Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 52
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-24-165
CHRISTINA MORRIS Opinion Delivered January 28, 2026
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE BENTON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 04DR-10-1411]
CHAD MORRIS HONORABLE DOUG SCHRANTZ,
APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED
STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge
Pro se appellant, Christina Morris, appeals from a Benton County Circuit Court
order denying her petition for modification of visitation and contempt. Christina argues ten
points on appeal, all of which allege violations of her Due Process rights under the United
States Constitution. However, Christina did not make these constitutional arguments
below, and because they are raised for the first time on appeal, they will not be considered
by this court. It is well settled that we will not address an issue raised for the first time on
appeal, even a constitutional argument. Rawlins v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 83, 684 S.W.3d
602. Therefore, this opinion will focus on the crux of each issue on appeal without the
constitutional analysis.
Christina presents for this court’s consideration the following points on appeal: The
circuit court erred in (1) finding the appellee, Chad Morris, did not violate Arkansas Rule
of Civil Procedure Rule 5 when effecting service upon her; (2) ruling Christina could not
enjoy standard visitation rights without first finding that she is unfit or a danger to the
children; (3) finding Christina did not comply with the requirements of the psychological
evaluation of Dr. John Childers; (4) ruling joint custody could never occur; (5) failing to
issue a statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law; (6) failing to properly serve her
with a final order; (7) restricting her ability to discuss the court case with her children; (8)
failing to rule on the motions she filed seeking protection of sensitive information; (9)
allowing testimony from witnesses on material outside the scope of the proceedings; and
(10) not appointing a new court-appointed therapist. We affirm.
I. Relevant Facts
After this court handed down its opinion in Morris I in October 2022, Christina filed
an emergency petition for modification of visitation and contempt in June 2023.1 A
temporary hearing on Christina’s petition was held on July 5, 2023. During this hearing,
Christina contended that the original standard visitation order and the 2018 modification of
the order that prohibits leaving MC2 alone or in the care of an individual under twentyone was still in effect after the 2020 modification order. She argued the court must enforce
these stipulations—specifically, that MC2 should not be left unsupervised and that Chad
must communicate with her through AppClose. 2 Christina claimed Chad had left the
1
The factual background leading to this appeal was thoroughly examined in Morris I.
Please refer to Morris v. Morris (Morris I), 2022 Ark. App. 386, at 7–8, 653 S.W.3d 533, 538–
39, the details of which we hereby incorporate. In this opinion, we will focus only on the
pertinent facts from the prior appeal in the context of the current case.
2
AppClose is a comprehensive co-parenting mobile and web platform designed to
help separated or divorced parents manage communication, schedules, and expenses in a
structured, documented way.
2
children, ages fourteen and fifteen, unattended during a business meeting, thus prompting
the need for enforcement.
Chad provided testimony regarding MC2’s genetic disorder, medications, and
educational background. He disagreed with Christina’s view of MC2’s diagnosis as a serious
health condition and stated he was aware of the requirements of the 2018 modification order
but felt confident allowing the children to remain home alone after school due to their age,
maturity, and an unblemished record. While Chad used AppClose to communicate with
Christina, he stated he was cautious about sharing information to keep her from
undermining MC2’s educators and making MC2 feel bad about herself. He noted
improvements in both children since the transition to supervised visitation, highlighting that
Christina had not utilized her supervised visitation rights. At the conclusion of the temporary
hearing, the court denied Christina’s request for emergency relief and ordered her to pay
Chad $1,500 in attorney’s fees.
On October 31, 2023, the court held a final hearing on Christina’s petition. During
this hearing, Christina argued she had not been properly served by either Chad or the court,
which the court found disingenuous and “smack[ing] of gamesmanship” because she served
Chad by email and asked the court to contact her by email, but she wanted Chad to serve
her in person or by regular mail. Christina had actual notice of Chad’s pleadings, and the
court found no prejudice to her. Christina also requested to proceed only on the issue of
her fitness for standard visitation while postponing the contempt aspect, to which the court
agreed. However, once testimony began, Christina objected to discussions regarding the
children’s best interest, claiming it was outside the scope of her fitness evaluation. The court
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clarified that the best interest of the children is paramount in custody cases, thus remaining
a significant consideration.
