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Amadasun v. Armstrong, Town Clerk of South Windsor
HARRISON AMADASUN v. BONNIE ARMSTRONG,
TOWN CLERK OF SOUTH WINDSOR
(SC 21196)
Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker,
Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff, a candidate for town council in the November, 2025 South Windsor municipal election, appealed from the trial court’s judgment dismissing his action brought pursuant to the statutes (§§ 9-328 and 9-371b) affording a candidate who is aggrieved by any ruling of any election official in connection with a municipal election or referendum, respectively, expedited judicial review of his or her claims. In the November, 2025 municipal election, South Windsor electors approved, by way of referendum, several revisions to the South Windsor charter, one of which changed the maximum number of individuals affiliated with a particular political party who could serve on the nine member town council from six individuals to a bare majority of five. During that election, electors also voted for town council candidates, with six Democratic Party candidates receiving more votes than any Republican Party candidate. The plaintiff received the sixth highest vote total of the Democratic candidates, and B received the fourth highest vote total of the Republican candidates. Following the election, the defendant, the South Windsor town clerk, determined that the bare majority charter revision, as approved in the referendum, applied to the 2025 town council election, even though the minutes from a meeting of the South Windsor Charter Revision Commission at which the commission proposed the bare majority charter revision indicated that the revision, if approved, would not take effect until the November, 2027 South Windsor municipal election. The town clerk thereupon issued a preliminary list of election winners, declaring that B, rather than the plaintiff, had won the final seat on the town council. The plaintiff claimed in the trial court that he was aggrieved by the town clerk’s decision to apply the bare majority charter revision in determining which candidates had won the November, 2025 town council election. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the town clerk’s decision was not a ruling of an election official within the meaning of §§ 9-328 and 9-371b. On appeal from the trial court’s judgment of dismissal, the plaintiff claimed that the trial court incorrectly had concluded that the town clerk’s application of the bare majority charter revision to determine the results of the November, 2025 town council election was not a ruling of an election official for purposes of §§ 9-328 and 9-371b. Held:
The trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and, accordingly, this court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The town clerk’s decision to apply the newly approved bare majority charter revision, rather than the provisions of the charter that purportedly were in effect on the day of the November, 2025 municipal election, to determine the composition of the town council from that same election constituted a ruling of an election official for purposes of §§ 9-328 and 9-371b.
Amadasun v. Armstrong, Town Clerk of South Windsor
The town clerk was required to determine the winners of the town council election pursuant to statute (§ 9-167a (c)) and to report those winners to the secretary of the state pursuant to statute (§ 9-320 (a)), and the fact that these two statutory directives are codified in title 9 of the General Statutes strongly suggested that they are electoral in nature.
The town clerk, in deciding that the bare majority charter revision was applicable to the November, 2025 municipal election, necessarily interpreted the South Windsor charter in order to determine the effective date of that revision, which, in turn, directly affected the accuracy of the results that the town clerk determined under § 9-167a (c) and reported under § 9-320 (a). Moreover, the town clerk’s resolution of a question about the applicability of a charter revision to the town council candidates elected simultaneously with the approval of that revision is within the purpose of the election contest statutes, and the town clerk’s decision to apply the newly approved bare majority charter revision ultimately dictated the answer to the question of who won the election.
Argued January 13—officially released February 17, 2026*
Procedural History
Action challenging, inter alia, the defendant’s determination that certain revisions to the town charter,
which had been approved by town electors by way of referendum, were applicable to the 2025 municipal election
for town council, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Hartford, where the court, Cobb, J., granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and rendered
judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to
this court. Reversed; further proceedings.
John B. Kennelly, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Jesse A. Langer, with whom, on the brief, were Richard D. Carella and Brian C. Hoeing, for the appellee
(defendant).
Opinion
ALEXANDER, J. This expedited appeal arises from
a dispute concerning whether certain revisions to the
South Windsor Charter (charter), approved by town
electors by way of referendum in the November 4, 2025
*
February 17, 2026, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
Amadasun v. Armstrong, Town Clerk of South Windsor
South Windsor (town) municipal election, determine
the outcome of the election of the town council, which
was conducted that same day. The sole issue presented
requires us to decide if the town clerk, the defendant,
Bonnie Armstrong, made a “ruling of [an] election official” within the meaning of General Statutes §§ 9-328
and 9-371b when she applied minority representation
requirements from the newly adopted charter revisions
in determining who had won the town council election.
