SYLLABUS
This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.
Andris Arias v. County of Bergen (A-45-24) (089642)
Argued October 9, 2025 -- Decided January 22, 2026
JUSTICE HOFFMAN, writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the Court considers whether Bergen County is immunized from liability in tort, pursuant to the Landowner Liability Act (LLA), N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-2 to -10, for a rollerblading accident that occurred on a path in Van Saun County Park.
The 130-acre Van Saun Park features playgrounds, pavilions, picnic facilities, a dog park, a zoo, athletic fields, tennis courts, pathways, fishing ponds, and wooded areas. Its amenities are available to the public free of charge. In April 2021, plaintiff Andris Arias fell into a pothole on a paved pedestrian path while rollerblading in the park. Arias filed a complaint alleging negligence against the County, which owns and operates the park. The County filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting immunity under the LLA. The trial court granted the County’s motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. See 479 N.J. Super. 268 (App. Div. 2024). The Court granted certification. 260 N.J. 223 (2025).
HELD: The LLA has grown -- along with New Jersey’s own growth and development -- into a “liberally construed . . . inducement” for landowners to open “their property for sport and recreational activities” without “fear of liability.” N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-5.1. Rollerblading, which is akin to “skating,” is the type of “recreational activity” contemplated by the Legislature, see id. at -2, just as Van Saun Park is the type of open and expansive “premises,” see id. at -3, for which this legislative grant of immunity is both intended and necessary. The LLA thus immunizes Bergen County for the accident at issue.
1. In 1962, the Legislature enacted the precursor to the LLA as an effort to protect rural landowners from liability for hunting and fishing on their property. In 1968, the Legislature replaced that Act with the LLA, which expanded immunity to the “owner, lessee or occupant of premises” for “sport and recreational activities.” N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-3(a). The Legislature did not define “premises.” Rather, the LLA introduced a broad array of exemplar “activities” that would satisfy the statute and immunize the landowner from liability, including “skating, skiing, sledding, tobogganing and any other outdoor sport, game and recreational activity.” Id. at -2.
1
In 1991, the Legislature amended the LLA, broadening the scope of LLA immunity still further and making clear, for the first time, that the LLA “shall be liberally construed to serve as an inducement to the owners . . . of property, that might otherwise be reluctant to do so for fear of liability, to permit persons to come onto their property for sport and recreational activities.” Id. at -5.1. The 1991 LLA also expanded immunity coverage to include “improved” or “commercial” premises and expanded the examples of covered activities to include “riding snowmobiles, allterrain vehicles or dirt bikes.” Id. at -2 to -3. (pp. 7-12)
2. In the first case construing the 1991 amendments, the Appellate Division held that the LLA was inapplicable to a rollerblading incident on a road within a residential condominium development. Toogood v. Saint Andrews at Valley Brook, 313 N.J. Super. 418, 420 (App. Div. 1998). Citing as a contrast a case involving an accident on a playground within a 35-acre park inside Fort Dix, Toogood clarified that the 1991 amendments did not broaden the definition of “premises” to include “owners and occupiers of suburban residential property.” Id. at 425-26. It explained that the amendments were “clearly designed to focus the inquiry on the dominant character of the land and to account for the evolving types of activities considered recreational pursuits.” Ibid. (pp. 12-14)
3. Like the Appellate Division, the Court sees no evidence of legislative intent to induce or immunize recreational activities in residential backyards or condominium developments, and it does not alter any prior guidance in this regard. But Van Saun Park -- although located in a densely populated area -- is the very type of open property the Legislature seeks to protect through the LLA, like the park inside Fort Dix. Prior to the 1991 amendments, the Court identified factors for courts to consider about the area in which a property is located to avoid taking “too expansive a view of the immunity conferred by the Legislature.” Harrison v. Middlesex Water Co., 80 N.J. 391, 401 (1979). The Legislature, however, clarified in 1991 that a more expansive view of immunity should be taken going forward. The Court thus no longer finds the Harrison factors relevant to an analysis that -- to comport with the purpose expressed in N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-5.1 -- should be guided by whether the dominant character of the subject premises itself is of a type of open land conducive to engaging in sport and recreational activities. Holding that Van Saun Park is not a “premises” under the LLA would expose the County to liability and might discourage the opening of properties to the public for free -- consequences antithetical to the Legislature’s purpose in enacting and broadening the LLA. (pp. 15-20)
AFFIRMED.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRE-LOUIS,
WAINER APTER, FASCIALE, and NORIEGA join in JUSTICE HOFFMAN’s
opinion.
