NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: October 15, 2024
S24A0588. TEDDER v. THE STATE.
BETHEL, Justice.
In October 2015, a jury found Dolonte Tedder guilty of malice
murder and related crimes in connection with the shooting death of
Quleon Glass. 1 This is the second appearance of Tedder’s case in this
1 The crimes occurred on September 8, 2014. On December 12, 2014, a
Fulton County grand jury indicted Tedder and co-indictees Jacquavious
Eggleston and Teandria Tabb for various offenses. Tedder was indicted for
participation in criminal street gang activity (Count 1), malice murder (Count
2), felony murder (Counts 3-5), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon upon
Glass (Count 6), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon upon Cedrick
Gifford (Count 7), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony
(Count 9). Eggleston was indicted on each count, as well as an additional count
of making false statements (Count 8). Tabb was indicted on Counts 2-4, 6-7,
and 9. Eggleston and Tabb pleaded guilty and testified against Tedder at trial.
Tedder was tried alone before a jury from October 26 to October 28, 2015,
and was found guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced Tedder to serve
life in prison on Count 2; a concurrent term of 15 years on Count 1; a concurrent
term of 20 years on Count 7; and a consecutive term of 5 years on Count 9. The
remaining counts merged or were vacated by operation of law. Tedder filed a
timely motion for new trial, which he amended through new counsel. The trial
court granted in part the amended motion for new trial, finding that trial
counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. We reversed the trial
Court. See State v. Tedder, 305 Ga. 577 (826 SE2d 30) (2019)
(“Tedder I”). Following the trial court’s denial of his motion for new
trial, Tedder appeals, arguing that the evidence at trial was
insufficient to sustain his convictions, that the trial court committed
reversible error in two respects, and that trial counsel rendered
constitutionally ineffective assistance in three respects. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
1. We set forth the facts of this case in Tedder I:
[O]n the afternoon of September 8, 2014, [co-indictee
Teandria Tabb] was hanging out with her boyfriend Glass
and his friend Tedder. During that time, Glass received a
call from [co-indictee] Eggleston, who wanted a ride to a
College Park apartment complex. Tabb, Glass, and
Tedder then got into Tabb’s vehicle and drove to pick up
Eggleston. When the four arrived at the College Park
apartment complex, Eggleston exited the vehicle to speak
to a group congregated around several parked cars.
Shortly thereafter, Glass exited the vehicle, as did
Tedder, who did not appear to know the people outside
the vehicle. Ten minutes later, Eggleston, Glass, and
court’s ruling in State v. Tedder, 305 Ga. 577 (826 SE2d 30) (2019), and
remanded the case to the trial court for consideration of the remaining grounds
of Tedder’s motion for new trial. Tedder thereafter amended his motion for new
trial on two occasions. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion,
as amended, on November 29, 2023. Tedder filed a timely notice of appeal, and
the case was docketed to this Court’s April 2024 term and submitted for a
decision on the briefs.
2
Tedder reentered the car, and Glass instructed Tabb to
follow two other cars. Glass was sitting in the front
passenger seat, Eggleston was sitting behind Tabb, and
Tedder was sitting behind Glass.
Tabb testified that she followed the cars to a house
near Godby Road, where all three cars parked, and
Eggleston again exited the car to speak with people
outside the house. When he returned, Eggleston
instructed Tabb to continue following the other two cars.
The other cars drove erratically, and, when Tabb would
lose track of them, Eggleston used his phone to
communicate with persons in the other cars to find out
where to meet up. No one in the car questioned what was
happening or asked to be let out of the car. According to
Tabb, she continued driving, directed by Eggleston, for
about twenty minutes, during which time she came to the
conclusion that the purpose of the drive was to locate a
certain group of people.2 At some point during the drive,
Tabb stopped at a light on Godby Road. While at the light,
she heard Glass say “you just want to shoot at them.”3
Tabb recalled that no one in the car seemed surprised by,
objected to, or questioned Glass’s statement.
When the light turned green, Tabb drove the car
through the intersection, and, shortly thereafter, Tabb
heard gunshots ring from Glass’s weapon.4 When Tabb
heard Glass fire his gun, she also saw, in her peripheral
vision, Eggleston stand up through her open sunroof.