Ross Kelley, a mental-health therapist, testified on Christina’s behalf. He discussed
his review of Dr. Childers’s reports, which raised concerns that Christina potentially suffers
from schizophrenia, delusional disorder, paranoid personality disorder, and obsessivecompulsive disorder. Despite the fact that he had evaluated Christina over multiple sessions
and did not see her as a risk to others, Kelley acknowledged during cross-examination that
he had not reviewed the foundational reports behind Dr. Childers’s conclusions and was
not qualified to interpret Dr. Childers’s tests. He also noted Christina had not completed
the additional recommended psychological testing and agreed she should avoid discussing
the court case with her children.
Christina stated that while she was not prepared for overnight visits, she sought
increased, unsupervised visitation with the children. Chad testified against unsupervised
visitation due to Christina’s previous behavior. He explained that Christina discouraged
MC2 from listening to her teachers and often emotionally distressed the children by crying
during phone conversations. Chad expressed his belief that Christina should be limited in
her interactions with the school.
Dr. Crouch, MC2’s long-time psychiatrist, testified that he sees MC2 biannually. He
noted a period of calm since the custody change in 2019 and characterized Christina as
excessively narcissistic: she dismisses differing views and labels herself as an expert in various
fields. He explained that Christina’s attendance at appointments was often disruptive due to
her tendency to intervene excessively in MC2’s care.
4
Marlene Bradshaw, a special education coordinator in the Bentonville School
District, shared her experiences with MC2 and Christina. Having known MC2 since fourth
grade, she detailed MC2’s struggles with the transition to high school, which led to her
enrollment in a virtual program. Regarding Christina, Bradshaw described her interactions
with school staff as contentious and often bullying, noting that Christina was frequently in
“attack mode,” which hindered collaborative solutions.
Susan Kilpatrick, the court-appointed therapist for the children, testified that MC1
had discovered details about the court case online, which disturbed him. Kilpatrick
originally recommended discontinuing unsupervised visitation due to concerns about the
information Christina shared with the children. She characterized the relationship between
Christina and the children as “not irreparable, but currently very challenging.”
At the close of testimony, both Christina and Chad provided closing remarks, and
the children’s attorney ad litem expressed that unsupervised visitation would be detrimental
to the children and that both children asked to maintain supervised visitation with their
mother.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court found that Christina’s claims
regarding improper service were insincere and not in violation of Arkansas Rule of Civil
Procedure 5, issued a protective order concerning the children’s medical records, and
prohibited both parties from discussing the court case with the children. The court also
expressed concern about Christina’s history of subjecting MC2 to unnecessary medical tests,3
3
See Morris I for an in-depth recitation of this issue.
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which it deemed abusive, and highlighted Christina’s failure to acknowledge or address her
mental-health issues.
In its subsequent written order, the court made the following rulings:
(3) The court finds that based on the testimony presented, that there is absolutely
no chance or likelihood that the parties could ever share joint custody due to
the actions and behaviors of [Christina], as a result, joint custody of the minor
children is not deemed possible or appropriate;
(4) The court further finds that based on the testimony presented today, that the
actions of [Christina] do not show a compliance with the requirements of the
psychological evaluation and recommendations of Dr. John H. Childers, Jr.
which was entered in the previous trial of this matter on November 24, 2020.
Further, it does not appear that [Christina] has established any basis that the
modification of visitation would be in the minor children’s best interest, and
therefore, the court finds and directs that the visitation to be exercised by
[Christina] shall be in compliance with the visitation set forth in the order
entered on December 16, 2020, whereupon it was stated that . . . [Christina]
shall be entitled to exercise supervised visitation . . . .