2
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-45 September Term 2024
089642
Andris Arias,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
County of Bergen,
Defendant-Respondent.
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at
479 N.J. Super. 268 (App. Div. 2024).
Argued Decided
October 9, 2025 January 22, 2026
Alex S. Capozzi argued the cause for appellant (Brach
Eichler, attorneys; Alex S. Capozzi, on the briefs).
David Mateen, Assistant County Counsel, argued the
cause for respondent (Thomas J. Duch, Bergen County
Counsel, attorney; David Mateen, on the brief).
Tyrone F. Sergio argued the cause for amicus curiae New
Jersey Association for Justice (Britcher, Leone & Sergio,
attorneys; Tyrone F. Sergio, of counsel, and E. Drew
Britcher, on the brief).
Lawrence Bluestone argued the cause for amici curiae
New Jersey Association of Counties and the County of
Essex (Genova Burns, attorneys; Lawrence Bluestone,
1
Angelo J. Genova, and Celia S. Bosco, of counsel and on
the brief).
JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
At issue in this case is whether Bergen County is immunized from
liability in tort, pursuant to the Landowner Liability Act (LLA), N.J.S.A.
2A:42A-2 to -10, for a rollerblading accident that occurred on a path in Van
Saun County Park, a 130-acre park owned and operated by the County. We
hold that the LLA immunizes Bergen County for this accident.
The LLA, which originated as an effort to protect rural landowners from
liability for hunting and fishing on their property, has grown -- along with
New Jersey’s own growth and development -- into a “liberally construed . . .
inducement” for landowners to open “their property for sport and recreational
activities” without “fear of liability.” N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-5.1. Rollerblading,
which is akin to “skating,” is the type of “recreational activity” contemplated
by the Legislature, see id. at -2, just as Van Saun Park is the type of open and
expansive “premises,” see id. at -3, for which this legislative grant of
immunity is both intended and necessary -- especially as growth and
development compromise the availability of recreational properties in
suburban and urban environments.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division.
2
I.
Van Saun Park was established in 1960. It is located within the
suburban confines of Paramus, New Jersey, and is owned and operated by
Bergen County. The 130-acre park features playgrounds, pavilions, picnic
facilities, a dog park, a zoo, athletic fields, tennis courts, pathways, fishing
ponds, and wooded areas. Its amenities are available to the public free of
charge.
On April 24, 2021, plaintiff Andris Arias fell into a pothole on a paved
pedestrian path while rollerblading in Van Saun Park. Arias asserts that her
fall caused a permanent and debilitating neurological condition (complex
regional pain syndrome), as well as spinal injuries requiring surgery.
Arias filed a complaint against the County, alleging negligence for
failure to maintain the path or warn visitors of the pothole. In response, the
County filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim,
pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), asserting immunity under the LLA.
The trial court granted the County’s motion and dismissed the complaint
without prejudice, holding that “there’s no question here that the Landowner
Liability Act applies to this County park.” The trial court rejected Arias’s
contention that the buildings in the park made the LLA inapplicable, noting
3
that the LLA “expressly provides that it applies even if the premises is
improved.”
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Arias’s
complaint without prejudice. Arias v. County of Bergen, 479 N.J. Super. 268
(App. Div. 2024). After surveying relevant precedent, the appellate court
found that immunity pursuant to the LLA, as amended in 1991, requires an
analysis of whether the “premises” in question is the type of open property that
would draw the public to engage in sport and recreational activities. Id. at
288. The appellate court found this question best answered by the “dominant
character of the land” test articulated in Toogood v. Saint Andrews at Valley
Brook Condominium Ass’n, 313 N.J. Super. 418, 425-26 (App. Div. 1998).
