NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: October 15, 2024
S24A0636. THOMPSON v. THE STATE.
BOGGS, Chief Justice.
Appellant Willie Felix Thompson challenges his convictions for
malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting
death of Felicia Sullivan. Appellant contends that the evidence was
legally insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court
plainly erred by giving separate, conflicting jury instructions on
prior-bad-acts evidence and prior-difficulties evidence. We conclude
that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient as a matter of
federal constitutional due process to authorize the jury to find
Appellant guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted.
Additionally, Appellant has failed to demonstrate any clear or
obvious error by the trial court in providing jury instructions on
prior-bad-acts evidence and prior-difficulties evidence. Accordingly,
we affirm.1
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
evidence at trial shows as follows. Appellant and Felicia Sullivan2
began dating in 2015 after meeting on an online dating site. The two
“talked” periodically over five years and eventually moved in
together at a residence on Goldie Drive in Marietta in September
2020.
Sullivan’s cousin, Mechelle McBride, who Sullivan talked with
daily, testified regarding several violent interactions between
Appellant and Sullivan. McBride testified that in 2018 Sullivan
1 The crimes occurred on April 19, 2021. On July 1, 2021, a Cobb County
grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated
assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
Appellant was tried from April 18 to 22, 2022. The jury found Appellant guilty
of all charges. On April 22, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life in
prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder and a consecutive
term of five years for the weapons charge. The felony murder count was
vacated by operation of law. Although the trial court purported to vacate the
aggravated assault count by operation of law, the count is merged as a matter
of fact into the malice murder charge. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 301 Ga. 79, 80-81 (799 SE2d 762) (2017). On April 26, 2022, Appellant filed a motion for new
trial, which he amended with new counsel on May 1, 2023. The trial court held
an evidentiary hearing on June 20, 2023, and denied the motion on August 25,
2023. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in
this Court to the April 2024 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
2 Sullivan also went by the nickname “Tiny.”
2
called her because Appellant slapped Sullivan in the mouth when
arguing about money. In 2019, Appellant choked and threw Sullivan
against a wall, causing Sullivan to attempt to “knee him in the
private” to get him off.
At trial, Officer Aaron Johnson of the Marietta Police
Department testified that on November 23, 2020, he responded to a
domestic dispute call at the Goldie Drive residence involving
Appellant and Sullivan. Sullivan told Officer Johnson that
Appellant was intoxicated and threatened to hit her, balled up his
fist, and snatched Sullivan’s phone away while she was speaking
with the 911 operator. Appellant had Sullivan’s phone when the
officers arrived. Officer Johnson attempted to talk with Appellant,
but he was uncooperative. Subsequently, Appellant was placed
under arrest for interfering with a 911 call. As Officer Johnson
escorted Appellant to the police cruiser, Officer Johnson heard
Appellant say something to the effect of “[S]he better be gone[,] or
I’m going to burn this place down.”
The same night as Appellant’s arrest, Sullivan called McBride
3
to explain what happened, detailing that Appellant was drunk and
pointed a gun at her face. About a week later, Sullivan was speaking
with McBride over the phone when McBride overheard Appellant
tell Sullivan, “B**ch I will kill you,” to which Sullivan replied she
would “F**k him up.”
At trial, Appellant testified in his own defense as follows:
Appellant had not been living at the Goldie Drive residence prior to
the shooting, due to ongoing issues with Sullivan. Instead, he had
been living back and forth between a nearby motel in Marietta and
visiting family in Mississippi. He ultimately decided to move to
Mississippi. On April 19, 2021, he returned to the Goldie Drive
residence to collect the remainder of his belongings. However, he did
not bring any moving boxes or a moving truck. And upon arrival,
instead of packing, he began grilling in the backyard with his pistol
on him. Appellant testified that he always carried his Hi-Point ninemillimeter pistol when in the backyard because of the nearby
wooded area and his concern about potential intruders.
