16 (d) requires
lawyers to, “[u]pon termination of representation,” “take steps to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable
notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel,
surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding
any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.” Rule 3.2 requires
lawyers to “make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the
interests of the client.” Rule 3.5 (d) prohibits lawyers from “engag[ing] in
conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.” Finally, Rule 8.4 (a) (4) prohibits
lawyers from “engag[ing] in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation.”
19
bond hearing; failed to visit the son in jail; and refused to contact
the son or to communicate with the mother. Thus, the grievants
asked for a refund, which McCalep ignored. The mother and the son
filed separate grievances in March and May 2022, but McCalep
failed to respond. In his “Bar Grievance Response,” McCalep stated
that it appeared that the people he hired to manage his law office
had been stealing from the grievants and noted that the documents
reflecting their payments did not contain his telephone numbers or
address; instead, they showed a Miami area code and his office was
listed as being in McDonough, though he never had an office there.
The Bar alleged that McCalep violated Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4 (a) and
(b), 1.5 (a) and (b), 1.16 (d), and 8.4 (a) (4).
Based on McCalep’s statements about his office staff stealing
from and mismanaging his law firm, the Bar alleged in the formal
complaint that in all of the matters, McCalep violated Rules 5.3 (a)
through (c) because he possessed managerial and direct supervisory
authority at his firm but failed to make reasonable efforts to ensure
that the conduct of his non-lawyer employees was compatible with
20
his professional obligations; and his non-lawyer employees engaged
in conduct that would have been violations of the GRPC if committed
by a lawyer, and he knew of or ratified the conduct and failed to take
reasonable remedial action after learning of it. The Bar also alleged
that McCalep violated Rule 5.5 (a) because he provided an
opportunity for his employees to hold themselves out falsely as
people authorized to practice law in Georgia. Moreover, the Bar
alleged that McCalep violated Rule 8.4 (a) (1) by allowing his nonlawyer employees to engage in conduct that violated the GRPC,
including Rule 5.5 (a) and the other Rules as charged. The Bar
further alleged that McCalep’s conduct during the disciplinary
proceedings violated Rule 9.3 because he failed to adequately
respond to the notices of investigation.
Turning to the ABA Standards, the Special Master analyzed
(1) the duties violated; (2) the lawyer’s mental state; (3) the potential
or actual injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and (4) the
existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. As to duties violated,
the Special Master found that ABA Standard 4.11 (disbarment
21
appropriate when lawyer knowingly converts client property and
causes injury) applied to McCalep’s violations of Rules 1.15 (I) and
(II). ABA Standard 4.41 (disbarment appropriate when lawyer
abandons the practice, knowingly fails to perform services for client,
or engages in a pattern of neglect with respect to client matters and
causes injury) applied to his violations of Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, and 1.4.
ABA Standard 4.51 (disbarment appropriate when lawyer’s course
of conduct demonstrates that he does not understand the most
fundamental legal doctrines or procedures and causes injury)
applied to McCalep’s violations of Rule 1.1. ABA Standard 4.61
(disbarment appropriate when lawyer knowingly deceives client
with intent to benefit lawyer or another and causes injury) applied
to his violations of Rules 1.5 and 8.4 (a) (4). ABA Standard 5.11
(disbarment appropriate when lawyer engages in serious criminal
conduct which involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on lawyer’s
fitness to practice law) applied to his violations of Rule 8.4 (a) (4).
ABA Standard 6.2 (disbarment appropriate when lawyer knowingly
22
violates court order or rule with intent to obtain benefit for himself
or another) applied to his violations of Rule 3.2, and ABA Standard
6.3 (disbarment appropriate when lawyer causes significant or
potentially significant interference with the outcome of the legal
proceeding and causes injury) applied to his violation of Rule 3.5 (d).
Finally, ABA Standard 7.0 (disbarment appropriate when lawyer
knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a
professional with intent to obtain benefit for lawyer or another and
causes injury) applied to his violations of Rules 1.5, 1.16, 5.3, 5.5, 8.4
(a) (1), and 9.3.
The Special Master found that McCalep had violated the GRPC
knowingly and intentionally, and that his misconduct caused
serious injury to the grievants due to the loss of funds they paid for
services he did not provide, and the loss of their opportunities to hire
competent and diligent lawyers to pursue their claims and defend
their rights. McCalep’s misconduct also injured the legal profession.
The Special Master found that the presumptive penalty was
disbarment. The Special Master found the following aggravating
23
factors: prior disciplinary history, in that McCalep received a threeyear suspension for violating Rule 1.7, see McCalep, 283 Ga. at 586;
dishonest or selfish motive; pattern of misconduct; and multiple
offenses. See ABA Standard 9.22 (a) – (d). Moreover, the Special
Master found that McCalep refused to acknowledge the wrongful
nature of his conduct; his incarcerated clients were vulnerable
victims; he had substantial experience in the practice of law; and he
was indifferent to making restitution.10 See ABA Standard 9.22 (g)
– (j). The Special Master found no applicable mitigating factors.
The Special Master summarized that McCalep’s misconduct
involved keeping fees for work he did not appear to have any
intention of completing, or otherwise abandoning his office to be
mismanaged by his non-lawyer staff, which seriously injured the
10 The Special Master also found that McCalep’s failure to respond to the
notices of investigation was a factor in aggravation. See ABA Standard 9.22 (e)
(identifying as a factor in aggravation “bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the
disciplinary agency”). However, McCalep was charged with violating Rule 9.3
for failing to respond to the notices of investigation, and we decline to rely on
specific conduct in aggravation of discipline when that same conduct is also
charged as a violation of the GRPC. See, e.g., In the Matter of Eddings, 314 Ga.
409, 418 n.3 (877 SE2d 248) (2022).
24
clients, and McCalep failed to respond to the disciplinary
proceedings. Thus, the Special Master concluded that McCalep
should be disbarred. See In the Matter of Farmer, 307 Ga. 307 (835
SE2d 629) (2019).
Conclusion
Having reviewed the records in both cases, we conclude that
disbarment is the appropriate sanction for McCalep’s severe
misconduct in these matters and is consistent with the sanction
imposed in similar cases.11 See Cleveland, ___ Ga. at ___ (disbarring
attorney who abandoned clients in civil and criminal matters and
was found in default on notice of discipline); In the Matter of Proctor,
313 Ga. 637 (872 SE2d 691) (2022); In the Matter of Powell, 310 Ga.
859 (854 SE2d 731) (2021). Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the
name of Timothy Orman McCalep be removed from the rolls of
11 We note that the questions of whether the Bar has proven violations
of Rules 5.5 and 8.4 (a) (1) seem uncertain and we do not base our action here
upon a violation of those Rules. Resolution of those questions is obviated by the
strong evidence of severe violations of other Rules warranting disbarment.
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persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. McCalep
is reminded of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (b).
Disbarred. All the Justices concur.
26