Arias, 479 N.J. Super. at 288-89.
The Appellate Division found that test to be more appropriate than
consideration of the four factors suggested by this Court -- prior to the LLA’s
1991 amendments -- in Harrison v. Middlesex Water Co., 80 N.J. 391, 401
(1979), which focused on the property surrounding the “premises” in question,
as opposed to the “dominant character” of the “premises” itself. Arias, 479
N.J. Super. at 288. Ultimately, the court held that “[t]he Park’s dominant
character as an open space for sport and recreational activities renders the Park
the type of property entitled to the protections under the LLA.” Id. at 289.
4
This Court granted Arias’s petition for certification. 260 N.J. 223
(2025). We also granted leave to appear as amici curiae to the New Jersey
Association of Counties and the County of Essex, which participated jointly.
The New Jersey Association for Justice, which appeared as amicus before the
Appellate Division, continued to participate in the appeal.
II.
A.
Arias argues that the Appellate Division in this case deviated from prior
precedent, such as Harrison, that considered the nature of the surrounding area
for purposes of determining whether the LLA applied. In so doing, Arias
contends, the appellate court also misconstrued the effect of the 1991
amendments to the LLA and misapplied the more recent Appellate Division
opinion in Toogood. Rather than relying upon Toogood’s “dominant character
of the land” test, Arias submits that the Appellate Division should have looked
to the four factors discussed in Harrison and concluded that the LLA does not
apply to Van Saun Park.
The New Jersey Association for Justice (NJAJ) joins Arias in requesting
that this Court reverse the Appellate Division’s decision. NJAJ argues that the
LLA was designed to be interpreted narrowly and to protect recreational
activities on rural or semi-rural lands, not “improved tract[s] of land” in a
5
“densely populated suburban residential neighborhood”; any other
interpretation is, according to the NJAJ, inappropriate policymaking. NJAJ
views the “dominant character of the land test” to be a departure from
legislative intent and contends that an overbroad interpretation of the LLA
runs the risk of disincentivizing property owners from keeping premises safe.
B.
The County argues that LLA immunity is justified because recreation is
the dominant character of Van Saun Park and Arias was pursuing such a
recreational activity on the day of her accident. The County submits that
Toogood’s “dominant character of the land” test is more akin to the liberal
construction of the LLA mandated by the Legislature than a review of the four
factors in Harrison, which focus on the surrounding environment rather than
the premises in question.
Like the County, the New Jersey Association of Counties and the County
of Essex (NJAC/Essex) jointly support affirmance of the Appellate Division’s
judgment. They argue that immunity for Van Saun Park is consistent with the
Legislature’s explicit mandate to construe the statute broadly and protect open
lands throughout the state. NJAC/Essex contend that precluding immunity
would discourage property owners from providing liberal access to open
recreational spaces, in direct contravention of the intent and purpose of the
6
LLA. NJAC/Essex further argue that the need for immunity is heightened --not negated -- by Van Saun Park’s proximity to residential areas because it is
within densely populated residential areas that the volume of recreational
visitors is highest.
III.
As the parties’ arguments reflect, the question of immunity in this case
turns on the effect of statutory amendments on factors established in preamendment case law. We therefore begin by tracing the history and expansion
of landowner immunity provisions.
A.
In 1962, the Legislature enacted the precursor to the LLA, which
exempted any “landowner of agricultural lands or woodlands” from liability
for injuries to anyone “hunting or fishing upon the landowner’s property”
absent “a deliberate or willful act on the part of such landowner.” L. 1962, c.
