Cite as 2026 Ark. 39
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR-25-529
Opinion Delivered: February 19, 2026
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE CRAIGHEAD
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 16JCR-23-1385]
V.
HONORABLE RANDY PHILHOURS,
JUDGE
ROY NICHOLS, JR.
APPELLEE REVERSED AND REMANDED.
NICHOLAS J. BRONNI, Associate Justice
This interlocutory appeal concerns the scope of Arkansas’s rape-shield statute. The
State charged Roy Nichols with raping Roschell Lamb. Nichols claims the sex was
consensual, and he seeks to introduce evidence he claims will show the two had a prior
sexual encounter. Our rape-shield statute generally prohibits the admission of such
evidence, but the circuit court held that evidence was admissible here. The State appeals.
We reverse that decision and remand this matter for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
Facts and Procedural Background
This case began in July 2011, when Rochell Lamb reported to police that she had
been raped by an unknown assailant. Lamb told police—and later testified at trial—that on
the night in question, a stranger grabbed her as she was walking back to her apartment,
dragged her into a nearby shed, removed her clothes, and vaginally and orally raped her.
The initial police investigation did not yield any suspects, and the matter remained dormant until 2018, when the State identified Nichols as a suspect based on DNA. Following further
investigation—and eventually locating Lamb in 2023—the State charged Nichols with rape.
Nichols disputes Lamb’s account that she was raped by a stranger, and he seeks to
testify that the two had a prior sexual encounter. He also seeks to ask Lamb about that
alleged encounter. Our rape-shield statute generally bars evidence of an alleged victim’s
“prior sexual conduct,” including allegations that the defendant and victim had prior sexual
contact. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-42-101(b) (Supp. 2021). But that prohibition is not absolute.
Instead, the statute allows the admission of such evidence, where “following [a] hearing, the
[circuit] court determines that . . . [evidence] is relevant to a fact in issue, and that its
probative value outweighs its inflammatory or prejudicial nature.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-42-101(c)(2)(A).
Nichols invokes that exception, arguing that his alleged prior sexual encounter with
Lamb undermines her claim that she was raped by a stranger. At an in camera hearing on
Lamb’s motion to testify and ask about that alleged previous encounter, Nichols testified
that he had known Lamb for three or four years and that the pair had sex at a friend’s house
weeks before the alleged rape. His mother and sister also testified at the hearing that, in the
weeks around the alleged rape, Lamb came to their home looking for Nichols.
The circuit court concluded that Nichols’s proffered testimony and questions were
admissible. It found that Nichols’s claim that the pair had a sexual encounter just “two
weeks” before the alleged rape was probative of consent “on the night of the incident” and
issued a written order permitting Nichols to both testify about and cross-examine Lamb
2
concerning “any consensual sexual conduct between them.” It also excluded Nichols’s
mother and sister from testifying.
Pursuant to Ark. R. App. P. –Crim. 3, the State timely filed an interlocutory appeal.
Discussion
We review circuit court decisions admitting evidence concerning an alleged victim’s
prior sexual conduct for abuse of discretion. State v. Cossio, 2017 Ark. 297, at 5, 529 S.W.3d
620, 623. Conducting that review, we conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion
because Nichols’s claim that he had a sexual encounter with Lamb weeks before the alleged
rape was uncorroborated, marginally probative at best, and highly prejudicial. Indeed,
Nichols’s “allegation of [a] prior encounter is” precisely the kind of claim that our statute
was designed to exclude. Sera v. State, 341 Ark. 415, 442, 17 S.W.3d 61, 78 (2000). The
circuit court erred in holding otherwise, and we reverse.