(5) In light of [Christina’s] statement that she is unclear of what is or is not
appropriate, the Court has attempted to clarify once again that [Christina] is
specifically ordered and prohibited from discussing the court case or related
matters with the children during these visitations. . . .
(6) [Christina] shall be allowed to have two (2) phone calls per week with the minor
children . . . .
(7) It is further clear from the testimony presented by [Christina] and the testimony
of Dr. Matthew Crouch, Susan Kilpatrick, and Maureen Bradshaw that
[Christina] has been a disruptive force to the therapy by both Dr. Crouch and
Susan Kilpatrick, and in addition, has been disruptive to the educational process
not only for [MC2], but for other children as well, and as a result, [Christina]
is specifically ordered, prohibited and enjoined from communicating in any
manner, entering upon the premises or businesses or other buildings or
Matthew Crouch, Susan Kilpatrick, [MC’s school] or any other medical or
mental health care provider of the parties minor children. . . .
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II. Standard of Review
In domestic-relations cases, we review the evidence de novo and will not reverse the
circuit court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Brown v. Brown, 2012 Ark. 89, 387
S.W.3d 159. We also give special deference to the circuit court’s superior position in
evaluating the witnesses, their testimony, and the child’s best interest. Id. Because a circuit
court maintains continuing jurisdiction over visitation, it may modify or vacate a prior
visitation order when it becomes aware of a material change in circumstances since the
previous order. Id. The party seeking modification has the burden of demonstrating such a
material change in circumstances. Id. Regarding visitation, the primary consideration is the
best interest of the child. Id. Important factors for the court to consider in determining
reasonable visitation are the wishes of the child, the capacity of the party desiring visitation
to supervise and care for the child, problems of transportation and prior conduct in abusing
visitation, the work schedule or stability of the parties, and relationship with siblings and
other relatives. Id. The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that fixing visitation rights is a
matter that lies within the sound discretion of the circuit court. Id.
III. Analysis
A. Best-Interest Arguments
Points two, three, and four will be addressed together because they each require a
best-interest analysis. While a circuit court retains jurisdiction to modify an initial custody
award, the standard for modification is more stringent than it is for the initial determination.
Powell v. Marshall, 88 Ark. App. 257, 265, 197 S.W.3d 24, 28–29 (2004). A party seeking
to modify custody must prove that a material change of circumstances has occurred since
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the last order of custody or that material facts were unknown to the court when the decree
was entered. Id., 197 S.W.3d at 28. If that threshold requirement is met, the court must
then determine who should have custody, with the sole consideration being the best interest
of the child. Evans v. McKinney, 2014 Ark. App. 440, at 4, 440 S.W.3d 357, 359. If the
threshold requirement of a material change in circumstances is not met, there is no need for
a best-interest finding. Ellington v. Ellington, 2019 Ark. App. 395, at 6, 587 S.W.3d 237,
241. The reason for this more stringent standard for modifying custody is to promote
stability and continuity in the life of the child and to discourage repeated litigation of the
same issues. Powell, 88 Ark. App. at 265, 197 S.W.3d at 29.
Christina argues that the circuit court erred in denying her request for unsupervised
visitation without making a finding that she was unfit. The standard Christina must meet is
not whether she is unfit or a danger but whether there was a material change of
circumstances warranting modification of the custody award. Change-of-custody decisions
must be based on the particular facts and circumstances of each case in relation to the
standard of the best interest of the child. Hudgens v. Martin, 2009 Ark. App. 462. In addition,
credibility determinations are left to the circuit court, and we will not reweigh the evidence.