107 (codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-1 and repealed by L. 1968, c. 73, § 4). The
1962 Act protected “owners of rural or semi-rural lands, pointedly, agricultural
and wooded tracts”; it “was not designed or intended to protect all landowners
generally.” Harrison, 80 N.J. at 398-99. As we noted in Harrison while
surveying the history of the LLA, “[t]he Legislature apparently recognized the
inability of the owners of such lands to control trespassers, or even to accord
7
reasonable safeguards to invitees, who hunted and fished on their property.”
Id. at 399.
In 1968, the Legislature repealed the 1962 Act and replaced it with the
LLA, L. 1968, c. 73 (codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-2 to -5), which expanded
immunity to the “owner, lessee or occupant of premises” for “sport and
recreational activities.” N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-3(a). The Legislature did not define
“premises” for these purposes. Rather, the LLA introduced a broad array of
exemplar “activities” that would satisfy the statute and immunize the
landowner from liability: “hunting, fishing, trapping, horseback riding,
training of dogs, hiking, camping, picnicking, swimming, skating, skiing,
sledding, tobogganing and any other outdoor sport, game and recreational
activity.” Id. at -2.
The scope and intent of this new statute were considered in a trio of
cases decided in the decade following the LLA’s enactment.
B.
In Boileau v. De Cecco, we summarily affirmed the Appellate Division’s
holding that the LLA did not apply to a diving accident in a backyard
swimming pool in a suburban neighborhood. 65 N.J. 234 (1974). The
appellate court held “that the legislative change of the term ‘agricultural lands
or woodlands’ to ‘premises’” was “intended to better define, and perhaps
8
somewhat broaden, the protected class originally specified” but “was not
intended to enlarge the protected class of landowners to homeowners in
suburbia,” i.e., “someone’s backyard.” Boileau v. De Cecco, 125 N.J. Super.
263, 267 (App. Div. 1973).
Next, in Harrison, we considered whether the LLA immunized a
municipal utility for a drowning that occurred in a ninety-four-acre reservoir,
used by the public for swimming and ice skating, that was located “on an
improved tract situated in a highly populated suburban community . . . [and]
surrounded by both private homes as well as public recreational facilities.” 80
N.J. at 394-95, 401-02. We affirmed the importance of identifying “the
underlying intent and the overriding purpose of the Legislature” in order to
give meaning to undefined statutory terms, such as “premises” in this statute;
we found in this instance, however, that “[t]he background of the [LLA] . . . is
not rich.” Id. at 398.
This Court, therefore, was reluctant to “attribute to the Legislature . . .
an intent that the [LLA] be accorded a broad application,” particularly because
immunity statutes generally “should be given narrow range.” Id. at 401. We
nevertheless made clear that the public policy undergirding the LLA is to
“encourage” landowners “to keep their lands in a natural, open and
environmentally wholesome state.” Id. at 400. We found this to be “an
9
important policy in view of the substantial and seemingly relentless shrinkage
and disappearance of such land areas from the face of our State.” Ibid.
In an effort to balance those interests and principles, this Court
identified four factors that reviewing courts should not “disregard” in applying
the LLA: “the use for which the land is zoned, the nature of the community in
which it is located, its relative isolation from densely populated
neighborhoods, as well as its general accessibility to the public at large.” Id.
at 401. Because we could not identify any intent on the part of the Legislature
to immunize “all landholders from liability for injuries incurred during the
course of outdoor recreational activity on their property, particularly with
respect to improved lands freely used by the general public . . . in urban or
suburban areas,” we found that the land at issue -- “an improved tract situated
in a highly populated suburban community” -- was not subject to immunity.
Id. at 401-02.
Approximately a decade later, the Appellate Division in Whitney v.
Jersey Central Power & Light Co. held that the LLA did not immunize a public
utility from liability for an ATV accident that occurred on a roadway used to
maintain the utility’s electrical lines that ran through a wildlife preserve. 240
N.J. Super. 420, 421-22 (App. Div. 1990). The appellate court found that such
a “roadway . . . is not the kind of ‘undeveloped, open and expansive rural [or]
10
semi rural’ property[] protected by the [LLA],” especially considering that
“the roadway did not appear to be in a natural condition.” Id. at 424 (first
alteration in original) (quoting Harrison, 80 N.J. at 400). Accordingly, the
court found that LLA immunity does not “extend[] to an improved and
regularly maintained property located in a sparsely populated area” and “used
in the conduct of a commercial enterprise.” Id. at 425.