2 Tabb testified that she came to this conclusion because she heard
someone in the back of the car make statements such as, “we can’t find them,”
“they’re not here no more,” “they just not out here,” and “let’s just go … they
ran, they’re not out here no more.” Tabb believed it was Eggleston who made
these statements, and she, once again, testified that no one else in the car
questioned these statements or asked to be let out of the car
3 Neither Tabb’s nor Eggleston’s trial testimony indicated whom Glass
was referencing with this statement.
4 Tabb testified that Glass “carried a weapon everywhere.”
3
Tabb could not see what Tedder was doing or whether he
had a gun due to a large laundry basket obstructing her
vision. During the commotion, she also recalled hearing
someone yell, “They were shooting back, they were
shooting back.” Tabb did not see that Glass was wounded
until after she drove away from the shooting.
Eggleston testified that he and Glass were friends
and fellow members of “Yung Fame,” which Eggleston
characterized as a rap group but which a detective with
the College Park Police Department characterized as
having been known to be involved in “gang activity.”
Eggleston stated that Tedder was not a member of Yung
Fame, that he did not know Tedder, and that he first met
Tedder on the day of Glass’s death. Eggleston explained
that, while at the College Park apartment complex, he
was speaking with other Yung Fame members regarding
an attempt earlier in the day by a member of the Sex
Money Murder (“S.M.M.”) gang to shoot Davon Lewis,
another Yung Fame member. He also explained that [the
occupants of] the two cars he instructed Tabb to follow
were looking for members of the S.M.M. gang to exact
revenge for the earlier attempted shooting. Eggleston
testified that Tedder did not know any of the people at the
apartment complex and did not “participate in [the Yung
Fame members’] talking about . . . what was going on.”
Eggleston admitted to having a .40-caliber handgun,
which he fired while he was standing through the sunroof,
and he confirmed that Glass had a gun, although he did
not recall the type of gun. Eggleston was the only witness
who testified that Tedder was armed,5 but he also
testified that he could not see whether Tedder shot his
weapon because the laundry basket obstructed his view.
5 While Eggleston claimed that he could recall specifically that Tedder
was riding in the vehicle with a gun on his leg, Eggleston was unable to recall
whether the gun was a rifle, a shotgun, or a handgun.
4
When Eggleston sat back down in the vehicle, he saw that
Glass had suffered a gunshot wound to the head, and he
directed Tabb to a hospital.
Cedrick Gifford, who was present at the crime scene
during the shooting, testified that . . . [a]s he was
walking along Godby Road, he saw a car drive past him,
and he saw someone shooting from the car; Gifford
sustained a gunshot wound to his arm. . . .
Dr. Michael Heninger, the forensic pathologist from
the Fulton County Medical Examiner’s Office, concluded
that Glass’s cause of death was a gunshot wound to the
back of his head. Though Dr. Heninger was unable to
locate a bullet during the autopsy, he testified that the
entry wound was circular and “smaller than average”
when compared to the typical wound inflicted by a
handgun and that the angle of the shot was “straighton.” . . .
Finally, the State offered as a witness Omar Stuart,
an ex-boyfriend of Tedder’s sister. Stuart claimed that he
made contact with Tedder after learning of the shooting,
and Tedder asked Stuart for a ride. Stuart, accompanied
by his father, picked up Tedder and took Tedder back to
Stuart’s home. Stuart testified that, upon arriving at his
home, Tedder gave him two pistols. Stuart told Tedder
that he did not want the pistols and did not ask Tedder
for any details regarding the guns, but proceeded to put
the pistols in a shoebox and to hide them in his closet.
Stuart testified that, a few days later, Tedder returned to
Stuart’s home and took the guns. . . .
Based on the totality of the evidence presented at
trial, the State argued that Tedder, sitting behind Glass,
was the only person who could have fired the shot that
killed Glass. Defense counsel argued that Tedder was
merely present in the vehicle, that he did not participate
in planning or executing the shootout, and that he was
5
not armed. Tedder’s counsel also attacked Eggleston’s
credibility, calling him a “liar” and pointing out the
inconsistencies in Eggleston’s testimony about Tedder’s
having a gun. Tedder’s counsel further argued, consistent
with Dr. Heninger’s testimony on cross-examination, that
Eggleston fired the fatal shot. Ultimately, however, the
jury found Tedder guilty on all charges.
Tedder I, 305 Ga. at 577-581 (footnotes in original).