Glisson v. Glisson, 2018 Ark. App. 21, at 11, 538 S.W.3d 864, 870. Here, the court found
that Christina did not establish any basis that the modification of visitation would be in the
children’s best interest. Moreover, the children expressed their preference for supervised
visitation with Christina, which is an appropriate factor for the lower court to consider. See
Myers v. McCall, 2009 Ark. App. 541, at 7, 334 S.W.3d 878, 882. We cannot say the circuit
court’s finding was clearly erroneous; therefore, we affirm on this point.
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Christina argues in her third point that the circuit court erred in ruling she did not
comply with the requirements of the psychological evaluation and the recommendations of
Dr. Childers. As the circuit court explained, the best interest of the children must always be
considered. It is clear from the record before us that Christina has not complied with the
provisions of the 2020 order when it comes to addressing her mental-health issues.
Therefore, the lower court was within its discretion to determine there had not been a
change in circumstances warranting modification of custody, nor would it be in the
children’s best interest to do so. We find no merit to her argument and affirm.
For her fourth point on appeal, Christina argues that the circuit court erred by
including a ruling in its order that joint custody could never occur. Her argument ignores
the importance of the children’s best interest. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. 2025) provides that joint custody is favored in Arkansas. In an action
concerning an original custody determination, there is a rebuttable presumption that joint
custody is in the child’s best interest, but this presumption may be rebutted if the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that joint custody is not in the child’s best interest. Ark.
Code Ann. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(iv)(a) & (b)(1). Therefore, because the court was required
to make a best-interest determination when deciding to modify the custody arrangement,
its decision regarding joint custody was not in error. However, we note that the circuit
court’s ruling on the issue of joint custody is open to modification should a material change
of circumstances arise and should it be in the children’s best interest for the parties to share
joint custody. Arkansas uses a present-based analysis when analyzing custody issues, and the
circuit court must examine the changes and best interest of the children presented as
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evidence to the court at the time of the final hearing, not changes that may occur weeks,
months, or years down the road. See Acklin v. Acklin, 2017 Ark. App. 322, at 2, 521 S.W.3d
538, 539 (holding that material changes had to have occurred since the last order of custody).
B. Failure to Issue a Statement of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Next, Christina argues that the circuit court erred in denying her motion to provide
a statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Under Arkansas Rule of Civil
Procedure 52, if requested by a party at any time prior to the entry of the judgment, in all
contested actions tried upon the facts without a jury, the court shall find the facts specially
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant
to Rule 58; and in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions, the court shall similarly
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its
action. Ark. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1). Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Id. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous (clearly against the preponderance of the evidence), and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the circuit court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses. Id. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall
be considered as the findings of the court. Id. If an opinion or memorandum of decision is
filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear therein. Id.
Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under these
rules. Id.
In reviewing Rule 52 and the record, including the order Christina references, her
argument is without merit. Christina filed her motion after the court entered its order.
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Additionally, the order did contain findings of fact and conclusions of law. Rule 52(a) does
not impose a strict burden on the circuit court; the court need only make brief, definite,
and pertinent findings of fact and conclusions of law on the contested matters. CenterPoint
Energy Gas Transmission Co. v. Green, 2012 Ark. App. 326, 413 S.W.3d 867. The court need
not explain why it found the facts the way it did or give detailed reasons for its decision. Id.
Rather, the findings should be specific enough to enable the appellate court to understand
the factual basis and analytical process by which the circuit court reached its decision. Id.
The rule does not require specific findings on each and every factual question arising in the
lawsuit. Weathersbee v. Wallace, 14 Ark. App. 174, 686 S.W.2d 447 (1985). In this case, the
circuit court addressed the relevant issues, and the basis for its ruling was clear. Therefore,
we affirm.
C. Service Under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 5
Christina’s sixth argument on appeal requires us to determine if she was properly
served under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 5. Specifically, Christina asserts the
circuit court did not properly serve her with a final order.
Under Rule 5, service on the attorney or on the party shall be made by delivering a
copy to him or by sending it to him by regular mail or a commercial delivery company at
his last known address or, if no address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court.
