NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: October 15, 2024
S23Y0879. IN THE MATTER OF WILLIAM SLATER VINCENT.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on William Slater
Vincent’s (State Bar No. 727801) second amended petition for
voluntary discipline filed before the issuance of a formal complaint.
See Bar Rule 4-227 (b).1 In his second amended petition, Vincent2
admits that he violated Rules 1.15 (II) (a)3 and 1.15 (III) (b)4 of the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d).
The maximum penalty for a violation of either rule is disbarment.
1 Where relevant, Vincent incorporates by reference his initial and first
amended petitions for voluntary discipline.
2 Vincent has been a member of the Georgia Bar since 1982.
3 The rule provides in relevant part: “All funds held by a lawyer for a
client and all funds held by a lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be
deposited in and administered from a trust account.”
4 “Lawyer shall designate all trust accounts, whether general or specific,
as well as all deposit slips and checks drawn thereon, as an ‘Attorney Trust
Account,’ ‘Attorney Escrow Account’ ‘IOLTA Account’ or ‘Attorney Fiduciary
Account.’ The name of the attorney or law firm responsible for the account shall
also appear on all deposit slips and checks drawn thereon.”
1. Vincent’s Admissions.
Vincent admits that he violated Rule 1.15 (II) (a) “on three
discrete occasions when he failed to deposit advance payments of
recording fees and fees for publication of notices into his IOLTA
account or an attorney trust account.” Vincent avers that the
conduct at issue occurred when he received certain checks from
clients comprised of both (1) earned funds for legal services already
rendered and (2) funds advanced to him to pay recording and
publication-notice fees. Instead of separating the payments or
asking for separate checks, Vincent deposited the checks comprised
of both fund categories into his operating account. Vincent admits
that he should have taken the additional step of depositing the
advance payment for the publication and filing fees into his attorney
trust account and then issued the checks to the relevant entities
from that account.
Separately, Vincent admits that he violated Rule 1.15 (III) (b)
by “failing to ensure that his Business Checking Preferred account .
. . had a description which complied with” Rule 1.15 (III) (b) by
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identifying it as an “Attorney Trust Account” on statements, checks,
and deposit slips. Vincent admits that he failed to take notice that
the account identification violated Rule 1.15 (III) (b).
Looking to the American Bar Association’s Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”), see In the Matter of
McCalep, 318 Ga. 260, 262 (897 SE2d 846) (2024), Vincent notes that
the ethical duty he violated was his duty to the profession. In
addition, Vincent states that his conduct was attributable to
negligence, see ABA Standard 7.3 (explaining that reprimand is
generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently engaged in conduct
that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes
potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system), and notes
that ABA Standard 4.14 provides that admonition is generally
appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in dealing with client
property and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client.
In aggravation, Vincent admits that he received prior
discipline, see ABA Standard 9.22 (a) and In the Matter of Vincent,
295 Ga. 766, 768 (764 SE2d 133) (2014) (accepting Vincent’s petition
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for voluntary discipline admitting a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) and
imposing a 12-month suspension based on Vincent’s 2007 guilty plea
to one count of wire fraud and failing to timely report the conviction
to the State Bar), and that he has substantial experience in the
practice of law, having been admitted to the State Bar in 1982
(although he claims he has never engaged full-time in the practice
of law), see ABA Standard 9.22 (i). In mitigation, Vincent notes that
he lacked a dishonest or selfish motive in the conduct at issue, see
ABA Standard 9.32 (b); he provided a full and free disclosure to the
disciplinary board and displayed a cooperative attitude toward the
proceedings, see ABA Standard 9.32 (e); he has a good character and
reputation, see ABA Standard 9.32 (g); he showed remorse, see ABA
Standard 9.32 (l); and his prior offense was remote in time, see ABA
Standard 9.32 (m).
Vincent requests that the Court impose discipline in the range
of a public reprimand to a suspension of one to three months. See In
the Matter of Brown, 297 Ga. 865, 867 (778 SE2d 790) (2015)
(accepting petition for voluntary discipline with conditions for
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violations of trust account rules where all persons harmed by
attorney were made whole and there were mitigating
circumstances); In the Matter of Francis, 297 Ga. 282, 283 (773 SE2d
280) (2015) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline and imposing
a review panel reprimand where attorney permitted a comingling of
personal and fiduciary funds into his trust account, but the evidence
did not show that funds belonging to others were wrongfully
retained for a period of time). Vincent notes that the mitigating
factors present in his case far outweigh the aggravating factors.