C.
Almost immediately thereafter, and arguably in response to Whitney, see
Toogood, 313 N.J. Super. at 424, the Legislature enacted L. 1991, c. 496,
which broadened the scope of LLA immunity. The version of the LLA as
amended in 1991 is at issue in this case. Significantly, the Legislature made
clear, for the first time, that the LLA “shall be liberally construed to serve as
an inducement to the owners, lessees and occupants of property, that might
otherwise be reluctant to do so for fear of liability, to permit persons to come
onto their property for sport and recreational activities.” N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-5.1
(emphasis added). The 1991 LLA also expanded immunity coverage to
include “improved” or “commercial” premises and expanded the examples of
covered activities to include “riding snowmobiles, all-terrain vehicles or dirt
bikes.” Id. at -2 to -3.
The statute currently provides:
11
An owner, lessee or occupant of premises, whether or
not posted as provided in section 23:7-7 of the Revised
Statutes, and whether or not improved or maintained in
a natural condition, or used as part of a commercial
enterprise, owes no duty to keep the premises safe for
entry or use by others for sport and recreational
activities, or to give warning of any hazardous
condition of the land or in connection with the use of
any structure or by reason of any activity on such
premises to persons entering for such purposes.
[Id. at -3(a).]
And it currently defines “[s]port and recreational activities” to include:
hunting; fishing; trapping; horseback riding; training of
dogs; hiking; camping; picnicking; swimming; skating;
skiing; sledding; tobogganing; operating or riding
snowmobiles, all-terrain vehicles or dirt bikes; and any
other outdoor sport, game and recreational activity
including practice and instruction in any of these
activities.
[Id. at -2.]
D.
In Toogood, the first case construing the 1991 amendments, the
Appellate Division held that the LLA was inapplicable to a rollerblading
incident on a road within a residential condominium development. 313 N.J.
Super. at 420. The appellate court contrasted these facts with those in Weber
v. United States, 991 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.J. 1998), where an accident had
occurred on a swing set in a playground within a thirty-five-acre park inside
Fort Dix. The appellate court cited, with favor, the district court’s holding in
12
Weber that the LLA applied because “[m]aintenance of an open tract of land
and allowance of access by the general public for passive or active recreational
purposes are precisely the types of conduct the Legislature seeks to
encourage.” Toogood, 313 N.J. Super. at 425.
That said, the Appellate Division clarified that even though the 1991
amendments were in response to Whitney, which had “unnecessarily restricted
immunity afforded to landowners of . . . open tracts of land,” the Legislature’s
expansion of immunity was not intended to broaden the definition of
“premises” to include “owners and occupiers of suburban residential property”
such as a condominium development. Id. at 425-26. According to the
appellate court, the 1991 amendments were “clearly designed to focus the
inquiry on the dominant character of the land and to account for the evolving
types of activities considered recreational pursuits.” Ibid.
Consistent with Toogood, the Appellate Division in Mancuso v. Klose
declined to apply the LLA to injuries incurred when an eleven-year-old tripped
over a fence separating his yard from his neighbor’s yard. 322 N.J. Super.
289, 293-94 (App. Div. 1999). The appellate court first held that “passing
through” a neighbor’s property to join friends on another property for a game
of “tag” was not the type of recreational activity covered by the LLA. Id. at
296. Second, the Appellate Division agreed with the trial court’s conclusion
13
that a residential “neighborhood area with houses in close proximity to the
point where fences are put up to close off the houses” is not the type of
“premises” that is subject to the LLA. Id. at 297.
Against this backdrop of statutory enactments and interpretive case law,
we now consider whether the LLA encompasses Van Saun Park.
IV.