Ark. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2). Delivery of a copy, for purposes of this paragraph, means handing
it to the attorney or to the party; leaving it at his office with his clerk or other person in
charge thereof; or, if the office is closed or the person has no office, leaving it at his dwelling
house or usual place of abode with some person residing therein who is at least fourteen
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years of age. Id. Service by mail is presumptively complete upon mailing, and service by a
commercial delivery company is presumptively complete upon depositing the papers with
the company. Id. When service is permitted on an attorney, such service may be effected
by electronic transmission, including email, provided that the attorney being served has
facilities within his or her office to receive and reproduce verbatim electronic transmissions.
Id. Service is complete upon transmission but is not effective if it does not reach the person
to be served. Id.
Christina’s argument that the circuit court did not properly serve her with the final
order is a misapplication of Rule 5. Rule 5(b)(3) requires parties, not the circuit court, to
effectuate proper service. Additionally, Rule 5 only requires service under Rule 44 when
new claims are brought after a final judgment is entered. Ark. R. Civ. P. 5(a). We affirm. Commented [KW1]: I would move all of this above the
section addressing points not developed or preserved to
make more sense chronologically based on the
D. Remaining Points Not Developed or Preserved for Review adjustment to point one. I’ve done this below, but leaving
here incase you don’t like that.
Points one, seven, eight, and ten are not preserved for this court’s review. Point one,
that because Chad served Christine through email, she was not properly served under Rule
5, is not developed enough for this court’s review. Christina does not identify which specific
pleading Chad failed to serve her with. We will not make an appellant’s argument for her
or consider an argument that is not properly developed. Cullen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2021
Ark. App. 445, 2021 WL 5349459. Because this point has not been developed, it provides
no grounds for reversal. Id.
4
Under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4(a), immediately on the filing of the
complaint, the clerk shall issue a summons to the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s attorney, who
shall deliver it for service to a person authorized by this statute to serve process.
12
Point seven, that the circuit court erred in restricting Christina’s ability to discuss the
court case with her children, focuses on freedom of speech and content-based regulations
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which, as discussed above,
is not preserved for this court’s review.
Point eight is that the circuit court erred in not ruling on Christina’s motions seeking
to seal or redact the records in this case; however, Christina failed to obtain a ruling on this
issue. It is an appellant’s responsibility to obtain a ruling to preserve an issue for appeal, and
the failure to obtain a ruling precludes our review. TEMCO Constr., LLC v. Gann, 2013
Ark. 202, 427 S.W.3d 651.
Point ten is that the circuit court abused its discretion by allowing Kilpatrick to
continue as the minor children’s court-ordered therapist, but Christina never objected to
this ruling during the lower court proceedings. This court will not address arguments made
for the first time on appeal. Compton v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 587, 682 S.W.3d 348.
E. Allowing Witness Testimony Outside the Scope of the Hearing
Finally, Christina argues that the circuit court erred in allowing Ms. Bradshaw, Ms.
Kilpatrick, and Dr. Crouch to testify as to the best interest of the children and then use that
testimony as a basis for its order prohibiting her from entering school grounds and interfering
with the children’s educational and medical needs. Circuit courts possess broad discretion
in matters pertaining to discovery and the admission of witness testimony. See Neal v. Neal,
2016 Ark. App. 223, 491 S.W.3d 467. The witnesses Chad called in this case and the
testimony they provided were relevant to the issue of whether Christina had taken steps to
improve her mental-health issues and aided the court in determining whether custody
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modification would be in the minor children’s best interest. Ms. Bradshaw, Ms. Kilpatrick,
and Dr. Crouch provided testimony that assisted the circuit court in its decision whether to
modify custody. We hold that it was within the circuit court’s discretion to allow the
testimony of these three individuals.
Affirmed.
ABRAMSON and GLADWIN, JJ., agree.
Christina Morris, pro se appellant.
Tim Cullen, for appellee.
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