As a result of her decision to apply the new charter revisions, the defendant awarded the final seat on the town
council to Richard M. Balboni, Jr.,1 rather than to the
plaintiff, Harrison Amadasun.2 The trial court dismissed
the plaintiff’s action after concluding that the defendant’s decision was not “a ruling of an election official” for purposes of §§ 9-328 and 9-371b. We disagree and
reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The record reveals the following facts, as alleged in
the operative complaint and attached exhibits. See, e.g., Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651–52, 974 A.2d 669
(2009). In September, 2023, the town council established
a charter revision commission (commission). At that
time, §§ 203 and 204 of the charter provided for minority representation on the town council and limited the
nine member town council to a maximum of six members
1
The plaintiff named Stephanie Thomas, in her official capacity as secretary of the state, and the State Elections Enforcement Commission as defendants for notice purposes only pursuant to §§ 9-328 and 9-371b. They appeared but did not otherwise participate in this action.
The plaintiff also named Balboni as a notice defendant. He appeared but did not participate in the hearing before the trial court or in this appeal. After we announced our decision from the bench in this appeal, the plaintiff amended his complaint to add a quo warranto count and to name Balboni as a defendant with respect to that count. As of the date of this opinion, a trial on the merits is scheduled for April 1 and 2, 2026.
At our request, counsel from the Office of the Attorney General appeared at oral argument before this court to represent the position of the secretary of the state on the statutory issues in this appeal. The court appreciates the participation of counsel from the Office of the Attorney General in this matter.
2
The Office of the Appellate Clerk has corrected the spelling of the plaintiff’s last name in this appeal.
Amadasun v. Armstrong, Town Clerk of South Windsor
of any political party. Those sections also precluded
any political party from nominating and electing more
than six candidates for the town council. South Windsor
Charter §§ 203 and 204 (2023). The commission proposed
revisions to §§ 203 and 204 that would increase minority
representation by decreasing the majority number from
six to five, thus allowing for only a “bare majority . . . .” The proposed charter revisions eliminated the elected
positions of treasurer and board of selectmen, and converted the town clerk position from an elected office to
an appointed one. The minutes from the commission’s
March 18, 2025 meeting indicate that the proposed charter revisions would take effect on November 2, 2027;
the revisions themselves indicate that the town clerk
would be an appointed office on that date. Approval of
the proposed charter revisions was a referendum question on the ballot in the town’s municipal election held
on November 4, 2025. The town’s voters approved the
revisions in that election.
In that same municipal election, the town’s voters
elected officers, including the town council, board of
education, board of selectmen, planning and zoning commission, town clerk, and town treasurer. Consistent with
the provisions of the charter that governed at the time
of the election, the Democratic and Republican Parties
each nominated six candidates for the town council, and
the ballot instructed the voters to choose “[u]p to [s]ix” candidates for the town council, rather than the five prescribed by the proposed revised charter provisions. Each
of the six Democratic candidates, one of whom was the
plaintiff, received more votes than any Republican candidate; the plaintiff received the sixth highest vote total of the Democratic candidates, and Balboni received the
fourth highest vote total of the Republican candidates.