2. Tedder contends that the trial court erred by denying his
motion for a directed verdict, arguing that the evidence was
insufficient to prove he was a party to the crimes. Tedder also
contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction
for violation of the Georgia Gang Act. We are not persuaded.
(a) We turn first to Tedder’s claim that the trial court erred by
denying his motion for a directed verdict. In support of this claim,
Tedder points to testimony that he did not participate in planning
the drive-by shooting, arguing that the State failed to prove that he
had prior knowledge that the shooting would occur and, thus, failed
to prove that he was a party to the crimes. In Tedder’s estimation,
the evidence showed, at best, that he concealed the weapons after
the crimes and, as such, that he was an accessory after the fact, not
6
a party to the crimes. The evidence presented at trial belies this
claim.
The standard of review for the denial of a motion for a
directed verdict of acquittal is the same as for
determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction. Under this review, we must put aside any
questions about conflicting evidence, the credibility of
witnesses, or the weight of the evidence, leaving the
resolution of such things to the discretion of the trier of
fact. When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence as a
matter of constitutional due process, we must determine
whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Monroe v. State, 315 Ga. 767, 768 (1) (884 SE2d 906) (2023)
(citations and punctuation omitted).
Tedder was charged individually and as a party to the crimes
of malice murder,6 aggravated assault with a deadly weapon by
shooting bystander Gifford,7 and possession of a firearm during the
6 See OCGA § 16-5-1 (a) (“A person commits the offense of murder when
he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes
the death of another human being.”).
7 See OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) (“A person commits the offense of
aggravated assaults when he or she assaults . . . [w]ith a deadly weapon”).
7
commission of a crime. 8 To prove Tedder guilty of these charges, 9 the
State was required to show either that Tedder was the direct
perpetrator of the crimes — that is, that he personally possessed a
firearm and that he fired the shots that injured Gifford and killed
Glass — or that “he intentionally aided or abetted in the commission
of the crimes or intentionally advised, encouraged, counseled, or
procured someone else to commit the crimes.” Milton v. State, 318
Ga. 737, 742 (2) (900 SE2d 590) (2024) (citation and punctuation
omitted). And “[w]hile mere presence at the scene of the crime is not
sufficient evidence to convict one of being a party to a crime, criminal
intent may be inferred from presence, companionship, and conduct
8 See OCGA § 16-11-106 (b) (1) (prohibiting any person from “hav[ing] on
or within arm’s reach of his or her person a firearm . . . during the commission
of, or the attempt to commit . . . [a]ny crime against or involving the person of
another”).
9 Tedder was also charged with and found guilty of three counts of felony
murder (Counts 3-5) and an additional count of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon (Count 6). However, because those counts merged for
sentencing or were vacated by operation of law, Tedder was not sentenced on
those counts. Thus, to the extent Tedder challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence underlying those counts, any such argument is moot. See Eggleston
v. State, 309 Ga. 888, 890-891 (848 SE2d 853) (2020). We address the
sufficiency of the evidence to support Tedder’s conviction for participation in
criminal gang activity in Division 2 (b) below.
8
before, during, and after the offense.” Frazier v. State, 308 Ga. 450,
453 (2) (a) (841 SE2d 692) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).
“Whether the evidence supports such an inference is a question for
the jury.” Mohamed v. State, 307 Ga. 89, 90 (1) (834 SE2d 762)
(2019). Applying these principles, we conclude that the evidence
presented at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
jury’s verdicts, was constitutionally sufficient to support Tedder’s
convictions.
As to the convictions for malice murder and aggravated
assault, the evidence did not conclusively show, as Tedder argues,
that Tedder participated in planning the shooting. But that makes
no difference here because there was sufficient evidence from which
the jury could find, based on his conduct immediately before, during,
and after the crimes, that Tedder shared a common criminal intent
with the actual perpetrator. Specifically, Tabb testified that, before
the shooting, it became apparent to her from statements made by
one of the men — Eggleston, she assumed but was not certain —
that the purpose of her driving the three men around was to locate
9
a certain group of people. She further testified that no one in the car,
including Tedder, questioned what was happening or asked to be let
out of the car, nor did anyone question Glass’s instruction that “you
just want to shoot at them.” She also testified that Glass, a close
friend of Tedder’s, “carried a gun everywhere.” The jury could infer
from this evidence that Tedder knew, or at least became aware
before the crimes, that a shooting would occur. See McGruder v.
