Cite as 2026 Ark. 30
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR-25-359
Opinion Delivered: February 12, 2026
CHRIS ALLEN OLIGER
APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE
JOHNSON COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT
V.
[NO. 36CR-21-455]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE JAMES DUNHAM,
APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED.
CODY HILAND, Associate Justice
Appellant Chris Allen Oliger appeals from the denial and dismissal of his petition for
postconviction relief filed pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1. In his
petition, Oliger alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate the contents
of a laptop and unidentified DNA found on a knife at the crime scene. Oliger also raised a
Brady claim on the basis that the prosecutor suppressed a laptop that allegedly contained an
exculpatory recording.1 Finally, Oliger claimed that the prosecutor knowingly presented
false testimony. Below, the circuit court entered a detailed order addressing each of Oliger’s
claims and denied and dismissed petition. On appeal, Oliger raises the same claims raised
below. His arguments are without merit. Thus, we affirm.
1
See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)
I. Background
In 2023, Oliger was convicted by a Johnson Couty jury of capital murder, aggravated
robbery, and theft of property. Oliger was sentenced to an aggregate term of life
imprisonment. We affirmed his direct appeal. See Oliger v. State, 2025 Ark. 8, 704 S.W.3d
305. Our opinion set out the evidence adduced at trial, which included, among other
things, that Oliger had sent multiple social-media messages to friends revealing his intention
to rob the victim, Deanna Teague; that he admitted to investigators and others that he had
stabbed Teague in her throat, which was the fatal wound; that he admitted stealing Teague’s
car; that DNA on Teague’s hands and fingernail clippings matched Oliger’s DNA within a
statistical probability; and that evidence following the murder established that Oliger
possessed and used Teague’s credit cards. Id. at 1–5, 704 S.W.3d at 306–08.
II. Standard of Review
We will not overturn the denial of postconviction relief absent a finding of clear
error. Barefield v. State, 2024 Ark. 141, at 3, 696 S.W.3d 822, 826. A finding is considered
clearly erroneous when, despite some supporting evidence, our review of the entire record
leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that an error has occurred. Id., 696 S.W.3d at
826.
III. Claims for relief
The direct-appeal record2 reveals that Oliger and Mark Mathis helped Teague move
into an apartment on the day she was murdered. Oliger’s claims for relief are based on his
2
This court may take judicial notice in postconviction proceedings of the record on direct appeal without need to supplement the record. Wright v. State, 2025 Ark. 54, at 3 n.3, 709 S.W.3d 805, 806 n.3.
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allegation that a laptop was present at the crime scene and recorded the “incident leading to
the victim’s demise.” According to Oliger, the recording shows that Teague and Mathis
argued over money that Mathis owed Teague, and during the course of the argument,
Mathis stabbed Teague three times. Oliger also claims that Teague fell on her own knife
while trying to defend herself, resulting in the fatal stab wound to her neck. Finally, Oliger
alleged that after Teague’s death, he stole Teague’s possessions, including a laptop that he
turned over to his sister, Tonya Wood.3
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Oliger alleges that he informed his trial counsel about the stolen laptop and the
exculpatory recording it contained that implicated Mathis as the murderer. Oliger contends
that counsel refused to investigate or attempt to take possession of the stolen laptop, which
Oliger contends was in his sister’s possession at the time. Oliger also alleges that counsel
was ineffective for failing to investigate an unidentified partial DNA profile found on the
handle of one of the knives recovered from the crime scene. Oliger asserts that the DNA
would have matched Mathis’s DNA.
We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims using the two-step analysis arising
out of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See
Barefield, 2024 Ark. 141, at 3, 696 S.W.3d at 826. Under Strickland, a petitioner is required
to show that their trial counsel’s performance was deficient and then due to such deficiencies
it prejudiced their defense. Id., 696 S.W.3d at 826–27.
3
In the direct-appeal record, Wood’s first name is spelled “Tonia,” and in Oliger’s Rule 37.1 petition, he spells her name “Tonya.”
3
Regarding the threshold issue of deficiency, we presume that a trial counsel’s
performance was sufficient. Id., 696 S.W.3d at 827. To overcome that strong presumption,
the petitioner must demonstrate specific acts and omissions that—when viewed from the
trial counsel’s perspective over the course of the trial—could not have been the result of
“reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 3–4, 696 S.W.3d at 827. Allegations without
factual substantiation are insufficient. Id. at 4, 696 S.W.3d at 827. Furthermore, merely
conclusory statements that one’s counsel was ineffective cannot be the basis for
postconviction relief. Id., 696 S.W.3d at 827.
As for the remaining issue of prejudice, a petitioner must affirmatively demonstrate
that the deficiency resulted in a prejudicial outcome. Barefield, 2024 Ark. 141, at 4, 696
S.W.3d at 827. They must show that there is a reasonable probability that the fact-finder’s
decision would have been different absent their trial counsel’s deficiencies. Id., 696 S.W.3d
at 827. As we have said before, “[t]his is a high bar.” Id., 696 S.W.3d at 827. If a Rule 37
petition fails at the threshold issue of deficiency, we need not address the remaining prong
that weighs its potential prejudicial effect. Id., 696 S.W.3d at 827.