Shortly after election day, the defendant issued a list
of the “[p]reliminary [w]inners” of the election. Because the defendant had determined that the bare majority
charter revisions, as approved in the referendum, would
apply to the 2025 town council election consistent with
Amadasun v. Armstrong, Town Clerk of South Windsor
their “adoption date of November 5, 2025,” the list of
preliminary winners declared that Balboni, rather than
the plaintiff, had won a seat on the town council. The
defendant applied the November 5, 2025 adoption date
to the election for town council because § 1005 (b) of the charter, which preexisted the work of the commission,
provides that “[t]he effective date of [charter] revisions, if adopted by a referendum, shall be the day immediately
following such referendum.”3 The defendant’s list of preliminary winners also stated that three individuals had
been elected to the board of selectmen and one individual had been elected treasurer, despite the elimination of
those positions in the charter revisions. On November
10, 2025, the defendant swore all of the purported election winners into office, including the three selectmen,
the treasurer, and the nine member town council, with
Balboni seated instead of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff brought this action pursuant to §§ 9-328
and 9-371b, which provide for the expedited review of
election disputes in municipal and referenda elections,
respectively. The plaintiff claimed that he was “aggrieved by the ruling of the defendant in her capacity as an election official to apply the charter revisions to the November 4, 2025 municipal election . . . .” He claimed that he was harmed because (1) “[a]ssuming arguendo that the
charter revisions adopted by referendum were effective
as of November 5, 2025, their application to . . . the
November 4, 2025 election results constitutes a retroactive application of a law [that] improperly compromises
a substantive right,” (2) “[t]he defendant’s unequal and
subjective application of the charter revisions by seating the treasurer and board of selectmen but not all six
Democratic town council candidates is a violation of the
equal protection clauses of both the Connecticut and
3
In light of General Statutes §§ 9-320 and 9-371, we express no view on the effective dates of either the election of town council candidates or the referendum changes. We also express no view as to whether the charter revisions apply retroactively to the results of the November 4, 2025 election or only prospectively to the next municipal election. These issues will be before the trial court when it considers the merits of this case.
Amadasun v. Armstrong, Town Clerk of South Windsor
United States constitutions,” and (3) “[t]he defendant’s
interpretation that the charter revisions . . . were to be effective on November 5, 2025, and not November 2,
2027, is clearly erroneous and improper.”
The defendant moved to dismiss the action on the
ground that the plaintiff was not statutorily aggrieved
because §§ 9-328 and 9-371b are limited to challenges to
“ruling[s] of an election official” and “[do] not provide for jurisdiction over charter amendment disputes.” Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to
dismiss, concluding that the plaintiff had not established that the defendant’s application of the revised charter
provisions was a “ruling of an election official . . . .” The court determined that the defendant’s decision did not
“involv[e] the election process, as required under the
statutes,” because it “occurred after the election was
over, the votes were counted, and there were no claims
regarding the number of votes each candidate for town
council received. [The defendant’s] decision was not
applicable to ‘the election process’ but involved an after election application of the revised charter, the effective date provision.” The trial court concluded that “this
determination or ruling was made in conformity with the
charter revisions, and the defendant was merely applying and abiding by the law.” Accordingly, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and rendered
judgment thereon.
The plaintiff appealed directly from the judgment of
dismissal to this court.4 Following an expedited brief4
General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (5) permits a direct appeal to this court in “any election or primary dispute brought to the Supreme Court pursuant to . . . [General Statutes §] 9-325 . . . .” Neither party to this case followed the appellate process contemplated by § 9-325, which requires “any party to the complaint” to raise “any question of law . . . [that] should be reviewed by the Supreme Court” and the trial court to “transmit” its decision, such certified questions of law, and a “proper finding of facts” to the chief justice, who then calls a “special session” of this court to hold a hearing within fifteen days of the trial court’s judgment “upon the questions of law so certified.” Nonetheless, because § 9-325 provides that “[n]othing in [that] section shall be considered as prohibiting an appeal to the Supreme Court from a final judgment
Amadasun v. Armstrong, Town Clerk of South Windsor
ing schedule, we held oral argument on January 13,
2026. Immediately after oral argument, we issued the
following order: “The judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint brought pursuant to §§ 9-328 and 9-371b is
reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings according to law.” We stated at the
time that this written opinion would follow.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court
incorrectly concluded that the defendant’s application
of the bare majority charter revisions to determine the
results of the town council election was not a “ruling of an election official.” Relying heavily on Whitnum Baker
v. Secretary of the State, 350 Conn. 753, 326 A.3d 235
(2024) (three judge panel pursuant to General Statutes
§ 9-323),5 and Caruso v. Bridgeport, 285 Conn. 618, 941
of the Superior Court,” we have often exercised our discretion to treat appeals from a final judgement in which the parties and the trial court have not made use of the procedure described in § 9-325 as if they had been filed in the Appellate Court and transferred to this court under § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1. See, e.g., Airey v. Feliciano, 350 Conn. 162, 168 n.4, 323 A.3d 1037 (2024); Caruso v. Bridgeport, 285 Conn. 618, 622 n.3, 941 A.2d 266 (2008); Bortner v. Woodbridge, 250 Conn. 241, 245 n.4, 736 A.2d 104 (1999). We did the same in this present appeal, including complying with the requirement in § 9-325 that we hear the appeal within fifteen days, regardless of the length or complexity of the trial court proceedings under review.