State, 303 Ga. 588, 590-591 (II) (814 SE2d 293) (2018). In addition,
Eggleston testified that, immediately after the shooting, he saw
Tedder waving a gun outside the car window, and Glass, who was
sitting directly in front of Tedder, was shot in the back of the head.
Evidence also showed that Eggleston was armed with a firearm and
that he fired his weapon during the shooting. And there was
evidence that, after the shooting, Tedder fled the crime scene and
that he concealed two firearms at the home of his sister’s exboyfriend. From this evidence, a rational jury was authorized to find
Tedder guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder and
aggravated assault, at least as a party to the crimes. See Leanos v.
10
State, 303 Ga. 666, 668-669 (2) (814 SE2d 332) (2018) (evidence
sufficient to support appellant’s convictions as party to the crimes
despite testimony that appellant did not participate in planning
crimes because evidence showed, among other things, that appellant
“became aware of the plan” before the shooting, agreed to be the getaway driver, and helped to conceal firearm used in the crimes).
Compare Taylor v. State, 306 Ga. 277, 285 (3) (a) (830 SE2d 90)
(2019) (purported accomplice’s “conduct before, during, and after
[shooting] did not indicate an intent to aid or abet appellant in any
of the crimes charged” where purported accomplice drove victim to
crime scene for drug deal during which victim was killed but did not
flee scene with assailants and instead reported shooting to police
and disclosed that he and victim were present for drug deal).
As to the conviction for possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, Eggleston testified that Tedder was armed
with a gun during the crimes, which is sufficient to sustain the
11
conviction as a matter of federal constitutional due process. 10 See
State v. Thomas, 311 Ga. 407, 420 (4) (858 SE2d 52) (2021)
(concluding that accomplice’s “testimony alone was sufficient to
support [appellant’s] convictions as a matter of due process under
the federal Constitution”). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by
denying Tedder’s motion for a directed verdict.
(b) Tedder also argues that the State failed to present sufficient
evidence to support his conviction for participation in criminal gang
activity. More specifically, Tedder contends that the State failed to
prove either that Yung Fame was a “criminal street gang,” as that
term is defined in Georgia’s Gang Act, OCGA § 16-15-1 et seq., or
that Tedder was associated with Yung Fame. We conclude that the
evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish that Yung
Fame was a gang for purposes of the Gang Act and that Tedder was
associated with the gang.
Tedder was convicted of violating the Gang Act by
10 Tedder does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter
of Georgia statutory law.
12
participating in criminal gang activity through the commission of
murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon as an associate of Yung Fame. See OCGA §§ 16-15-4 (a) (“It
shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with a
criminal street gang to conduct or participate in criminal gang
activity through the commission of any offense enumerated in
paragraph (1) of Code Section 16-15-3.”); 16-15-3 (1) (J) (enumerated
offenses include “[a]ny criminal offense . . . that involves violence,
possession of a weapon, or use of a weapon”). And to convict Tedder
of violating the Gang Act, the State was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt (1) that Yung Fame was a “criminal street gang”
within the meaning of the Gang Act; (2) that Tedder was associated
with Yung Fame; (3) that Tedder committed at least one of the
predicate acts of malice murder, felony murder, or aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon; and (4) that the commission of those
offenses was intended to further the interests of Yung Fame. See
Monroe, 315 Ga. at 768 (1); Overstreet v. State, 312 Ga. 565, 572-573
(1) (b) (864 SE2d 14) (2021). Tedder’s arguments on appeal concern
13
the first and second elements, namely, whether the State proved
that Yung Fame was a “criminal street gang” and whether Tedder
was associated with Yung Fame.
OCGA § 16-15-3 (2) defines “criminal street gang” as “any
organization, association, or group of three or more persons
associated in fact, whether formal or informal, which engages in
criminal gang activity.” Tedder argues that the State failed to prove
that Yung Fame engaged in “criminal gang activity” because, he
says, the State did not present any evidence about the group’s
involvement in such activity beyond the crimes of which he was
found guilty in this case. It is true that “the commission of an
enumerated offense by the defendant is not itself sufficient to prove
the existence of a ‘criminal street gang’ because ‘an isolated offense
by a single member does not fulfil’ the statutory requirement of a
‘group of three or more persons which engages in criminal gang
activity.’” Boyd v. State, 306 Ga. 204, 209 (1) (b) (830 SE2d 160)
(2019) (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 284 Ga. 803, 807 (2) (671 SE2d
497) (2009)) (cleaned up). “But we have also clarified that evidence
14
that multiple gang members conspired to engage in underlying
crimes constituting ‘criminal gang activity,’ as defined in OCGA §
16-15-3 (1) and (2), can be proof of a gang’s existing, ongoing criminal
activity.” Boyd, 306 Ga. at 209 (1) (b) (emphasis in original; citation
and punctuation omitted).