After grilling, he left to go to the store. Upon returning, he
4
attempted to put some meat in the kitchen and store his pistol in the
main bedroom. As he entered through the back door of the house —
with his pistol in hand — Sullivan, who Appellant claimed was
intoxicated, began cursing at him. According to Appellant, Sullivan
was positioned near the back door entrance such that he “brushed
past her” upon entering. After he brushed up against her, “she put
her hands on [him] and pushed [him] into the wall and grabbed [his]
wrist.” He told her to leave him alone and then walked into the
hallway leading to the main bedroom. Sullivan followed him and
“pushed [him] again and grabbed [his] wrist.” The two then began a
struggle in the hallway. Appellant claimed that Sullivan hit him in
the head with an unknown heavy object, and then “everything went
dark.” After he was hit, two gunshots went off, both hitting
Sullivan. 3 The medical examiner later testified that one bullet
entered near her mouth, breaking her mandible, exiting her mouth
3 After conducting an gunshot primer residue (“GSR”) analysis, forensics
experts concluded that Appellant “either discharged a firearm, was in close
proximity to a firearm upon discharge, or came into contact with an Item whose
surface had GSR, like a recently discharged firearm.”
5
and then reentering her neck, and finally exiting through her back.
The other bullet entered from the midline of her neck, striking an
artery and then exiting through her back.4
Upon being wounded, Sullivan left the hallway and entered the
main bedroom, where she slumped down in between the bed and TV
dresser. Appellant went into the room to ask Sullivan if she was
“ok,” but she was unresponsive. Appellant did not call 911 because,
he claimed, his phone number was registered in Illinois and when
he had on a previous unrelated occasion attempted to call 911, the
call was directed to Illinois police. Appellant instead video-called his
sister, Angela Thompson, who lived in Oxford, Mississippi.
Appellant, hysterically crying, told Angela “[H]e shot Tiny.” He
further said that Sullivan had been “talking mess and walking up
on him.” Angela told Appellant to call 911, but he did not. So, Angela
4 The medical examiner testified that although there was no way to
determine which wound occurred first, the bullet wound near Sullivan’s mouth
was fired from about “[a] foot and a half, two feet to maybe up to three feet,
maybe . . . two and a half, . . . two.” The wound that entered her neck was fired
from a distance greater than approximately two to three feet away. The
downward angle of the entry and exit wounds suggested that Sullivan was
leaning forward when she was shot.
6
asked her aunt, Lula Patton, who was with her when Appellant
called, to contact Lula’s son, Alvin Patton, in Georgia and have him
go to the Goldie Drive residence to see “what was going on.” It took
Alvin approximately 30 to 40 minutes to get there. Once he arrived,
he called Lula to tell Appellant to come outside. When Appellant
came out, Alvin asked him what happened, and Appellant responded
that “he had shot her.” Alvin asked whether 911 had been called,
and Appellant said no. Alvin immediately called 911, and police
officers arrived shortly after. Once officers arrived, they began lifesaving procedures on Sullivan, moving her from the main bedroom
to the hallway to the living room.
EMS arrived shortly after and began to render aid. Meanwhile,
officers started questioning Appellant outside. Officers noted that
Appellant appeared intoxicated at the time of questioning. When
asked what happened, Appellant said he came home about “10 or 15
minutes” ago to find Sullivan shot. The officers then spoke to Angela
over the phone and Alvin in person at the scene, who both said that
Appellant told them that he shot Sullivan. At that point, the police
7
detained Appellant. Sullivan was pronounced deceased at the crime
scene.
Detectives recovered a nine-millimeter pistol on the bed in the
main bedroom, a nine-millimeter shell casing in the hallway outside
the bedroom, a spent bullet underneath the bed in the main
bedroom, several empty beer cans in the trash can and two on the
kitchen table and discovered a bullet hole in the bedroom mirror
that exited out of a window behind the mirror. Detectives also found
a shell casing lodged in the chamber of the pistol.
2. Appellant contends that the evidence was constitutionally
insufficient under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781,
61 LE2d 560) (1979), because the testimony and other evidence
relied upon by the State did not show Appellant was guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. Moreover, he contends that his fear of being hit
by the allegedly larger, intoxicated Sullivan, along with their
altercation just before the shooting, supported his justification
defense and did not authorize the jury to reject that defense.