We continue to “invite the legislature to clarify whether the 1978 amendments to § 9-325 . . . authorize direct appeals to this court outside of the certified question process.” (Citation omitted.) Airey v. Feliciano, supra, 168 n.4; see also Wrinn v. Dunleavy, 186 Conn. 125, 134 n.10, 440 A.2d 261 (1982). We also caution the bench and bar that our use of this procedure to expedite election contest appeals taken without compliance with § 9-325 is wholly discretionary.
5
Section 9-323 differs from the other election contest statutes because it gives judges of this court original jurisdiction over questions of fact and law in disputes arising from the elections of presidential electors, United States senators, and United States representatives. See, e.g., In re Election of the United States Representative for the Second Congressional District, 231 Conn. 602, 608 n.5, 653 A.2d 79 (1994). Under § 9-323, one judge of this court hears a federal election contest when the proceeding is brought “prior to such election,” with “complaints ‘made subsequent to the election’ . . . decided by a panel of three judges.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Whitnum Baker v. Secretary of the State, supra, 350 Conn. 755 n.1. Because § 9-323 does not provide for en banc or panel review of the decision of the assigned
Amadasun v. Armstrong, Town Clerk of South Windsor
A.2d 266 (2008), the plaintiff contends that the defendant necessarily interpreted the charter and the effective date of its revisions in executing her responsibility under General Statutes § 9-320 (a) to determine who had been
elected to town office and to inform the secretary of the state accordingly. The plaintiff emphasizes the selective nature of the defendant’s decision, which implemented
the bare majority charter revisions, but not the position elimination aspect of the charter revisions, and posits
that, “as an election official, [the defendant] made a
ruling that decided a question presented to the official, namely, in what order do the results of the election come into effect?”6 We agree with the plaintiff.
The jurisdictional issue in this case is whether the
plaintiff was statutorily aggrieved by a “ruling of [an]
election official” under §§ 9-328 and 9-371b. See, e.g.,
Arciniega v. Feliciano, 329 Conn. 293, 301–302, 184
A.3d 1202 (2018). Aggrievement implicates the plaintiff’s standing and the court’s subject matter jurisdiction; e.g., id., 300–301; and our review of the trial court’s ruling on the defendant’s motion to dismiss is plenary.
See, e.g., Manginelli v. Regency House of Wallingford,
Inc., 347 Conn. 581, 591, 298 A.3d 263 (2023).
Under § 9-328, “[a]ny elector or candidate claiming to
have been aggrieved by any ruling of any election official in connection with an election for any municipal office . . . may bring a complaint to any judge of the Superior Court
for relief therefrom.” (Emphasis added.) Section 9-371b
is similarly worded and provides an expedited remedy
judge or judges; see Fay v. Merrill, 336 Conn. 432, 442 n.14, 246 A.3d 970 (2020) (Robinson, C. J.) (assigned pursuant to § 9-323); decisions of one or three Supreme Court judges acting pursuant to that statute are not binding precedent with respect to this court and thus constitute only persuasive authority.
6
The plaintiff also asserts that this ruling was effectively “a mistake in the count of votes cast for any [municipal] office,” as contemplated by § 9-328, and that, under Bortner v. Woodbridge, 250 Conn. 241, 269, 736 A.2d 104 (1999), “[a]n election official’s mistake in the count of the vote [confers] jurisdiction [on] the court in addition to and independently from an allegation of an aggrievement by the ruling of an election official.” Given our conclusion that the defendant’s determination was a ruling of an election official, we need not address these arguments.
Amadasun v. Armstrong, Town Clerk of South Windsor
to “[a]ny person . . . claiming to have been aggrieved by any ruling of any election official in connection with a
referendum . . . .”
A significant body of case law has explained the meaning of the phrase “ruling of any election official” under the various election contest statutes and has given it
the same meaning across the scheme. See, e.g., Airey v.
Feliciano, 352 Conn. 639, 650–51, 338 A.3d 344 (2025);
Arciniega v. Feliciano, supra, 329 Conn. 302–303;
Caruso v. Bridgeport, supra, 285 Conn. 646–47; cf.