Here, when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s
verdict, the State presented sufficient evidence to establish that
Yung Fame was a group of three or more persons that conspired to
engage in “criminal gang activity” as defined by OCGA § 16-15-3 (1)
and that Tedder was associated with Yung Fame. The evidence
showed that members of Yung Fame were in each of the three cars
that left the apartment complex before the shooting, with two
members — Glass and Eggleston — riding in a single vehicle, which
supports the reasonable inference that Yung Fame had more than
three members. In addition, Eggleston testified that Glass was a
member of Yung Fame, an investigating officer testified that Yung
Fame was “known to be involved in gang activity,” and Tabb
confirmed that Glass was involved in “gang activity.” And the
15
meeting of the Yung Fame members at the apartment complex to
plan the retaliatory shooting established that the group conspired to
engage in crimes that constitute “criminal gang activity.” See Boyd,
306 Ga. at 209-210 (1) (b); McGruder, 303 Ga. at 592 (II) (before
drive-by shooting was carried out, gang members “‘engaged in
criminal gang activity’ when they gathered to plan the attack”);
Hayes v. State, 298 Ga. 339, 341-342 (1) (a) (781 SE2d 777) (2016)
(“[E]vidence of [appellant’s and his co-defendants’] conspiracy to
commit armed robbery was proof of their existing, ongoing criminal
activity.”). Though Eggleston testified that Tedder was not a
member of Yung Fame, evidence that Tedder participated in the
retaliatory drive-by shooting with other Yung Fame members was
sufficient to prove that he was at least associated with Yung Fame,
which is all the statute requires. See OCGA § 16-15-4 (“It shall be
unlawful for any person employed by or associated with a criminal
street gang to conduct or participate in criminal gang activity . . . .”
(emphasis supplied)). Accordingly, Tedder’s challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for violation of
16
the Georgia Gang Act fails.
3. Tedder next argues that, when responding to a jury question,
the trial court improperly commented on the evidence in violation of
OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1) (“It is error for any judge, during any phase
of any criminal case, to express or intimate to the jury the judge’s
opinion as to whether a fact at issue has or has not been proved or
as to the guilt of the accused.”). Relatedly, Tedder asserts that the
trial court erred by excluding juror affidavits submitted in support
of his claim that the trial court violated OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1). We
address these arguments in turn.
(a) During deliberations, the jury requested to see transcripts
that were used to refresh the recollection of two investigating
officers who testified at trial. The transcripts were not admitted into
evidence, however, and both the prosecutor and Tedder’s counsel
agreed that the transcripts could not be provided to the jury. The
jurors were brought to the courtroom, where the foreperson
explained that they wanted to review the transcripts because they
disagreed about the substance of the officers’ testimony and wanted
17
to understand why shell casings recovered at the crime scene were
not admitted into evidence at trial. In response, the trial judge
explained:
[I]f you recall from the start, what I’ve been telling you is,
you’ve got to make your mind up based upon what you
hear and see in the courtroom. You’ve heard it, and you’ve
seen it. . . . The interviews that you refer to were not
introduced into evidence. The witnesses talked about
them. You have to use your recollection of what they said
about those things. And again, as I told you, don’t try to
be detectives. Just try to find out. You have the evidence.
That’s all the evidence that was put up. That’s all you are
to consider. That, together with applying your common
sense and drawing whatever inferences you think are
reasonable in light of the evidence you heard. But that’s
it. That’s it.
