UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DEAFUEH MONBO,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 25-cv-01788 (DLF)
TIMOTHY FOGLE,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Deafueh Monbo, proceeding pro se, brings this suit against Timothy Fogle, alleging
various claims of copyright and trademark infringement. Before the Court is Fogle’s Motion to
Dismiss. See Dkt. 7. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Monbo co-owns the copyright to a logo created for 12 O’Clock Boyz, an “independent
urban dirt-bike film.” Compl. ¶ 6, Dkt. 1; see id. ¶¶ 6–14. The logo includes the following
elements: “the structure of [a] dirt-bike motorcycle, stylized wording, rider performing a stunt,
silhouette of a man (sideview), dirt-bike motorcycle with the front wheel up, and front wheel of
dirt-bike motorcycle appears over letter.” Id. ¶ 18. Since 2001, Monbo has also “continuously
used” the “12 O’Clock Boyz trademark . . . in connection with entertainment services, sports,
multiple corporate businesses, films, clothing, footwear, advertising, [and] website and social
media.” Id. ¶ 26. She “acquired trademark common law rights for her ‘12 O’Clock Boyz’
Trademark in 2001 when [she] began selling in interstate commerce.” Id. ¶ 30. She has registered
her trademark with the U.S. Trademark Office. See id. ¶¶ 32–33.
Fogle is a Florida resident who owns a U.S. registered trademark for a design mark that
“includes the words ‘Wheels Up Guns Down’ and an artistic rendition of a person riding a motor
bike.” Fogle Aff. ¶ 7, Dkt.7-2; see id. ¶ 4; Compl. ¶ 5. Until recently, he operated the website
“wheelsupgunsdown.com” and a Facebook page of a similar name. Fogle Aff. ¶¶ 8–9; see Compl.
¶ 23. Both the website and the Facebook page used the logo, Fogle Aff. ¶ 12, which he created
“to support the military and first responders” and because he is “passionate about peaceful
protesting,” id. ¶ 10.
Although Fogle “made several t-shirts with the Logo for personal use,” he “do[es] not
intend to sell or market these items.” Id. ¶ 11. While the website “advertised T-shirts and stickers
with the Logo for sale, . . . any potential customer who may have attempted to purchase a T-shirt
or sticker would not have been able to complete a sale as the website was not fully operational.”
Id. ¶ 14. The Facebook page, for its part, “never advertised sales of any product with the Logo.”
Id. ¶ 13. Accordingly, Fogle has “never sold any T Shirt, sticker, or any other good with the Logo
through the Website, Facebook Page[,] or otherwise.” Id. ¶ 16. He has also “never directed a
third-party agent to sell or advertise any goods with the Logo.” Id. ¶ 17.
On June 6, 2025, Monbo filed this action, alleging copyright and trademark infringement.
See Compl. ¶¶ 39–56. She seeks, among other relief, $300,000 in compensatory damages. Id. at
14. Fogle has moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Mot. to Dismiss
1, Dkt. 7.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(b)(2), a defendant may move to dismiss an action when the court lacks
personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). “On such a motion, the plaintiff bears the burden
of ‘establishing a factual basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction’ over each defendant.”
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Triple Up Ltd. v. Youku Tudou Inc., 235 F. Supp. 3d 15, 20 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Crane v. N.Y.
Zoological Soc’y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). To meet this burden, the plaintiff “cannot
rely on conclusory allegations,” id., but rather “must allege specific facts connecting the defendant
with the forum,” Shibeshi v. United States, 932 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Second
Amend. Found. v. U.S. Conf. of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). In deciding the
motion, the court “may receive and weigh affidavits and any other relevant matter to assist it in
determining the jurisdictional facts.” Triple Up, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 20 (citation modified).
“Ultimately, the Court must satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction to hear the suit.” Id. at 20–21
(citation modified).
III. ANALYSIS
Lawsuits require personal jurisdiction. See Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 600 U.S. 122,
128–29 (2023). Courts “may exercise one of two types of personal jurisdiction: (1) ‘general or
all-purpose jurisdiction’ or (2) ‘specific or case-linked jurisdiction.’” Lewis v. Full Sail, LLC, 266
F. Supp. 3d 320, 323 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). “Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds
of their jurisdiction over persons.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014); see also id.
(personal jurisdiction must also “compor[t] with the limits imposed by federal due process”).
For the reasons that follow, the Court lacks both general and specific jurisdiction over
Fogle.