General Statutes § 9-323 (federal elections); General
Statutes § 9-324 (elections of state officers and probate judges); General Statutes § 9-328 (municipal elections);
General Statutes § 9-329a (primaries); General Statutes
§ 9-371b (referenda).
The first comprehensive interpretation of the phrase
“ruling of an election official” was provided in Bortner v. Woodbridge, 250 Conn. 241, 736 A.2d 104 (1999), which
arose under § 9-328. This court observed that it is not a defined phrase under the election statutes and that none
“of the legislative history . . . give[s] any indication that it was intended to have some specialized meaning.” Id.,
267. Thus, this court “presume[d] . . . that the legislature intended it to have its ordinary meaning in the English
language, as gleaned from the context of its use.” Id.;
see also Caruso v. Bridgeport, supra, 285 Conn. 638–46
(engaging in full statutory analysis of phrase as used in § 9-329a).
Bearing in mind that “[s]tatutory provisions governing election contests are strictly construed”; Caruso
v. Bridgeport, supra, 285 Conn. 639; it is well established under Bortner and Caruso that “[a] ruling of an
election official must involve some act or conduct by
the official that (1) decides a question presented to the official, or (2) interprets some statute, regulation or
other authoritative legal requirement, applicable to
the election process. . . . This court’s prior review of
the text, genealogy, and legislative history of [election] statute[s] has revealed that this test is not intended to
Amadasun v. Armstrong, Town Clerk of South Windsor
have a narrow, technical meaning. . . . Instead, [t]his test is broad enough to include conduct that comes within
the scope of a mandatory statute governing the election
process, even if the election official has not issued a ruling in any formal sense. When an election statute mandates
certain procedures, and the election official has failed
to apply or to follow those procedures, such conduct
implicitly constitutes an incorrect interpretation of the requirements of the statute and, therefore, is a ruling. . . . Conversely, the court will not find a party aggrieved by a ruling when the ruling is made in conformity with
the law.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Arciniega v. Feliciano, supra,
329 Conn. 302–303; see also Airey v. Feliciano, supra,
352 Conn. 650–51 (reaffirming “imputed knowledge
doctrine”).
Under these principles, an election official has made a
ruling when asked to act, even in the absence of a mandatory statutory duty to do so, but has not made a ruling if the official lacks the authority to perform the act desired by the otherwise aggrieved plaintiff. See, e.g., Arciniega v. Feliciano, supra, 329 Conn. 304–305, 309–10; see
also Strong v. Toth, Superior Court, judicial district
of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (December
10, 1993) (10 Conn. L. Rptr. 533, 535) (certification of
election results was not ruling in challenge to residency of successful candidates because neither town clerk nor
chief election moderator “had any authority or obligation to determine the residency of any candidates or to
alter the election results in the event certain candidates were determined [not to] be residents of the district from which they were elected”).
The election contest statutes also “may not be used
to challenge the underlying election laws and merely
[consider] whether the election official’s ruling complied with those laws . . . .” (Citations omitted.) Whitnum
Baker v. Secretary of the State, supra, 350 Conn. 762;
see Scheyd v. Bezrucik, 205 Conn. 495, 502–503, 535
A.2d 793 (1987). In Fay v. Merrill, 336 Conn. 432, 246
Amadasun v. Armstrong, Town Clerk of South Windsor
A.3d 970 (2020), then Chief Justice Robinson, assigned
pursuant to § 9-323, set forth an illustrative comparison. He concluded that the election contest statutes “do not
confer jurisdiction over . . . fundamental constitutional challenges to [an executive order expanding absentee
voting], which the [secretary of the state]—acting as
an elections official—implemented via [a ballot] application” but, in dictum, noted that the statutes would
have “conferred jurisdiction . . . over [a] claim that the application is not itself faithful to [an executive order].” Id., 450 n.19. Similarly, in Wrotnowski v. Bysiewicz,
289 Conn. 522, 958 A.2d 709 (2008), then Chief Justice
Rogers, assigned pursuant to § 9-323, concluded that
there was no ruling when the plaintiff “claim[ed] only
that the existing election laws governing presidential
elections are not adequate to ensure compliance with
article two, § 1, of the federal constitution.” Id., 528; see id., 529. She emphasized that “the election statutes
neither require nor authorize the [secretary of the state] to verify the constitutional qualifications of a candidate for the office of president of the United States.” Id., 528.