Tedder contends that this response amounted to an improper
comment on the evidence in violation of OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) because,
he says, the trial judge effectively instructed the jurors to disregard
any concerns they had about a lack of evidence or conflicts in the
evidence. Tedder did not object to the response at trial, and, “as he
now concedes, his failure to make a timely objection precludes
appellate review, unless the alleged violation of OCGA § 17-8-57 (a)
constitutes plain error which affects substantive rights of the
18
parties.” Sturkey v. State, 319 Ga. 156, 158 (2) (902 SE2d 607) (2024)
(citation and punctuation omitted). See also OCGA § 17-8-57 (b). To
establish plain error, Tedder “must point to a legal error that was
not affirmatively waived, was clear and obvious beyond reasonable
dispute, affected his substantial rights, and seriously affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Sturkey, 319 Ga. at 158 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted).
We see no error, let alone plain error, in the trial judge’s
response to the jury’s question because the response neither
pertained to a disputed issue of fact, see Moore v. State, 315 Ga. 263,
272 (4) (882 SE2d 227) (2022) (“To violate [OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1)],
the trial court’s comments must pertain to a disputed issue of fact.”
(citation and punctuation omitted)), nor conveyed “the judge’s
opinion as to whether a fact at issue ha[d] or ha[d] not been proved
or as to the guilt of” Tedder, OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1). Instead, the
trial judge’s explanation that the transcripts were not introduced
into evidence and, thus, were not available for viewing was the “type
of explanation” that amounts to “a permissible clarification of
19
procedure that does not address the credibility of witnesses or any
fact at issue in trial.” Roberts v. State, 305 Ga. 257, 262-263 (4) (824
SE2d 326) (2019) (trial judge did not violate OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1)
by instructing jury to “pay special attention” to video footage
because, viewed in context, comment was simply “a straightforward
explanation that [the jury] would not have additional opportunities
to review the video during deliberations”); Linson v. State, 287 Ga.
881, 884 (700 SE2d 394) (2010) (no violation of OCGA § 17-8-57
where trial judge informed jury that video had been redacted to
include only relevant portions). As to the remainder of the response,
the trial judge did not, as Tedder argues, instruct the jury to
disregard a lack of evidence or conflicts in the evidence presented at
trial. Rather, the trial judge merely reiterated a point on which the
jury had already been charged — that the jury was duty-bound to
decide the case based solely on the evidence presented at trial and
any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom — which was a correct
statement of law. There was no error here, plain or otherwise, and
this claim fails.
20
(b) In a related enumeration, Tedder asserts that the trial court
erred by excluding under OCGA § 24-6-606 (b) (“Rule 606 (b)”)11
affidavits executed by two jurors that Tedder submitted at the
motion for new trial hearing in support of his claim that the trial
court’s response to the jury’s question violated OCGA § 17-8-57.
Tedder argues that the trial court’s response to the jury constituted
“extraneous prejudicial information” and that these affidavits were
admissible to demonstrate “the effect” the response “had on the
verdicts entered” in this case or, in other words, to show that he was
harmed by the purportedly improper response. But because we have
already concluded that there was no error in the trial court’s
11 Rule 606 (b) states:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror
shall not testify by affidavit or otherwise nor shall a juror’s
statements be received in evidence as to any matter or statement
occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the
effect of anything upon the jury deliberations or any other juror’s
mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent
from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror’s mental
processes in connection therewith; provided, however, that a juror
may testify on the question of whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the juror’s attention,
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear
upon any juror, or whether there was a mistake in entering the
verdict onto the verdict form.
21
response to the jury’s question, any error in excluding evidence of
harm arising from that response is itself harmless. See Palmer v.
State, 310 Ga. 668, 677 (3) (853 SE2d 650) (2021) (“It is fundamental
that harm as well as error must be shown for reversal.” (citation and
punctuation omitted)). And in any event, the jurors’ affidavits were
not admissible under Rule 606 (b) to show the “effect” of anything
upon the jury’s deliberations.
As we have explained, Rule 606 (b) “creat[es] a nearly
categorical bar on juror testimony, with only three specific
exceptions.” Harris v. State, 314 Ga. 51, 55 (2) (875 SE2d 649) (2022)
(Rule 606 (b)’s exceptions permit jurors to testify about whether “(A)
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the
jury’s attention; (B) an outside influence was improperly brought to
bear on any juror; or (C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict
on the verdict form” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Here, while
“Rule 606 (b) permitted the jurors to testify on the question of
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought
to their attention,” the Rule “prohibited them from testifying as to
22
how such information affected their deliberations or the verdict,” the
precise purpose for which Tedder sought to admit the affidavits. Id.