Here, there is no evidence to support Oliger’s conclusory claims that a stolen laptop
proved Mathis was the murderer or that Teague stabbed herself during the attack. Those
claims are directly contradicted by the record on direct appeal.
The trial transcript shows that the jury heard multiple recorded statements Oliger
made to investigators. Across three separate interviews, Oliger never mentioned a laptop
belonging to Teague or any recording of the crime. If Oliger knew of a laptop containing
evidence of his innocence, it is unlikely he would have failed to disclose it. Instead, during
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the third interview, Oliger admitted that he stabbed Teague in her throat. See Oliger, 2025
Ark. 8, at 4, 7, 704 S.W.3d at 307, 309.
The record also establishes that Oliger admitted to a witness, Trista Norris, that he
had killed someone. He told Norris he covered the body with clothing and showed her
the victim’s credit cards. Norris’s testimony was corroborated by evidence that Teague’s
body was found under a pile of clothing. Norris further testified that she saw Teague’s first
name on the credit cards in Oliger’s possession.
Oliger’s sister, Wood, testified that Oliger admitted to her that he had stabbed
someone in the throat. She also witnessed Oliger rent a hotel room using Teague’s credit
card. Although Oliger claimed that Wood took possession of the laptop for safekeeping,
Wood’s only testimony regarding a laptop was that Oliger stole it from Teague on the night
she was murdered. Oliger presented no evidence that the laptop contained an exculpatory
recording. Accordingly, he failed to rebut the presumption that counsel was effective
because provided no factual support for his claim that counsel failed to investigate a laptop
containing potentially exculpatory evidence.
Second, Oliger argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a DNA
comparison between Mathis and an unidentified partial DNA profile found on a folding
knife recovered from Teague’s home. Investigator Matt Foster testified that two knives
were found at the scene. One was a fixed-blade knife discovered outside Teague’s bedroom
window. Foster testified that Oliger admitted he exited the apartment through that
window. The second knife was a folding knife found in a box containing miscellaneous
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household items inside the apartment. Foster testified that it was unknown which knife
inflict Teague’s wounds.
Oliger presented no evidence that the unidentified DNA profile would have
implicated Mathis. Trial testimony established that Teague was murdered sometime after
10:00 p.m., when she last spoke with her daughter. Foster testified that Mathis’s phone data
confirmed Mathis’s alibi and showed he was not near Teague’s home during the relevant
time period. The evidence further showed that the fatal wound was to Teague’s neck, and
Oliger admitted to investigators and to his sister that he stabbed Teague in the neck. The
fixed-blade knife was also directly connected to Oliger because it was recovered outside the
window through which he admitted exiting the apartment.
Counsel was not ineffective for declining to seek DNA testing to connect Mathis to
the folding knife. Neither knife was definitively established as the murder weapon. It was
reasonable for counsel to forego testing DNA on a knife that could not be shown to have
been used in the murder, particularly for the purpose of implicating a suspect whose alibi
had already been verified.
Even if Mathis’s DNA had been found on the folding knife, there is no reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have changed. The evidence showed that
Oliger was the last person seen with Teague; he admitted exiting the apartment through a
window near where the fixed-blade knife was found; he stole Teague’s car; he possessed
her credit cards after her death; he admitted to investigators, his sister, and Norris that he
killed Teague; and his DNA was found on Teague’s hands and nail clippings. The jury was
aware that Mathis had been present at Teague’s apartment earlier that day and that
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unidentified DNA was found on one of the knives. That evidence did not create reasonable
doubt as to Oliger’s guilt.
B. Brady Violation
Oliger also claims that Wood turned over the laptop containing exculpatory evidence
to investigators who suppressed the laptop and its contents in violation of Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). An allegation that evidence was
withheld in violation of Brady “may not constitute fundamental error that would render the
judgment subject to collateral attack so as to be cognizable in Rule 37.1 proceedings if the
issue was one that could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal.” Flemons v. State, 2016
Ark. 460, at 10–11, 505 S.W.3d 196, 205.
Here, Oliger clearly knew about the laptop and its contents. He could have raised
this issue at trial. Moreover, as discussed above, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate
that the stolen laptop contained potentially exculpatory evidence. Consequently, Oliger’s
Brady claim is not supported by evidence of the existence of a potentially exculpatory
recording and is otherwise not cognizable in a Rule 37.1 proceeding.
C. Presentation of False Testimony
Lastly, Oliger alleges that the prosecution suborned perjury when Mathis was called
to testify that he was “across town” at the time of Teague’s was murder. According to
Oliger, investigators were aware of the purported laptop recording showing that Mathis was
the murderer and that the unidentified DNA would have matched Mathis, but the
prosecution allowed Mathis to falsely testify to the contrary. Again, Oliger’s claim regarding
the existence of a stolen laptop recording has no evidentiary support. In any event, a claim
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of prosecutorial misconduct, including a claim of suborning perjury, is a direct challenge to
the conviction and is therefore not cognizable in postconviction proceedings under Rule
37.1. Dennis v. State, 2020 Ark. 28, at 14, 592 S.W.3d 646, 655. Thus, the circuit court
did not clearly err when it denied and dismissed Oliger’s petition.
Affirmed.
Chris Allen Oliger, pro se appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Walker K. Hawkins, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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