In applying the LLA, we rely on familiar principles of statutory
interpretation to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. State v. A.M., 252 N.J.
432, 450 (2023). We begin by looking to the statute’s plain language, ibid.,
and “presume that the Legislature intended the words that it chose and the
plain and ordinary meaning ascribed to those words” unless the statute
includes specific definitions, Paff v. Galloway Township, 229 N.J. 340, 353
(2017); accord N.J.S.A. 1:1-1.
As discussed above, the LLA immunizes liability for “sport and
recreational activities” on “premises” in an “improved . . . condition.”
N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-2 to -3(a). There can be no doubt that rollerblading falls
among the covered “activities,” which include “skating . . . and any other
outdoor sport, game and recreational activity.” Id. at -2. Arias does not
contest that she was engaged in a sport or recreational activity under the
statute. The 1991 amendments also made clear that rollerblading on a paved
14
path, i.e., an “improved . . . condition,” is protected within the scope of
immunity. See id. at -3(a).
The more challenging question is whether Van Saun Park is a “premises”
pursuant to a statute that provides no express definition for this term. See id.
at -2 to -3. The LLA provides limited guidance in this regard. It is clear from
the statute that a “premises” must be a property where “sport and recreational
activities,” as defined under N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-2, can be conducted, but the
long list of covered activities followed by the catch-all category of “any other
outdoor sport, game and recreational activity” leaves open a wide array of
possibilities. We find additional guidance in the precedent analyzing the LLA.
The Appellate Division has consistently held, both before and after the
1991 amendments, that the LLA does not apply to residential land in a
suburban setting: a backyard swimming pool in Boileau, 125 N.J. Super. at
266-67; a fence that separates backyards in Mancuso, 322 N.J. Super. at 293;
and a road within a residential condominium development in Toogood, 313
N.J. Super. at 420. We likewise see no evidence of legislative intent to induce
or immunize recreational activities in such residential backyards or
condominium developments -- and we do not alter any prior guidance in this
regard.
15
But Van Saun Park -- a 130-acre partially wooded park onto which the
public is invited, free of charge, to participate in numerous sport and
recreational activities, including rollerblading -- is distinct from the residential
properties at issue in Boileau, Mancuso, and Toogood. Even though it is
located in a densely populated suburban, rather than rural, area, the park
provides the same expansive and accessible property to which people are
drawn for outdoor sport and recreation. It is this very type of open property
that the Legislature seeks to maintain in New Jersey and protect through the
LLA.
It is here that we find the Appellate Division’s post-1991-amendments
analysis in Toogood to be particularly instructive. 313 N.J. Super. at 424-27.
In finding that a road within a condominium development was not the type of
“premises” that the Legislature sought to protect, the court in Toogood
juxtaposed a residential suburban road with a playground inside a thirty-fiveacre park in the Fort Dix Military Reservation and held that “[m]aintenance of
an open tract of land and allowance of access by the general public for passive
or active recreational purposes are precisely the types of conduct the
Legislature seeks to encourage.” Id. at 425-26. That same type of recreational
“conduct” on the same type of “premises” -- rollerblading in the 130-acre Van
Saun Park -- is present here.