When properly viewed in the light most favorable to the
8
verdicts, the evidence presented at trial and summarized above
was sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to
authorize a rational jury to find Appellant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. See
Jackson, 443 at 319. See also Anthony v. State, 298 Ga. 827, 829
(785 SE2d 277) (2016) (“The jury is free to reject any evidence in
support of a justification defense and to accept the evidence that
the shooting was not done in self-defense.”); Vega v. State, 285 Ga.
32, 33 (673 SE2d 223) (2009) (“‘It was for the jury to determine the
credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or
inconsistencies in the evidence.’” (cleaned up)).
Here, witnesses testified regarding Appellant’s history of
being violent toward Sullivan, including slapping and choking her,
as well as threatening to kill her. See Lackey v. State, 286 Ga.
163, 164-165 (686 SE2d 112) (2009) (holding that the evidence
was constitutionally sufficient to authorize a defendant’s
convictions for malice murder and possession of a firearm during
the commission of a felony where, although a defendant claimed
9
that the shooting was unintentional, there was testimony that the
defendant was angry with the victim at the time of the crimes).
Appellant also admitted to Angela and Alvin that he shot Sullivan
but offered police a different version of events when questioned
about what occurred. See Blackshear v. State, 309 Ga. 479, 482-484
(847 SE2d 317) (2020) (concluding that the evidence was
constitutionally sufficient to authorize a defendant’s malice murder
conviction where a defendant gave inconsistent statements to
police about involvement in a victim’s death). Forensic evidence
also showed that gunshot primer residue was found on Appellant’s
hands, and bullet holes were found in the bedroom mirror despite
Appellant’s claim that the shooting took place in the hallway.
Ballistics evidence further indicated that although it was unclear
which wound Sullivan suffered first, the shots were fired from
varying distances. The shot that entered near Sullivan’s mouth
was fired from approximately a foot and a half to up to three feet
away. The shot that entered her neck was fired from a distance
greater than at least two and a half to three feet. Accordingly, this
10
evidence undermined Appellant’s claim that the shots were fired
when he and Sullivan were engaged in a struggle. As such, the
evidence was indeed sufficient to authorize a jury to find Appellant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder and the
weapons charge. Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 386 n.1, 388-389 (846 SE2d 83) (2020) (holding that the evidence was
constitutionally sufficient to support convictions for malice murder
and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony where
“[i]nvestigators . . . found gunshot primer residue on [the
defendant’s] clothes,” the defendant “gave inconsistent stories to
police, and he had a history of physical violence and threats toward
[the victim]”).
3. Appellant next argues that the trial court plainly erred by
giving conflicting instructions to the jury on prior-bad-acts evidence
and prior-difficulties evidence with respect to the same evidence.
See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b). Appellant, however, has failed to
demonstrate that the trial court made a clear or obvious error, so he
claim of plain error fails.
11
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion to admit “Other Acts”
evidence that would be introduced through the testimony of McBride
and Officer Johnson. See OCGA § 24-4-404 (b). Their testimony
regarding Appellant’s previous violent interactions with Sullivan
would be used to establish intent and absence of mistake, as well as
showing prior difficulties between Appellant and Sullivan. See id.
Counsel for Appellant indicated that he had no objection to the State
introducing such evidence, nor does Appellant challenge the ruling
admitting the evidence. The parties also agreed that a limiting
instruction would be given before the introduction of said evidence.
Prior to Officer Johnson testifying about the November 2020
domestic dispute involving Appellant and Sullivan, the trial court
gave the following limiting instruction:
Sometimes evidence is admitted for a limited
purpose or against some parties and not others or for
some counts and not others. Such evidence may be
considered by the jury for the sole issue or purpose
against that party only for the counts for which the
evidence is limited and not for any other purpose.
In order to prove its case in Counts 1, 2, and 3, the
State must show intent and must negate or disprove
mistake or accident. To do so, the State has offered
12
evidence of other acts allegedly committed by the accused.
You are permitted to consider that evidence only
insofar as it may relate to those issues and not for any
other purpose. You may not infer from such evidence that
the defendant is of a character that would commit such
crimes.