A. We begin with the text of the rape-shield statute. That provision generally
prohibits defendants from introducing evidence of prior sexual contact between the
defendant and the alleged victim “to attack the credibility of the victim, to prove consent
or any other defense, or for any other purpose.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-42-101(b). But that
statute also contains an exception, permitting such evidence where, after an in camera
hearing, the circuit court determines the evidence is both “relevant to a fact in issue” and
“its probative value outweighs its inflammatory or prejudicial nature.” Ark. Code Ann. §
16-42-101(c)(2)(C). Collectively, those provisions prevent defendants from discussing a
victim’s sexual history unless the defendant demonstrates that the prior conduct is acutely
probative of the defendant’s guilt. Cossio, 2017 Ark. 297, at 5, 529 S.W.3d at 623.
3
Consistent with that principle, we have long held that such evidence is strongly
disfavored and only rarely admissible. For instance, particularly relevant here, we have
previously explained that our rape-shield statute does not permit defendants to simply
“present uncorroborated ‘evidence’ that he and the victim had previously engaged in sexual
intercourse over the victim’s denial that she had ever known her assailant before the
incident.” Graydon v. State, 329 Ark. 596, 602, 953 S.W.2d 45, 48 (1997). Instead, at a
minimum, there must be some “corroborating evidence that linked [the defendant] with
the victim prior to the date of the offense.” Id. (explaining that “self-serving testimony” is
insufficient).
Moreover, even where corroboration exists, the proffered evidence of prior sexual
contact will be excluded absent evidence directly connecting “the alleged prior acts to the
consent alleged in the present incident.” Id.; accord McCoy v. State, 2010 Ark. 373, at 11,
370 S.W.3d 241, 248 (an “allegation of a prior sexual encounter with the victim, which is
unrelated to the incident being prosecuted and denied by the victim, is ‘the very type
contemplated to be excluded under the statute’” (quoting Sera, 341 Ark. at 442, 17 S.W.3d
at 78)). Thus, for example, we have previously held that evidence of contact may be
admissible to give the jury an accurate understanding of an event when it occurs
“immediately” before an alleged rape or is “so closely connected with” the offense that it
forms “part of the same occurrence.” Cossio, 2017 Ark. 297, at 7, 529 S.W.3d at 624 (citing
Turner v. State, 258 Ark. 425, 434, 527 S.W.2d 580, 586 (1975)); see also Herren v. State,
2018 Ark. App. 528, at 6, 563 S.W.3d 606, 610 (defendant permitted to testify about sexual
contact just minutes before the alleged offense). But evidence of sexual contact weeks or
4
days before an event is unlikely to meet that standard. See Cossio, 2017 Ark. 297, at 7, 529
S.W.3d at 624 (evidence of sexual conduct the day before not relevant); Kimery v. State,
2023 Ark. App. 473, at 13, 678 S.W.3d 816, 824 (similar).
B. Applying that standard, the circuit court should have denied Nichols’s motion to
admit evidence of his alleged prior sexual encounter with Lamb.
First, Nichols’s testimony was utterly uncorroborated and entirely self-serving. At
most, to corroborate his account, Nichols points to his mother’s and his sister’s testimony
that Lamb had come looking for him in the weeks around the rape. Yet even crediting that
testimony, which the circuit court excluded, it does not corroborate Nichols’s claim that he
had a prior sexual encounter with Lamb. It would only suggest “that he and the victim
were acquaintances,” McCoy, 2010 Ark. 373, at 11, 370 S.W.3d at 248, and while that
evidence might have been admissible to show that Nichols and the victim knew each other,
it is not sufficient to admit evidence under the rape-shield statute. Indeed, to hold otherwise
would undermine the very purpose of the rape-shield statute and sanction the admission of
wholly unsupported claims designed to humiliate and discourage victims from “participating
in the prosecution of their attackers.” Graydon, 329 Ark. at 602, 953 S.W.2d at 48.
Second, Nichols does not point to any connection between the alleged prior contact
and the rape that would warrant its admission. He does not, for example, claim that the
prior conduct was “intermingled or contemporaneous with the alleged rape.” Cossio, 2017
Ark. 297, at 7, 529 S.W.3d at 624. Just the opposite, he claims the prior sexual encounter
occurred weeks earlier and under very different circumstances. Nor did the circuit court
5
do any better, simply asserting—contrary to established precedent, see supra at 4–5—that a
couple of weeks was close enough in time to render the prior conduct probative of consent.