Moreover, he asserts that the proposed discipline will assure the
Court and the State Bar that the public will be protected and will
assure the public that the profession has appropriately addressed
his conduct. Finally, he states that his conduct does not show that
he is unfit to practice as an attorney nor does it warrant a significant
suspension.
2. State Bar’s Response.
The State Bar supports Vincent’s second amended petition.
However, the State Bar alleges—without elaboration—that
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Vincent’s “violations are more than a ‘technical violation,’” so a
public reprimand—the minimum punishment for violating trust
account rules—is not appropriate. Rather, the State Bar contends
that a three-month suspension is more appropriate under these
circumstances considering that Vincent’s background presents
numerous aggravating factors, including prior discipline, see
Vincent, 295 Ga. at 766; substantial experience in the practice of
law; and evidence of a pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses.
See ABA Standard 9.22 (c) and (d). See also In the Matter of Howard,
292 Ga. 413, 414 (783 SE2d 89) (2013) (explaining that “a trust
account is a high honor and privilege afforded to a member of the
Bar, so even a technical violation should have public discipline so as
to protect clients, courts, and the public”). Moreover, the State Bar
argues that the cases Vincent cites in support of a public reprimand
do not involve lawyers such as Vincent with prior discipline due to a
felony conviction combined with a failure to report that conviction to
the State Bar. See In the Matter of Tyson, __ Ga. __, __ (904 SE2d
503, 505) (2024) (rejecting petition for voluntary discipline in part
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because the Court’s “precedents approving six-month suspensions
typically [did] not involve attorneys with [such] disciplinary
history”).
3. Analysis and Conclusion.
Having reviewed the record and this Court’s precedent, we
conclude—under the unique circumstances presented by this case—
that a public reprimand is appropriate. See In the Matter of Cook;
311 Ga. 206, 218-219 (857 SE2d 212) (2021) (concluding that under
totality of circumstances, public reprimand was appropriate where
attorney violated Rules 1.15 (I) (a), 1.15 (II) (a) and (b); “evidence did
not prove that [attorney] acted dishonestly, intentionally, or
maliciously”; mitigating factors outweighed aggravating factors); In
the Matter of Davis, 306 Ga. 381, 382-383 (830 SE2d 734) (2019)
(accepting petition for voluntary discipline and imposing a public
reprimand where attorney violated Rules 1.15 (I) (a) and 1.15 (II) (b)
based on improper use of trust account; trust account violations were
negligent but unintentional; attorney had no prior disciplinary
history but did have substantial experience in the practice of law);
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Brown, 297 Ga. at 867; Howard, 292 Ga. at 414 (accepting petition
for voluntary discipline and imposing a public reprimand for an
admitted violation of trust account rules because “a trust account is
a high honor and privilege afforded to a member of the Bar, so even
a technical violation should have public discipline so as to protect
clients, courts, and the public”; attorney alerted Bar to the error and
immediately changed his firm’s account practice to ensure no other
violations occurred). Cf. also In the Matter of Johnson, 302 Ga. 865,
866 (809 SE2d 797) (2018) (accepting petition for voluntary
discipline and imposing a six-month suspension where the
petitioner “suggest[ed] that the appropriate discipline in his case
should fall somewhere in a range between a suspension for one
month and a suspension for one year, although he request[ed] a
suspension of no more than three months[,]” and the State Bar
recommend[ed] a suspension of one year”); In the Matter of Duncan,
301 Ga. 898, 901 (804 SE2d 342) (2017) (accepting a petition for
voluntary discipline and imposing a six-month suspension with
conditions where the petitioner “request[ed] that the Court suspend
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him for a period between six to twelve months” and the State Bar
“urge[ed] that the Court accept [the] petition so long as it impose[d]
a suspension of six to twelve months”). Although Vincent was
disciplined in 2014 based on a conviction for wire fraud, that offense
is remote in time. Vincent, 295 Ga. at 766. See also In the Matter of
Levine, 303 Ga. 284, 287 (811 SE2d 349) (2018) (noting that nearly
10-year-old prior offense—the attorney’s “sole prior disciplinary
offense”—was not considered in aggravation because it was remote
in time). Consequently, we accept the second amended petition for
voluntary discipline and direct that William Slater Vincent receive
a public reprimand in open court in accordance with Bar Rules 4-102 (b) (3) and 4-220 (c) for his admitted violation of Rules 1.15 (II)
(a) and 1.15 (III) (b).
Petition for Voluntary Discipline Accepted. Public Reprimand.
All the Justices concur.
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