An election official’s claimed adherence to the law will
not, without more, defeat jurisdiction under the election contest statutes when “the gravamen” of the plaintiff’s
claim is the misapplication of a law. Whitnum Baker v.
Secretary of the State, supra, 350 Conn. 762. Thus, in
Whitnum Baker, a panel of three judges of this court,
McDonald, Alexander, and Dannehy, Js., exercised
jurisdiction over a write-in candidate’s claim that the
secretary of the state had misapplied the law by erroneously communicating information about General Statutes (Supp. 2024) § 9-373a, and then refusing to accept
her untimely candidate registration form that resulted
from that error under § 9-323. Id., 762–63.
Applying these principles, we conclude that the defendant’s decision to apply the newly approved charter
revisions, rather than the provisions of the charter that purportedly were in effect on the day of the municipal election, to determine the composition of the town
Amadasun v. Armstrong, Town Clerk of South Windsor
council from that same election was a ruling of an election official. Contrary to the defendant’s arguments in this
appeal, the fact that the decision was made subsequent
to balloting and ballot tabulation does not remove it from the election process and render it solely a decision of a governmental organization under General Statutes §
7-193 (a).7 Instead, the decision required the defendant
to apply two of the statutory dictates codified in title 9 of the General Statutes, which strongly suggests that they
are electoral in nature. See Clark v. Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Dept., 346 Conn. 711, 729–31, 295 A.3d 889 (2023).
Subsection (c) of General Statutes § 9-167a, the minority representation statute, directed the defendant to
determine “the winner or winners” of the town council
election by deeming elected only those candidates from
the majority party, in this case the Democratic Party,
up to the maximum number allotted by subsection (a) of
that statute or the town charter, as permitted by subsection (e), before turning to “[t]he next highest ranking
candidates” to fill the remainder of the seats.8 Section
9-320 (a) then required the defendant, “within ten days
7
Section 7-193 (a) is part of the Home Rule Act (act), General Statutes § 7-187 et seq., which empowers “municipalities . . . to adopt a charter to serve as the organic law of that municipality. . . . It is well established that a [town’s] charter is the fountainhead of municipal powers. . . . The charter serves as an enabling act, both creating power and prescribing the form in which it must be exercised.” (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Windham Taxpayers Assn. v. Board of Selectmen, 234 Conn. 513, 529, 662 A.2d 1281 (1995); see, e.g., Cook-Littman v. Board of Selectmen, 328 Conn. 758, 768–69, 184 A.3d 253 (2018) (discussing purpose of charters and home rule legislation). “The act requires charters to conform to certain standards”; Windham Taxpayers Assn. v. Board of Selectmen, supra, 530; with § 7-193 (a) requiring municipalities to have both a “legislative body” and a “chief executive officer.” General Statutes § 7-193 (a) (1) and (2). With respect to “any elective legislative body,” such as a town council, the charter must prescribe (1) “[t]he number of members,” (2) “the terms of office of such members,” and (3) “the method by which they are elected . . . .” General Statutes § 7-193 (a) (1).
8
As the defendant acknowledges, and as was discussed at oral argument before this court, several decisions of this court have considered minority representation disputes brought under § 9-328, albeit without expressly addressing the jurisdictional question raised in this case. See Putala v. DePaolo, 225 Conn. 378, 623 A.2d 989 (1993); Lobsenz
Amadasun v. Armstrong, Town Clerk of South Windsor
after the municipal election,” to “return to the Secretary of the State a statement of the name, post-office address and term of each person elected to office in such election.” In deciding that the bare majority charter revisions were applicable, the defendant necessarily interpreted the
charter with respect to the effective date of the revisions, which directly affected whether the results that
the defendant determined and reported under §§ 9-167a
(c) and 9-320 (a), respectively,9 were correct. Resolving a question about the applicability of a charter provision to the municipal officers elected simultaneously
with its approval is within the purpose of the election
contest statutes, which is to ensure the accuracy of the
election results and “that the will of the people is carried out.” Bortner v. Woodbridge, supra, 250 Conn. 254. The
defendant’s decision to apply the newly approved bare
majority charter revisions went to the question that
every candidate and voter wants answered: Who won?