A. General Jurisdiction
While “[a] court with general jurisdiction may hear any claim against [a] defendant[,]”
“only a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to general
jurisdiction in that State.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., San Francisco Cnty.,
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582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017) (citation modified). In particular, “[e]xercise of this so-called ‘general
jurisdiction’ requires that the defendant’s contacts within the forum be ‘continuous and systematic’
in order for the defendant to be forced to defend a suit arising out of any subject matter unrelated
to the defendant’s activities within the forum.” Conant v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 24 F. Supp. 3d
1, 12 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
415–16 (1984)).
The Court lacks general jurisdiction over Fogle. Monbo has not alleged any facts
suggesting that Fogle has “continuous and systematic” contacts within the forum. Id. Indeed,
Fogle neither resides nor maintains his principal place of business in the District of Columbia, and
he has visited the District only once, for a family vacation in November 2021. See Compl. ¶ 5;
Fogle Aff. ¶¶ 4–6. Monbo’s conclusory allegation that this Court has general jurisdiction over
Fogle, see Pl.’s Opp’n 2, Dkt. 8, is insufficient to meet her burden of “establishing a factual basis
for the [Court’s] exercise of personal jurisdiction,” Crane, 894 F.2d at 456; see Triple Up, 235 F.
Supp. 3d at 20 (citation modified).
B. Specific Jurisdiction
“In contrast to general, all-purpose jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is confined to
adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes
jurisdiction.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 564 U.S. at 919 (citation modified). “A
plaintiff seeking to establish specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant must establish that
specific jurisdiction comports with the forum’s long-arm statute, D.C. Code § 13–423(a), and does
not violate due process.” FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Mkts., Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1094–95 (D.C. Cir.
2008). As relevant here, § 13–423(a)(1) provides that a court “may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the
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person’s . . . transacting any business in the District of Columbia.” D.C. Code § 13–423(a)(1).
“[A] court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant satisfies due process if there are
‘minimum contacts’ between the defendant and the forum such that the defendant should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Urquhart-Bradley v. Mobley, 964 F.3d 36, 44
(D.C. Cir. 2020) (citation modified). “That is, there must exist a relationship among the defendant,
the forum, and the litigation such that the defendant’s suit-related conduct creates a substantial
connection with the forum.” Id. (citation modified); see Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 762 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (“[Section 13–423(a)(1)] has been held by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
to be coextensive (for cases that fit within its description) with the Constitution’s due process
limit.”).
Monbo argues that this Court has specific jurisdiction over Fogle because he “purposefully
availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in the District of Columbia” by advertising
and marketing on Amazon.com “infringing T-shirt[s]” and by shipping those T-shirts to addresses
in the District. Pl.’s Opp’n 2; see id. at 1–2. In support of this argument, Monbo points to
screenshots of an Amazon transaction in which she purchased one of the allegedly infringing Tshirts and had it shipped to a post office box in the District. See Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 2, Dkt. 8-2.
Monbo has not met her burden to demonstrate that this Court has specific jurisdiction over
Fogle. To start, Monbo does not allege any facts suggesting that Fogle is in any way connected
with the Amazon storefront from which she purchased the subject T-shirt. Indeed, the T-shirt does
not even feature Fogle’s allegedly infringing logo. Compare id. (depicting what appears to be a
dirt-bike rider riding on a single wheel in front of a city skyline with the words “WHEELS UP
GUNS UP” above the skyline and “MIAMI” along the foreground), with Compl. 5 (depicting
Fogle’s logo). Furthermore, Fogle has attested that he has “never sold any good or service to any
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person in the District,” Fogle Aff. ¶ 16; see Def.’s Reply 1–2, Dkt. 9, and Monbo has not offered
any evidence to suggest otherwise.1 On this record, the Court cannot conclude that it has specific
jurisdiction over Fogle.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Fogle’s Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 7, and
dismiss Monbo’s claims against Fogle without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(2). A separate order consistent with this decision accompanies this memorandum
opinion.
DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH
United States District Judge
March 30, 2026
1
Monbo does not appear to argue that Fogle’s activities through his website and Facebook page are sufficient to give rise to specific jurisdiction and, in any event, such an argument would fail. Monbo does not allege that Fogle “transact[ed] any business in the District of Columbia,” D.C. Code § 13–423(a)(1), using either platform, and Fogle expressly disclaims having ever done so, see Fogle Aff. ¶¶ 13–17.
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