16
In reaching its holding, the Toogood court emphasized that the 1991
amendments were “clearly designed to focus the inquiry on the dominant
character of the land and to account for the evolving types of activities
considered recreational pursuits.” Ibid. Harrison, relying upon the notion that
the legislative grant of immunity should be construed “narrow[ly],” laid out a
series of factors that, if “disregard[ed],” might lead the courts to take “too
expansive a view of the immunity conferred by the Legislature.” 80 N.J. at
401. The Legislature, however, clarified in 1991 that a more expansive view
of immunity should be taken going forward. See N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-5.1. In so
doing, the Legislature has altered our perspective on the four factors that the
pre-1991 Harrison opinion cautioned us not to “disregard”: the zoning of the
land, its surrounding community, its isolation, and its accessibility to the
public. See 80 N.J. Super. at 401. We no longer find those factors to be
particularly relevant, let alone determinative, in the context of an analysis that
should be guided by whether the “dominant character” of the subject
“premises” itself is of a type of open land conducive to engaging in sport and
recreational activities. 1
1
We do not foreclose the possibility that one of the Harrison factors may have a bearing on the fact-specific analysis required under the LLA. For instance, it is conceivable that a residential property could be surrounded by open lands conducive to the type of sport or recreational activity incentivized by the LLA,
17
For the Toogood court, the thirty-five-acre park in Weber was subject to
immunity because it was “open” space intended to be used for sport or
recreational purposes. 313 N.J. Super. at 425 (citing Weber, 991 F. Supp. at
695). The same is true for Van Saun Park. That notion of “open” space has its
roots in the initial articulation of landowner liability but, as we made clear in
Harrison, is subject to change as New Jersey, itself, changes. 80 N.J. at 400
(identifying the “importan[ce] . . . of the substantial and seemingly relentless
shrinkage and disappearance” of “open” spaces for purposes of interpreting
and applying the LLA). And New Jersey has changed substantially over the
half century since the first iteration of the LLA and the more than four decades
since we decided Harrison. It is, as the Appellate Division here found,
“axiomatic that New Jersey’s open spaces are diminishing rapidly.” Arias, 479
N.J. Super. at 285. In the context of a suburban setting such as Paramus, an
open and expansive 130-acre park in which the public is invited to participate
in sport and recreational activities is of the type and character of “premises”
for which immunity protection is both intended and appropriate pursuant to the
LLA.
and that such surrounding lands may impact the perspective toward the residential property in question.
18
Such treatment is consistent with the express intent of the 1991
amendments. Whereas, before 1991, we could not “ascribe a purpose on the
part of the Legislature to sanction an expansive application of the operative
statute,” Harrison, 80 N.J. at 403, after 1991, we now find such a purpose to be
express, N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-5.1; accord Assemb. Judiciary L. & Pub. Safety
Comm. Statement to A. 4678 (Dec. 5, 1991) (the LLA “shall be liberally
construed to serve as an inducement to permit persons to use the property for
recreational activities”). We find that an analysis focused on the “dominant
character” of the land comports with that express purpose.
Finally, we are concerned that holding Van Saun Park is not a
“premises” under the LLA would expose the County to liability and might
discourage counties and municipalities from opening existing or new
properties to the public for free. As recognized by the LLA and cases like
Harrison, there is inherent difficulty in monitoring open and expansive land to
prevent trespassers or guarantee the safety of the entire property. See, e.g.,
Harrison, 80 N.J. at 399. That is no less true for a 130-acre park. If the park
was not covered by the LLA, the costs of potential liability would likely be
passed on to the taxpayer, directly through increased taxes or indirectly
through decreased or eliminated services. To avoid such risks and costs,
municipalities might close parks, avoid opening new ones, or begin charging
19
admission to facilities such as Van Saun Park. Such consequences are
antithetical to the Legislature’s express purpose in enacting and subsequently
broadening the LLA.
V.
The above survey of precedent and law in the context of landowner
immunity for sport and recreational activities is instructive: what began as
narrow immunity for hunting and fishing in forested lands has evolved into a
broader immunity that is intended to be both “liberally construed” and to
“induce[]” landowners to create or maintain open lands for a broad and nonexclusive array of “sport and recreational activities” without “fear of liability.”
N.J.S.A. 2A:42A-5.1. Not surprisingly, this evolution has occurred in a state
in which such open lands and the recreational opportunities they provide are
becoming increasingly scarce and in need of protection. Recognizing that Van
Saun Park is the type of “premises” that the Legislature intended to protect and
preserve -- and that its dominant character is that of open and expansive land
onto which the public is invited to recreate -- is consistent with legislative
intent as well as the above-surveyed precedent.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate
Division.
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CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRELOUIS, WAINER APTER, FASCIALE, and NORIEGA join in JUSTICE
HOFFMAN’s opinion.
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