(emphasis supplied). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by
excluding the affidavits under Rule 606 (b).
4. Finally, Tedder asserts that his trial counsel rendered
constitutionally ineffective assistance in three respects. To succeed
on this claim, Tedder bears the burden of showing “that his counsel’s
performance both was deficient (objectively unreasonable under the
circumstances) and caused him prejudice (shown by establishing a
reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been
different absent counsel’s deficient performance).” Harmon v. State
319 Ga. 259, 265 (3) (903 SE2d 28) (2024). See also Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (III) (B) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)
(1984). Critically, a defendant must show both “deficient
performance and prejudice through competent evidence, for a silent
or ambiguous record is not sufficient to overcome the strong
presumption of reasonable performance.” Thorpe v. State, 304 Ga.
266, 268 (2) (a) (818 SE2d 547) (2018) (citation and punctuation
23
omitted).
(a) Tedder’s first claim of ineffective assistance concerns trial
counsel’s failure to present the testimony at trial of Devon Lewis,
the target of the attempted shooting that preceded the retaliatory
drive-by shooting during which Glass was killed. Tedder did not
present Lewis’s testimony at the hearing on his motion for new trial
and instead relied on a transcript of Lewis’s unsworn statement to
police. The trial court rejected this claim, concluding that Lewis’s
unsworn statement to police was insufficient to establish prejudice.
On appeal, Tedder primarily argues that the trial court erred by
refusing to consider Lewis’s unsworn statement to police in
resolving this claim because, he insists, unsworn statements are
“legally acceptable substitutes” for witness testimony. As our
precedent plainly demonstrates, Tedder is incorrect.
When a defendant asserts that trial counsel was deficient for
failing to present the testimony of a witness at trial, he “may not
rely on hearsay and speculation, including prior unsworn
statements, to prove the prejudice prong of his ineffectiveness
24
claim.” Neely v. State, 302 Ga. 121, 124 (2) (805 SE2d 18) (2017)
(citation and punctuation omitted). Rather, he must present “either
testimony from the uncalled witness or a legally recognized
substitute” for the witness’s testimony. Harris v. State, 304 Ga. 652,
655 (2) (a) (821 SE2d 346) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted).
And our precedent is clear that “unsworn statements to police are
not a legally acceptable substitute for witness testimony needed to
prove prejudice.” Id. at 656 (2) (b). See also Palmer v. State, 310 Ga.
668, 678-679 (4) (853 SE2d 650) (2021); Manriquez v. State, 285 Ga.
880, 881 (2) (684 SE2d 650) (2009) (noting that “an affidavit” is “a
legally recognized substitute” for an uncalled witness’s testimony
and that “copies of [witness’s] unsworn statements to police” are
insufficient to carry burden of proving prejudice). As Tedder relies
only on a transcript of Lewis’s unsworn statement to police, the trial
court correctly concluded that Tedder cannot carry his burden of
proving prejudice with respect to this claim. Accordingly, this
enumeration presents no basis for reversal.
(b) Tedder next asserts that trial counsel was deficient for
25
failing to introduce into evidence surveillance video footage from the
hospital to which Glass was taken after the shooting. According to
Tedder, this footage was crucial to his defense because it showed
that Eggleston, not Tedder, disposed of the guns and would have
raised reasonable doubt about Tedder’s participation in the crimes.
The footage was offered as an exhibit to Tedder’s amended motion
for new trial and is part of the appellate record. Nevertheless, our
review of this claim is frustrated by Tedder’s failure to direct this
Court to the pertinent portion of the video footage.
As this Court has emphasized time and again, we are “not
required to scour the record for support for an appellant’s
arguments.” Davis v. State, 306 Ga. 140, 144 (3) (a) (829 SE2d 321)
(2019). Rather, the burden is on Tedder, the party alleging error, to
show it by the record. See Lee v. State, 318 Ga. 412, 426 (5) (d) (ii)
(897 SE2d 856) (2024). Though at least a portion of the video footage
is part of the appellate record, Tedder cites only generally to the
footage, which has a running time of more than an hour, and fails to
direct the Court to the specific portion that purportedly supports
26
this claim. And despite reviewing the video footage in its entirety,
we are unable to identify the relevant portion of the footage, which,
from our review, does not appear to depict the events that Tedder
says it does. 12 In light of these circumstances, Tedder has not
established how introducing the surveillance video footage into
evidence at trial could have helped his defense and therefore has not
established that counsel’s performance was deficient in this regard.