We disagree with the defendant that our reasoning in
Scheyd v. Bezrucik, supra, 205 Conn. 495, supports her
argument that the plaintiff’s claims are not cognizable
under §§ 9-328 and 9-371b because they are constitutional in nature. Scheyd, which this court decided prior
to its more comprehensive analyses of the phrase “ruling
of an election official” in Bortner and Caruso, held that v. Davidoff, 182 Conn. 111, 438 A.2d 21 (1980); Anderson v. Ludgin, 175 Conn. 545, 400 A.2d 712 (1978).
Nevertheless, in Bortner v. Woodbridge, supra, 250 Conn. 241, this court cited Lobsenz for the proposition that the application of § 9-167a to the vote totals by an election moderator for purposes of determining the winner of the election constituted a ruling by that official under § 9-328. Id., 270. Although the court in Lobsenz considered the scope of the trial court’s authority under § 9-328 to resolve the dispute without ordering new elections, it did not consider whether the determination was a ruling under that statute. See Lobsenz v. Davidoff, supra, 182 Conn. 116–17.
9
We understand the plaintiff’s claims in the present case to be grounded in the defendant’s decision to apply the charter revisions selectively to the town council, but not the treasurer and selectmen positions, in determining the results of the election. The alleged selective application is not determinative of whether the defendant’s decision regarding the town council election is a ruling of an election official.
Amadasun v. Armstrong, Town Clerk of South Windsor
a constitutional challenge to General Statutes (Rev. to
1987) § 9-167a, as amended by Public Acts 1987, No.
87-498, was not “within the jurisdictional confines of . . . § 9-328, which, under narrowly defined circumstances,
provides expedited judicial procedures for the resolution of election disputes.” (Footnote omitted.) Id., 496–97;
see id., 505, 507. Quoting a footnote in Wrinn v. Dunleavy, 186 Conn. 125, 134 n.10, 440 A.2d 261 (1982),
this court stated that a complaint brought under the
election contest statutes “must concern a ruling of an
election official or a mistake in the count of votes. . . . A plaintiff may not use these [statutes] to challenge a
law or regulation under which the election or primary
election is held by claiming aggrievement in the election official’s obedience to the law. In such a case the plaintiff may well be aggrieved by the law or regulation, but he
or she is not aggrieved by the election official’s rulings [that] are in conformity with the law.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Scheyd v. Bezrucik,
supra, 503. This court held that, because the petitioners in Scheyd had not alleged “a violation of one of the
statutes specially referenced in § 9-328 [or] . . . that the town clerk made a ‘mistake’ in the vote count”; id., 502; they were not aggrieved by a ruling of an election official. Id., 505. This court rejected their policy based request
“to reconsider the merits of our footnote in Wrinn”; id.; observing that “[t]he legislature might reasonably have
opted for speedy adjudication of disputes about technical violations of election laws on the theory that identification and rectification of such mistakes [are] ordinarily
not . . . matter[s] of great complexity. Constitutional
adjudication, by contrast, requires study and reflection
and may therefore, as a general matter, be deemed less
appropriate for accelerated disposition.” Id., 505–506;
see also id., 506 (relying on legislative acquiescence given amendments to statutory scheme but not to § 9-328
subsequent to Wrinn).
Although it might appear that this court’s rationale
in Scheyd could apply to the present case, we conclude
that it does not control the outcome here. First, unlike in
Amadasun v. Armstrong, Town Clerk of South Windsor
Scheyd, the operative complaint here asserts a nonconstitutional claim of error, namely, that it was “clearly
erroneous and improper” to apply the newly approved
charter revisions in determining the winners of the election, rather than applying the provisions that were in
effect when the ballot was printed and the votes cast.
Second, Scheyd is not as expansive as the defendant
argues. Scheyd, by its own terms, is limited to structural or facial challenges to election laws. It does not
preclude challenges to an election official’s application of “statute[s], regulation[s] or other authoritative legal requirement[s] . . . applicable to the election process”; (internal quotation marks omitted) Arciniega v. Feliciano, supra, 329 Conn. 302; in specific cases, even if
the effect of the challenged decisions might well result
in a harm that is constitutional in nature. We therefore
conclude that the trial court improperly dismissed the
plaintiff’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings according to law.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.