The evidence may be considered only to the extent
that it may show the issues that the State is required or
authorized to prove in the crimes charged in the case now
on trial. Such evidence, if any, may not be considered by
you for any other purpose.
The defendant is on trial for the offenses charged in
this bill of indictment only and not for any other acts.
Before you may consider any other alleged acts for the
limited purposes stated, you must first determine
whether it is more likely than not that the accused
committed the other alleged acts.
If so, you must then determine whether the acts
shed any light on the issues for which the act was
admitted in the crimes charged in the indictment in this
trial. Remember to keep in mind the limited use and the
prohibited use of this evidence about other acts of the
defendant.
By giving this instruction, the Court in no way
suggests to you that the defendant has or has not
committed any other acts nor whether such acts, if
committed, prove anything. This is solely a matter for
your determination.
In its closing instruction to the jury, the trial court gave a
13
virtually identical instruction as the one above.5 The trial court also
provided the below instruction regarding prior difficulties at the
close of trial:
Evidence of prior difficulties or lack thereof between the
defendant and the alleged victim have been admitted for
the sole purpose of illustrating, if it does, the state of
feeling between the defendant and the alleged victim, the
reasonableness of any alleged fears by the defendant or
alleged victim. Whether this evidence illustrates such
matters is a matter solely for you, the jury, to determine,
but you are not to consider such evidence for any other
purpose.
The instructions given by the trial court comported with the
language of the applicable Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury
Instructions. See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II
Criminal Cases §§ 1.34.00 (Limiting Instructions/ Purpose, Parties,
Counts); 1.34.10 (Other Crimes, Wrongs, Acts (formerly Similar
Transactions)); 1.34.20 (Prior Difficulties between Parties
(Witness) (or lack thereof)).
5 The trial court omitted the first paragraph of the “Other Acts”
instruction given prior to Officer Johnson’s testimony.
14
Appellant urges that the trial court committed plain error by
instructing the jury to evaluate evidence of Appellant’s physical
violence against Sullivan using jury instructions for both Rule 404
(b) prior bad acts and prior difficulties. 6 He contends that these
instructions were inconsistent and likely left the jury confused
about how to properly evaluate this evidence during deliberations.
To show plain error, [Appellant] must point to an error
that was not affirmatively waived, the error must have
been clear and not open to reasonable dispute, the error
must have affected his substantial rights, and the error
must have seriously affected the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.
State v. Williams, 308 Ga. 228, 231 (838 SE2d 764) (2020) (cleaned
up).
Here, Appellant has failed to satisfy the second prong of plain
error review. Appellant does not cite any legal authority or
precedent holding that a trial court erred in connection with
6 Plain error applies because Appellant did not object to the instructions
at issue during trial. See Simmons v. State, 291 Ga. 705, 712 (733 SE2d 280)
(2012) (“When a party fails to object to a jury charge or the omission of a charge during trial but raises the issue on appeal, this Court reviews the charge for
plain error.”).
15
providing jury instructions on prior-bad-acts evidence and priordifficulties evidence on the same piece of evidence, nor have we found
any. See Sconyers v. State, 318 Ga. 855, 862 (901 SE2d 170) (2024)
(holding that the defendant failed to show plain error with regard to
the trial court’s pattern charge on prior difficulties, in part, because
the defendant “pointed to no controlling precedent holding that a
trial court erred in connection with the pattern charge on prior
difficulties”); McKibbins v. State, 293 Ga. 843, 853-854 (750 SE2d
314) (2013) (seeing no plain error where Appellant pointed to no
decision holding that failing to define “accomplice” in the pattern
charge on accomplice testimony was error). See also Baker v. State,
___ Ga. ___, ___ (902 SE2d 645, 651) (2024) (concluding there was
no plain error where the defendant failed to point to any binding
case law to support that an additional instruction on bias was
required on the record, nor did this Court find any). Therefore, this
enumeration of error fails. See Hill v. State, 310 Ga. 180, 194 (850
SE2d 110) (2020) (“The Court need not analyze all of the elements
of the plain error test when the appellant fails to establish one of
16
them.”).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
17