See id.; Shaw v. State, 292 Ga. 871, 874 (3) (a) n.5 (742 SE2d 707)
(2013) (“An ambiguous or silent record is not sufficient to disprove
the strong and continuing presumption of competent
performance. Therefore, where the record is incomplete or unclear
about counsel’s actions, we will presume that he did what he should
have done.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
12 We note that some portion of the video footage appears to be missing
from the record before us. The video footage comprises two electronic files; the
footage shown on the first file concludes at approximately 7:00 p.m. on the day
of the crimes, and the footage on the second file resumes at approximately 8:00
p.m. As a general matter, the appellant bears the burden of ensuring that the
appellate record is complete. See Ware v. State, 279 Ga. 17, 18 (2) (608 SE2d
643) (2005) (“When a portion of the evidence bearing upon the issues raised by
the enumerations of error is not brought up in the appellate record so that this
court can make its determination from a consideration of it all, an affirmance
as to that issue must result.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
27
(c) In his final claim of ineffective assistance, Tedder contends
that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to sufficiently
cross-examine Eggleston regarding his initial untruthful statements
to police, why he altered his account of the crimes, and his
subsequent plea agreement with the State. More specifically, Tedder
complains that his trial counsel did not elicit testimony from
Eggleston that investigating officers pressured him to change his
account of the crimes.
At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel detailed his
strategic approach for Eggleston’s cross-examination. Trial counsel
pursued a two-pronged defense in an effort to rebut the State’s
theories that Tedder either was the direct perpetrator of the crimes
or was a party to the crimes. To that end, counsel sought to
demonstrate that Tedder both was unarmed and was merely present
during the crimes. As to his strategy for cross-examining Eggleston,
trial counsel explained that he did not want to question Eggleston
too extensively about his changing statements because he did not
know what the exact substance of Eggleston’s responses might be
28
and he was concerned about eliciting testimony unfavorable to
Tedder. Trial counsel instead decided “to focus on the fact that
[Eggleston] had a gun,” that “[h]e admitted to firing it, and that he
admitted to firing it outside the vehicle,” essentially seeking to paint
Eggleston as the person directly responsible for Glass’s death. And
on cross-examination, Eggleston testified that Tedder was not a
member of Yung Fame and did not know any of the Yung Fame
members prior to the crimes, that Eggleston made conflicting
statements about who disposed of the firearms after the shooting,
and that Eggleston initially lied to police before changing his story
and accepting a plea deal. Trial counsel also elicited testimony that
Eggleston was charged with the same crimes as Tedder but that,
pursuant to his plea agreement with the State, he was sentenced to
serve 20 years in prison while Tedder faced life in prison if convicted.
“Decisions about what particular questions to ask on crossexamination are quintessential trial strategy and will rarely
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. In particular, whether to
impeach prosecution witnesses and how to do so are tactical
29
decisions.” Davis, 306 Ga. at 146 (2) (e) (citation and punctuation
omitted). In light of the cross-examination trial counsel conducted
and counsel’s testimony at the motion for new trial hearing, Tedder
has not shown that trial counsel’s strategic approach to crossexamining Eggleston was patently unreasonable. See id.; Smith v.
State, 303 Ga. 643, 648 (III) (B) (814 SE2d 411) (2018).
Moreover, Tedder has failed to present evidence that Eggleston
changed his account of the crimes as a result of pressure from police.
In support of this claim, Tedder generally points to a transcript and
video-recording of Eggleston’s unsworn interview with police during
which Eggleston changed his account of the crimes, which Tedder
submitted in support of his motion for new trial. But Tedder does
not explain — and it is not apparent to us — how this evidence
demonstrates that Eggleston’s altered statement was coerced by the
police, and the mere fact that Eggleston changed his account of the
crimes while being questioned by police does not establish that he
did so as a result of police coercion. See Redding v. State, 307 Ga.
722, 727 (2) (a) (838 SE2d 282) (2020) (appellant failed to
30
demonstrate that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to
cross-examine witness about possible prison sentence the witness
faced in connection with criminal charges brought before the witness
testified because appellant failed to present evidence that the
witness “had any sort of plea deal with the State . . . in exchange for
his statement to police or his testimony at trial”). For these reasons,
this claim, like the others, fails.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
31