Recognizing that, Nichols barely even bothers to defend the circuit court’s
reasoning. Rather, he argues that his claim of a prior sexual encounter was probative
because it undermines Lamb’s claim that she did not know her attacker and shows why she
might lie about being raped. But Nichols does not need to mention the alleged prior sexual
encounter to make that point. On the contrary, Nichols can make that point by introducing
evidence that he and Lamb had known each other for years, cross-examining Lamb on
whether they knew each other, potentially calling other witnesses to testify that the two
knew each other, and pointing out their age difference. Thus, on balance, any claim that
the two had a prior sexual encounter would add little to the jury’s understanding and would
instead simply serve to inflame the jury. On that basis too, the circuit court should have
excluded it. See Sera, 341 Ark. at 442, 17 S.W.3d at 78 (affirming exclusion of evidence of
little probative value that would simply “cast [the victim] in a bad light”).
C. Alternatively, Nichols claims that barring him from asking Lamb about their
alleged prior sexual encounter violates the Confrontation Clause. That argument fares no
better.
The Confrontation Clause provision guarantees a criminal defendant the right “to .
. . confront[] witnesses against him.” U.S. Const., amend IV. It does not entitle defendants
to ask whatever questions they want. See Bowden v. State, 301 Ark. 303, 309, 783 S.W.2d
842, 844 (1990) (“The Confrontation Clause ‘guarantees an opportunity for effective crossexamination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever
6
extent, the defense might wish.’” (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)));
see also United States v. Carson, 870 F.3d 584, 597 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[O]nce [a] motivation
[to lie] has been established, the defendant has no constitutional right to pile on.”). On the
contrary, states are free to impose “reasonable limits” to prevent “harassment, prejudice,
confusion of issues, [protect] [a] witness’s safety,” and otherwise limit an “interrogation that
is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Id. (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,
679 (1986)). Rape-shield statutes reflect that principle, “represent[ing] a valid legislative
determination that rape victims deserve heightened protection against surprise, harassment,
and unnecessary invasions of privacy.” Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 150 (1991); accord
State v. Awbery, 367 P.3d 346, 349 (Mont. 2016); State v. Craig, 853 N.E.2d 621, 635 (Ohio
2006).
At the same time, the Supreme Court has also warned that even otherwise valid
evidentiary rules, like rape-shield statutes, cannot prevent a defendant from asking questions
that might give the jury “a significantly different impression of [an accuser’s] credibility.”
Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232 (1988) (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680)). But
critically, as other courts have explained, whether that is the case depends on whether the
defendant “ha[s] other ways to obtain the effect that the excluded examination would have
allegedly established.” United States v. Brown, 110 F.3d 605, 611 (8th Cir. 1997).
Applying that standard, Nichols’s claim fails. As previously explained, Nichols does
not need to ask Lamb about an alleged prior sexual encounter to attack her credibility or
otherwise undermine her claim that she did not know her attacker. He can do that by
asking her about whether the two knew each other and introducing his own evidence that
7
they did. And against that backdrop, it is hard to see what, if anything, other than
salaciousness, allowing Nichols to ask about an alleged prior sexual encounter would add.
Thus, the jury is unlikely to form a significantly different impression of Lamb’s credibility
absent Nichols’s proposed questions about an alleged prior encounter, and the
Confrontation Clause does not entitle Nichols to ask them.
Conclusion
The circuit erred in holding that the rape-shield statute permits Nichols to testify and
ask Lamb questions about an alleged sexual encounter weeks before the alleged rape. We
reject Nichols’s arguments to the contrary; reverse the decision of the circuit court; and
remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Joseph Karl Luebke, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellant.
Jimmy Lee Hood, for appellee.
8